创业投资引导基金运作机制研究
|
摘要
风险投资通过为创业企业提供资本支持和管理服务,成为支持企业技术创新的强大引擎,有助于推动一国的科技创新和经济发展。我国自引入风险投资以来,已经经过了20余年的发展,但仍然处于初级阶段,并且发展缓慢。与美国、以色列等风险投资发达国家相比无论在风险投资机构数量、投资规模和被投资中小企业数量方面还存在很大差距。由于风险投资的高风险性,单纯依靠市场配置风险投资往往面临市场失灵问题。我国当前风险投资呈现出“红苹果”效应,即风险投资主要集中在投资成长期或成熟期创业企业。从而导致处于种子期和初创期的创业企业通常得不到风险投资的支持,直接阻碍了科技成果转化。为解决上述问题,在风险投资发达的国家和地区,都通过设立政策性风险投资引导基金来引导民间资金设立各类商业性风险投资基金,从而促进风险投资形成,并引导私人部门投资者投向种子期或初创期企业。因此,进行有关引导基金运作机制的研究,具有非常重要的理论意义和现实意义。
基于共同代理关系的视角,本文就引导基金运作机制开展了研究,主要包括以下几个方面的工作:
1.基于共同代理理论,分析了引导基金参与下,引导基金和私人部门投资者与风险投资家构成了共同代理关系。本文指出,因共同代理关系的存在,委托人与代理人之间,以及委托人之间因效用最大化目标的不一致,产生了三类代理成本。
2.引导基金参与下,风险投资家同时承担了两类任务,第一类任务是投资于处于成长期或成熟期创业企业,第二类任务是投资于处于种子期或初创期的创业企业。第二类任务具有较差的可观测度。基于多任务委托代理模型,本文就引导基金参与下如何设计针对风险投资家的激励机制进行了研究。
3.由于引导基金的参与,在引导基金、私人部门投资者和风险投资家之间呈现出了共同代理关系的特点。传统的治理机制一定程度上可以解决委托人与代理人间因利益冲突而导致的代理成本,但无法委托人之间因利益冲突而导致的代理成本。因此应设计并发挥冲突管理机制,以解决共同代理关系下的委托人之间利益冲突而产生的代理成本。本文以模型分析了冲突管理机制在降低代理成本方面的作用。
Venture capital (VC) is a new kind investment vehicle, and it provides capital and non-capital services to venture company, and becomes an important power to promote innovation of technology and accelerate economic development. VC has been introduced into our country for almost 20 years, however the development of VC is still in the preliminary stage. Compared with USA and Israel, the number of VC, investment volume and the number of portfolio are smaller. Because of the high risk of VC, market failure exists. There is a phenomenon called“red apple effect”in our country, and that means VC mostly invest into entrepreneurs which are in later stage. As result, the seed-stage and start-up entrepreneurs cannot achieve enough capital, and the shortage constrains the transition from research to actual production. Many countries establish the leading fund to resolve the problem, to attract the investment from private sector. The leading fund and venture capital investors will incorporate a hybrid fund, which mainly invest into seed-stage and start-up entrepreneurs.
Based on the sight of Common Agency, this paper researches the operational mechanism of venture capital leading fund, and achieves conclusions as follows:
1. This paper points out that there is a kind of Common Agency relationship among leading fund, private sector investors and venture capitalist. There are three agent costs.
2. The venture capitalist gets two tasks, one is to invest the enterpreises which are in later-stage, and the other is to invest the ones which are in early-stage. The second one is hard to observe. Based on the multi-task principle-agent model, this dissertation does researches about how to inspire the venture capitalist.
3. Because of the common agency, so the traditional governance mechanism could not solve the conflict between leading fund and private sector investors. This paper points out that the mechanism of conflict management is important, and could induce the agency costs among the leading fund, private sector investors and venture capitalist.
基于共同代理关系的视角,本文就引导基金运作机制开展了研究,主要包括以下几个方面的工作:
1.基于共同代理理论,分析了引导基金参与下,引导基金和私人部门投资者与风险投资家构成了共同代理关系。本文指出,因共同代理关系的存在,委托人与代理人之间,以及委托人之间因效用最大化目标的不一致,产生了三类代理成本。
2.引导基金参与下,风险投资家同时承担了两类任务,第一类任务是投资于处于成长期或成熟期创业企业,第二类任务是投资于处于种子期或初创期的创业企业。第二类任务具有较差的可观测度。基于多任务委托代理模型,本文就引导基金参与下如何设计针对风险投资家的激励机制进行了研究。
3.由于引导基金的参与,在引导基金、私人部门投资者和风险投资家之间呈现出了共同代理关系的特点。传统的治理机制一定程度上可以解决委托人与代理人间因利益冲突而导致的代理成本,但无法委托人之间因利益冲突而导致的代理成本。因此应设计并发挥冲突管理机制,以解决共同代理关系下的委托人之间利益冲突而产生的代理成本。本文以模型分析了冲突管理机制在降低代理成本方面的作用。
Venture capital (VC) is a new kind investment vehicle, and it provides capital and non-capital services to venture company, and becomes an important power to promote innovation of technology and accelerate economic development. VC has been introduced into our country for almost 20 years, however the development of VC is still in the preliminary stage. Compared with USA and Israel, the number of VC, investment volume and the number of portfolio are smaller. Because of the high risk of VC, market failure exists. There is a phenomenon called“red apple effect”in our country, and that means VC mostly invest into entrepreneurs which are in later stage. As result, the seed-stage and start-up entrepreneurs cannot achieve enough capital, and the shortage constrains the transition from research to actual production. Many countries establish the leading fund to resolve the problem, to attract the investment from private sector. The leading fund and venture capital investors will incorporate a hybrid fund, which mainly invest into seed-stage and start-up entrepreneurs.
Based on the sight of Common Agency, this paper researches the operational mechanism of venture capital leading fund, and achieves conclusions as follows:
1. This paper points out that there is a kind of Common Agency relationship among leading fund, private sector investors and venture capitalist. There are three agent costs.
2. The venture capitalist gets two tasks, one is to invest the enterpreises which are in later-stage, and the other is to invest the ones which are in early-stage. The second one is hard to observe. Based on the multi-task principle-agent model, this dissertation does researches about how to inspire the venture capitalist.
3. Because of the common agency, so the traditional governance mechanism could not solve the conflict between leading fund and private sector investors. This paper points out that the mechanism of conflict management is important, and could induce the agency costs among the leading fund, private sector investors and venture capitalist.
引文
[1] Aggarwal, R. K.,Nanda, D.,Access, Common Agency and Board Size,CASIFO Working Paper Series, 2004
[2] Ayayi, A., Public policy and venture capital: The Canadian labor-sponsored venture capital funds. Journal of Small Business Management, 2004,42(3):335-345
[3] B.Douglas Bernheim,Michael D.Whinston,Common Agency,Econometrica,1986,4(54):923-942
[4] Barbara Cornelius , Who's who in venture capital research? ,Technovation,2006,26(2):782-807
[5] Baygan, G. 2003, Baygan,G.venture capital policies in Israel.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers,2003(3),12
[6] Benoit Leleux and Bernard Surlemon,Public versus private venture capital: seeding or crowding out? A pan-European analysis,Journal of Business Venturing,2003,18(1):81-104
[7] Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne,How to Restore Higher-Powered Incentives in Multitask Agencies,The Journal of Low,Economy and Organization,1999(15):418-433
[8] Bernard, S.D.,Incentives in Common Agency,CIRANO:Scientific Series, 2001,189
[9] Bernheim B.D.,Whinston M. D. ,Common Agency,Econometrica,1986,54(4):923-942
[10] Bernheim B.D.,Whinston M. D.,Common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion,The Rand Journal of Economics,1985,16(2):269-281
[11] Biais,B. Martimort,D.Roehet J.,Competing Mechanism in a Common Value Environment,Econometrica,2000,68:799-837
[12] Biglaiser,G. and Mezzetti,Principals Competing for an Agent in the presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,Journal of Economic Theory,1993,61:302-330
[13] Christian Keuschnigg,Soren Bo Nielsen,Tax policy,venture capital and entrepreneurship,Journal of Public Economics,2003,87(1):175-203
[14] Clarysse B.,Wright M.,Mustar P,Behavioural additionality of R&D subsidies:A learning perspective,Research Policy,2009,38 (10) : 1517-1533
[15] Corts, K. S.,The Strategic Effect of Vertical Market Structure:Common Agency and Divisionalization in the US Motion Picture Industry,Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,2001,(10):509-528
[16] Cumming, D. J., MacIntosh, J. G., Crowding out private equity: Canadian evidence, Journal of Business Venturing, 2006,21(5):569-609
[17] Da Rin, M., Nicodano, G., Sembenelli, A.,Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets , Journal of Public Economics,2006,90(8-9):1699-1723
[18] Diewert,W.E.,Functional Forms for Profit and Transformation Function,Journal of Economic Theory,1973,6:284-316
[19] Dixit,A.,Grossman G.,Helpman E.,Common Agency and Coordination:General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,The Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(4):752-769
[20] Dossani, R., Kenney, M., Creating an environment for venture capital in India,World Development, 2002,30(2):227-253
[21] Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan,Pre-seed government venture capital funds,Journal of International Entrepreneurship,2009,7:26-56
[22] Douglas Cumming,Government Policy towards entrepreneurial finance: innovation investment funds,Journal of Business Venturing,2007,22:193-235
[23] Douglas J. Cumming,Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, 2003
[24] Douglas J.Cumming,Grant Fleming,Armin Schwienbacher,Legality and venture capital exits,Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(2):214-245
[25] Epstein,L.,M. peters,A Revelation principle for Competing Mechanisms,Journal of Economic Theory,1999,88:119-160
[26] Esther Gal-Or,A Common Agency with Incomplete Information,The RAND Journal of Economics,1991,22:274-286
[27] European Commission, Best practices of public support for early-stage equity finance: Final report of the expert group,DG Enterprise and Industry,European Commission,Brussels,2005
[28] European Commission, State aid and risk capital. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001(C235):3-11
[29] European Commission , Best practices of public support for early-stage equity finance, Final report of the expert group,2005,September
[30] Gal-or E.,A Common Agency with Incomplete Information,The Rand Journal of Economics,1991,22:274-286
[31] Gil Avnimelech,Morris Teubal,Create venture capital industriesthat co-evolve with high tech:Insights from an extended industry life cycle perspective of the Israeli experience,Research Policy,2006,35(10),1477-1498
[32] Gilson, R. J., Engineering a venture capital market: Lessons from the American experience. Stanford Law Review,2003,55(4):1067-1103
[33] Holmstrom B.,Moral Hazard in Teams,The Bell Journal of Economies,1982,13(2):324-340
[34] Holmstrom, Bengt , Paul Milgrom , Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design,Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1991(7):24-52
[35] Holmstrom,Milgrom,Multitask principal-Agent Analysis:Incentive Contracts,Assets Ownership,and Job Design,Journal of Law,Economies,and organization,1991,7:24-52
[36] Hyytinen A.,Pajarinen M.,2001
[37] Jensen,M.,W.H. Meckling,Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4),305-360
[38] Kahn C. , Mookherjee D. , Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts ,The RAND Journal of Economies,1998,29(3):443-465
[39] Kanniainen,Keuschingg,2001
[40] Khalil F.,Martimort D.,Parigi B.,Monitoring a Common Agency,working paper,University of Washington
[41] Lance E. Davis,Douglass. C. North,Institutional Change and American Economic Growth,New York: Cambridge University Press,1971,179
[42] Laussel D.,Breton M.,Conflict and Cooperation:The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Environment,Journal of Economic Theory,2001,100,489-510
[43] Leleux, B., Surlemont, B.,Public versus private venture capital: seeding or crowding out? A pan-European analysis,Journal of Business Venturing, 2003,18(1):81-104
[44] Lerner, J. ,The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program,Journal of Business, 1999,72(3):285-318
[45] Lerner, J. ,When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: The design of effective 'public venture capital' programs,Economic Journal, 2002. 112(477):F73-F84
[46] Lerner, J. , The syndication of venture capital investments,Financial Management,1994,23:16-27
[47] Lerner, J..The syndication of venture capital investments,Financial Management,1994,23:16-27
[48] Lerner, Josh,The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-run Effects of the SBIR Program, Journal of Business,1999,72:285-318
[49] Leslie A.Jeng, Philippe C.Wells,The determinants of venture capital funding: evidence across countries,Journal of Corporate Finance,2000(6):241-289
[50] Maeho-Stadler,Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment,The Journal of Industrial Economics,1998,46(4),489-510
[51] Marco Da Rin,Giovanna Nicodano,Alessandro Sembenelli,Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets,Journal of Public Economics,working paper,2006
[52] Martimort D.,Exclusive dealing,common agency,and multiprincipals incentive theory,The RAND Journal of Economics,1996,27(1):1-31
[53] Martimort D.,Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators,Journal of Economic Theory,1999,88,261-293
[54] Martimort D.,Stole,L.,Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types,CESifo Working Paper No.572
[55] Martimort D.,Stole,L.,The Revelation and Delegation Principals in Common Agency Games,Econometrica,2001,70:1659-1674
[56] Martimort D.,The organization Of Government:The Multiprineipal Nature of Govemment,Europea:1Eeonomic Review,1996,40:673-685
[57] Maula, M , Murray, G. , Finnish Industry Investment ltd.: an International Evaluation,Helsinki:Ministry of Trade & Industry,2003,175
[58] Mike Wright,Andy Lockett,Bart Clarysse,Martin Binks,University spin-out companies and venture capital,Research Policy,2006,35(4):481-501
[59] Mikko Jaaskelainen , Markku Maula , Gordon Murray , Profit distribution and compensation structures in publicly and privately funded hybrid venture capital funds,Research Policy,2007,36(7):913-929
[60] Murray, G. C., Marriott, R., Why has the investment performance of technology specialist, European venture capital funds been so poor? Research Policy, 1998,27(9):947-976
[61] Myerson R.,Optimal Auction Design,Mathematics of operationsResearch,1981,6:58-73
[62] P.斯曼通,技术变革的经济分析,北京:机械工业出版社,1989,4-5
[63] Paul A. Gompers, Josh Lerner,The venture capital cycle,the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,1999,139
[64] Williamson, Oliver E., The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting,New York:Free Press,1985,378
[65]陈和,创业投资的政策性引导基金模式研究,科学学与科学技术管理,2006,(5):79-83
[66]陈红辉,赵正堂,天使投资:我国的现状、问题与对策,金融观察,2004(8):34-35,20
[67]陈建先,高新技术发展的政府“种子基金”构架——重庆高新技术产业发展的理论研究,西南民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版),20002,23(9):12-16
[68]成思危,积极稳妥地推进我国的风险投资事业,管理世界,1999,1:2-7
[69]程静,外国政府对风险投资的扶持政策及启示,科技管理研究,2000(3):37-40
[70]道格拉斯.C.诺斯,经济史中的结构与变迁,上海:上海人民出版社,1997,20
[71]杜朝运,郑瑜,海峡西岸经济区发展创业投资引导基金研究——兼析台湾创业投资引导基金研究,福建金融,2009,(5):27-31
[72]范柏乃,沈荣芳,陈德棉,国外促进风险投资业发展的法规政策综述,外国经济与管理,2000,9:22-26
[73]房汉廷,王伟光,郭戎,创业投资母子基金模板比较及启示,高科技与产业化,2004(11):23-27
[74]房汉廷,中国创业风险投资发展中的七大问题,中国科技论坛,2007,4:3-10
[75]付玉秀,张洪石,公共创业投资项目发展的研究与实践,中国科技论坛,2004,(6):120-124,78
[76]高亚平,王蓓蓓,周密,浅析创业投资引导基金的支持方式,江苏科技信息,2008,(7):8-11
[77]龚建立,徐炳炳,王飞绒,政府性创业投资引导基金的运作模式研究,经济纵横,2007,(8):28-30
[78]龚雪,以资引资创投引导基金的倍增效应,中国高新区,2009,(2):25-26
[79]辜胜阻,李正友,刘入领,我国政府在科技风险投资中的角色,投资研究,1999(12):20-23
[80]谷建全,关于加快我国风险投资发展的理论思考,经济经纬,2000,3:78-81
[81]顾骅珊,政府设立创业投资引导基金的运作管理模式探析,经济研究导刊,2009,41(3):67-68
[82]顾云松,钟甫宁,刘晓玲,南京市高校利用创业投资转化科技成果问题的实证研究,科学学与科学技术管理,2006,6:32-36
[83]郭丽虹和赵新双,优化政府创业投资引导基金效益的策略研究,中国科技论坛,2007,(11):99-101,115
[84]何建洪,马凌,政府引导基金下创业投资经理人与风险企业的合谋分析,科技管理研究,2008,(9):185-187
[85]贺亚力,从德国和以色列的实践看政府如何引导创业风险投资市场发展,中国科技论坛,2006,7(4):134-136
[86]桁林,政府与市场关系理论及其发展,求实学刊,2003,2:44-49
[87]黄小花,风险投资发展的国际经验及我国的对策,财经理论与实践,1999(5):12-16
[88]蒋芬,宁建荣,创业投资引导基金的发展概况及启示,今日科技,2008,(7):45-46
[89]焦军利,关于国内外创业风险投资引导基金的比较分析报告,科技情报开发与经济,2007,17(34):129-131
[90]科斯,诺恩,威廉姆斯,制度、契约与组织,北京:经济科学出版社,2003,56
[91]李开孟,我国政府性创业投资引导基金的运作模式及操作要点,中国投资,2009,(4):100-103
[92]李攀艺,蒲勇健,基于共同代理理论的研究型高效R&D活动激励研究,科技进步与对策,2006(11):176-179
[93]李清芬,基金中基金:资产管理的独特机制,证券市场导报,2003,(12):15-19
[94]李松涛,余筱箭,浅议技术创新模式与金融体系模式的相互关系,软科学,2002,12(3):5-7
[95]李万寿,关于建立产业投资引导基金的政策建议,宏观经济研究,2005,(2):47-49
[96]李夏,政府引导基金的探索与实践,创新,2009,(3):21-24
[97]李宇龙,严旭芳,日本产业投资基金分析,外国经济与管理,1998(12):27:30
[98]廖肇辉,集团客户授信:共同代理问题及其对策研究初探,金融研究,2009(5):160-165
[99]刘德学、张昕光、樊治平和张锋,我国创业投资基金组织形式与管理模式探讨,中国软科学,2001,(2):51-53
[100]刘丁已,周纯,何国全,天使投资与风险投资基金的比较分析,商业经济与管理,2005(5):66-70
[101]刘健钧,创业投资引导基金指导意见,证券市场导报,2009,(1):9-14,76
[102]刘健钧,建立我国创业投资政策扶持机制的政策探讨,宏观经济管理,2003(8):30-32
[103]刘健钧,解读创业投资引导基金指导意见,中国科技投资,2009,(3):21-26
[104]刘健钧,借鉴国际经验发展我国创业投资引导基金,中国金融,2007,(21):33-34
[105]刘健钧,境外创业投资引导基金运作模式与启示,中国科技投资,2006(10):42-46
[106]刘健钧,新西兰创业投资基金计划的实施机制,中国科技投资,2006(6):52-53
[107]刘健钧,中国政策性创业投资基金运作模式探讨,中国创业投资与高科技,2004(10):74-76
[108]刘涛,关于开发银行参与滨海创业投资引导基金的研究,华北金融,2008,(8):14-16
[109]刘昕,产业投资基金及其管理机构的模式选择,财经问题研究,2004,251(10):33-38
[110]卢现祥,西方新制度经济学,北京:中国发展出版社,1999,34-35
[111]路迹,苏贵光,创业投资基金:美、日发展模式的比较与借鉴,金融,2005,(5):54-58
[112]罗明忠和苏启林,政府介入风险投资的经验教训,南方金融,2004,333(5):44-46
[113]骆品亮,陆毅,共同代理与独家代理的激励效率比较研究,管理科学学报,2006,9(1):47-53
[114]彭丁带,美国风险投资法律制度研究,北京:北京大学出版社,2005年,89
[115]彭菲菲,浅析我国创业投资引导基金新模式——信托模式,技术与市场,2008,(6):67
[116]苏启林,财政资金如何介入创业投资,财政研究,2006,(6):13-14
[117]苏启林和刘涵,发达国家创业投资特别立法的经验借鉴,创业投资与高科技,2003,(1):56-57
[118]苏启林和隋广军,给予创业投资资本利得的税收激励政策研究,中央财经大学学报,2004,(8):11-15
[119]谈毅,我国风险投资基金管理模式探析,科研管理,2005,26(4):109-116
[120]谭祖卫,胡芳日,创业投资引导基金运作模式探讨,中国科技投资,2008,(8):65-67
[121]田厚平,郭亚军,杨耀东,分销系统中多委托人及委托人可能合作的委托代理问题,系统工程理论方法应用,2004,13(4):361-366
[122]王丽红,瞄向新加坡的种子基金,中国创业投资与高科技,2003,(7):59-60
[123]王小芳,管锡展,多委托人代理关系——共同代理理论研究及其最新进展,外国经济与管理,2004,10:10-15
[124]王旭,刘玉国,科技型企业生命周期及其特征分析,2003,22(4),79-80
[125]王一军和林嵩,风险投资主体与政府跟进投资机构的合作博弈研究,中国科技论坛,2009,(5):23-26
[126]闻岳春,程同朦,政府引导基金和海外风险资本在支持技术创新方面的应用研究,浙江金融,2008,(11):8-9
[127]邢恩泉,政府对创业投资的融资引导作用,博士学位论文,天津财经大学,2008
[128]徐宝林,美国“小企业投资公司计划”及启示,经济纵横,2007(2):63-64
[129]徐进,梁鸿,徐鲁媛,上海浦东新区科技型企业融资扶持的政策性基金运作模式分析,科技进步与对策,2007,24(5):13-15
[130]杨军,褚保金,新西兰创业投资基金计划的实施机制,中国科技投资,2006,(6):52-53
[131]杨军,中国创业投资发展与政府扶持研究,博士学位论文,南京农业大学,2006
[132]叶翔,美国的产业投资基金,金融研究,1998(10):47-54
[133]伊查克·爱迪思,企业生命周期(赵睿等译),北京:中国社会科学出版社,1997,178
[134]尹睿哲,政府对创业投资的支持:创业投资引导基金的比较研究,管理观察,2009,(3):25-27
[135]于凤坤,政府创业投资引导基金的实践与作用,中国科技投资,2007,(9):70-71
[136]曾德明,陈立勇,企业研发投资的外部效应与最优补贴政策,运筹与管理,2003,12(2):106-109
[137]翟建强,李昆山,李小蓉,关于设立河北省创业风险投资引导基金的思考,2008,28(1):207-211
[138]张静、吴菡和何国杰,政府设立创业风险投资引导基金的模式探讨,科技管理研究,2007,(2):4-6,17
[139]张陆洋,风险投资导论,上海:复旦大学出版社,2007,45-50
[140]张维,邱勇,熊熊,天使投资在中国的发展环境研究,科技管理研究,2007,27(6):56-58
[141]张维迎,博弈论与信息经济学,上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996,473-480
[142]张晓晴,中国创业资本引导基金治理模式研究,生产力研究,2008(23):53-55
[143]章彰,傅巧灵,政府干预与创业投资的发展,财经理论与实践,2000,3:23-26
[144]章彰,政府干预与创业投资,中国科技论坛,2000,3:12-17
[145]赵昌文,关于进一步完善四川省高新技术产业金融政策与服务的研究报告,承担各单位:四川大学、电子科技大学、西南交通大学、西南财经大学、中国人民银行成都分行、成都高新区创新投资有限公司、中国出口信用保险公司成都分公司,2007年10月9日
[146]赵成国,陈莹,政府创业投资引导基金运作管理模式研究,上海金融,2008,(4):35-39
[147]郑安国,论政府在推动风险投资业发展中的地位与作用,复旦学报:社会科学版,2000(3),125-132
[148]郑春东,冯振环,我国种子资本的运作模式与优化思路研究,现代财经,2002(3):25-28
[149]钟梓坚,试论我国创业投资引导基金的法律保障机制,中国高新区,2008(2):86-87
[150]朱一平,风险资本治理机制研究,北京:中国经济出版社,2007,56
1该发展报告由科学技术部、商务部和国家开发银行联合调查,国家软科学研究计划项目:2004DGQ2K044
3转引自陈德棉,《缝隙投资也的发展研究》,北京:科技管理研究出版社,1998,105-106
4《芬兰产业投资公司法案》即,于1999年12月30日通过,于2000年1月5日生效
5,2007,第1章
6,2007,第2章
7即,于2000年2月生效
8即,于2007年经过第一次修正,又于2009年3月26日通过第二次修正,目前生效的政府令是自2009年4月1日起生效的
9,2009,第1条
10,2009,第3条
12本部分的分析借鉴了郑志刚博士《投资者之家的利益冲突和公司治理机制的整合》的思路。
[2] Ayayi, A., Public policy and venture capital: The Canadian labor-sponsored venture capital funds. Journal of Small Business Management, 2004,42(3):335-345
[3] B.Douglas Bernheim,Michael D.Whinston,Common Agency,Econometrica,1986,4(54):923-942
[4] Barbara Cornelius , Who's who in venture capital research? ,Technovation,2006,26(2):782-807
[5] Baygan, G. 2003, Baygan,G.venture capital policies in Israel.OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers,2003(3),12
[6] Benoit Leleux and Bernard Surlemon,Public versus private venture capital: seeding or crowding out? A pan-European analysis,Journal of Business Venturing,2003,18(1):81-104
[7] Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne,How to Restore Higher-Powered Incentives in Multitask Agencies,The Journal of Low,Economy and Organization,1999(15):418-433
[8] Bernard, S.D.,Incentives in Common Agency,CIRANO:Scientific Series, 2001,189
[9] Bernheim B.D.,Whinston M. D. ,Common Agency,Econometrica,1986,54(4):923-942
[10] Bernheim B.D.,Whinston M. D.,Common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion,The Rand Journal of Economics,1985,16(2):269-281
[11] Biais,B. Martimort,D.Roehet J.,Competing Mechanism in a Common Value Environment,Econometrica,2000,68:799-837
[12] Biglaiser,G. and Mezzetti,Principals Competing for an Agent in the presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,Journal of Economic Theory,1993,61:302-330
[13] Christian Keuschnigg,Soren Bo Nielsen,Tax policy,venture capital and entrepreneurship,Journal of Public Economics,2003,87(1):175-203
[14] Clarysse B.,Wright M.,Mustar P,Behavioural additionality of R&D subsidies:A learning perspective,Research Policy,2009,38 (10) : 1517-1533
[15] Corts, K. S.,The Strategic Effect of Vertical Market Structure:Common Agency and Divisionalization in the US Motion Picture Industry,Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,2001,(10):509-528
[16] Cumming, D. J., MacIntosh, J. G., Crowding out private equity: Canadian evidence, Journal of Business Venturing, 2006,21(5):569-609
[17] Da Rin, M., Nicodano, G., Sembenelli, A.,Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets , Journal of Public Economics,2006,90(8-9):1699-1723
[18] Diewert,W.E.,Functional Forms for Profit and Transformation Function,Journal of Economic Theory,1973,6:284-316
[19] Dixit,A.,Grossman G.,Helpman E.,Common Agency and Coordination:General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,The Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(4):752-769
[20] Dossani, R., Kenney, M., Creating an environment for venture capital in India,World Development, 2002,30(2):227-253
[21] Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan,Pre-seed government venture capital funds,Journal of International Entrepreneurship,2009,7:26-56
[22] Douglas Cumming,Government Policy towards entrepreneurial finance: innovation investment funds,Journal of Business Venturing,2007,22:193-235
[23] Douglas J. Cumming,Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, 2003
[24] Douglas J.Cumming,Grant Fleming,Armin Schwienbacher,Legality and venture capital exits,Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(2):214-245
[25] Epstein,L.,M. peters,A Revelation principle for Competing Mechanisms,Journal of Economic Theory,1999,88:119-160
[26] Esther Gal-Or,A Common Agency with Incomplete Information,The RAND Journal of Economics,1991,22:274-286
[27] European Commission, Best practices of public support for early-stage equity finance: Final report of the expert group,DG Enterprise and Industry,European Commission,Brussels,2005
[28] European Commission, State aid and risk capital. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001(C235):3-11
[29] European Commission , Best practices of public support for early-stage equity finance, Final report of the expert group,2005,September
[30] Gal-or E.,A Common Agency with Incomplete Information,The Rand Journal of Economics,1991,22:274-286
[31] Gil Avnimelech,Morris Teubal,Create venture capital industriesthat co-evolve with high tech:Insights from an extended industry life cycle perspective of the Israeli experience,Research Policy,2006,35(10),1477-1498
[32] Gilson, R. J., Engineering a venture capital market: Lessons from the American experience. Stanford Law Review,2003,55(4):1067-1103
[33] Holmstrom B.,Moral Hazard in Teams,The Bell Journal of Economies,1982,13(2):324-340
[34] Holmstrom, Bengt , Paul Milgrom , Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design,Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1991(7):24-52
[35] Holmstrom,Milgrom,Multitask principal-Agent Analysis:Incentive Contracts,Assets Ownership,and Job Design,Journal of Law,Economies,and organization,1991,7:24-52
[36] Hyytinen A.,Pajarinen M.,2001
[37] Jensen,M.,W.H. Meckling,Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4),305-360
[38] Kahn C. , Mookherjee D. , Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts ,The RAND Journal of Economies,1998,29(3):443-465
[39] Kanniainen,Keuschingg,2001
[40] Khalil F.,Martimort D.,Parigi B.,Monitoring a Common Agency,working paper,University of Washington
[41] Lance E. Davis,Douglass. C. North,Institutional Change and American Economic Growth,New York: Cambridge University Press,1971,179
[42] Laussel D.,Breton M.,Conflict and Cooperation:The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Environment,Journal of Economic Theory,2001,100,489-510
[43] Leleux, B., Surlemont, B.,Public versus private venture capital: seeding or crowding out? A pan-European analysis,Journal of Business Venturing, 2003,18(1):81-104
[44] Lerner, J. ,The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program,Journal of Business, 1999,72(3):285-318
[45] Lerner, J. ,When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: The design of effective 'public venture capital' programs,Economic Journal, 2002. 112(477):F73-F84
[46] Lerner, J. , The syndication of venture capital investments,Financial Management,1994,23:16-27
[47] Lerner, J..The syndication of venture capital investments,Financial Management,1994,23:16-27
[48] Lerner, Josh,The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-run Effects of the SBIR Program, Journal of Business,1999,72:285-318
[49] Leslie A.Jeng, Philippe C.Wells,The determinants of venture capital funding: evidence across countries,Journal of Corporate Finance,2000(6):241-289
[50] Maeho-Stadler,Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment,The Journal of Industrial Economics,1998,46(4),489-510
[51] Marco Da Rin,Giovanna Nicodano,Alessandro Sembenelli,Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets,Journal of Public Economics,working paper,2006
[52] Martimort D.,Exclusive dealing,common agency,and multiprincipals incentive theory,The RAND Journal of Economics,1996,27(1):1-31
[53] Martimort D.,Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators,Journal of Economic Theory,1999,88,261-293
[54] Martimort D.,Stole,L.,Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types,CESifo Working Paper No.572
[55] Martimort D.,Stole,L.,The Revelation and Delegation Principals in Common Agency Games,Econometrica,2001,70:1659-1674
[56] Martimort D.,The organization Of Government:The Multiprineipal Nature of Govemment,Europea:1Eeonomic Review,1996,40:673-685
[57] Maula, M , Murray, G. , Finnish Industry Investment ltd.: an International Evaluation,Helsinki:Ministry of Trade & Industry,2003,175
[58] Mike Wright,Andy Lockett,Bart Clarysse,Martin Binks,University spin-out companies and venture capital,Research Policy,2006,35(4):481-501
[59] Mikko Jaaskelainen , Markku Maula , Gordon Murray , Profit distribution and compensation structures in publicly and privately funded hybrid venture capital funds,Research Policy,2007,36(7):913-929
[60] Murray, G. C., Marriott, R., Why has the investment performance of technology specialist, European venture capital funds been so poor? Research Policy, 1998,27(9):947-976
[61] Myerson R.,Optimal Auction Design,Mathematics of operationsResearch,1981,6:58-73
[62] P.斯曼通,技术变革的经济分析,北京:机械工业出版社,1989,4-5
[63] Paul A. Gompers, Josh Lerner,The venture capital cycle,the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,1999,139
[64] Williamson, Oliver E., The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting,New York:Free Press,1985,378
[65]陈和,创业投资的政策性引导基金模式研究,科学学与科学技术管理,2006,(5):79-83
[66]陈红辉,赵正堂,天使投资:我国的现状、问题与对策,金融观察,2004(8):34-35,20
[67]陈建先,高新技术发展的政府“种子基金”构架——重庆高新技术产业发展的理论研究,西南民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版),20002,23(9):12-16
[68]成思危,积极稳妥地推进我国的风险投资事业,管理世界,1999,1:2-7
[69]程静,外国政府对风险投资的扶持政策及启示,科技管理研究,2000(3):37-40
[70]道格拉斯.C.诺斯,经济史中的结构与变迁,上海:上海人民出版社,1997,20
[71]杜朝运,郑瑜,海峡西岸经济区发展创业投资引导基金研究——兼析台湾创业投资引导基金研究,福建金融,2009,(5):27-31
[72]范柏乃,沈荣芳,陈德棉,国外促进风险投资业发展的法规政策综述,外国经济与管理,2000,9:22-26
[73]房汉廷,王伟光,郭戎,创业投资母子基金模板比较及启示,高科技与产业化,2004(11):23-27
[74]房汉廷,中国创业风险投资发展中的七大问题,中国科技论坛,2007,4:3-10
[75]付玉秀,张洪石,公共创业投资项目发展的研究与实践,中国科技论坛,2004,(6):120-124,78
[76]高亚平,王蓓蓓,周密,浅析创业投资引导基金的支持方式,江苏科技信息,2008,(7):8-11
[77]龚建立,徐炳炳,王飞绒,政府性创业投资引导基金的运作模式研究,经济纵横,2007,(8):28-30
[78]龚雪,以资引资创投引导基金的倍增效应,中国高新区,2009,(2):25-26
[79]辜胜阻,李正友,刘入领,我国政府在科技风险投资中的角色,投资研究,1999(12):20-23
[80]谷建全,关于加快我国风险投资发展的理论思考,经济经纬,2000,3:78-81
[81]顾骅珊,政府设立创业投资引导基金的运作管理模式探析,经济研究导刊,2009,41(3):67-68
[82]顾云松,钟甫宁,刘晓玲,南京市高校利用创业投资转化科技成果问题的实证研究,科学学与科学技术管理,2006,6:32-36
[83]郭丽虹和赵新双,优化政府创业投资引导基金效益的策略研究,中国科技论坛,2007,(11):99-101,115
[84]何建洪,马凌,政府引导基金下创业投资经理人与风险企业的合谋分析,科技管理研究,2008,(9):185-187
[85]贺亚力,从德国和以色列的实践看政府如何引导创业风险投资市场发展,中国科技论坛,2006,7(4):134-136
[86]桁林,政府与市场关系理论及其发展,求实学刊,2003,2:44-49
[87]黄小花,风险投资发展的国际经验及我国的对策,财经理论与实践,1999(5):12-16
[88]蒋芬,宁建荣,创业投资引导基金的发展概况及启示,今日科技,2008,(7):45-46
[89]焦军利,关于国内外创业风险投资引导基金的比较分析报告,科技情报开发与经济,2007,17(34):129-131
[90]科斯,诺恩,威廉姆斯,制度、契约与组织,北京:经济科学出版社,2003,56
[91]李开孟,我国政府性创业投资引导基金的运作模式及操作要点,中国投资,2009,(4):100-103
[92]李攀艺,蒲勇健,基于共同代理理论的研究型高效R&D活动激励研究,科技进步与对策,2006(11):176-179
[93]李清芬,基金中基金:资产管理的独特机制,证券市场导报,2003,(12):15-19
[94]李松涛,余筱箭,浅议技术创新模式与金融体系模式的相互关系,软科学,2002,12(3):5-7
[95]李万寿,关于建立产业投资引导基金的政策建议,宏观经济研究,2005,(2):47-49
[96]李夏,政府引导基金的探索与实践,创新,2009,(3):21-24
[97]李宇龙,严旭芳,日本产业投资基金分析,外国经济与管理,1998(12):27:30
[98]廖肇辉,集团客户授信:共同代理问题及其对策研究初探,金融研究,2009(5):160-165
[99]刘德学、张昕光、樊治平和张锋,我国创业投资基金组织形式与管理模式探讨,中国软科学,2001,(2):51-53
[100]刘丁已,周纯,何国全,天使投资与风险投资基金的比较分析,商业经济与管理,2005(5):66-70
[101]刘健钧,创业投资引导基金指导意见,证券市场导报,2009,(1):9-14,76
[102]刘健钧,建立我国创业投资政策扶持机制的政策探讨,宏观经济管理,2003(8):30-32
[103]刘健钧,解读创业投资引导基金指导意见,中国科技投资,2009,(3):21-26
[104]刘健钧,借鉴国际经验发展我国创业投资引导基金,中国金融,2007,(21):33-34
[105]刘健钧,境外创业投资引导基金运作模式与启示,中国科技投资,2006(10):42-46
[106]刘健钧,新西兰创业投资基金计划的实施机制,中国科技投资,2006(6):52-53
[107]刘健钧,中国政策性创业投资基金运作模式探讨,中国创业投资与高科技,2004(10):74-76
[108]刘涛,关于开发银行参与滨海创业投资引导基金的研究,华北金融,2008,(8):14-16
[109]刘昕,产业投资基金及其管理机构的模式选择,财经问题研究,2004,251(10):33-38
[110]卢现祥,西方新制度经济学,北京:中国发展出版社,1999,34-35
[111]路迹,苏贵光,创业投资基金:美、日发展模式的比较与借鉴,金融,2005,(5):54-58
[112]罗明忠和苏启林,政府介入风险投资的经验教训,南方金融,2004,333(5):44-46
[113]骆品亮,陆毅,共同代理与独家代理的激励效率比较研究,管理科学学报,2006,9(1):47-53
[114]彭丁带,美国风险投资法律制度研究,北京:北京大学出版社,2005年,89
[115]彭菲菲,浅析我国创业投资引导基金新模式——信托模式,技术与市场,2008,(6):67
[116]苏启林,财政资金如何介入创业投资,财政研究,2006,(6):13-14
[117]苏启林和刘涵,发达国家创业投资特别立法的经验借鉴,创业投资与高科技,2003,(1):56-57
[118]苏启林和隋广军,给予创业投资资本利得的税收激励政策研究,中央财经大学学报,2004,(8):11-15
[119]谈毅,我国风险投资基金管理模式探析,科研管理,2005,26(4):109-116
[120]谭祖卫,胡芳日,创业投资引导基金运作模式探讨,中国科技投资,2008,(8):65-67
[121]田厚平,郭亚军,杨耀东,分销系统中多委托人及委托人可能合作的委托代理问题,系统工程理论方法应用,2004,13(4):361-366
[122]王丽红,瞄向新加坡的种子基金,中国创业投资与高科技,2003,(7):59-60
[123]王小芳,管锡展,多委托人代理关系——共同代理理论研究及其最新进展,外国经济与管理,2004,10:10-15
[124]王旭,刘玉国,科技型企业生命周期及其特征分析,2003,22(4),79-80
[125]王一军和林嵩,风险投资主体与政府跟进投资机构的合作博弈研究,中国科技论坛,2009,(5):23-26
[126]闻岳春,程同朦,政府引导基金和海外风险资本在支持技术创新方面的应用研究,浙江金融,2008,(11):8-9
[127]邢恩泉,政府对创业投资的融资引导作用,博士学位论文,天津财经大学,2008
[128]徐宝林,美国“小企业投资公司计划”及启示,经济纵横,2007(2):63-64
[129]徐进,梁鸿,徐鲁媛,上海浦东新区科技型企业融资扶持的政策性基金运作模式分析,科技进步与对策,2007,24(5):13-15
[130]杨军,褚保金,新西兰创业投资基金计划的实施机制,中国科技投资,2006,(6):52-53
[131]杨军,中国创业投资发展与政府扶持研究,博士学位论文,南京农业大学,2006
[132]叶翔,美国的产业投资基金,金融研究,1998(10):47-54
[133]伊查克·爱迪思,企业生命周期(赵睿等译),北京:中国社会科学出版社,1997,178
[134]尹睿哲,政府对创业投资的支持:创业投资引导基金的比较研究,管理观察,2009,(3):25-27
[135]于凤坤,政府创业投资引导基金的实践与作用,中国科技投资,2007,(9):70-71
[136]曾德明,陈立勇,企业研发投资的外部效应与最优补贴政策,运筹与管理,2003,12(2):106-109
[137]翟建强,李昆山,李小蓉,关于设立河北省创业风险投资引导基金的思考,2008,28(1):207-211
[138]张静、吴菡和何国杰,政府设立创业风险投资引导基金的模式探讨,科技管理研究,2007,(2):4-6,17
[139]张陆洋,风险投资导论,上海:复旦大学出版社,2007,45-50
[140]张维,邱勇,熊熊,天使投资在中国的发展环境研究,科技管理研究,2007,27(6):56-58
[141]张维迎,博弈论与信息经济学,上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996,473-480
[142]张晓晴,中国创业资本引导基金治理模式研究,生产力研究,2008(23):53-55
[143]章彰,傅巧灵,政府干预与创业投资的发展,财经理论与实践,2000,3:23-26
[144]章彰,政府干预与创业投资,中国科技论坛,2000,3:12-17
[145]赵昌文,关于进一步完善四川省高新技术产业金融政策与服务的研究报告,承担各单位:四川大学、电子科技大学、西南交通大学、西南财经大学、中国人民银行成都分行、成都高新区创新投资有限公司、中国出口信用保险公司成都分公司,2007年10月9日
[146]赵成国,陈莹,政府创业投资引导基金运作管理模式研究,上海金融,2008,(4):35-39
[147]郑安国,论政府在推动风险投资业发展中的地位与作用,复旦学报:社会科学版,2000(3),125-132
[148]郑春东,冯振环,我国种子资本的运作模式与优化思路研究,现代财经,2002(3):25-28
[149]钟梓坚,试论我国创业投资引导基金的法律保障机制,中国高新区,2008(2):86-87
[150]朱一平,风险资本治理机制研究,北京:中国经济出版社,2007,56
1该发展报告由科学技术部、商务部和国家开发银行联合调查,国家软科学研究计划项目:2004DGQ2K044
3转引自陈德棉,《缝隙投资也的发展研究》,北京:科技管理研究出版社,1998,105-106
4《芬兰产业投资公司法案》即
5
6
7即
8即
9
10
12本部分的分析借鉴了郑志刚博士《投资者之家的利益冲突和公司治理机制的整合》的思路。
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |