中国上市银行公司治理结构与治理绩效关系研究
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摘要
中国银行业改革是中国经济体制改革的重要组成部分，商业银行的改革将对未来经济和金融发展产生全局性影响，对国家经济和金融安全具有决定性作用。近年来国际金融业处于剧烈的动荡与分化之中，各国金融机构都在进行重组融合，国际金融竞争出现了新的格局。国内外的这些因素都对中国金融业提出了严峻的挑战，特别是我国金融市场完全对外开放后，国内外银行之间的竞争加剧。这场竞争，实质上是现代银行制度的竞争，而现代银行制度的核心就是现代银行公司治理机制。因此，治理结构的优化是提高我国商业银行竞争力的必由之路。
商业银行作为一类特殊的公司，既有一般公司的普遍性，也有其特殊性。在当前对公司治理结构问题的研究成果中，国内外学术界更为关注的是企业，特别是上市公司的治理结构，而对商业银行治理的论述相对较少。有鉴于此，本文在对银行公司治理进行理论分析的基础上，对我国上市银行公司治理问题进行了研究。
本文在充分考虑银行业特殊性的基础上，通过建立一组包括单方程和联立方程在内的模型，实证分析了股权结构与经营绩效间的关系。研究结果显示，较大的第一大股东的持股比例、控制能力以及较高的股权集中度阻碍了银行绩效的提高，而境外战略投资者和实际控制人性质是银行绩效的促进剂。此外，研究还发现，董事会规模对绩效有一定的负面影响，而独立董事占董事会的比例以及银行两职分离情况对绩效有促进作用。
中国上市银行越来越多地通过引入战略投资者特别是境外战略投资者来完善公司治理机制，提高银行绩效。本文以我国上市银行为样本，采用面板数据（Panel Data）计量方法从上市银行治理指标、安全性、盈利性、成长性四个方面，对上市银行引进境外战略投资者前后的效果进行比较分析和定量研究。研究结果表明，引入境外战略投资者能有效完善中国上市银行的公司治理机制。上市银行绩效的改善说明引入境外战略投资者的银行在一定程度上复制了境外战略投资者较为成熟的公司治理结构,先进的经营理念和风险控制技术，基本达到了引进境外战略投资者的最初目的。
本文通过收集我国上市的国有大型股份制商业银行及其他已上市银行的数据，实证分析了银行信息披露与公司治理绩效之间的关系。实证研究表明，一般公司治理的研究结论不适用于银行业。中国上市银行内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的影响较小，仅发现两职分离的领导权结构以及分散的股权结构能够提高会计信息披露质量，没有发现董事会、债权人以及经理人激励合约等治理机制对会计信息披露质量的影响。在产品市场的强烈竞争对公司治理控制机制形成约束之后的统计结果显示，对于内部治理结构不完善的中国上市银行，产品市场的强烈竞争会进一步降低内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的提高。
本文还采用了上市股份制商业银行数据，实证分析了董事会独立性与银行经营绩效之间的关系。研究结果发现，董事会独立性对银行绩效的促进作用并不明显。银行绩效的提升除了改善治理结构、完善银行内部控制机制等外，增加网点数量，扩大市场份额也有重要作用。最后，论文提出了引进战略投资者、完善银行内部控制机制等政策性建议。
The reform in China’ banking sector is an important part of China’s economic reform,the reform of commercial bank will give an overall impact on national economic andfinancial development in the future, and play a decisive role in China’s economy andfinance. In addition, in recent years with the international financial upheavals anddifferentiation among the world’s financial institutions, national financial institutions allthe world carried out re-integration, new patterns appears in the international financialcompetition. All these factors at home and abroad of China’s financial pose a severechallenge. After the full opening of China's financial markets, increased competitionbetween domestic and foreign banks. In essence, this competition is competition ofmodern banking system. the core of the modern banking system is modern bankingcorporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the governance structure's optimization isthe only way improving our country commercial bank competition.
The Commercial banks take a kind of special company, both universality havinggeneral company and have whose particularity. In current to corporate governancestructure question research results, what the domestic and foreign academic circle morepay attention is the enterprise, specially to be listed corporate governance structure, butthe discussion of governance of commercial banks is relatively few. Based on this, thisarticle, in governs to the bank company carries on the theoretical analysis in thefoundation, this paper analyzes the corporate governance of the listed banks in China.
With full consideration to the banking’s peculiarity, the establishment of a group ofmodels consisting of a single equation and simultaneous equations, this papar empiricallyanalyses the relationship between ownership structure and bank performance. Theevidence suggests that larger proportion of the largest stock-hold, balances capacity of thelargest stock-hold and higher ownership concentration hinder the bank to improveperformance.But foreign strategic investors and the nature of the actual controller areaccelerant of bank performance. In addition, the study also found that the board sizes havenegative impact on performance.But the proportion of independent directors and bankelderships have certainly helpful for performance.
The introduction of strategic investors, especially foreign strategic investors, have been more and more popular among the Chinese listing banks, for the purpose ofcorporate governance&bank performance improvement. This paper, based on a samplelisted Chinese banks, using the panel data empirical model, analyses the influence offoreign strategic investors introduction to the listed Chinese banks, from4perspectives ofbank governance index, bank security, bank profitability, and bank growth. The findingsare that after the introduction of foreign strategic investors, the basic characteristics ofbanks show significant difference, with the bank governance index, bank security, andbank profitability mostly in line with theoretical expectations, except for thecharacteristics of bank growth, which can be explained as the result of a gradual reformprocess for the listed Chinese banks’ introduction of the foreign strategic investors. It isimplied that the introduction of foreign strategic investors could improve Chinese listedbanks' governance mechanism with recent opening of our financial sector. Thisimprovement demonstrates that those banks partnered with foreign strategic investorshave in fact replicated the maturity structure of foreign corporate governance, advancedmanagement concepts and their risk control technology, achieving the initial target of theforeign strategic investors introduction. It is noted that this research is focusing solely onstrategic investors, not strategic speculators, and the authors have conducted strictselection on sampling the foreign strategic investors, to get rid of disturbance from thosesmall-scale foreign speculators, who are different from strategic investors, always givingno thoughts to long term value of the investors, and therefore would bring no benefits onimproving the management system and technology of the Chinese listing banks.
In this paper, through collecting data about listed state-owned large-scale joint-stockcommercial banks and other listed bank in China, and taking the empirical analysismethod to analyze the relationship between the bank information disclosure and corporategovernance performance.The evidence suggests that China's listed banks only theleadership structure and ownership structure has significant relation with the disclosure.In the strong competition product market on corporate governance control mechanismformed after the binding statistics show that the internal governance structure of imperfectChinese companies, the strong product market competition will further reduce internalcontrol mechanisms on the disclosure of accounting information quality improvement.
The paper use the data of listed joint-stock commercial banks, empirical analysis therelationship between Board Independence and bank performance. The results showed that the performance of the Board to promote the independence of the role of banks is notobvious. In addition to improving bank performance improvement management structure,the increase in the number of outlets, increase market share also has an important role.Finally, the paper proposes some policy suggestions about bring in strategic investors andimproving the internal control mechanism and so on.
商业银行作为一类特殊的公司，既有一般公司的普遍性，也有其特殊性。在当前对公司治理结构问题的研究成果中，国内外学术界更为关注的是企业，特别是上市公司的治理结构，而对商业银行治理的论述相对较少。有鉴于此，本文在对银行公司治理进行理论分析的基础上，对我国上市银行公司治理问题进行了研究。
本文在充分考虑银行业特殊性的基础上，通过建立一组包括单方程和联立方程在内的模型，实证分析了股权结构与经营绩效间的关系。研究结果显示，较大的第一大股东的持股比例、控制能力以及较高的股权集中度阻碍了银行绩效的提高，而境外战略投资者和实际控制人性质是银行绩效的促进剂。此外，研究还发现，董事会规模对绩效有一定的负面影响，而独立董事占董事会的比例以及银行两职分离情况对绩效有促进作用。
中国上市银行越来越多地通过引入战略投资者特别是境外战略投资者来完善公司治理机制，提高银行绩效。本文以我国上市银行为样本，采用面板数据（Panel Data）计量方法从上市银行治理指标、安全性、盈利性、成长性四个方面，对上市银行引进境外战略投资者前后的效果进行比较分析和定量研究。研究结果表明，引入境外战略投资者能有效完善中国上市银行的公司治理机制。上市银行绩效的改善说明引入境外战略投资者的银行在一定程度上复制了境外战略投资者较为成熟的公司治理结构,先进的经营理念和风险控制技术，基本达到了引进境外战略投资者的最初目的。
本文通过收集我国上市的国有大型股份制商业银行及其他已上市银行的数据，实证分析了银行信息披露与公司治理绩效之间的关系。实证研究表明，一般公司治理的研究结论不适用于银行业。中国上市银行内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的影响较小，仅发现两职分离的领导权结构以及分散的股权结构能够提高会计信息披露质量，没有发现董事会、债权人以及经理人激励合约等治理机制对会计信息披露质量的影响。在产品市场的强烈竞争对公司治理控制机制形成约束之后的统计结果显示，对于内部治理结构不完善的中国上市银行，产品市场的强烈竞争会进一步降低内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的提高。
本文还采用了上市股份制商业银行数据，实证分析了董事会独立性与银行经营绩效之间的关系。研究结果发现，董事会独立性对银行绩效的促进作用并不明显。银行绩效的提升除了改善治理结构、完善银行内部控制机制等外，增加网点数量，扩大市场份额也有重要作用。最后，论文提出了引进战略投资者、完善银行内部控制机制等政策性建议。
The reform in China’ banking sector is an important part of China’s economic reform,the reform of commercial bank will give an overall impact on national economic andfinancial development in the future, and play a decisive role in China’s economy andfinance. In addition, in recent years with the international financial upheavals anddifferentiation among the world’s financial institutions, national financial institutions allthe world carried out re-integration, new patterns appears in the international financialcompetition. All these factors at home and abroad of China’s financial pose a severechallenge. After the full opening of China's financial markets, increased competitionbetween domestic and foreign banks. In essence, this competition is competition ofmodern banking system. the core of the modern banking system is modern bankingcorporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the governance structure's optimization isthe only way improving our country commercial bank competition.
The Commercial banks take a kind of special company, both universality havinggeneral company and have whose particularity. In current to corporate governancestructure question research results, what the domestic and foreign academic circle morepay attention is the enterprise, specially to be listed corporate governance structure, butthe discussion of governance of commercial banks is relatively few. Based on this, thisarticle, in governs to the bank company carries on the theoretical analysis in thefoundation, this paper analyzes the corporate governance of the listed banks in China.
With full consideration to the banking’s peculiarity, the establishment of a group ofmodels consisting of a single equation and simultaneous equations, this papar empiricallyanalyses the relationship between ownership structure and bank performance. Theevidence suggests that larger proportion of the largest stock-hold, balances capacity of thelargest stock-hold and higher ownership concentration hinder the bank to improveperformance.But foreign strategic investors and the nature of the actual controller areaccelerant of bank performance. In addition, the study also found that the board sizes havenegative impact on performance.But the proportion of independent directors and bankelderships have certainly helpful for performance.
The introduction of strategic investors, especially foreign strategic investors, have been more and more popular among the Chinese listing banks, for the purpose ofcorporate governance&bank performance improvement. This paper, based on a samplelisted Chinese banks, using the panel data empirical model, analyses the influence offoreign strategic investors introduction to the listed Chinese banks, from4perspectives ofbank governance index, bank security, bank profitability, and bank growth. The findingsare that after the introduction of foreign strategic investors, the basic characteristics ofbanks show significant difference, with the bank governance index, bank security, andbank profitability mostly in line with theoretical expectations, except for thecharacteristics of bank growth, which can be explained as the result of a gradual reformprocess for the listed Chinese banks’ introduction of the foreign strategic investors. It isimplied that the introduction of foreign strategic investors could improve Chinese listedbanks' governance mechanism with recent opening of our financial sector. Thisimprovement demonstrates that those banks partnered with foreign strategic investorshave in fact replicated the maturity structure of foreign corporate governance, advancedmanagement concepts and their risk control technology, achieving the initial target of theforeign strategic investors introduction. It is noted that this research is focusing solely onstrategic investors, not strategic speculators, and the authors have conducted strictselection on sampling the foreign strategic investors, to get rid of disturbance from thosesmall-scale foreign speculators, who are different from strategic investors, always givingno thoughts to long term value of the investors, and therefore would bring no benefits onimproving the management system and technology of the Chinese listing banks.
In this paper, through collecting data about listed state-owned large-scale joint-stockcommercial banks and other listed bank in China, and taking the empirical analysismethod to analyze the relationship between the bank information disclosure and corporategovernance performance.The evidence suggests that China's listed banks only theleadership structure and ownership structure has significant relation with the disclosure.In the strong competition product market on corporate governance control mechanismformed after the binding statistics show that the internal governance structure of imperfectChinese companies, the strong product market competition will further reduce internalcontrol mechanisms on the disclosure of accounting information quality improvement.
The paper use the data of listed joint-stock commercial banks, empirical analysis therelationship between Board Independence and bank performance. The results showed that the performance of the Board to promote the independence of the role of banks is notobvious. In addition to improving bank performance improvement management structure,the increase in the number of outlets, increase market share also has an important role.Finally, the paper proposes some policy suggestions about bring in strategic investors andimproving the internal control mechanism and so on.
引文
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