我国环境资源可持续利用的机制设计研究
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摘要
人类活动范围的增大以及改造自然能力的提升正在对整个地球的环境承载能力提出严峻挑战,地球环境资源系统正面临无法回避的系统性风险,环境危机已成为制约经济和社会发展的瓶颈,环境资源将成为最重要的战略资源。传统经济模式下的社会生产方式和运行机制必将受到挑战,生态文明时代即将到来。在充分尊重自然和社会规律的基础之上,本文运用机制设计理论,设计出包含协调机制、市场交易机制、宏观调控机制、科技创新体机制、人才引进机制在内的环境资源可持续利用机制,以解决经济发展与环境保护之间的矛盾,协调相关利益冲突。
协调机制充分考虑到时间和空间的统一性以及资源配置的公平和效率问题,力求实现各机制的相互补充与协调,使各机制共同构成有机整体。市场交易机制包括产权机制、排污权交易机制、低碳交易机制、补偿与合作机制和可持续性消费机制,通过市场交易机制设计可以实现环境资源利用的经济效率。宏观调控机制可以转变政府职、避免政府失灵,通过建立健全绿色财政、税收体系引导微观主体行为,通过引入环境统计和核算方法可以加强对环境利用的实时监控、建立绿色审计与考评体系可以引导各级政府的树立绿色行政理念。科技创新机制充分运用知识扩散的微观机理与乘数效应,积极调动科技创新主体的源动力,完成在企业、行业和区域以及国家层面机制设计,为环境资源可持续利用和新型资源的开发提供动力。人才引进机制从人才引进、利用再到人才激励提供了有效的平台,构建人才流动的良好通道,为环境资源可持续利用提供智力支持,可以实现人与自然的良性互动。
With the increasing territory of human and the improving ability of transforming nature, the carrying capacity of the Earth's environment is facing the baptism, a systemic risk happened to the environmental resources of the global system. Therefore, ecological resources and climate resources have become the most important strategic resources. In the context of globalization and knowledge-based economy, the information civilization, the ecological civilization and the industrial civilization appear at the same time, impacting the using patterns of environmental resources and the operation of human society.
In front of the environmental crisis, a great deal of resolution such as "Rio de Janeiro agreement" in 1992 "Kyoto Protocol" in 1997 "Bali road map" in 2007, "Copenhagen Protocol" in 2009, have been proposed by the international community. However, no reasonable mechanism has been established, resulting with unavoidable issues to the sustainable development of socio-economic. Meanwhile, facing the U.S. subprime-induced financial crisis, many developed countries are stepping up green technology innovation, and a new round of technological competition has already intensified. Whether can we seize this historic opportunity or not will have far-reaching impact of our country’s future. As a developing country, China is facing the problems of designing a reasonable mechanism to address the conflict between the economic development and environmental protection and how to assume responsibility for international environmental issues.
The theory of Mechanism Design can fully overcome misunderstanding of the traditional economic on the understanding of environmental resources, and achieve the transcendence in the arrangement of environmental resources. Mechanism design theory makes full use of game theory, information economics. Economic efficiency and effective are improved by designing new modes of production and transaction. Effective solutions were addressed to the arrangement of environmental resource from the time and space dimensions, and the coordination among different interests. The strict assumes of the traditional economic theory is relaxed. And the best mechanism designs was chosen from the various pros and cons ones. Recognizing the limitations of the market trading mechanisms, it pointed out that the efficiencies of the government's macroeconomic regulation and control and other non-market-based mechanism design can also be maximized.
Column methods from the market mechanisms to the collective action of game theory are provided by the mechanism design theory, which takes the institution design as a process of non-cooperative game, and the best institution was filtered out through comparing different mechanisms. Therefore, mechanism design theory can reconcile the contradiction between existing theories, and has advantage relative to traditional theory, and the study of sustainable mechanism design on environmental resources can be also useful in other fields. On the base of understanding the basic role of environmental resources in economic growth, one must recognize that the finite nature of environmental resources will become the constraints for sustainable development, and also understand the public goods and value added attributes of environmental. Under the new model of sustainable development, changes to the research paradigm, methods and innovative model should be achieved. The sustainable use of environmental resources is achievable under the utilization of the mechanism design theory.
The Mechanism for the sustainable use of environmental resources is composed of coordination mechanisms, the market trading mechanisms, macro regulation and control mechanisms, technological innovation mechanisms and human resources introduction mechanisms. In this virtuous circle, the coordination mechanism becomes the basis of the mechanism, the market trading mechanism can achieve the efficiency and equity in the use of environmental resources protection, macro regulation and control mechanisms constitute the guidance and supervision duty of environmental resources using, scientific and technological innovation mechanisms provide the impetus for the use of environmental resources, human resources introduction mechanisms achieve the well interaction between the flow of talent resource and environment utilization.
1. Coordination Mechanisms
In the process of mechanism design, the unity of time and space should be fully taken into account, as well as the basic problems of economics equity and efficiency issues, these mechanisms complement with each other and constitute an organic mechanism together.
(1) The application of basic laws of economics. The whole Mechanisms should enhance the linkage and alternative relations among the mechanisms, as well as the multiple needs of the development. The composing mechanisms should interact with each other; they have the relationships of reinforcing and restraint, which can avoid the inevitable drawbacks of a signal mechanism, this can enhance the coordination and efficiency of the whole mechanism.
(2) To respect the objective laws. In the process of mechanism design, the constraints of the objective mandatory and the needs of efficiency enhancement should be noticed. It includes the constraints of the nature’s laws, such as self-purification capacity of the environment, the regeneration level of resource, the carrying capacity of ecosystems and others and the constraints of social factors such as maintain social stability, the coordination of development and social value orientation and so on.
(3) To ensure the effectiveness of mechanism design. The develop degree, sustain degree, and coordinate degree can be used to guide and measure the environmental resource utilization mechanism. In the process of designing, the inherent conflicts and effective evaluation mechanisms are very important for the effective running of mechanisms, special attentions must be paid for the information asymmetry problem, clarifying the relationship between the interests of the main body using the game theories and the adoption of institutional analysis. The mechanism design should adept to the trend of economic globalization, achieving the balance between environmental protection and trade liberalization; so that a country’s economic strength matchs its international environmental responsibility.
2. Market trading mechanisms
(1) Property rights mechanism. Proper property rights mechanism is the premise of formatting the price mechanism of natural resources; also it is the premise of effective operation of market mechanisms. Through the building of property rights mechanisms, compensation mechanism, resource tax system and resources allocation mechanism, a fairly income distribution, restraint and incentive mechanisms can be composed.
(2) The emissions trading mechanism. Under the premise of total control, through the building of well-defined property rights, allocation of emission rights authority, the implementation of emission rights standards and effective information exchange platform,transaction costs saving and efficiency improvement can be achieved.
(3) Low-carbon trading mechanisms. Fully integrating the market space and location advantages, establishing an open carbon trading market can achieve domestic and abroad "win-win" results and mission reduction in the process of introducing capital and technology. Through building the stable growth market mechanisms, making the network transactions and the entity transactions compile with each other, increasing the trading members, expanding carbon trading partners, the development of carbon finance can be achieved
(4) Compensation and cooperation mechanisms. On the basis of systematic environmental resources,the ecological and interest relationships were effectively streamlined in the system, clearing ecological compensation scopes, methods and objects. The institutional guarantees together with the economic cooperation and principles can achieve environmental equity within the system. Using the international assistance, the external transfer payments can address externalities issues of environment. Giving full role of non-governmental organization (NGO) in the environmental resource can well complement the compensation and cooperation mechanisms.
(5) Sustainable consumption mechanism. Consumption can be guided sustainable through updating the consumer concept, developing green consumption preferences, adhering to the principles of sustainable consumption and improving the formal system of laws.
3. Macro-control mechanisms
Government should avoid its drawbacks in the course of environmental resources using. Through the reformation of government management system and restraint mechanism, the macro-control failure and government failure can be prevent, achieving the incentive compatibility between the government regulation and regulation objects.
(1) The transformation of government functions. In the course of energy saving, emission reduction and environmental protection strengthen the coordination and service functions of government can change the philosophy regulatory and build a green government. Environmental policy should be revised in time, the costs of government's regulatory and regulatory effects should be maintained at the optimal level, meanwhile, the systematic, continuity, and cooperating of the policies mechanisms should be emphasized.
(2) Establish a sound green finance, tax system, clear green incentives mechanism. The green procurement system can enhance the conduction and demonstration effect of government actions, and the incentives and leverage of tax can encourage the development and use of energy-saving products, guiding continual behavior of businesses and consumers.
(3) Introduce environmental statistics and accounting methods to enhance real-time monitoring. Environmental data should be got authenticity, continuity, comparability, relevance and systematic, the using of environmental statistics, can achieve the function of controlling and supervision. The strengthening of the accounting of energy consumption at all levels and the green audit of environmental protection can achieve the functions of monitoring, examination and disclosure.
(4) Establish monitoring mechanisms and green evaluation system, and guide all levels of government to establish green administration concept. The evaluation index system of environment resources sustainable utilization consists of the five-index-system including scientific and technological innovation capacity, ecological and environmental protection, resource allocation efficiency, entrepreneurship and human resource allocation efficiency as well as industrial development.
4. Science and technology innovation mechanisms
Environmental crisis provides the incentive for the innovation of technology, institution and organization. At the micro level, complying with the essence of knowledge, innovations generates within the minds and body, and continues to spread by the organizational systems and innovation networks of meso-level, leading to the formation system of national science and technology innovation of macro level. The science and technology innovation mechanism is an integrity mechanism, covering the whole micro, meso and the macro levels.
(1) Technological innovation micro mechanism and its multiplier effect. At the micro level, tacit and explicit knowledge can be translated into each other, and they form knowledge innovation spiral within the organization. The innovation mechanism at the organizations level through the formation of innovation networks, the innovation mechanism can generates social effects by the formation of innovation networks, which expanses on the macro level. And by the scale effect, agglomeration effects, and the multiplier effect, the innovation completes the expansion on the macro level.
(2) The dynamics compositions of technological innovation mechanisms. The mainstay source for scientific and technology innovation is people’s needs, interests, competition and environmental fluctuations. Human inertia and vested interests interference result in the resistance, the inherent inertia becomes the principal balance of scientific and technological innovation mechanism, the innovation sense determines its direction, and the mechanism with systematic characteristic complies with the law of economic evolution.
(3) The dynamic mechanism design of technology innovation. On enterprise-level, the innovation mechanisms include the management mechanism, the individual self-realization mechanism, information transmission mechanism, innovation-oriented mechanism, constraints and incentives mechanism as well as the external environment pressure mechanism. The enterprise technological innovation mechanism has a path-dependent characteristic, the systematic and non-systemic risks the enterprises faces requires them to strengthen cooperation in the competition. At the industry or regional level, business cooperation and competition forms the complex adaptive network of innovative mechanisms, beyond the administrative areas and national boundaries, the innovative mechanisms becomes the regional cooperation and the national innovation mechanisms.
(4) The promotion policies of green technology innovative. The establishment of market economic system should aim at realizing the organic integration and interaction of knowledge innovation, technological innovation and institutional innovation, and establish reasonable and effective patent system, strengthen scientific and technological innovation system, improve knowledge management and enhance R & D investment of resources, give tax policy and financial support to construct the incentives mechanisms of the green technology innovation.
5. The talent introduction mechanisms
Facing the financial crisis and the restructuring of the global intellectual resources, it is necessary to introduce innovation in talent recruiting mechanisms, which is thought to be systematic and comprehensive. Economic theories are introduced to build a long-lasting, dynamic, sustainable mechanism.
(1) Talent introduction to change the mode of economic development. The essence of talent introduction is to introduce different types of intellectual capital and its knowledge. So the talent structures, introduction processes, and the allocation of intellectual resources adapt to the economic growth and the changes of environment.
Talent introduction brings learning effect and competitive effect of knowledge spillovers leading to a concentration of talent effects. Social network helps to strengthen the concentration effect, forming regional innovation effect. In short, talent introduction can conduct the innovation in the market, the formation of human capital, technological innovation and deduce new industries, and results in a cumulative positive cycle.
(2) The specific design of talent introduction mechanism.
The talent introduction mechanism is facing the serious brain drain of our country systematic and standardized lacking, the management and utilization problems and international competition. Talent introduction mechanism design focuses on the building of procedural mechanism and efficiency, providing an effective platform from the source to the using of intelligence. By strengthening the macro-control, the intellectual stimulation, the intermediary services as well as the international exchange and cooperation mechanism the talent introduction countries can achieve the all-round design from the introduction, utilization and motivation of talents.
It should be based on the“common differentiated responsibilities”principle, to promote the transfer of low carbon intellectual. The low-carbon economic should be developed by strengthening the introduction of the improved technology, new energy technologies and carbon capture and storage technology.
In summery, by the systematic design of mechanisms for the sustainable use of environmental resources, this thesis breaks through the limitation of the traditional economic theories. Using the mechanism design theory, it systematically analyses the composing mechanisms of the sustainable use of environmental resources and the internal linkages among the mechanisms, then establish the well targeted and synoptically model. From the economic mechanism, institutional design, government intervention and other perspectives, it designs a multiple-level-mechanism. The dynamic mechanism, implementation mechanism, sustainable mechanisms were deeply excavated, providing a systemic solution to achieve the sustainable use of environmental resources in China.
协调机制充分考虑到时间和空间的统一性以及资源配置的公平和效率问题,力求实现各机制的相互补充与协调,使各机制共同构成有机整体。市场交易机制包括产权机制、排污权交易机制、低碳交易机制、补偿与合作机制和可持续性消费机制,通过市场交易机制设计可以实现环境资源利用的经济效率。宏观调控机制可以转变政府职、避免政府失灵,通过建立健全绿色财政、税收体系引导微观主体行为,通过引入环境统计和核算方法可以加强对环境利用的实时监控、建立绿色审计与考评体系可以引导各级政府的树立绿色行政理念。科技创新机制充分运用知识扩散的微观机理与乘数效应,积极调动科技创新主体的源动力,完成在企业、行业和区域以及国家层面机制设计,为环境资源可持续利用和新型资源的开发提供动力。人才引进机制从人才引进、利用再到人才激励提供了有效的平台,构建人才流动的良好通道,为环境资源可持续利用提供智力支持,可以实现人与自然的良性互动。
With the increasing territory of human and the improving ability of transforming nature, the carrying capacity of the Earth's environment is facing the baptism, a systemic risk happened to the environmental resources of the global system. Therefore, ecological resources and climate resources have become the most important strategic resources. In the context of globalization and knowledge-based economy, the information civilization, the ecological civilization and the industrial civilization appear at the same time, impacting the using patterns of environmental resources and the operation of human society.
In front of the environmental crisis, a great deal of resolution such as "Rio de Janeiro agreement" in 1992 "Kyoto Protocol" in 1997 "Bali road map" in 2007, "Copenhagen Protocol" in 2009, have been proposed by the international community. However, no reasonable mechanism has been established, resulting with unavoidable issues to the sustainable development of socio-economic. Meanwhile, facing the U.S. subprime-induced financial crisis, many developed countries are stepping up green technology innovation, and a new round of technological competition has already intensified. Whether can we seize this historic opportunity or not will have far-reaching impact of our country’s future. As a developing country, China is facing the problems of designing a reasonable mechanism to address the conflict between the economic development and environmental protection and how to assume responsibility for international environmental issues.
The theory of Mechanism Design can fully overcome misunderstanding of the traditional economic on the understanding of environmental resources, and achieve the transcendence in the arrangement of environmental resources. Mechanism design theory makes full use of game theory, information economics. Economic efficiency and effective are improved by designing new modes of production and transaction. Effective solutions were addressed to the arrangement of environmental resource from the time and space dimensions, and the coordination among different interests. The strict assumes of the traditional economic theory is relaxed. And the best mechanism designs was chosen from the various pros and cons ones. Recognizing the limitations of the market trading mechanisms, it pointed out that the efficiencies of the government's macroeconomic regulation and control and other non-market-based mechanism design can also be maximized.
Column methods from the market mechanisms to the collective action of game theory are provided by the mechanism design theory, which takes the institution design as a process of non-cooperative game, and the best institution was filtered out through comparing different mechanisms. Therefore, mechanism design theory can reconcile the contradiction between existing theories, and has advantage relative to traditional theory, and the study of sustainable mechanism design on environmental resources can be also useful in other fields. On the base of understanding the basic role of environmental resources in economic growth, one must recognize that the finite nature of environmental resources will become the constraints for sustainable development, and also understand the public goods and value added attributes of environmental. Under the new model of sustainable development, changes to the research paradigm, methods and innovative model should be achieved. The sustainable use of environmental resources is achievable under the utilization of the mechanism design theory.
The Mechanism for the sustainable use of environmental resources is composed of coordination mechanisms, the market trading mechanisms, macro regulation and control mechanisms, technological innovation mechanisms and human resources introduction mechanisms. In this virtuous circle, the coordination mechanism becomes the basis of the mechanism, the market trading mechanism can achieve the efficiency and equity in the use of environmental resources protection, macro regulation and control mechanisms constitute the guidance and supervision duty of environmental resources using, scientific and technological innovation mechanisms provide the impetus for the use of environmental resources, human resources introduction mechanisms achieve the well interaction between the flow of talent resource and environment utilization.
1. Coordination Mechanisms
In the process of mechanism design, the unity of time and space should be fully taken into account, as well as the basic problems of economics equity and efficiency issues, these mechanisms complement with each other and constitute an organic mechanism together.
(1) The application of basic laws of economics. The whole Mechanisms should enhance the linkage and alternative relations among the mechanisms, as well as the multiple needs of the development. The composing mechanisms should interact with each other; they have the relationships of reinforcing and restraint, which can avoid the inevitable drawbacks of a signal mechanism, this can enhance the coordination and efficiency of the whole mechanism.
(2) To respect the objective laws. In the process of mechanism design, the constraints of the objective mandatory and the needs of efficiency enhancement should be noticed. It includes the constraints of the nature’s laws, such as self-purification capacity of the environment, the regeneration level of resource, the carrying capacity of ecosystems and others and the constraints of social factors such as maintain social stability, the coordination of development and social value orientation and so on.
(3) To ensure the effectiveness of mechanism design. The develop degree, sustain degree, and coordinate degree can be used to guide and measure the environmental resource utilization mechanism. In the process of designing, the inherent conflicts and effective evaluation mechanisms are very important for the effective running of mechanisms, special attentions must be paid for the information asymmetry problem, clarifying the relationship between the interests of the main body using the game theories and the adoption of institutional analysis. The mechanism design should adept to the trend of economic globalization, achieving the balance between environmental protection and trade liberalization; so that a country’s economic strength matchs its international environmental responsibility.
2. Market trading mechanisms
(1) Property rights mechanism. Proper property rights mechanism is the premise of formatting the price mechanism of natural resources; also it is the premise of effective operation of market mechanisms. Through the building of property rights mechanisms, compensation mechanism, resource tax system and resources allocation mechanism, a fairly income distribution, restraint and incentive mechanisms can be composed.
(2) The emissions trading mechanism. Under the premise of total control, through the building of well-defined property rights, allocation of emission rights authority, the implementation of emission rights standards and effective information exchange platform,transaction costs saving and efficiency improvement can be achieved.
(3) Low-carbon trading mechanisms. Fully integrating the market space and location advantages, establishing an open carbon trading market can achieve domestic and abroad "win-win" results and mission reduction in the process of introducing capital and technology. Through building the stable growth market mechanisms, making the network transactions and the entity transactions compile with each other, increasing the trading members, expanding carbon trading partners, the development of carbon finance can be achieved
(4) Compensation and cooperation mechanisms. On the basis of systematic environmental resources,the ecological and interest relationships were effectively streamlined in the system, clearing ecological compensation scopes, methods and objects. The institutional guarantees together with the economic cooperation and principles can achieve environmental equity within the system. Using the international assistance, the external transfer payments can address externalities issues of environment. Giving full role of non-governmental organization (NGO) in the environmental resource can well complement the compensation and cooperation mechanisms.
(5) Sustainable consumption mechanism. Consumption can be guided sustainable through updating the consumer concept, developing green consumption preferences, adhering to the principles of sustainable consumption and improving the formal system of laws.
3. Macro-control mechanisms
Government should avoid its drawbacks in the course of environmental resources using. Through the reformation of government management system and restraint mechanism, the macro-control failure and government failure can be prevent, achieving the incentive compatibility between the government regulation and regulation objects.
(1) The transformation of government functions. In the course of energy saving, emission reduction and environmental protection strengthen the coordination and service functions of government can change the philosophy regulatory and build a green government. Environmental policy should be revised in time, the costs of government's regulatory and regulatory effects should be maintained at the optimal level, meanwhile, the systematic, continuity, and cooperating of the policies mechanisms should be emphasized.
(2) Establish a sound green finance, tax system, clear green incentives mechanism. The green procurement system can enhance the conduction and demonstration effect of government actions, and the incentives and leverage of tax can encourage the development and use of energy-saving products, guiding continual behavior of businesses and consumers.
(3) Introduce environmental statistics and accounting methods to enhance real-time monitoring. Environmental data should be got authenticity, continuity, comparability, relevance and systematic, the using of environmental statistics, can achieve the function of controlling and supervision. The strengthening of the accounting of energy consumption at all levels and the green audit of environmental protection can achieve the functions of monitoring, examination and disclosure.
(4) Establish monitoring mechanisms and green evaluation system, and guide all levels of government to establish green administration concept. The evaluation index system of environment resources sustainable utilization consists of the five-index-system including scientific and technological innovation capacity, ecological and environmental protection, resource allocation efficiency, entrepreneurship and human resource allocation efficiency as well as industrial development.
4. Science and technology innovation mechanisms
Environmental crisis provides the incentive for the innovation of technology, institution and organization. At the micro level, complying with the essence of knowledge, innovations generates within the minds and body, and continues to spread by the organizational systems and innovation networks of meso-level, leading to the formation system of national science and technology innovation of macro level. The science and technology innovation mechanism is an integrity mechanism, covering the whole micro, meso and the macro levels.
(1) Technological innovation micro mechanism and its multiplier effect. At the micro level, tacit and explicit knowledge can be translated into each other, and they form knowledge innovation spiral within the organization. The innovation mechanism at the organizations level through the formation of innovation networks, the innovation mechanism can generates social effects by the formation of innovation networks, which expanses on the macro level. And by the scale effect, agglomeration effects, and the multiplier effect, the innovation completes the expansion on the macro level.
(2) The dynamics compositions of technological innovation mechanisms. The mainstay source for scientific and technology innovation is people’s needs, interests, competition and environmental fluctuations. Human inertia and vested interests interference result in the resistance, the inherent inertia becomes the principal balance of scientific and technological innovation mechanism, the innovation sense determines its direction, and the mechanism with systematic characteristic complies with the law of economic evolution.
(3) The dynamic mechanism design of technology innovation. On enterprise-level, the innovation mechanisms include the management mechanism, the individual self-realization mechanism, information transmission mechanism, innovation-oriented mechanism, constraints and incentives mechanism as well as the external environment pressure mechanism. The enterprise technological innovation mechanism has a path-dependent characteristic, the systematic and non-systemic risks the enterprises faces requires them to strengthen cooperation in the competition. At the industry or regional level, business cooperation and competition forms the complex adaptive network of innovative mechanisms, beyond the administrative areas and national boundaries, the innovative mechanisms becomes the regional cooperation and the national innovation mechanisms.
(4) The promotion policies of green technology innovative. The establishment of market economic system should aim at realizing the organic integration and interaction of knowledge innovation, technological innovation and institutional innovation, and establish reasonable and effective patent system, strengthen scientific and technological innovation system, improve knowledge management and enhance R & D investment of resources, give tax policy and financial support to construct the incentives mechanisms of the green technology innovation.
5. The talent introduction mechanisms
Facing the financial crisis and the restructuring of the global intellectual resources, it is necessary to introduce innovation in talent recruiting mechanisms, which is thought to be systematic and comprehensive. Economic theories are introduced to build a long-lasting, dynamic, sustainable mechanism.
(1) Talent introduction to change the mode of economic development. The essence of talent introduction is to introduce different types of intellectual capital and its knowledge. So the talent structures, introduction processes, and the allocation of intellectual resources adapt to the economic growth and the changes of environment.
Talent introduction brings learning effect and competitive effect of knowledge spillovers leading to a concentration of talent effects. Social network helps to strengthen the concentration effect, forming regional innovation effect. In short, talent introduction can conduct the innovation in the market, the formation of human capital, technological innovation and deduce new industries, and results in a cumulative positive cycle.
(2) The specific design of talent introduction mechanism.
The talent introduction mechanism is facing the serious brain drain of our country systematic and standardized lacking, the management and utilization problems and international competition. Talent introduction mechanism design focuses on the building of procedural mechanism and efficiency, providing an effective platform from the source to the using of intelligence. By strengthening the macro-control, the intellectual stimulation, the intermediary services as well as the international exchange and cooperation mechanism the talent introduction countries can achieve the all-round design from the introduction, utilization and motivation of talents.
It should be based on the“common differentiated responsibilities”principle, to promote the transfer of low carbon intellectual. The low-carbon economic should be developed by strengthening the introduction of the improved technology, new energy technologies and carbon capture and storage technology.
In summery, by the systematic design of mechanisms for the sustainable use of environmental resources, this thesis breaks through the limitation of the traditional economic theories. Using the mechanism design theory, it systematically analyses the composing mechanisms of the sustainable use of environmental resources and the internal linkages among the mechanisms, then establish the well targeted and synoptically model. From the economic mechanism, institutional design, government intervention and other perspectives, it designs a multiple-level-mechanism. The dynamic mechanism, implementation mechanism, sustainable mechanisms were deeply excavated, providing a systemic solution to achieve the sustainable use of environmental resources in China.
引文
①http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm
①根据《财经》在2008年4月博鳌论坛年会期间对作者的专访整理,并经作者确认,详见:埃瑞克?马斯. 机制设计可解环保难题[J].财经, 2007, (9): 36-37.
①引自《资本论》第一卷,中共中央马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林著作编译局译,人民出版社1975年版,第553页。
①以下根据冷淑莲、冷崇总(2007)年的研究整理,详见:冷淑莲,冷崇总.资源环境约束与可持续发展问题研究[J].价格月刊, 2007, (11): 3-9。
①据法新社2008年7月29日报道,为了达成一项世界贸易协议而进行的马拉松式的“多哈回合”谈判破裂了。因为美国和印度就食品关税问题进行了数天争吵后未能握手言和,情绪激动的代表愤然放弃了谈判,详见:http://news.sohu.com/20080731/n258508424.shtml
②傅京燕.环境规制与产业国际竞争力[M].北京:经济科学出版社, 2006,2-5页。
①生态足迹(ecological footprint)也称“生态占用”。是指任何已知人口(某个个人、一个城市或一个国家)的生态足迹是生产这些人口所消费的所有资源和吸纳这些人口所产生的所有废弃物所需要的生物生产土地的总面积和水资源量。将一个地区或国家的资源、能源消费同自己所拥有的生态能力进行比较,能判断一个国家或地区的发展是否处于生态承载力的范围内,是否具有安全性。生态足迹模型是最早是由加拿大生态经济学家Williams Rees等在1992年提出,并在1996年由其博士生Waekemagel完善的,在我国张志强、徐中民等学者2000年第一次引入并开展实证研究,详见:张志强,徐中民,程国栋.生态足迹的概念及计算模型[J].生态经济, 2000(10): 8-10。
①参看A.Ulph (1997)关于环境经济学方面的综述Ulph, A. (1997),‘Environmental Policy, Strategic Trade and Innovation’, in C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco, eds., New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
①万以诚等编:《新文明的路标》长春:吉林人民出版社,1997年,第3页。
②激励相容是一个非常重要的经济概念,在最近30年已成为现代经济学中一个核心概念,是任何经济体制都需要具有的性质。能否提供激励相容是检验一个经济机制的基本标准(赖霜,朱慧斌.浅析经济手段在资源环境管理中的有效性[J].广东科技, 2008, (3): 40-42.)
①http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ny/news/2010/01-28/2095938.shtml
①中国成奢侈品大市场委员呼吁立法遏制过度消费,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-07/11/ content_5432387.htm
①红色区域为中国:http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html
②红色区域为亚太地区:http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredProjByRegionPieChart.html
①所谓锦标赛是一种优胜者将获得晋升的竞赛标准与规则,它的主要特征是竞赛结果只依赖于参赛人相对于其他参赛人的表现,而与参赛人的绝对表现无关。见:周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究, 2004, (6): 33-40;周权雄,朱卫平.国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究[J].经济学, 2010, 9(2): 571-596。
①本部分研究成果经过整理发表于《技术经济与管理研究》,2009(2):23-27,题目为《科技创新体系的动力机制研究》并被人大复印资料《创新政策与管理》全文转载,详见:2009(8):9-15。
①关于因果模糊的研究详见:李佳.因果模糊与持续竞争优势的形成[J].中国工业经济, 2006, (4): 122-126。
①他们以后(埃尔森,Elzen,1986;沃格瑞特,Vergragt,1988;罗森,Rosen,1993;比克与劳,Bijker & Law, 1997、1992;阿尔德,Alder,1998;科林斯和平奇,Collins & Pinch, 1998)详见:HENRIK BRUUN J H. Crossing Boundaries: An Integrative Framework for Studying Technological Change[J]. Social Studies of Science, 2003, 33(1): 95-116.
①关于知识的相互作用以及组织知识的扩散,野中郁次郎和竹内光隆(1995)在《知识创造公司》一书中提出了隐性知识与外显知识相互转换的四种模式,简称为SECI模型,也可见Nonaka , I,(1994),“A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation”Organization Science, Vol. 5,No.1,pp14-37.
②在郝英奇,2003,“科技进步动力机制研究”,《既南学报(哲学社会科学)》,第6期研究中,他对这些在史丹,李晓斌(2004)“高技术产业发展的影响因素及其数据检验”,《中国工业经济》,第12期的研究中,他们详细的分析影响科技创新系统的各种因素,并进行了实证检验。
①对于企业科技创新风险的系统性分析详见:王宗军,杨萍, 2008,“企业自主技术创新风险的影响因素研究”,《技术经济》,第4期。
①第一次能源结构转化从薪柴转向煤炭(1920),第二次能源结构转换从煤炭转向油气(1959),第三次能源转换从矿物能源向可再生能源转化。详见:朱四海.中国农村能源政策:回顾与展望[J].农业工程技术(新能源产业), 2009, (9): 3-8。
①所谓“锁定效应”是指基础设施、机器设备、个人大件耐用消费品等,一旦投入,其使用年限均在15年乃至50年以上,期间不能轻易废弃,详见:张坤民.低碳世界中的中国:地位、挑战与战略[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2008, 18(3): 1-7。
①也可见Kanaroglou P, Lidaw KL, Papageorgiou YY (1986) An analysis of migratory systems: I. theory. Environ Plan 18:913-928;Fawcett JT, Arnold F (1987) Explaining diversity: Asian and Pacific immigration systems. In: Fawcett JT, Carino BV (eds) Pacific bridges: the new immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands. Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island.
①羊群行为理论是从心理学角度研究经济人在信息不完全、不确定的环境下的行为特性的理论,详见:朱杏珍.人才集聚过程中的羊群行为分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究, 2002, (7): 53-56。[255]朱杏珍.人才集聚过程中的羊群行为分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究, 2002, (7): 53-56.
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①根据《财经》在2008年4月博鳌论坛年会期间对作者的专访整理,并经作者确认,详见:埃瑞克?马斯. 机制设计可解环保难题[J].财经, 2007, (9): 36-37.
①引自《资本论》第一卷,中共中央马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林著作编译局译,人民出版社1975年版,第553页。
①以下根据冷淑莲、冷崇总(2007)年的研究整理,详见:冷淑莲,冷崇总.资源环境约束与可持续发展问题研究[J].价格月刊, 2007, (11): 3-9。
①据法新社2008年7月29日报道,为了达成一项世界贸易协议而进行的马拉松式的“多哈回合”谈判破裂了。因为美国和印度就食品关税问题进行了数天争吵后未能握手言和,情绪激动的代表愤然放弃了谈判,详见:http://news.sohu.com/20080731/n258508424.shtml
②傅京燕.环境规制与产业国际竞争力[M].北京:经济科学出版社, 2006,2-5页。
①生态足迹(ecological footprint)也称“生态占用”。是指任何已知人口(某个个人、一个城市或一个国家)的生态足迹是生产这些人口所消费的所有资源和吸纳这些人口所产生的所有废弃物所需要的生物生产土地的总面积和水资源量。将一个地区或国家的资源、能源消费同自己所拥有的生态能力进行比较,能判断一个国家或地区的发展是否处于生态承载力的范围内,是否具有安全性。生态足迹模型是最早是由加拿大生态经济学家Williams Rees等在1992年提出,并在1996年由其博士生Waekemagel完善的,在我国张志强、徐中民等学者2000年第一次引入并开展实证研究,详见:张志强,徐中民,程国栋.生态足迹的概念及计算模型[J].生态经济, 2000(10): 8-10。
①参看A.Ulph (1997)关于环境经济学方面的综述Ulph, A. (1997),‘Environmental Policy, Strategic Trade and Innovation’, in C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco, eds., New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
①万以诚等编:《新文明的路标》长春:吉林人民出版社,1997年,第3页。
②激励相容是一个非常重要的经济概念,在最近30年已成为现代经济学中一个核心概念,是任何经济体制都需要具有的性质。能否提供激励相容是检验一个经济机制的基本标准(赖霜,朱慧斌.浅析经济手段在资源环境管理中的有效性[J].广东科技, 2008, (3): 40-42.)
①http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ny/news/2010/01-28/2095938.shtml
①中国成奢侈品大市场委员呼吁立法遏制过度消费,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-07/11/ content_5432387.htm
①红色区域为中国:http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html
②红色区域为亚太地区:http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredProjByRegionPieChart.html
①所谓锦标赛是一种优胜者将获得晋升的竞赛标准与规则,它的主要特征是竞赛结果只依赖于参赛人相对于其他参赛人的表现,而与参赛人的绝对表现无关。见:周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究, 2004, (6): 33-40;周权雄,朱卫平.国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究[J].经济学, 2010, 9(2): 571-596。
①本部分研究成果经过整理发表于《技术经济与管理研究》,2009(2):23-27,题目为《科技创新体系的动力机制研究》并被人大复印资料《创新政策与管理》全文转载,详见:2009(8):9-15。
①关于因果模糊的研究详见:李佳.因果模糊与持续竞争优势的形成[J].中国工业经济, 2006, (4): 122-126。
①他们以后(埃尔森,Elzen,1986;沃格瑞特,Vergragt,1988;罗森,Rosen,1993;比克与劳,Bijker & Law, 1997、1992;阿尔德,Alder,1998;科林斯和平奇,Collins & Pinch, 1998)详见:HENRIK BRUUN J H. Crossing Boundaries: An Integrative Framework for Studying Technological Change[J]. Social Studies of Science, 2003, 33(1): 95-116.
①关于知识的相互作用以及组织知识的扩散,野中郁次郎和竹内光隆(1995)在《知识创造公司》一书中提出了隐性知识与外显知识相互转换的四种模式,简称为SECI模型,也可见Nonaka , I,(1994),“A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation”Organization Science, Vol. 5,No.1,pp14-37.
②在郝英奇,2003,“科技进步动力机制研究”,《既南学报(哲学社会科学)》,第6期研究中,他对这些在史丹,李晓斌(2004)“高技术产业发展的影响因素及其数据检验”,《中国工业经济》,第12期的研究中,他们详细的分析影响科技创新系统的各种因素,并进行了实证检验。
①对于企业科技创新风险的系统性分析详见:王宗军,杨萍, 2008,“企业自主技术创新风险的影响因素研究”,《技术经济》,第4期。
①第一次能源结构转化从薪柴转向煤炭(1920),第二次能源结构转换从煤炭转向油气(1959),第三次能源转换从矿物能源向可再生能源转化。详见:朱四海.中国农村能源政策:回顾与展望[J].农业工程技术(新能源产业), 2009, (9): 3-8。
①所谓“锁定效应”是指基础设施、机器设备、个人大件耐用消费品等,一旦投入,其使用年限均在15年乃至50年以上,期间不能轻易废弃,详见:张坤民.低碳世界中的中国:地位、挑战与战略[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2008, 18(3): 1-7。
①也可见Kanaroglou P, Lidaw KL, Papageorgiou YY (1986) An analysis of migratory systems: I. theory. Environ Plan 18:913-928;Fawcett JT, Arnold F (1987) Explaining diversity: Asian and Pacific immigration systems. In: Fawcett JT, Carino BV (eds) Pacific bridges: the new immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands. Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island.
①羊群行为理论是从心理学角度研究经济人在信息不完全、不确定的环境下的行为特性的理论,详见:朱杏珍.人才集聚过程中的羊群行为分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究, 2002, (7): 53-56。[255]朱杏珍.人才集聚过程中的羊群行为分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究, 2002, (7): 53-56.
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