政治关联成本与企业效率研究
|
摘要
企业与政府官员或政治人物之间的政治关联,是各国经济发展过程中的一种普遍现象,尤其是在转型经济背景下的中国,文化和制度上的特点决定了企业与政府建立亲密关系的重要性。政治关联对企业的生产经营、财务政策、经营业绩乃至资本市场都产生了重要的影响,使政治关联成为财务和金融领域研究的热点。目前的研究认为政治关联作为一种有价值的资源,使企业能够以更便利的途径,更低的成本获得经营许可证、政府补助、低利率贷款等裨益,从而有利于企业的价值绩效。但是当以会计绩效作为绩效衡量指标时,许多研究一致发现政治关联企业的经营绩效普遍较差。政治关联使企业更易获取各种稀缺资源和竞争优势,但其会计绩效却差于非关联企业,这一悖论产生的原因是政治关联为企业带来一些利益的同时,其负面影响也不可小觑,而目前的研究对此却较少关注。
本文以寻租理论、政治成本理论和效率理论为基础,认为企业政治关联作为一种寻租活动,是需要付出一定代价的。为了建立、维护和提升政治关联,企业需要承担一系列的寻租成本。这些寻租成本是企业参与政治活动而使企业资源发生转移,给企业造成的经济损失,本文称之为“政治关联成本”。使用中国民营上市公司2006年至2009年的经验数据,本文实证检验了政治关联成本在企业税负、雇员规模、薪酬支出、非生产性支出和过度投资等几个方面的现实体现,并以SFA方法计算的企业效率为绩效衡量指标,进一步检验了政治关联、政治关联成本对企业绩效的影响。
通过理论和实证研究,本文得到如下结论：
1.政治关联在企业税负方面具有“政治成本效应”,政治关联企业的综合税负高于非关联企业。为了企业及其领导人的政治声誉、政治地位等政治利益,政治关联企业具有降低纳税风险、做大纳税贡献的强烈动机。政治关联对企业税负影响存在着“声誉政治成本”、“升迁政治成本”和“责任政治成本”等效应,使其综合税负率显著高于非关联企业,并且政治关联程度越强,企业综合税负率越高。
2.政治关联使企业的雇员成本显著高于非关联企业。企业领导人的政治身份使企业被政府、.工会、劳动部门、媒体等关注的程度较高,企业用工具有示范作用,所以政治关联企业容易受到政府为实现扩大就业、促进社会稳定目标而进行的政治干预,使其承担更大的社会责任。政治关联企业比非关联企业雇佣了更多的劳动力,并支付了更高的薪酬成本,并且政治关联程度越强,企业的雇员规模及其薪酬成本也越高。
3.政治关联的民营企业,其非生产性支出比例高于国有企业和其他民营企业。国有企业因具有天然的政治关联,在获得政府资源时受到政府关照,发生了较少的非生产性支出；而民营企业的政治关联使其在日常经营活动中被迫支付了更高比例的非生产性支出,以与其他企业竞租政府资源。并且企业的非生产性支出受到企业所在地区市场化程度的影响,市场化程度越低,政治关联企业的非生产性支出也越高。
4.政治关联企业的过度投资水平显著高于非关联企业,并且企业总的政治关联程度越强,过度投资水平越严重。与非关联企业相比,政治关联企业在投资时受到的资金、渠道等资源约束较小,管理层-方面受到政府的支持和鼓励,自信心极易膨胀,导致过度自信,另一方面为了维护和提升其政治地位,也需要不断扩大企业规模作为政治资本,导致政治关联企业更可能为追求建立企业帝国而盲目扩大投资规模,甚至投资于净现值为负的项目,引发过度投资问题。
5.政治关联使企业需要承担上述方面的政治关联成本,从而对企业效率造成消极影响。企业将本来应配置于生产经营和战略发展领域的资源用于建立、维护和提升政治关联的非生性寻租活动中,改变了资源的配置方式,寻租带来的利益很大程度上会被寻租及由此导致的政治关联成本所抵消甚至超越,导致企业效率的降低。政治关联企业比非关联企业从政府手中获得了更多的稀缺资源,但其企业效率反而低于非关联企业,说明政治关联导致的整个社会资源的分配方式是无效率的,是对社会资源的浪费。政治关联对社会福利造成的损失也属于广义上的政治关联成本,但这种损失由全社会来承担。
本文以政治关联对企业和社会造成的负面影响为切入点,提出了政治关联成本的概念,研究了企业在经营活动和投资活动中几项主要的政治关联成本,解释和回答了政治关联企业会计业绩悖论产生的原因,丰富了政治关联及其经济效应的理论研究；并以SFA方法测量的企业效率为绩效指标,发现政治关联对企业效率和社会经济效率的消极影响,为政治关联与经济后果两者之间的关系做出了进一步的理论证明。这些研究结论可以使民营企业家、社会各届对企业寻求政治关联具有更清醒、全面的理解和认识。企业及其领导人的主要精力不应放在寻求政治关系寻租上,而应在激烈的市场竞争中通过管理、技术和营销的持续创新获得竞争优势,更多地从事生产性活动获得利益。同时需要坚定不移的推动中国的市场化进程,减少政府对经济的干预,创造出公平的竞争环境,给予所有企业平等的国民待遇,让市场在配置资源方面发挥基础作用。
The relevant relationship between enterprise and government officers or politicians is a common phenomenon during economic developing process all over the world. Particularly, China has a special culture and institution under the reforming economic background, so it is very important for Chinese enterprise maintain a close relationship with government. Political connection has important influence on enterprise's procession of operating, financial policy, operating performance, even the capital market, which becomes a hot issue in the field of financial research.
The resent research find out that the political connection is a valuable resource for company, which can improve company's performance because it could help enterprise to obtain some benefits with lower cost and in a more convenient way, such as operation license, government grants, low interest rate loan. But when using accounting measurement as yardsticks to measure performance, many researches find that political connection company have poorer performance than no-connection company. Political connection enterprises are more likely to get all sorts of scarce resources and competitive advantages, but its accounting performance is poorer than non-connection enterprise. The causes of the paradox are that although political connection could bring some interests for company, its negative influence for company also cannot be neglected. But so far, few researches pay attention to this paradox.
Based on the rent-seeking theory, political cost theory and efficiency theory, enterprise political connection as a kind of rent-seeking activities need to pay the price. In order to establish, maintain and promote the connection, the enterprise has to bear the rent-seeking cost. The enterprise resources that are transferred during the political activities are called "political connection cost". This cost brings economic lost to enterprise. According to the data of Chinese private listed companies from 2006 to 2009, several aspects of political connection cost are examined which are enterprise tax burden, number of employees, labor cost, non-operating expenditures and overinvestment. By using the SFA method to measure the enterprise efficiency, the paper also examines the impact of political connection and political connation cost on enterprise performance.
Through theoretical and empirical studies, the paper has obtained flowing conclusions:
1. Political connection have "political cost effect" in tax burden aspect since tax burden of political connection firms is significantly higher than no political connection firms. For the sake of political reputation, political status, political interest of firms and their leaders, political connection firms have strong motivation to increase tax contribution and reduce tax risk. The effects of political connection on tax burden have "political reputation cost effect ", " political promotion cost effect" and " political responsibility cost effect", which making their tax burden significantly higher than no political connection firms, furthermore the stronger degree of political connection, the higher tax burden is.
2. Labor cost of political connection firms is significantly higher than no connection firms. Government, trade unions, labor department and media may pay more attention to political connection firms by reason of their leader's political status. Political connection firms play a standard role for other firms on employment, which more easily being intervened by government for realization of expanding employment and promoting social stability. These make political connection firms undertake more social responsibility. The number of employees and labor costs are significantly higher than non-connection companies. Moreover, the higher level of political connection, the more population of employees, and the greater of labor cost.
3. In private firms with political connected, unproductive expenditure are higher than state-owned enterprises and other private enterprises. State-owned enterprises pay lower unproductive expenditure because their natural political association with government which can easily obtain government resources. Political connection firms have to compete with other enterprise for obtaining government resources, so they are forced to pay higher unproductive expenditure in daily operating activities. Moreover, unproductive expenditure are influenced by the marketization degree of the area where the firm located, the more market-oriented of the area firm located, the lower of the firm's unproductive expenditure.
4. The overinvestment level of firms with political connection is significantly higher than no political connection firms, and the stronger of political connection, the higher level of overinvestment. Compared with non political connection enterprises, political connection enterprises are less restrained by investment resource of funds and ways when they invest. The self-confidence of management easily becomes expansion for political connection firms due to they are supported and encouraged by government, which leading to overconfidence. On the other hand, in order to maintain and promote political status, political connection firms also need to constantly expand firm scale. Political associated enterprises are more likely to expand investment scale to building enterprise empire, even investing in negative NPV project, which leading to overinvestment.
5. Base on the reasons mentioned above, political connection influenced enterprise efficiency negatively. The enterprise should distribute enterprise resources in the field of operation and strategic developing rather than in rent-seeking activities for establishing, maintaining and promoting political connection. The benefits of rent-seeking will be offset even exceeded by the political connection costs, which leading to firms'ineffectiveness. The political connection enterprises acquired more scarce resources, but its efficiency is lower than non political connection firms. This phenomenon means political association leads to inefficient resources allocation of the whole society. In a broad sense, the social welfare losses by political association also belong to political connection cost, but the losses are afforded by the whole society.
In accordance with negative effects of political connection for enterprise and social, this paper brings the concept of political connection cost. Several main political cost are confirmed in firms operational activities and investment activities, which have interpreted the accounting performance paradox of political connection firms, also enriched the theory of political connection and its economic effect. Using enterprise efficiency as performance index which calculated by SFA method, the paper found political connection have negative influence on enterprise efficiency and social efficiency, which theoretically proved the relationship between political connection and its economic consequences. These results can make private entrepreneurs, as well as whole society get sober and comprehensive understanding for companies seeking political connection. Enterprise and its leaders should seek the competitive advantages through continuous innovation of management, technology and marketing in the fierce competition market, that is to say that firms should obtained benefits mainly by productive activities rather than by rent-seeking of political connection. Meanwhile, China should unswervingly promote marketization, reduce government intervention on economy, create a fair competitive environment, give all enterprise national treatment equally, and make market playing a fundamental role in resources allocation.
本文以寻租理论、政治成本理论和效率理论为基础,认为企业政治关联作为一种寻租活动,是需要付出一定代价的。为了建立、维护和提升政治关联,企业需要承担一系列的寻租成本。这些寻租成本是企业参与政治活动而使企业资源发生转移,给企业造成的经济损失,本文称之为“政治关联成本”。使用中国民营上市公司2006年至2009年的经验数据,本文实证检验了政治关联成本在企业税负、雇员规模、薪酬支出、非生产性支出和过度投资等几个方面的现实体现,并以SFA方法计算的企业效率为绩效衡量指标,进一步检验了政治关联、政治关联成本对企业绩效的影响。
通过理论和实证研究,本文得到如下结论：
1.政治关联在企业税负方面具有“政治成本效应”,政治关联企业的综合税负高于非关联企业。为了企业及其领导人的政治声誉、政治地位等政治利益,政治关联企业具有降低纳税风险、做大纳税贡献的强烈动机。政治关联对企业税负影响存在着“声誉政治成本”、“升迁政治成本”和“责任政治成本”等效应,使其综合税负率显著高于非关联企业,并且政治关联程度越强,企业综合税负率越高。
2.政治关联使企业的雇员成本显著高于非关联企业。企业领导人的政治身份使企业被政府、.工会、劳动部门、媒体等关注的程度较高,企业用工具有示范作用,所以政治关联企业容易受到政府为实现扩大就业、促进社会稳定目标而进行的政治干预,使其承担更大的社会责任。政治关联企业比非关联企业雇佣了更多的劳动力,并支付了更高的薪酬成本,并且政治关联程度越强,企业的雇员规模及其薪酬成本也越高。
3.政治关联的民营企业,其非生产性支出比例高于国有企业和其他民营企业。国有企业因具有天然的政治关联,在获得政府资源时受到政府关照,发生了较少的非生产性支出；而民营企业的政治关联使其在日常经营活动中被迫支付了更高比例的非生产性支出,以与其他企业竞租政府资源。并且企业的非生产性支出受到企业所在地区市场化程度的影响,市场化程度越低,政治关联企业的非生产性支出也越高。
4.政治关联企业的过度投资水平显著高于非关联企业,并且企业总的政治关联程度越强,过度投资水平越严重。与非关联企业相比,政治关联企业在投资时受到的资金、渠道等资源约束较小,管理层-方面受到政府的支持和鼓励,自信心极易膨胀,导致过度自信,另一方面为了维护和提升其政治地位,也需要不断扩大企业规模作为政治资本,导致政治关联企业更可能为追求建立企业帝国而盲目扩大投资规模,甚至投资于净现值为负的项目,引发过度投资问题。
5.政治关联使企业需要承担上述方面的政治关联成本,从而对企业效率造成消极影响。企业将本来应配置于生产经营和战略发展领域的资源用于建立、维护和提升政治关联的非生性寻租活动中,改变了资源的配置方式,寻租带来的利益很大程度上会被寻租及由此导致的政治关联成本所抵消甚至超越,导致企业效率的降低。政治关联企业比非关联企业从政府手中获得了更多的稀缺资源,但其企业效率反而低于非关联企业,说明政治关联导致的整个社会资源的分配方式是无效率的,是对社会资源的浪费。政治关联对社会福利造成的损失也属于广义上的政治关联成本,但这种损失由全社会来承担。
本文以政治关联对企业和社会造成的负面影响为切入点,提出了政治关联成本的概念,研究了企业在经营活动和投资活动中几项主要的政治关联成本,解释和回答了政治关联企业会计业绩悖论产生的原因,丰富了政治关联及其经济效应的理论研究；并以SFA方法测量的企业效率为绩效指标,发现政治关联对企业效率和社会经济效率的消极影响,为政治关联与经济后果两者之间的关系做出了进一步的理论证明。这些研究结论可以使民营企业家、社会各届对企业寻求政治关联具有更清醒、全面的理解和认识。企业及其领导人的主要精力不应放在寻求政治关系寻租上,而应在激烈的市场竞争中通过管理、技术和营销的持续创新获得竞争优势,更多地从事生产性活动获得利益。同时需要坚定不移的推动中国的市场化进程,减少政府对经济的干预,创造出公平的竞争环境,给予所有企业平等的国民待遇,让市场在配置资源方面发挥基础作用。
The relevant relationship between enterprise and government officers or politicians is a common phenomenon during economic developing process all over the world. Particularly, China has a special culture and institution under the reforming economic background, so it is very important for Chinese enterprise maintain a close relationship with government. Political connection has important influence on enterprise's procession of operating, financial policy, operating performance, even the capital market, which becomes a hot issue in the field of financial research.
The resent research find out that the political connection is a valuable resource for company, which can improve company's performance because it could help enterprise to obtain some benefits with lower cost and in a more convenient way, such as operation license, government grants, low interest rate loan. But when using accounting measurement as yardsticks to measure performance, many researches find that political connection company have poorer performance than no-connection company. Political connection enterprises are more likely to get all sorts of scarce resources and competitive advantages, but its accounting performance is poorer than non-connection enterprise. The causes of the paradox are that although political connection could bring some interests for company, its negative influence for company also cannot be neglected. But so far, few researches pay attention to this paradox.
Based on the rent-seeking theory, political cost theory and efficiency theory, enterprise political connection as a kind of rent-seeking activities need to pay the price. In order to establish, maintain and promote the connection, the enterprise has to bear the rent-seeking cost. The enterprise resources that are transferred during the political activities are called "political connection cost". This cost brings economic lost to enterprise. According to the data of Chinese private listed companies from 2006 to 2009, several aspects of political connection cost are examined which are enterprise tax burden, number of employees, labor cost, non-operating expenditures and overinvestment. By using the SFA method to measure the enterprise efficiency, the paper also examines the impact of political connection and political connation cost on enterprise performance.
Through theoretical and empirical studies, the paper has obtained flowing conclusions:
1. Political connection have "political cost effect" in tax burden aspect since tax burden of political connection firms is significantly higher than no political connection firms. For the sake of political reputation, political status, political interest of firms and their leaders, political connection firms have strong motivation to increase tax contribution and reduce tax risk. The effects of political connection on tax burden have "political reputation cost effect ", " political promotion cost effect" and " political responsibility cost effect", which making their tax burden significantly higher than no political connection firms, furthermore the stronger degree of political connection, the higher tax burden is.
2. Labor cost of political connection firms is significantly higher than no connection firms. Government, trade unions, labor department and media may pay more attention to political connection firms by reason of their leader's political status. Political connection firms play a standard role for other firms on employment, which more easily being intervened by government for realization of expanding employment and promoting social stability. These make political connection firms undertake more social responsibility. The number of employees and labor costs are significantly higher than non-connection companies. Moreover, the higher level of political connection, the more population of employees, and the greater of labor cost.
3. In private firms with political connected, unproductive expenditure are higher than state-owned enterprises and other private enterprises. State-owned enterprises pay lower unproductive expenditure because their natural political association with government which can easily obtain government resources. Political connection firms have to compete with other enterprise for obtaining government resources, so they are forced to pay higher unproductive expenditure in daily operating activities. Moreover, unproductive expenditure are influenced by the marketization degree of the area where the firm located, the more market-oriented of the area firm located, the lower of the firm's unproductive expenditure.
4. The overinvestment level of firms with political connection is significantly higher than no political connection firms, and the stronger of political connection, the higher level of overinvestment. Compared with non political connection enterprises, political connection enterprises are less restrained by investment resource of funds and ways when they invest. The self-confidence of management easily becomes expansion for political connection firms due to they are supported and encouraged by government, which leading to overconfidence. On the other hand, in order to maintain and promote political status, political connection firms also need to constantly expand firm scale. Political associated enterprises are more likely to expand investment scale to building enterprise empire, even investing in negative NPV project, which leading to overinvestment.
5. Base on the reasons mentioned above, political connection influenced enterprise efficiency negatively. The enterprise should distribute enterprise resources in the field of operation and strategic developing rather than in rent-seeking activities for establishing, maintaining and promoting political connection. The benefits of rent-seeking will be offset even exceeded by the political connection costs, which leading to firms'ineffectiveness. The political connection enterprises acquired more scarce resources, but its efficiency is lower than non political connection firms. This phenomenon means political association leads to inefficient resources allocation of the whole society. In a broad sense, the social welfare losses by political association also belong to political connection cost, but the losses are afforded by the whole society.
In accordance with negative effects of political connection for enterprise and social, this paper brings the concept of political connection cost. Several main political cost are confirmed in firms operational activities and investment activities, which have interpreted the accounting performance paradox of political connection firms, also enriched the theory of political connection and its economic effect. Using enterprise efficiency as performance index which calculated by SFA method, the paper found political connection have negative influence on enterprise efficiency and social efficiency, which theoretically proved the relationship between political connection and its economic consequences. These results can make private entrepreneurs, as well as whole society get sober and comprehensive understanding for companies seeking political connection. Enterprise and its leaders should seek the competitive advantages through continuous innovation of management, technology and marketing in the fierce competition market, that is to say that firms should obtained benefits mainly by productive activities rather than by rent-seeking of political connection. Meanwhile, China should unswervingly promote marketization, reduce government intervention on economy, create a fair competitive environment, give all enterprise national treatment equally, and make market playing a fundamental role in resources allocation.
引文
①数据引自罗党论、唐清泉：中国民营上市公司制度环境与绩效问题研究,《经济研究》2009年第2期。
②数据引自中国广播网http://www.cnr.cn/gsfw/gsxw/kx/200910/t20091014_505509906.html
①转引自罗志荣：优化企业政治环境,《企业文明》,2003年第3期
[1]张建君,张志学.中国民营企业家的政治战略.管理世界,2005,(7):94-105.
[2]胡星斗.特权垄断：国家的一块心病.同舟共进.2007,(2)16-19.
[3]Faccio M. Politically Connected Firms:Can they squeeze the state? American Economic Review,2006, (96):369-386.
[4]罗党论,甄丽明.民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束.金融研究,2008,(12)：164-178.
[5]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性.经济研究,2010,(3)：65-77.
[6]戈登·塔洛克,寻租-对寻租活动的经济学分析,西南财经大学出版社,1999:31-77.
[7]Fisman, Raymond. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review,2001,91(4):1095-1102.
[8]S. Johnson, T. Mitton. Cronyism and capital controls:Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics,2003, (67):567-590.
[9]吴文峰,吴冲峰、刘晓微.中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值.经济研究,2008,(7)：130-141.
[10]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理.管理世界,2005,(7)：123-147.
[11]Butler A., Fauver l.,Mortal S.Corruption, political connections and municipal finance. SSRN Paper,2007.
[12]Hart Oliver. Firm, contracts, and financial structure. London:Oxford University Press,1995.
[13]Agrawal A. and Knoeber C.R.. Do some outside directors play a political role? Journal of Law and Economics,2001,44(1):179-198.
[14]Roberts, Brian E..Adead senator tells no lies:Senior and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science.1990,34((1):31-58.
[15]Khwaja A., Mian A.. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent-seeking in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005, (120): 1371-1411.
[16]Jayachandran, Seema.The Jeffords effect [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 2006,49(2):397-425.
[17]Goldman E., Rocholl J,So J.. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2331-2360.
[18]Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Sehoar A., Thesmar D.. Politically connected CEOs and corporate out comes:Evidence from Franee. Working paper,2004.
[19]K. M. Faccio, D.C. Parsley. The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms, Working Paper,2007.
[20]Bushman R.M., Piotroskl J.D., Smith A.J..What Determines corporate transparency? Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(2):207-252.
[21]Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, Hao Zhang. Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia. Journal Accounting and public policy,2006, (25):574-595.
[22]Helland E.A., Sykuta M.. Regulation and the evolution of corporate boards: monitoring, advising or window dressing. Journal of Law and Economics,2004,47 (1):167-193.
[23]Boubakri M., J.C. Cosset, W. Saffar. Political connections of newly privatized firms. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14:654-673.
[24]Faccio. The characteristics of politically connected firms,2006, Working paper, Vanderbilt University.
[25]Dinc I. Serdar. Politicians and banks:Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging countries. Journal of Financial Economics,2005, (77):453-479.
[26]Leuz C., Oberholzer-Gee F.. Political relationships, global financing and corporate transparency:Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics,2006, (81): 411-439.
[27]Sapienza, Paola. The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending. Journal of Financial Economics,2004, (72):357-384.
[28]Charumilind C., Kali R. and Wiwattanakantang Y.. Connected lending:Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business,2006, (79):181-218.
[29]Faccio M.. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review,2007,96(1): 369-386.
[30]Claessens S., Feijen E.and Laeven L.. Political connections and preferential access to finance:the role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economies,2000, (6):554-580.
[31]Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, Dev Mishra. Political connections and the cost of equity capital. Working paper,2008.
[32]Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, Hao Zhang. Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia. Journal Accounting and public policy,006, (25):574-595.
[33]Chaney, Faccio M., Parsley. The equality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Vanderbilt University, Working paper,2008.
[34]Shimin Chen, Zheng Sun, Song Tang. Political connections and invest efficiency: Evidence from SOEs and private Enterprises in China. Working paper,2009.
[35]Goldman, Rocholl So. Political connections and the allocation of procurement contracts. Indiana University,Working paper,2008.
[36]Wijantini. A test of the relationship between political connection and indirect costs of Financial Distress in Indonesia. Asian Academy of management Journal of Accounting and Finance,2007, (3):61-81.
[37]Faccio M., Masulis R.W., McConnell J.J.. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance,2006, (61):2597-2635.
[38]Ferguson, Thomas, Hans-Joachim Voth. Betting on Hitler-The value of political connections in Nazi Germany. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1): 101-137.
[39]Charumilind C., Kali R., Wiwattanakantang Y..Connected lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis. Journal of Business,2006, (79):181-218.
[40]Knight B.. Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 presidential election. Journal of Public Economics,2007, (91):389-409.
[41]Cooper M.J., Gulen H., Ovtchinnikov A.V.. Corporate political contributions and stock returns. Working paper,2006.
[42]Faccio & Parsley. Sudden deaths:Taking stock of geographic ties, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2007,41(1):197-220.
[43]Boubakri, Cosset & Saffar. Politically connected firms, Working paper,2008, HEC Montreal.
[44]Eun Kyong Choi, Kate Xiao Zhou. Entrepreneurs and Politics in the Chinese Transitional Economy:Political Connections and Rent-seeking. The China Review,2001,1(1):76-98.
[45]石晓乐,许年行.公司财务与政治关联研究进展.经济学动态,2009,(11)：35-40.
[46]胡星斗.论政企不分与政企分开.中国矿业大学学报,2001,(3):70-74.
[47]陈清泰.实行政企分开,为国有企业走向市场创造条件.中国工业经济,1998,(12)：5-8.
[48]王珺.政企关系演变的实证逻辑——我国政企分开的三阶段假说.经济研究,1999,(11：69-76.
[49]吴敬琏.自主企业制度：我国市场经济体制的基础.中国工业经济研究,1993,(1)：4-10.
[50]银温泉.政企分开的可行性研究.经济研究,1998,(2)：38-45.
[51]肖兴志,刘宝宏.国有企业政企关系再探讨.中国工业经济,1998,(1):74-77.
[52]孙亚忠.关于政企分开的系统分析.南京大学学报,2000,(6):151-156.
[53]曾万友.政企关系的变革与对策研究.经济理论与经济管理,1998(3)：8-13.
[54]井润田、唐小我.我国国有企业与政府间关系的研究.经济体制改革,1999,(5)：68-71.
[55]管益忻.关于政企分开的深层思考.经济研究,1994(7)：8-13.
[56赵经彻.国有企业建立现代企业制度的思考与探索.管理世界,2000(2)：86-92.
[57]田志龙.公司政治行为：西方相关研究的综述与评价.中国软科学,2003,(2)：68-73.
[58]高勇强,田志龙.政治环境、战略利益与公司政治行为.管理科学,2004,(2):1-6.
[59]王亮,赵定涛.企业-政府互动依赖关系与企业政治行为.公共管理学报,2003,(3)：12-17.
[60]卫武.我国企业政治策略与企业政治绩效的关联性研究,2004,华中科大学博士学位论文.
[61]卫武,田志龙,刘晶.我国企业经营活动中的政治关联性研究.中国工业经济,2004,(4)
[62]田志龙,高勇强,卫武.中国企业政治策略与行为研究.管理世界,2003,(12)：98-106.
[63]万庆良,蓝海林,叶广宇.政治资源与民营企业总部搬迁.科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(1)：131-137.
[64]卫武,李克克.基于政府角色转换的企业政治资源、策略与绩效之间的相互影响.管理科学学报,2009,(4)：31-43.
[65]胡旭旭.民营企业的政治关联及其经济效应分析.经济理论与经济管理,2010,(2)：74-79.
[66]王庆文,吴世农.政治关系对公司业绩的影响,中国第七届会计实证国际研讨会.
[67]罗党论,唐清泉.政治关系、社会资本与政策资源获取.世界经济,2009, (7)：84-96.
[68]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系,制度环境与民营企业银行贷款.管理世界,2008,(8)：9-21.
[69]陈运森,朱松.政治关系、制度环境与上市公司资本投资.财经研究,2009,(12)：27-39.
[70]唐建新,苏磊,潘红波.融资约束与政治关系.财会通讯,2010,(1):109-112.
[71]Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun. Political connections and the process of going public:Evidence from China. Journal of International Money and Finance,2009, (28):696-719.
[73]宁宇新,柯大钢.基于政治关系的企业债务融资结构研究.统计与决策,2009,(11)：135-137.
[74]谭劲松,陈艳艳,谭燕.地方上市公司数量、经济影响力与企业长期借款.中国会计评论,2010,8(1)：31-50.
[75]吴水亭,徐扬.发行管制下政治关系对民企再融资择时行为的影响.系统工程,2010,28(2)：55-62.
[76]肖浩,夏新平.政府干预、政治关联与权益资本成本.管理学报,2010,(6)：921-929.
[77]胡旭旭.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利.管理世界,2006,(5)：107-113.
[78]罗党论,唐清泉.中国民营上市公司制度环境与绩效问题研究.经济研究,2009,(2)：106-118.
[79]罗党论,刘晓龙.行业壁垒、政治关系与企业绩效.管理世界,2009,(5)：33-42.
[80]蔡地,万迪日方.民营企业家政治关联、政府干预与多元化经营.当代经济科学,2009,(11)：17-22.
[81]张敏,黄继承.政治关联、多元化与企业风险.管理世界,2009,(7):156-163.
[82]李善民,越晶晶,刘英.行业机会、政治关联与多元化并购.中大管理,2010,(4)：1-17.
[83]胡旭阳,史晋川.民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资.中国工业经济,2008,(4)：5-14.
[84]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政治背景与税收优惠.管理世界,2009,(3)：134-142.
[85]潘越,戴亦一,李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助.南开管理评论,2009,12(5)：6-17.
[86]李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助,2009,厦门大学硕士学位论文.
[87]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入——来自我国证券市场的经验证据.财经研究,2003,(9)：15-21.
[88]李维安,邱艾超,阎大颖.企业政治关系研究脉络梳理与未来展望.外国经济与管理,2010,32(5)：48-55.
[89]Hongbin Li, Lingsheng Meng, Qian Wang, LiAn Zhou. Political connections, financing and firm performance:Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics,2008, (87):283-299.
[90]姜跃龙.具有政府背景的高官继任影响企业价值吗?.中山大学研究生学刊,2008,(1)：82-89.
[91]罗党论,黄琼宇.民营企业的政治关系与企业价值.管理科学,2008,(12)：21-28.
[92]雷光勇,李书锋,王秀娟.政治关联、审计师选择与公司价值.管理世界,2009,(7)：145-155.
[93]杜兴强,周泽将.政治联系层级与中国民营上市公司真实业绩.经济与管理研究,2009,(8)：37-49.
[94]Fan, Wang, Zhang. Politically—connected CEOs, corporate governance and post—IPO performance of China partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economies,2007, (84):330-357.
[95]邓建平,曾勇.政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗.中国工业经济2009,(2)：98-108.
[96]胡永平,张宗益.高管的政治关联与公司绩效：基于国有电力生产上市公司的经验研究.中国软科学,2009,(6)：128-137.
[97]李维安,邱艾超.民营企业治理转型、政治联系与公司业绩.外国经济与管理,2010,23(4)：1-14.
[98]李维安,邱艾超,古志辉.双重公司治理环境政治联系偏好与公司绩效.中国工业经济,2010,(6)：85-95.
[99]游家兴,徐盼盼,陈淑敏.政治关联、职位壕沟与高管变更.金融研究,2010,(4)：128-124.
[100]贺子龙.不同股权结构下高管的政府背景对公司价值的影响,2009,上海交通大学硕士论文.
[101]任广乾,汪敏达.中国上市公司政治关联度与绩效的实证研究.山西财经大学学报,2010,32(9)：80-87.
[102]潘红波,余明桂.政治关系、控股股东利益输与民营企业绩效.南开管理评论,2010,13(4)：14-27.
[103]杜兴强,周泽将.政治联系与审计师选择.审计研究,2010,(2)：47-53.
[104]陈小林,潘克勤.法律环境、政治关系与审计定价.财贸经济,2007(增刊)：90-95.
[105]潘克勤.实际控制人政治身份、自律型治理与审计需求.审计研究,2010,(4)：57-65.
[106]杜兴强,雷宇,郭剑花.政治联系、政治联系方式与民营上市公司的会计稳健性.中国工业经济,2009,(7)：87-97.
[107]杜兴强,周泽将.政治联系方式与民营上市公司信息透明度.中南财经政法大学学报,2010,(1)：126-131.
[108]杜兴强,杜颖洁.濒死体验、盈余管理、政治联系与朽而不倒.山西财经大学学报,2010,32(7)：70-78.
[109]戈登·塔洛克,李政军(译).关税、垄断和偷窃的福利成本经济.社会体制比较,2001,(1)：47-51.
[110]Krueger A.. The political economy of the rent seeking society. American Economic Review,1974,64 (3):291-303.
[111]Bhagwati J.. Direct unproductive, profit seeking (DUP) activities. Journal of Political Economy,1982,90 (5):988-1002.
[112]Buchanan James M..1983. Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers And Laws of Succession. Journal of Law & Economics,1983,26(1):71-85.
[113]Stigler G.J.. The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,2(1):23-45.
[114]Peltzman S.. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics,1976,19(2):453-465.
[115]Watts R.L., J.L. Zimmerman. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting Review,53(1):112-134.
[116]Jones, Jennifer J. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-230.
[117]Han, Jerry C.Y., Shiing-Wu Wang. Political costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 persian gulf crisis. Accounting Review,1998,73(1): 103-117.
[118]Key, Kimberly Galligan.. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry. Journal of Accounting & Economics,1997, 23(3):309-337.
[119]Makar S.D., Alam P.. Earnings management and antitrust investigations: Political costs over business cycles. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1998,25(5-6):701-722.
[120]Cahan S.F. The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals:A refined test of the political cost hypothesis. The Accounting Review,1992,67(1): 77-95.
[121]张晓东.政治成本、盈余管理及其经济后果.中国工业经济,2008,(8)：109-119.
[122]李红玲.企业效率：理论研究与经验证据.南京农业大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[123]毕泗锋.经济效率理论研究述评.经济评论,2000,(9)：87-90.
[124]约翰·伊特韦尔.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典中文版.北京：经济科学出版社,1996,868-868.
[125]Farrell M.J.. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,1957, (3):252-290.
[126]Buchanan J.. Rent-seeking and profit-seeking.in Buchanan & Tullock(eds.) Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society,(M),Texas A & M University Press,1980.
[127]张军.特权与优惠的经济学分析.上海：立信会计出版社,1995,41—42.
[128]田伟.考虑地方政府因素的企业决策模型.管理世界,2007,(5)：16-23.
[129]李四海.制度环境,政治关系与企业捐赠.中国会计评论,2010,(6)：161-178.
[130]杜兴强,郭剑花,雷宇.政治联系方式与民营企业捐赠.财贸研究,2010,(7)：89-99.
[131]Ming Jia, Difang Wan, Zhe Zhang. Political Connection, Institutional Environment and Corporate Philanthropy. Xian Jiaotong University, woking paper,2008.
[132]梁莱歆,冯延超,杨继伟.民营企业实际控制人政治身份与审计师选择.审计与经济研究,2011,(2)：89-99.
[133]Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H.. Theory of firm:managerial behavior, agency cost and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3 (4):305-360.
[134]Zimmerman J.L.. Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1983,5(1):119-149
[135]Birnbaum J.H., A.S. Murray. Showdown at Gucci Gulch Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the unlikely triumph of tax reform. Random House.1983
[136]Kern B.B., Morris M.H.. Taxes and firm size:The effect of tax legislation during the 1980s.The Journal of the American Taxation Association,1992, (14): 80-96.
[137]Holland K.. Accounting policy choice:The relationship between corporate tax burden and company size. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1998, (25): 265-288.
[138]Derashid C., H. Zhang. Effective tax rates and the industrial policy hypothesis evidence from Malaysia. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 2003,12(1):45-62.
[139]Shevlin T., Porter S.. The corporate tax comeback in 1987 some further evidence. The Journal of the American Taxation Association,1992,14(1):58-79.
[140]Gupta S., K. Newberry. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rate:evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1997,16(1):1-39
[141]王延明.上市公司实际所得税影响因素分析.经济管理,2003,(20):79-97.
[142]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负.经济研究,2009,(10)：109-120.
[143]胡星斗.http://www.huxingdou.com.cn/
[144]Stickney C.P., McGee V. E.. Effective corporate tax rates:The effect of size, capital intensity, leverage and other factors. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1982,(2):125-152.
[145]Shliefer, Andrei and Robert W.Vishny. Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994, (109):995-1025.
[146]Xu, Linxin Colin, Tian Zhu and Yimin Lin. Political Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform.Economics of Transition,2005,13(1):1-24.
[147]Li, David D., Mingsong Liang. Causes of the soft budget constraint:Evidence on three explanations. Journal of Comparative Economics,1998, (26):104-116.
[148]曾庆生,陈信元.国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本.经济研究,2006,(5)：74-86
[149]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩.管理世界,2008,(10)：96-105
[150]Boycko M., A. Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. Theory of privatization. Economic Journal,1996, (106):309-319.
[151]潘克勤.实际控制人政治身份降低债权人对会计信息的依赖吗.南开管理评论,2009,(12)：38-46.
[152]Heckman, J. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica,1979, 47(1):153-61.
[153]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数—各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.
[154]Cai H., H. Fang, L. Xu. Eat, drink, firms and government:an investigation of corruption from entertainment expenditures of Chinese firms, Working Paper,2005.
[155]万华林.非生产性支出：理论分析与政策含义.会计之友,2008,(10)：14-15.
[156]万华林、陈信元.治理环境、企业寻租与交易成本.经济学,2010,(1)：553-570.
[157]Anderson M., R. Banker, R. Huang, S. Janakiraman. Cost behavior and fundamental analysis of SG&A costs. Working Paper,2006.
[158]Jensen M.. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economics Review,1986(76):323-329.
[159]Hambrick D.C., Daveni R.A.. Top team deterioration as part of the downward spiral of large corporate bankruptcies. Management Science,1992, (10):1445-1466.
[160]姜付秀,伊志宏,苏飞,黄磊.管理者背景特征与企业过度投资行为.管理世界,2009,(1)：130-139.
[161]王国生.转型时期地方政府面临的制度环境及其市场地位分析.南京社会科学,1999(11)：9-14
[162]张维迎.企业寻求政府支持的成本、收益分析.新西部,2001(8)：55-56.
[163]Heaton J. B.. Managerial optimism and corporate finance. Financial Management,2002, (31):33-45.
[164]汪德华,周晓艳.管理者过度自信与企业投资扭曲.山西财经大学学报,2007,(4),56-61.
[165]王霞,张敏,于富生.管理者过度自信与企业投资行为异化.南开管理评论,2008,(2)：77-83.
[166]Richardson S.. Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,(11):159-189.
[167]唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静.上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究.会计研究,2007,(7)：44-52.
[168]李鑫.自由现金流、现金股利与中国上市公司过度投资.证券市场导报,2007,(10)：55-59.
[169]罗进辉,万迪日方,蔡地.大股东治理与管理者过度投资行为研究.证券市场导报,2008,(12)：44-50.
[170]林青松,李实.企业效率理论与中国企业的效率,经济研究,1996,(7):
[171]Richard E. Caves, David R. Barton. Efficiency in U.S. manufacturing industries. Cambridge, MA. The MIT Press,1990.
[172]Aigner D.J., Lovell C.A.K., Schmidt P..Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Product on Functions Models. Journal of Econometrics,1977, (61):21-37.
[173]Battese, G.E., Coelli T.J., Frontier production functions, technical efficiency and panel data:with application to paddy farmers india. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 1992, (5):153-169.
[174]Battese G.E., Coelli T.J., A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic production frontier for paneldata. Empirical Ecnomics,1995, (20):325-332.
[175]王晓东,赵京力升.基于SFA的我国高科技上市公司技术效率及其影响的因素分析.工业技术经济,2007,(11)：145-157
[176]Roland G.2000 Transition and Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology(中译本).北京：北京大学出版社,2002.
[177]姚伟峰,鲁桐,何枫.股权分置改革、管理层激励与企业效率.世界经济,2009,(12)：77-86.
②数据引自中国广播网http://www.cnr.cn/gsfw/gsxw/kx/200910/t20091014_505509906.html
①转引自罗志荣：优化企业政治环境,《企业文明》,2003年第3期
[1]张建君,张志学.中国民营企业家的政治战略.管理世界,2005,(7):94-105.
[2]胡星斗.特权垄断：国家的一块心病.同舟共进.2007,(2)16-19.
[3]Faccio M. Politically Connected Firms:Can they squeeze the state? American Economic Review,2006, (96):369-386.
[4]罗党论,甄丽明.民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束.金融研究,2008,(12)：164-178.
[5]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性.经济研究,2010,(3)：65-77.
[6]戈登·塔洛克,寻租-对寻租活动的经济学分析,西南财经大学出版社,1999:31-77.
[7]Fisman, Raymond. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review,2001,91(4):1095-1102.
[8]S. Johnson, T. Mitton. Cronyism and capital controls:Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics,2003, (67):567-590.
[9]吴文峰,吴冲峰、刘晓微.中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值.经济研究,2008,(7)：130-141.
[10]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理.管理世界,2005,(7)：123-147.
[11]Butler A., Fauver l.,Mortal S.Corruption, political connections and municipal finance. SSRN Paper,2007.
[12]Hart Oliver. Firm, contracts, and financial structure. London:Oxford University Press,1995.
[13]Agrawal A. and Knoeber C.R.. Do some outside directors play a political role? Journal of Law and Economics,2001,44(1):179-198.
[14]Roberts, Brian E..Adead senator tells no lies:Senior and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science.1990,34((1):31-58.
[15]Khwaja A., Mian A.. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent-seeking in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005, (120): 1371-1411.
[16]Jayachandran, Seema.The Jeffords effect [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 2006,49(2):397-425.
[17]Goldman E., Rocholl J,So J.. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2331-2360.
[18]Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Sehoar A., Thesmar D.. Politically connected CEOs and corporate out comes:Evidence from Franee. Working paper,2004.
[19]K. M. Faccio, D.C. Parsley. The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms, Working Paper,2007.
[20]Bushman R.M., Piotroskl J.D., Smith A.J..What Determines corporate transparency? Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(2):207-252.
[21]Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, Hao Zhang. Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia. Journal Accounting and public policy,2006, (25):574-595.
[22]Helland E.A., Sykuta M.. Regulation and the evolution of corporate boards: monitoring, advising or window dressing. Journal of Law and Economics,2004,47 (1):167-193.
[23]Boubakri M., J.C. Cosset, W. Saffar. Political connections of newly privatized firms. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14:654-673.
[24]Faccio. The characteristics of politically connected firms,2006, Working paper, Vanderbilt University.
[25]Dinc I. Serdar. Politicians and banks:Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging countries. Journal of Financial Economics,2005, (77):453-479.
[26]Leuz C., Oberholzer-Gee F.. Political relationships, global financing and corporate transparency:Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics,2006, (81): 411-439.
[27]Sapienza, Paola. The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending. Journal of Financial Economics,2004, (72):357-384.
[28]Charumilind C., Kali R. and Wiwattanakantang Y.. Connected lending:Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business,2006, (79):181-218.
[29]Faccio M.. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review,2007,96(1): 369-386.
[30]Claessens S., Feijen E.and Laeven L.. Political connections and preferential access to finance:the role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economies,2000, (6):554-580.
[31]Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, Dev Mishra. Political connections and the cost of equity capital. Working paper,2008.
[32]Ajay Adhikari, Chek Derashid, Hao Zhang. Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia. Journal Accounting and public policy,006, (25):574-595.
[33]Chaney, Faccio M., Parsley. The equality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Vanderbilt University, Working paper,2008.
[34]Shimin Chen, Zheng Sun, Song Tang. Political connections and invest efficiency: Evidence from SOEs and private Enterprises in China. Working paper,2009.
[35]Goldman, Rocholl So. Political connections and the allocation of procurement contracts. Indiana University,Working paper,2008.
[36]Wijantini. A test of the relationship between political connection and indirect costs of Financial Distress in Indonesia. Asian Academy of management Journal of Accounting and Finance,2007, (3):61-81.
[37]Faccio M., Masulis R.W., McConnell J.J.. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance,2006, (61):2597-2635.
[38]Ferguson, Thomas, Hans-Joachim Voth. Betting on Hitler-The value of political connections in Nazi Germany. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1): 101-137.
[39]Charumilind C., Kali R., Wiwattanakantang Y..Connected lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis. Journal of Business,2006, (79):181-218.
[40]Knight B.. Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 presidential election. Journal of Public Economics,2007, (91):389-409.
[41]Cooper M.J., Gulen H., Ovtchinnikov A.V.. Corporate political contributions and stock returns. Working paper,2006.
[42]Faccio & Parsley. Sudden deaths:Taking stock of geographic ties, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2007,41(1):197-220.
[43]Boubakri, Cosset & Saffar. Politically connected firms, Working paper,2008, HEC Montreal.
[44]Eun Kyong Choi, Kate Xiao Zhou. Entrepreneurs and Politics in the Chinese Transitional Economy:Political Connections and Rent-seeking. The China Review,2001,1(1):76-98.
[45]石晓乐,许年行.公司财务与政治关联研究进展.经济学动态,2009,(11)：35-40.
[46]胡星斗.论政企不分与政企分开.中国矿业大学学报,2001,(3):70-74.
[47]陈清泰.实行政企分开,为国有企业走向市场创造条件.中国工业经济,1998,(12)：5-8.
[48]王珺.政企关系演变的实证逻辑——我国政企分开的三阶段假说.经济研究,1999,(11：69-76.
[49]吴敬琏.自主企业制度：我国市场经济体制的基础.中国工业经济研究,1993,(1)：4-10.
[50]银温泉.政企分开的可行性研究.经济研究,1998,(2)：38-45.
[51]肖兴志,刘宝宏.国有企业政企关系再探讨.中国工业经济,1998,(1):74-77.
[52]孙亚忠.关于政企分开的系统分析.南京大学学报,2000,(6):151-156.
[53]曾万友.政企关系的变革与对策研究.经济理论与经济管理,1998(3)：8-13.
[54]井润田、唐小我.我国国有企业与政府间关系的研究.经济体制改革,1999,(5)：68-71.
[55]管益忻.关于政企分开的深层思考.经济研究,1994(7)：8-13.
[56赵经彻.国有企业建立现代企业制度的思考与探索.管理世界,2000(2)：86-92.
[57]田志龙.公司政治行为：西方相关研究的综述与评价.中国软科学,2003,(2)：68-73.
[58]高勇强,田志龙.政治环境、战略利益与公司政治行为.管理科学,2004,(2):1-6.
[59]王亮,赵定涛.企业-政府互动依赖关系与企业政治行为.公共管理学报,2003,(3)：12-17.
[60]卫武.我国企业政治策略与企业政治绩效的关联性研究,2004,华中科大学博士学位论文.
[61]卫武,田志龙,刘晶.我国企业经营活动中的政治关联性研究.中国工业经济,2004,(4)
[62]田志龙,高勇强,卫武.中国企业政治策略与行为研究.管理世界,2003,(12)：98-106.
[63]万庆良,蓝海林,叶广宇.政治资源与民营企业总部搬迁.科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(1)：131-137.
[64]卫武,李克克.基于政府角色转换的企业政治资源、策略与绩效之间的相互影响.管理科学学报,2009,(4)：31-43.
[65]胡旭旭.民营企业的政治关联及其经济效应分析.经济理论与经济管理,2010,(2)：74-79.
[66]王庆文,吴世农.政治关系对公司业绩的影响,中国第七届会计实证国际研讨会.
[67]罗党论,唐清泉.政治关系、社会资本与政策资源获取.世界经济,2009, (7)：84-96.
[68]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系,制度环境与民营企业银行贷款.管理世界,2008,(8)：9-21.
[69]陈运森,朱松.政治关系、制度环境与上市公司资本投资.财经研究,2009,(12)：27-39.
[70]唐建新,苏磊,潘红波.融资约束与政治关系.财会通讯,2010,(1):109-112.
[71]Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun. Political connections and the process of going public:Evidence from China. Journal of International Money and Finance,2009, (28):696-719.
[73]宁宇新,柯大钢.基于政治关系的企业债务融资结构研究.统计与决策,2009,(11)：135-137.
[74]谭劲松,陈艳艳,谭燕.地方上市公司数量、经济影响力与企业长期借款.中国会计评论,2010,8(1)：31-50.
[75]吴水亭,徐扬.发行管制下政治关系对民企再融资择时行为的影响.系统工程,2010,28(2)：55-62.
[76]肖浩,夏新平.政府干预、政治关联与权益资本成本.管理学报,2010,(6)：921-929.
[77]胡旭旭.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利.管理世界,2006,(5)：107-113.
[78]罗党论,唐清泉.中国民营上市公司制度环境与绩效问题研究.经济研究,2009,(2)：106-118.
[79]罗党论,刘晓龙.行业壁垒、政治关系与企业绩效.管理世界,2009,(5)：33-42.
[80]蔡地,万迪日方.民营企业家政治关联、政府干预与多元化经营.当代经济科学,2009,(11)：17-22.
[81]张敏,黄继承.政治关联、多元化与企业风险.管理世界,2009,(7):156-163.
[82]李善民,越晶晶,刘英.行业机会、政治关联与多元化并购.中大管理,2010,(4)：1-17.
[83]胡旭阳,史晋川.民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资.中国工业经济,2008,(4)：5-14.
[84]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政治背景与税收优惠.管理世界,2009,(3)：134-142.
[85]潘越,戴亦一,李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助.南开管理评论,2009,12(5)：6-17.
[86]李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助,2009,厦门大学硕士学位论文.
[87]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入——来自我国证券市场的经验证据.财经研究,2003,(9)：15-21.
[88]李维安,邱艾超,阎大颖.企业政治关系研究脉络梳理与未来展望.外国经济与管理,2010,32(5)：48-55.
[89]Hongbin Li, Lingsheng Meng, Qian Wang, LiAn Zhou. Political connections, financing and firm performance:Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics,2008, (87):283-299.
[90]姜跃龙.具有政府背景的高官继任影响企业价值吗?.中山大学研究生学刊,2008,(1)：82-89.
[91]罗党论,黄琼宇.民营企业的政治关系与企业价值.管理科学,2008,(12)：21-28.
[92]雷光勇,李书锋,王秀娟.政治关联、审计师选择与公司价值.管理世界,2009,(7)：145-155.
[93]杜兴强,周泽将.政治联系层级与中国民营上市公司真实业绩.经济与管理研究,2009,(8)：37-49.
[94]Fan, Wang, Zhang. Politically—connected CEOs, corporate governance and post—IPO performance of China partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economies,2007, (84):330-357.
[95]邓建平,曾勇.政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗.中国工业经济2009,(2)：98-108.
[96]胡永平,张宗益.高管的政治关联与公司绩效：基于国有电力生产上市公司的经验研究.中国软科学,2009,(6)：128-137.
[97]李维安,邱艾超.民营企业治理转型、政治联系与公司业绩.外国经济与管理,2010,23(4)：1-14.
[98]李维安,邱艾超,古志辉.双重公司治理环境政治联系偏好与公司绩效.中国工业经济,2010,(6)：85-95.
[99]游家兴,徐盼盼,陈淑敏.政治关联、职位壕沟与高管变更.金融研究,2010,(4)：128-124.
[100]贺子龙.不同股权结构下高管的政府背景对公司价值的影响,2009,上海交通大学硕士论文.
[101]任广乾,汪敏达.中国上市公司政治关联度与绩效的实证研究.山西财经大学学报,2010,32(9)：80-87.
[102]潘红波,余明桂.政治关系、控股股东利益输与民营企业绩效.南开管理评论,2010,13(4)：14-27.
[103]杜兴强,周泽将.政治联系与审计师选择.审计研究,2010,(2)：47-53.
[104]陈小林,潘克勤.法律环境、政治关系与审计定价.财贸经济,2007(增刊)：90-95.
[105]潘克勤.实际控制人政治身份、自律型治理与审计需求.审计研究,2010,(4)：57-65.
[106]杜兴强,雷宇,郭剑花.政治联系、政治联系方式与民营上市公司的会计稳健性.中国工业经济,2009,(7)：87-97.
[107]杜兴强,周泽将.政治联系方式与民营上市公司信息透明度.中南财经政法大学学报,2010,(1)：126-131.
[108]杜兴强,杜颖洁.濒死体验、盈余管理、政治联系与朽而不倒.山西财经大学学报,2010,32(7)：70-78.
[109]戈登·塔洛克,李政军(译).关税、垄断和偷窃的福利成本经济.社会体制比较,2001,(1)：47-51.
[110]Krueger A.. The political economy of the rent seeking society. American Economic Review,1974,64 (3):291-303.
[111]Bhagwati J.. Direct unproductive, profit seeking (DUP) activities. Journal of Political Economy,1982,90 (5):988-1002.
[112]Buchanan James M..1983. Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers And Laws of Succession. Journal of Law & Economics,1983,26(1):71-85.
[113]Stigler G.J.. The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,2(1):23-45.
[114]Peltzman S.. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics,1976,19(2):453-465.
[115]Watts R.L., J.L. Zimmerman. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting Review,53(1):112-134.
[116]Jones, Jennifer J. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-230.
[117]Han, Jerry C.Y., Shiing-Wu Wang. Political costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 persian gulf crisis. Accounting Review,1998,73(1): 103-117.
[118]Key, Kimberly Galligan.. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry. Journal of Accounting & Economics,1997, 23(3):309-337.
[119]Makar S.D., Alam P.. Earnings management and antitrust investigations: Political costs over business cycles. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1998,25(5-6):701-722.
[120]Cahan S.F. The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals:A refined test of the political cost hypothesis. The Accounting Review,1992,67(1): 77-95.
[121]张晓东.政治成本、盈余管理及其经济后果.中国工业经济,2008,(8)：109-119.
[122]李红玲.企业效率：理论研究与经验证据.南京农业大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[123]毕泗锋.经济效率理论研究述评.经济评论,2000,(9)：87-90.
[124]约翰·伊特韦尔.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典中文版.北京：经济科学出版社,1996,868-868.
[125]Farrell M.J.. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,1957, (3):252-290.
[126]Buchanan J.. Rent-seeking and profit-seeking.in Buchanan & Tullock(eds.) Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society,(M),Texas A & M University Press,1980.
[127]张军.特权与优惠的经济学分析.上海：立信会计出版社,1995,41—42.
[128]田伟.考虑地方政府因素的企业决策模型.管理世界,2007,(5)：16-23.
[129]李四海.制度环境,政治关系与企业捐赠.中国会计评论,2010,(6)：161-178.
[130]杜兴强,郭剑花,雷宇.政治联系方式与民营企业捐赠.财贸研究,2010,(7)：89-99.
[131]Ming Jia, Difang Wan, Zhe Zhang. Political Connection, Institutional Environment and Corporate Philanthropy. Xian Jiaotong University, woking paper,2008.
[132]梁莱歆,冯延超,杨继伟.民营企业实际控制人政治身份与审计师选择.审计与经济研究,2011,(2)：89-99.
[133]Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H.. Theory of firm:managerial behavior, agency cost and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3 (4):305-360.
[134]Zimmerman J.L.. Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1983,5(1):119-149
[135]Birnbaum J.H., A.S. Murray. Showdown at Gucci Gulch Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the unlikely triumph of tax reform. Random House.1983
[136]Kern B.B., Morris M.H.. Taxes and firm size:The effect of tax legislation during the 1980s.The Journal of the American Taxation Association,1992, (14): 80-96.
[137]Holland K.. Accounting policy choice:The relationship between corporate tax burden and company size. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1998, (25): 265-288.
[138]Derashid C., H. Zhang. Effective tax rates and the industrial policy hypothesis evidence from Malaysia. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 2003,12(1):45-62.
[139]Shevlin T., Porter S.. The corporate tax comeback in 1987 some further evidence. The Journal of the American Taxation Association,1992,14(1):58-79.
[140]Gupta S., K. Newberry. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rate:evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1997,16(1):1-39
[141]王延明.上市公司实际所得税影响因素分析.经济管理,2003,(20):79-97.
[142]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负.经济研究,2009,(10)：109-120.
[143]胡星斗.http://www.huxingdou.com.cn/
[144]Stickney C.P., McGee V. E.. Effective corporate tax rates:The effect of size, capital intensity, leverage and other factors. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1982,(2):125-152.
[145]Shliefer, Andrei and Robert W.Vishny. Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994, (109):995-1025.
[146]Xu, Linxin Colin, Tian Zhu and Yimin Lin. Political Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform.Economics of Transition,2005,13(1):1-24.
[147]Li, David D., Mingsong Liang. Causes of the soft budget constraint:Evidence on three explanations. Journal of Comparative Economics,1998, (26):104-116.
[148]曾庆生,陈信元.国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本.经济研究,2006,(5)：74-86
[149]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩.管理世界,2008,(10)：96-105
[150]Boycko M., A. Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. Theory of privatization. Economic Journal,1996, (106):309-319.
[151]潘克勤.实际控制人政治身份降低债权人对会计信息的依赖吗.南开管理评论,2009,(12)：38-46.
[152]Heckman, J. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica,1979, 47(1):153-61.
[153]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数—各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.
[154]Cai H., H. Fang, L. Xu. Eat, drink, firms and government:an investigation of corruption from entertainment expenditures of Chinese firms, Working Paper,2005.
[155]万华林.非生产性支出：理论分析与政策含义.会计之友,2008,(10)：14-15.
[156]万华林、陈信元.治理环境、企业寻租与交易成本.经济学,2010,(1)：553-570.
[157]Anderson M., R. Banker, R. Huang, S. Janakiraman. Cost behavior and fundamental analysis of SG&A costs. Working Paper,2006.
[158]Jensen M.. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economics Review,1986(76):323-329.
[159]Hambrick D.C., Daveni R.A.. Top team deterioration as part of the downward spiral of large corporate bankruptcies. Management Science,1992, (10):1445-1466.
[160]姜付秀,伊志宏,苏飞,黄磊.管理者背景特征与企业过度投资行为.管理世界,2009,(1)：130-139.
[161]王国生.转型时期地方政府面临的制度环境及其市场地位分析.南京社会科学,1999(11)：9-14
[162]张维迎.企业寻求政府支持的成本、收益分析.新西部,2001(8)：55-56.
[163]Heaton J. B.. Managerial optimism and corporate finance. Financial Management,2002, (31):33-45.
[164]汪德华,周晓艳.管理者过度自信与企业投资扭曲.山西财经大学学报,2007,(4),56-61.
[165]王霞,张敏,于富生.管理者过度自信与企业投资行为异化.南开管理评论,2008,(2)：77-83.
[166]Richardson S.. Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,(11):159-189.
[167]唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静.上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究.会计研究,2007,(7)：44-52.
[168]李鑫.自由现金流、现金股利与中国上市公司过度投资.证券市场导报,2007,(10)：55-59.
[169]罗进辉,万迪日方,蔡地.大股东治理与管理者过度投资行为研究.证券市场导报,2008,(12)：44-50.
[170]林青松,李实.企业效率理论与中国企业的效率,经济研究,1996,(7):
[171]Richard E. Caves, David R. Barton. Efficiency in U.S. manufacturing industries. Cambridge, MA. The MIT Press,1990.
[172]Aigner D.J., Lovell C.A.K., Schmidt P..Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Product on Functions Models. Journal of Econometrics,1977, (61):21-37.
[173]Battese, G.E., Coelli T.J., Frontier production functions, technical efficiency and panel data:with application to paddy farmers india. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 1992, (5):153-169.
[174]Battese G.E., Coelli T.J., A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic production frontier for paneldata. Empirical Ecnomics,1995, (20):325-332.
[175]王晓东,赵京力升.基于SFA的我国高科技上市公司技术效率及其影响的因素分析.工业技术经济,2007,(11)：145-157
[176]Roland G.2000 Transition and Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology(中译本).北京：北京大学出版社,2002.
[177]姚伟峰,鲁桐,何枫.股权分置改革、管理层激励与企业效率.世界经济,2009,(12)：77-86.