中国创业投资网络的动态演进及网络绩效效应研究
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摘要
近十年来，在经济政策双重利好的背景下，我国创业投资呈现出快速发展的势头，中资创业投资在近年更是以倍数方式飞速增长。党的十八大报告指出，我国的科技创新能力不强，并明确提出实施创新驱动发展战略，要加快建设国家创新体系，促进创新资源高效配置。与此同时，国外学者几乎无一例外地证明了优质的创业投资网络有利于地区创新资源的高效配置，有利于地区创新经济的发展。那么我国的创业投资网络质量如何？目前针对中国创业投资网络的研究文献却寥寥无几。本文基于社会网络理论和创业投资理论，从社会网络结构角度考察中国创业投资网络的动态演进轨迹、分析其存在的问题，并进一步剖析影响网络演进的动力机制——网络的绩效效应、网络位置的中介效应，最后提出构建优质创业投资网络的建议。
创业投资网络理论是基于社会网络理论与创业投资理论发展而来的前沿研究。本文在理论综述与背景分析的基础上，首次利用投资于中国创业企业的所有创业投资事件构建创业投资网络，对中国创业投资网络的动态演进进行全面规范的实证研究，从时间、地区、不同性质的创业投资机构三个层面进行比较分析，观察中国创业投资网络的动态演进轨迹并归纳其特点。研究发现，不同所有权性质的创业投资机构在网络中的位置有很大的区别，中资创业投资机构表现消极处于弱势地位，外资一贯积极占据网络核心，合资善于学习网络地位越来越强。而忽视网络关系建设的中资创业投资的快速增加，反而影响了中国创业投资网络的质量。于是，本文继续从微观创业投资机构的层面出发，分析创业投资机构构建网络关系的动力来源：网络的绩效效应以及网络位置在所有权性质与投资绩效之间的中介效应。实证得出，不同所有权性质的创业投资机构可以通过优势的网络位置作中介而获取更高的投资绩效，这是驱动创业投资机构构建自身优势网络位置的动因。
进行社会网络研究时最好不要用抽样的方法，本文首先以2012年以前投资于中国境内创业企业的所有创业投资机构为研究样本，构建出17年的中国创业投资网络图，然后将创业投资机构的各项属性指标（所有权性质、总部所在地、成立时间、公司创业投资背景、金融背景、政府背景等）放入网络图中观察其规律，找出网络演进过程中规律性最强的属性指标——创业投资机构的所有权性质，接下来将所有权性质结合网络属性指标分析中国创业投资网络随时间演进的规律并与硅谷的创业投资网络指标值进行比较，研究发现：一、中国创业投资网络规模在逐年增加，但是网络质量却有下滑的趋势；二、不同所有权性质的创业投资机构在网络中的位置有明显的区别；三、在合作的创业投资网络中，中资创业投资机构表现消极处于弱势地位，外资一贯积极占据网络核心，合资善于学习网络地位越来越强。
其次，本文从整体网络的层面分析影响创业投资网络动态演进的原因。通过构建转换变量多元回归模型，对不同所有权性质创业投资机构的数目变化对我国创业投资网络属性指标的影响进行探索性分析，并进行Granger因果检验。研究结果表明：不同所有权性质创业投资机构的数目变化对创业投资网络指标有显著的影响，并且是它的Granger因。中资创业投资数目的增加会显著地降低网络的整体合作水平与中介能力。外资创业投资数目的增加会显著地提高网络整体合作水平。合资创业投资数目的增加可以显著提高网络的中介能力。
接下来，本文开始从微观创业投资机构的层面出发，分析创业投资机构构建自身网络地位的动因。外资创业投资为什么如此重视自身网络地位建设？本文就创业投资机构的网络地位对投资绩效的影响构建随机效应不平衡面板数据模型进行实证研究。研究结论表明，创业投资机构优质的网络地位可以显著地提高投资绩效。网络中创业投资机构与他人的合作关系越紧密，控制他人的能力越强，在网络中的影响力越大，投资绩效越高。其中，代表创业投资在整个网络中影响力的指标——接近中心度（closenesscentrality）对投资绩效的经济影响最大，其次是创业投资的合作能力（degree centrality）与受欢迎的程度（indegree）。
优质的网络位置有利于获得更高的投资绩效，而外资创业投资从一进入到中国市场就开始构建自己的网络地位，那么外资会不会是通过优势的网络位置而获取更高的投资绩效呢？本文再次构建不平衡面板数据模型深入分析所有权性质、网络位置与投资绩效三者间的关系，发现网络位置是所有权性质对投资绩效影响的中介变量，也就是说，所有权性质是通过网络位置对投资绩效产生影响的。外资通过优势的网络位置放大自身的优势，弥补作为外来者的劣势，从而取得比本土创业投资更高的投资绩效；而中资创业投资因忽略了合作网络关系的建设并没有利用好本土优势，导致低的投资绩效。
最后，本文着重从合作网络关系建设的角度，提出构建优质创业投资网络的建议。建议政府及相关部门应该：注重搭建创业投资机构间的合作交流平台、建立健全创业投资征信体系、鼓励学者加强对我国创业投资的理论研究、适时开展专业投资知识培训。同时，也为中资创业投资机构提高自身的网络地位提出了策略建议。基于目前中资创业投资机构的弱势网络地位，本文为创业投资机构建立优势的网络位置提出“舍得”策略，即先主动邀请其它创业投资机构进行联合投资以便将来能获得更多合作的机会，从而提高自身网络地位，并通过实证检验证明了“舍得”策略的可行性。
Venture capital in China showed a momentum of rapid development in the case of bothgood economic and good policies over the past decade. Chinese-funded venture capital hasrapidly grown even in a multiple way in recent years. The18th National Congress report ofthe Communist Party of China pointed out that the scientific and technological innovationcapability of China was not strong, and it definitely proposed that it was essential toaccelerate the construction of national innovation system and promote the efficientallocation of innovation resources in order to implement the innovation-driven developmentstrategy. Foreign scholars almost invariably proved that a quality venture-capital network isconducive to the efficient allocation of regional innovation resources and the developmentof regional innovation economy at the same time. Then, what about the quality ofventure-capital network of China? However, there is very little research literature referringto Chinese venture-capital network. This article investigated the dynamic evolution route ofthe venture capital network of China from the perspective of social network structure basedon the social network theory and venture-capital theory and analyzed its problems. Then, theperformance effects of the venture capital network and the mediation effects of networklocation were further analyzed. Finally, a proposal to build the quality venture-capitalnetworks was put forward.
The venture-capital network theory is based on the forefront study developed from thetheories of social network and venture capital. This study used all venture capital events ofinvesting in Chinese venture enterprises to build the venture capital network for the first timebased on the theoretical overview and background analysis and made a comprehensivenormative empirical research on the dynamic evolution of the venture capital network inChina. Comparative analyses were made from the three levels: time, area and the venturecapital institutions with different nature. The dynamic evolution routes of the venture capitalnetwork in China were observed, and their characteristics were summarized. The studyfound that there are very big differences in positions of the venture capital institutions withdifferent ownership properties. Chinese-funded venture-capital institutions display negativefeelings and are in weak positions. Foreign capital has been actively occupying the core ofthe network. Joint ventures are good at learning, so their network status is becomingstronger and stronger. However, instead, the network quality of Chinese venture capital isaffected for the neglect on a rapid increase in Chinese-funded venture capital in network construction. Thereupon, this study sequentially analyzed the performance effects of theventure capital network as well as the relationships among the three, the nature of ownership,network location and investment performance, from the level of venture capital institutions,then, further tested the mediation effects of network location. This empirical researchindicates that venture capital institutions with different ownership properties can obtain ahigher investment performance through intermediary: dominant network status. This is themotivation to drive venture capital institutions to build their own dominant networklocations.
It's unwise to use the sampling method when the social network is studied (Yuan Fang,1997)[56]. This study first constructed the network diagram of17-year venture capital inChina with study samples that were all venture capital institutions investing in ventureenterprises within Chinese territory before2012. Then, their various attribute-index (thenature of ownership, headquarters, Founded Time, venture capital of companies, financialbackground, government background, etc.) laws were observed by putting them into thenetwork diagram to find out the attribute index with strongest regularity, the nature ofownership of venture capital institutions, in network evolution process. Subsequently, theevolution rules of the network over time were analyzed by combining the nature of ownershipand network attribute indexes, and their values were compared with the index values ofventure capital network in the Silicon Valley. The study shows the following: Firstly, the scaleof the venture capital network in China is increasing year by year, but there appears a fallingtendency in network quality. Secondly, there are obvious differences in the positions ofventure capital institutions with different ownership properties in the network. Thirdly,Chinese-funded venture-capital institutions display negative feelings and are in weakpositions; foreign capital has been actively occupying the core; joint ventures are good atlearning, so their network status is becoming stronger and stronger in the cooperative networkof venture capital.
Then, the multiple regression models of conversion variables were built from the level ofthe overall dynamic evolution of network in this study. An exploratory analysis was made onthe influence of the change in the number of venture capital institutions with differentownership properties on the attribute indexes of the venture capital network in China, and theGranger causality test was conducted. The research results show that: the change in thenumber of venture capital institutions with different ownership properties is of a significantimpact on the attribute indexes of the venture capital network and is its Granger cause. Theincrease in the number of Chinese-funded venture capital can significantly reduce the overall cooperation level of network and its mediating capability. The increase in the number offoreign-capital venture capital can significantly improve the overall cooperation level ofnetwork. The increase in the number of joint-venture venture capital can significantly improvethe mediating capability of network.
Again then, why does foreign-capital venture capital attach so much importance to theconstruction of its own network status? The panel data model with unbalanced random effectswas built in terms of the effect of network status on investment performance from the level ofmicroscopic venture-capital institutions in this study to do the empirical research. The studyconclusions show that the good network status of venture capital institutions can significantlyimprove investment performance. The closer the cooperative relations among capitalinstitutions are in the network, the higher the investment performance is. The stronger themediating capability of venture capital institution and its ability to control others are, thehigher the investment performance is. The greater the influence of venture capital institutionis in the network, the higher the investment performance is. The index representing theinfluence of venture capital in the entire network among them--closeness centrality is of alargest impact on the economy of investment performance, followed by the cooperative abilityof venture capital (degree centrality) and popularity (indegree).
Next, this study did a deep analysis on the relationships among the nature of ownership,network position and investment performance by building another unbalanced model of paneldata. It is found that the network location is the intermediary variable, that is, the ownershipproperty affects investment performance through the network position. Foreign capitalenlarges its own advantages, makes up disadvantages as outsiders through the dominantnetwork position, and thereby, obtains higher investment performance than local venturecapital. However, the investment performance of Chinese-funded venture capital is lowbecause it ignores to build the cooperative network relationships and does not make good useof local advantages.
Finally, this research put forward a proposal to build a high-quality venture-capitalnetwork mainly from the point of view of the construction of cooperative network relations.It is suggested that the Government and relevant departments should focus on setting up thecooperation and exchange platform for venture capital institutions, establish the wholesomecredit system of venture capital, encourage scholars to strengthen the theoretical study onChinese venture capital and timely carry out the training on investment expertise. Thestrategy of "willing" was put forward so that Chinese-funded venture-capital institutionsimprove their own network status, and an empirical test on the feasibility of this strategy was conducted.
创业投资网络理论是基于社会网络理论与创业投资理论发展而来的前沿研究。本文在理论综述与背景分析的基础上，首次利用投资于中国创业企业的所有创业投资事件构建创业投资网络，对中国创业投资网络的动态演进进行全面规范的实证研究，从时间、地区、不同性质的创业投资机构三个层面进行比较分析，观察中国创业投资网络的动态演进轨迹并归纳其特点。研究发现，不同所有权性质的创业投资机构在网络中的位置有很大的区别，中资创业投资机构表现消极处于弱势地位，外资一贯积极占据网络核心，合资善于学习网络地位越来越强。而忽视网络关系建设的中资创业投资的快速增加，反而影响了中国创业投资网络的质量。于是，本文继续从微观创业投资机构的层面出发，分析创业投资机构构建网络关系的动力来源：网络的绩效效应以及网络位置在所有权性质与投资绩效之间的中介效应。实证得出，不同所有权性质的创业投资机构可以通过优势的网络位置作中介而获取更高的投资绩效，这是驱动创业投资机构构建自身优势网络位置的动因。
进行社会网络研究时最好不要用抽样的方法，本文首先以2012年以前投资于中国境内创业企业的所有创业投资机构为研究样本，构建出17年的中国创业投资网络图，然后将创业投资机构的各项属性指标（所有权性质、总部所在地、成立时间、公司创业投资背景、金融背景、政府背景等）放入网络图中观察其规律，找出网络演进过程中规律性最强的属性指标——创业投资机构的所有权性质，接下来将所有权性质结合网络属性指标分析中国创业投资网络随时间演进的规律并与硅谷的创业投资网络指标值进行比较，研究发现：一、中国创业投资网络规模在逐年增加，但是网络质量却有下滑的趋势；二、不同所有权性质的创业投资机构在网络中的位置有明显的区别；三、在合作的创业投资网络中，中资创业投资机构表现消极处于弱势地位，外资一贯积极占据网络核心，合资善于学习网络地位越来越强。
其次，本文从整体网络的层面分析影响创业投资网络动态演进的原因。通过构建转换变量多元回归模型，对不同所有权性质创业投资机构的数目变化对我国创业投资网络属性指标的影响进行探索性分析，并进行Granger因果检验。研究结果表明：不同所有权性质创业投资机构的数目变化对创业投资网络指标有显著的影响，并且是它的Granger因。中资创业投资数目的增加会显著地降低网络的整体合作水平与中介能力。外资创业投资数目的增加会显著地提高网络整体合作水平。合资创业投资数目的增加可以显著提高网络的中介能力。
接下来，本文开始从微观创业投资机构的层面出发，分析创业投资机构构建自身网络地位的动因。外资创业投资为什么如此重视自身网络地位建设？本文就创业投资机构的网络地位对投资绩效的影响构建随机效应不平衡面板数据模型进行实证研究。研究结论表明，创业投资机构优质的网络地位可以显著地提高投资绩效。网络中创业投资机构与他人的合作关系越紧密，控制他人的能力越强，在网络中的影响力越大，投资绩效越高。其中，代表创业投资在整个网络中影响力的指标——接近中心度（closenesscentrality）对投资绩效的经济影响最大，其次是创业投资的合作能力（degree centrality）与受欢迎的程度（indegree）。
优质的网络位置有利于获得更高的投资绩效，而外资创业投资从一进入到中国市场就开始构建自己的网络地位，那么外资会不会是通过优势的网络位置而获取更高的投资绩效呢？本文再次构建不平衡面板数据模型深入分析所有权性质、网络位置与投资绩效三者间的关系，发现网络位置是所有权性质对投资绩效影响的中介变量，也就是说，所有权性质是通过网络位置对投资绩效产生影响的。外资通过优势的网络位置放大自身的优势，弥补作为外来者的劣势，从而取得比本土创业投资更高的投资绩效；而中资创业投资因忽略了合作网络关系的建设并没有利用好本土优势，导致低的投资绩效。
最后，本文着重从合作网络关系建设的角度，提出构建优质创业投资网络的建议。建议政府及相关部门应该：注重搭建创业投资机构间的合作交流平台、建立健全创业投资征信体系、鼓励学者加强对我国创业投资的理论研究、适时开展专业投资知识培训。同时，也为中资创业投资机构提高自身的网络地位提出了策略建议。基于目前中资创业投资机构的弱势网络地位，本文为创业投资机构建立优势的网络位置提出“舍得”策略，即先主动邀请其它创业投资机构进行联合投资以便将来能获得更多合作的机会，从而提高自身网络地位，并通过实证检验证明了“舍得”策略的可行性。
Venture capital in China showed a momentum of rapid development in the case of bothgood economic and good policies over the past decade. Chinese-funded venture capital hasrapidly grown even in a multiple way in recent years. The18th National Congress report ofthe Communist Party of China pointed out that the scientific and technological innovationcapability of China was not strong, and it definitely proposed that it was essential toaccelerate the construction of national innovation system and promote the efficientallocation of innovation resources in order to implement the innovation-driven developmentstrategy. Foreign scholars almost invariably proved that a quality venture-capital network isconducive to the efficient allocation of regional innovation resources and the developmentof regional innovation economy at the same time. Then, what about the quality ofventure-capital network of China? However, there is very little research literature referringto Chinese venture-capital network. This article investigated the dynamic evolution route ofthe venture capital network of China from the perspective of social network structure basedon the social network theory and venture-capital theory and analyzed its problems. Then, theperformance effects of the venture capital network and the mediation effects of networklocation were further analyzed. Finally, a proposal to build the quality venture-capitalnetworks was put forward.
The venture-capital network theory is based on the forefront study developed from thetheories of social network and venture capital. This study used all venture capital events ofinvesting in Chinese venture enterprises to build the venture capital network for the first timebased on the theoretical overview and background analysis and made a comprehensivenormative empirical research on the dynamic evolution of the venture capital network inChina. Comparative analyses were made from the three levels: time, area and the venturecapital institutions with different nature. The dynamic evolution routes of the venture capitalnetwork in China were observed, and their characteristics were summarized. The studyfound that there are very big differences in positions of the venture capital institutions withdifferent ownership properties. Chinese-funded venture-capital institutions display negativefeelings and are in weak positions. Foreign capital has been actively occupying the core ofthe network. Joint ventures are good at learning, so their network status is becomingstronger and stronger. However, instead, the network quality of Chinese venture capital isaffected for the neglect on a rapid increase in Chinese-funded venture capital in network construction. Thereupon, this study sequentially analyzed the performance effects of theventure capital network as well as the relationships among the three, the nature of ownership,network location and investment performance, from the level of venture capital institutions,then, further tested the mediation effects of network location. This empirical researchindicates that venture capital institutions with different ownership properties can obtain ahigher investment performance through intermediary: dominant network status. This is themotivation to drive venture capital institutions to build their own dominant networklocations.
It's unwise to use the sampling method when the social network is studied (Yuan Fang,1997)[56]. This study first constructed the network diagram of17-year venture capital inChina with study samples that were all venture capital institutions investing in ventureenterprises within Chinese territory before2012. Then, their various attribute-index (thenature of ownership, headquarters, Founded Time, venture capital of companies, financialbackground, government background, etc.) laws were observed by putting them into thenetwork diagram to find out the attribute index with strongest regularity, the nature ofownership of venture capital institutions, in network evolution process. Subsequently, theevolution rules of the network over time were analyzed by combining the nature of ownershipand network attribute indexes, and their values were compared with the index values ofventure capital network in the Silicon Valley. The study shows the following: Firstly, the scaleof the venture capital network in China is increasing year by year, but there appears a fallingtendency in network quality. Secondly, there are obvious differences in the positions ofventure capital institutions with different ownership properties in the network. Thirdly,Chinese-funded venture-capital institutions display negative feelings and are in weakpositions; foreign capital has been actively occupying the core; joint ventures are good atlearning, so their network status is becoming stronger and stronger in the cooperative networkof venture capital.
Then, the multiple regression models of conversion variables were built from the level ofthe overall dynamic evolution of network in this study. An exploratory analysis was made onthe influence of the change in the number of venture capital institutions with differentownership properties on the attribute indexes of the venture capital network in China, and theGranger causality test was conducted. The research results show that: the change in thenumber of venture capital institutions with different ownership properties is of a significantimpact on the attribute indexes of the venture capital network and is its Granger cause. Theincrease in the number of Chinese-funded venture capital can significantly reduce the overall cooperation level of network and its mediating capability. The increase in the number offoreign-capital venture capital can significantly improve the overall cooperation level ofnetwork. The increase in the number of joint-venture venture capital can significantly improvethe mediating capability of network.
Again then, why does foreign-capital venture capital attach so much importance to theconstruction of its own network status? The panel data model with unbalanced random effectswas built in terms of the effect of network status on investment performance from the level ofmicroscopic venture-capital institutions in this study to do the empirical research. The studyconclusions show that the good network status of venture capital institutions can significantlyimprove investment performance. The closer the cooperative relations among capitalinstitutions are in the network, the higher the investment performance is. The stronger themediating capability of venture capital institution and its ability to control others are, thehigher the investment performance is. The greater the influence of venture capital institutionis in the network, the higher the investment performance is. The index representing theinfluence of venture capital in the entire network among them--closeness centrality is of alargest impact on the economy of investment performance, followed by the cooperative abilityof venture capital (degree centrality) and popularity (indegree).
Next, this study did a deep analysis on the relationships among the nature of ownership,network position and investment performance by building another unbalanced model of paneldata. It is found that the network location is the intermediary variable, that is, the ownershipproperty affects investment performance through the network position. Foreign capitalenlarges its own advantages, makes up disadvantages as outsiders through the dominantnetwork position, and thereby, obtains higher investment performance than local venturecapital. However, the investment performance of Chinese-funded venture capital is lowbecause it ignores to build the cooperative network relationships and does not make good useof local advantages.
Finally, this research put forward a proposal to build a high-quality venture-capitalnetwork mainly from the point of view of the construction of cooperative network relations.It is suggested that the Government and relevant departments should focus on setting up thecooperation and exchange platform for venture capital institutions, establish the wholesomecredit system of venture capital, encourage scholars to strengthen the theoretical study onChinese venture capital and timely carry out the training on investment expertise. Thestrategy of "willing" was put forward so that Chinese-funded venture-capital institutionsimprove their own network status, and an empirical test on the feasibility of this strategy was conducted.
引文
注1Udayan Gupta （Editor）,“Done Deals: Venture Capitalists Tell Their Stories”，Publisher: Harvard BusinessSchool，September2000，pp:98一99.这本书己被译为中文《做交易—风险投资家的故事）），人民邮电出版社，2002年。
注4OECD,1996,“Venture Capital and Innovation”,GD,168.
注3见2012年11月8日，中共中央前总书记胡锦涛代表十七届中央委员会缶中共第十八次代表大会作的报告《坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进为全面建成小康社会而奋斗》。
注1我国创业投资行业发展阶段的划分参见：成思危，中国风险投资十年回顾与展望，《中国风险投资年鉴2009》，2009，P38-43.
注2本段内容参考了ChinaVenture《2010年中国创业投资及私募股权投资市场统计分析报告》
注1见约翰·康芒斯所著《制度经济学》第8章第1节“物资和所有权”，赵睿译，华夏出版社，2009。
注1参考：（1）陈晓萍、徐淑英、樊景立主编：《组织与管理研究的实证方法》，北京大学出版社，2008，第324页。（2）道恩亚科布齐：《中介作用分析》，格致出版社、上海人民出版社，2012，第4页。
注1参考：道恩·亚科布齐（Dawn Iacobucci）著，李骏译：《中介作用分析》，格致出版社、上海人民出版社，2012，第19页。
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注4OECD,1996,“Venture Capital and Innovation”,GD,168.
注3见2012年11月8日，中共中央前总书记胡锦涛代表十七届中央委员会缶中共第十八次代表大会作的报告《坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进为全面建成小康社会而奋斗》。
注1我国创业投资行业发展阶段的划分参见：成思危，中国风险投资十年回顾与展望，《中国风险投资年鉴2009》，2009，P38-43.
注2本段内容参考了ChinaVenture《2010年中国创业投资及私募股权投资市场统计分析报告》
注1见约翰·康芒斯所著《制度经济学》第8章第1节“物资和所有权”，赵睿译，华夏出版社，2009。
注1参考：（1）陈晓萍、徐淑英、樊景立主编：《组织与管理研究的实证方法》，北京大学出版社，2008，第324页。（2）道恩亚科布齐：《中介作用分析》，格致出版社、上海人民出版社，2012，第4页。
注1参考：道恩·亚科布齐（Dawn Iacobucci）著，李骏译：《中介作用分析》，格致出版社、上海人民出版社，2012，第19页。
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