经理权力与公司投资行为研究
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摘要
最优契约理论认为有效的薪酬契约可以激励经理最大化股东价值,因而能够降低代理成本。然而,经理权力理论并不认为薪酬契约能够降低代理成本,经理有权力影响自己的薪酬,并且能够从公司攫取租金,经理薪酬本身就成为代理问题的一部分。投资活动是公司扩张规模的重要方式,规模的扩张能够为经理带来更多的可控资源、更稳定的职位、更高的薪酬等多方面好处,且投资活动多属于例外管理,需要经理的判断,因此经理有机会在投资过程中运用权力获得更多个人利益。公司是否进行投资、投资规模以及以何种方式进行投资,这些决策过程都会受到经理的影响,因而公司投资活动为研究经理权力攫取租金提供了很好的机会。
本文探讨经理权力与公司投资行为之间的关系,对公司投资行为从并购、多元化和研发投资三个方面进行研究。并购是公司外部投资行为,经理可以运用权力影响是否并购、以何种形式并购以及并购规模等方面。多元化既包括外部投资也包括内部投资,公司通过多元化将业务拓展到不同行业可以分散经营风险,也可以为公司带来更多的利润,从个人利益出发经理有动机推动多元化投资。研发投资是公司内部投资行为,更容易受到经理权力的影响。研发投资能够对公司竞争优势的获得和未来的发展产生积极影响,对经理薪酬和职业发展前景也有积极的影响。本文从投资扩大规模、降低风险和增强竞争力三方面效果选择并购、多元化和研发投资三种投资行为,研究经理权力对公司投资行为的影响,并考虑了薪酬激励对两者关系的影响,力求更全面地考察经理权力与投资行为之间错综复杂的关系。
经理运用权力影响公司投资行为不仅是可能的,也是可行的,因为投资活动可以为经理带来个人收益,也需要经理的参与和判断,所以经理权力与投资行为之间存在联系。在上述投资行为三方面的研究中虽然已有很多学者探讨了不同投资行为的影响因素,但尚未考虑经理权力的影响。投资活动作为经理攫取租金的重要手段之一,将其引入经理权力的研究框架有重要的理论意义和现实意义。本文的研究对于公司相关政策的制定、调整,以及更合理的机制设计都有重要的意义,也是理论界和实务界密切关注的问题。
本文分为七个部分,研究结构如下：
第一章导论。主要介绍了本文选题的背景和研究意义；阐述了本文的研究思路和创新点,勾勒出本文研究的总体框架。
第二章文献综述。对国内外经理权力和公司投资行为方面的实证研究进行了系统梳理,评述现有文献存在的不足之处,并为后文的研究提供切入点。同时也为相关变量的选取和定义提供依据。
第三章理论基础和制度背景。给出了本文研究的理论基础,主要包括代理理论、最优契约理论和经理权力理论。接着阐述了经理权力的衡量和权力如何通过对董事会、薪酬委员会、薪酬顾问等影响以攫取租金,还归纳了改革开放以来我国投资体制改革的历程和证券市场对公司并购的相关规定。这些制度背景将为后续的实证研究提供必要的支撑。
第四章经理权力与并购。主要是对经理权力影响公司并购进行实证检验,经理运用权力影响并购的动机在于并购能为经理带来个人收益,经理薪酬会因为并购所带来的公司规模扩大而得到增加,因此本章检验经理是否运用权力增加并购发生的概率和并购规模。国有企业经理薪酬往往会受到管制,当薪酬受到管制后并购则成为经理获取非货币替代性补偿的手段之一,因此本章还考虑了薪酬管制下经理权力对并购行为的影响。最后,本章还检验了受经理权力影响的并购对公司价值的影响。
第五章经理权力与多元化。多元化可以分散公司的经营风险,也有利于经理分散其对公司的专用性人力资本投资风险。通过在不同行业、领域进行经营可以应对某个特定行业的不景气和公司转型的挑战,缓解经理面临的职业生涯的压力和声誉的考验。多元化导致公司规模扩大之后经理薪酬和在职消费也会相应提高,因此经理会积极推动多元化。本章检验经理是否会运用权力提高多元化程度。当经理薪酬低于同行业平均水平时,表明公司主营业务盈利能力堪忧,经理会推动多元化投资以提高公司整体盈利能力,进而提高薪酬,本章对此进行了检验。最后检验受经理权力影响的多元化对公司价值产生的影响。
第六章经理权力与研发投资。与并购和多元化不同,研发投资属于公司的内部投资行为,因此受经理的影响比较明显。由于研发投资可以提高公司的市场竞争力,对公司未来发展能够产生深远的影响,而且经理薪酬和职业稳定性也会受其影响,因此本章检验经理权力对研发投资的影响。在经理获得高薪的情况下,经理会增加研发投资强度以增强公司的竞争优势、保持薪酬的领先水平,所以本章接下来检验经理高薪时权力对研发投资的影响。最后检验经理积极提高研发投资强度是否得到产品市场和股票市场的认可。
第七章全文结论和政策建议。在以上各章理论分析和实证检验的基础上总结出本文的主要研究结论,并依据实证检验结果为我国公司投资行为相关的制度规范提供相应的政策建议。最后就本文的研究局限性进行总结,并展望未来的研究方向。
本文采用实证研究的方法来探讨经理权力与投资行为之间的关系,针对不同问题采用的具体方法有所不同。经理权力的度量采用因子分析法将14个经理权力的影响因素综合为一个指标；并购绩效采用事件研究法估计并购公告日前后若干交易日累积超额收益率(CAR)和并购公告月前后若干月份的购买并持有超额收益(BHAR):不同变量之间的线性关系则采用最小二乘回归法,如经理权力对不同投资行为的影响、不同激励影响下经理权力与投资行为关系的变化等。本文研究数据主要来源于CSMAR各研究数据库,多元化数据来源于CCER数据库,部分项目参照上市公司年报进行了手工调整。数据的处理和分析运用软件Stata11.2。
通过理论分析和实证检验,本文得到如下研究结论：
第一,经理权力没有对是否并购产生明显的影响,而是对并购类型产生了显著影响,即经理权力越大,越倾向于进行本地并购。本文还发现受到薪酬管制影响的国有企业进行本地并购的概率更高,且并购规模更大。结果表明当地政府对国有企业干预程度比较深,从政府社会目标考虑会促进当地国有企业进行本地并购。经理受到薪酬管制的影响后为了获得非货币替代性补偿利用权力进行规模更大的并购。由于经理对并购的影响主要是基于个人利益,受经理权力影响大的并购对公司价值的损害更严重。
第二,在股东对公司的控制能力薄弱的情况下经理运用权力提高了多元化程度。当经理薪酬高于同行业平均水平时,表明公司有较强的盈利能力,有实力推行多元化投资。那些薪酬高于行业平均水平的公司经理可以得到较多的补偿,从而更有效地推动多元化投资。多元化存在折价现象,经理运用权力推动多元化在一定程度上加重了多元化折价,但是效果并不明显。
第三,研发投资对公司市场竞争优势和未来发展有重要影响,经理权力对研发投资有积极的正向影响。当经理获得高薪,能够补偿研发投资造成的短期业绩损失时,经理权力对研发投资的正向影响会越大。为保持薪酬的领先水平经理会增加研发投资强度以使公司在市场竞争中保持优势地位。研发投资能够通过产品市场体现出其价值,但是股票市场的反应并不明显,表明投资者对研发投资持谨慎的态度。
本文的主要改进和创新体现在以下方面：
第一,研究问题上,在理论上扩展了经理权力的运用范围。目前经理权力方面的研究主要关注经理权力对薪酬的影响,但是经理除了通过对董事会、薪酬委员会等公司治理机制的影响外,还可以通过其他方式。投资活动多属例外管理,需要经理的参与和判断,可以为经理运用权力攫取租金提供机会。并购、多元化和研发投资这些投资方面的研究多是关注投资给公司带来的价值,尚未有研究关注经理权力的影响。所以本文试图将经理权力和公司投资行为联系起来,从而扩展经理权力的运用范围。
第二,研究内容上,最优契约理论和经理权力理论关注的焦点都是薪酬,因此本文从薪酬激励的角度分析经理权力与公司投资行为之间的关系。当公司给予经理很高的薪酬激励时,为了保持薪酬的领先水平,经理权力对公司投资的影响一定程度上能够增加股东利益,此时最优契约理论更适用。当公司限制经理薪酬时,为了获得非货币替代性补偿,经理更可能基于个人利益对投资进行影响,最终则会损害股东价值,此时经理权力理论更适用。本文的研究表明最优契约理论和经理权力理论不是非此即彼的替代关系,而是各自有不同的适用环境,环境的影响很重要,从而推动了这两种理论的发展。
第三,变量设计上,对经理权力的度量更全面、更多元。经理权力的来源不是单一的,从多方面、多角度进行度量更符合客观事实、更有说服力。对经理权力的度量目前多见的是两种方式：一种是选择若干变量通过主成分分析等方法合成为一个综合的指标,另一种是以若干变量从不同角度分别度量。以若干变量从不同角度进行度量的缺陷是很显然的,一是若干变量的选取比较主观,选取的若干变量能在多大程度上代理经理权力也值得怀疑；二是选取的若干变量之间如果本身就存在较强的相关性,虽然是从不同角度进行了度量,但是增量信息却非常有限。将若干变量综合成一个合成指标以度量经理权力是比较好的方法,但目前的文献中用来度量经理权力的变量一般只有几个,对其进行主成分分析难以达到降维的效果,也容易出现信息的缺失,本文综合了已有文献在经理权力方面的度量方式,选择了14个指标从5个方面,涉及了股东、经理、组织、治理等内容,更全面地衡量了经理权力,对经理权力的度量做了有益的尝试。
Under optimal contracting approach, executive compensation practices are viewed as a mechanism designed to maximize the wealth of shareholders, and minimize the agency costs that exist between executives and shareholders. However, contrary to the optimal contracting approach, managerial power approach, which analyzes from the perspective focuses on the ability of executives to influence their own compensation scheme, points out that compensation arrangements approved by boards often deviate from optimal contracting. Executives have the power to receive compensation in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders; this excessive compensation constitutes rents. Executive compensation itself becomes part of agency problem. Investment is an important way to expend the firm size, as the firm size becomes bigger, executives have more control on firm resource, steadier position, and higher compensation. What's further, investment is by and large non-routine management, which means it needs executives' judgments. Subjective judgments facilitate executives to gain more private benefits in investment decision. Whether to invest, how to invest, and investment scale, all of these decision processes are more or less influenced by executives, thus, investment activities provide good opportunities to study how executives extract rent via their managerial power.
This dissertation focuses on the relation between managerial power and investment behaviors. Investment behaviors are subdivided into three parts: mergers and acquisitions (M&A), diversification, and research and development (R&D). M&A is external investment behavior. Executives can influence the decision of whether to implement M&A, which way to M&A, and M&A scale. When executive compensation is restricted by law or firm institution, executive tend to make more M&A to obtain alternative non-monetary compensation, like controllable resource, promotion, and personal reputation. Diversification could be either external investment or internal investment, or both. Although diversification is a way to expend firm size, its outstanding feature is risk-diversification. It also can gain more benefits from other industries. Thus, risk-aversion executives have motivation to diversify. R&D is totally internal investment behavior, could be influenced easily by executives. R&D is vital for a firm to gain competitive advantage in the market, and is also positive for executives to gain more compensation and promising future. When highly compensated, executives will be motivated to enhance R&D investment to keep compensation in leading level. These three parts of investment behavior from external perspective to internal perspective, reveal a comprehensive view of how managerial power influences investment behavior.
It is not only possible, but also feasible that executives influence investment behaviors via managerial power, because investment can bring executives private benefits, and investment also need executives'participation. Previous literature has enormous studies on M&A, diversification, and R&D, and also plenty of literature studies the managerial power and its relation with executive compensation. There is little literature study on the relation between managerial power and investment behavior directly. Investment is an important way to extract rent, so introducing investment to the research domain of managerial power has significance on both of theoretical and practice. The results of this dissertation can also provide some guidance for policy makers to design and modify incentive mechanism, and to supervise executive behavior.
The dissertation is composed of seven parts, it is arranged as follows:
Chapter1:Introduction. This chapter introduces the research incentives and study background, and the research significance for academia and practice. This chapter also elaborates the research idea and contribution, and draws the outline of the whole study.
Chapter2:Literature review. This chapter has a comprehensive review on the foreign and Chinese literature of managerial power and investment behavior. The review will give a panorama of the research frontier in these fields, and facilitates the following studies. Meanwhile, the review also provides literature evidence for the research variables selection and definition.
Chapter3:Theoretical analysis and institutional background. This chapter demonstrates three main theories which will be cited frequently in the whole dissertation, they are agency theory, optimal contracting theory and managerial power theory. This chapter also explains the literature how to measure the managerial power and executives how to extract rent through board of directors, compensation committee and compensation consultants. In institutional background, the chapter presents the investment systems reform in China since1979and regulations on mergers and acquisitions in capital market, these backgrounds will provide thorough insight on investment behaviors in China, and provide necessary support for following empirical studies.
Chapter4:Managerial power and M&A. This chapter is the empirical research of the influence of managerial power on M&A, executives have incentives to influence the M&A to gain private benefits. First of all, this chapter examines whether executives use managerial power to influence the M&A possibility and M&A scale. This chapter also considers the reality that many executive compensation in State-owned enterprises are restricted by government, under this specific situation, M&A provides a way for executives to gain alternative non-monetary compensation. Lastly, the chapter examines the performance of M&A, to explore the economic consequence of M&A influenced by executives.
Chapter5:Managerial power and diversification. Operating in different industries can diversify the firm risk and executives'human capital risk. Diversification is helpful for those recession industries which face the challenge of business transformation. It can also alleviate executives'pressure from occupation and reputation. Executive compensation and perquisite will increase as the firm size increases. Therefore, this chapter examines whether managerial power has positive influence on diversification. When executive compensation is less than industry average level, it means that the profitability of core businesses is bad, this chapter also examines whether managerial power promotes diversification in this situation. Lastly, this chapter tests the relation between firm value and diversification, which is influenced by managerial power.
Chapter6:Managerial power and R&D. since R&D is internal investment, executives have more influence on it. R&D can enhance firm's competitive advantage, thus, R&D has profound influence on firm's further development and on executive compensation and job stability. This chapter examines whether managerial power can strengthen R&D investment, and then examines the relation between managerial power and R&D under the situation that executives are highly compensated. The value of R&D will be reflected in the product market and securities market, this chapter will also examine whether the influence of managerial power on R&D can improve its value.
Chapter7:Conclusions and suggestions. Conclude the theoretical analysis and empirical results in above chapters, and provide some suggestions to improve the regulation on investment behaviors. Finally this chapter makes some comments on the limitations of the dissertation, and gives some clues for further studies.
This dissertation adopts empirical method to study the relation between managerial power and investment. Different methods are used for different purpose, for instance, factor analysis is adopted to integrate14managerial power factors to be a comprehensive one variable. Event study is applied to calculate the cumulative abnormal return to measure M&A performance before and after M&A announcement. Linear regression is used to test the linear relation among variables. The research data is collected from CSMAR database, but diversification data is collected from CCER database, I examine those data with the reference of annual reports. Stata11.2is the software used to clear up the data and to analyze the data.
The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:
Managerial power has no significant influence on whether to M&A or not, but has influence on M&A type, the more powerful of executives the higher possibility of local M&A. the State-owned enterprises with compensation restriction are more incline to local M&A, and have larger M&A scale. Influence of managerial power on M&A deteriorates firm value.
When shareholders have weak control on firms, executives use use managerial power to make operation more diversified. When compensation is higher than industry average level, executives have more motivation to diversify. Diversification deteriorates firm value; the influence of managerial power on diversification makes firm value worse, but the magnitude is not significant.
R&D has profound Influence on competitive advantage and development opportunities, executives have motivation to increase R&D investment. When compensation is higher, it can compensate executives for the short time loss caused by R&D investment, executive could further improve R&D investment to keep the compensation leading level. Product market reacts significantly positively to R&D, managerial power make this more significantly. However, securities market doesn't react significantly to R&D, even managerial power doesn't change the situation.
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
This study fills the gap between managerial power and investment, extends the scope of managerial power approach. Now managerial power literature focuses on compensation, while investment, like M&A, diversification, and R&D mainly concern on investment performance, some literature study the factors of investment, but managerial power is not included. Investment is non-routine management, executives can participate deeply in the decision making process. Executives have opportunities to extract rent via investment, study the relation between managerial power and investment could contribute to academia and practice.
Both optimal contracting approach and managerial power approach focus on compensation; this dissertation just analyzes the relation between managerial power and corporate investment from the perspective of compensation. When executives are highly compensated, in order to keep compensation in leading level, executives will positively influence investment decision, which is good for shareholder benefits; optimal contracting approach has good explanation on this. When executive compensation is restricted, in order to get alternative non-monetary compensation, executives negatively influence investment decision; managerial power approach has good explanation on this. This dissertation points out that optimal contracting approach and managerial power approach are not substituted, environment will make someone more explainable. This dissertation has contribution to the development of these two theories.
This study integrates14managerial power factors into one comprehensive and diversified variable to measure how powerful executives are. Previous literature has two kind of method to measure managerial power, one method is to select different variables to measure managerial power from different perspective. The drawbacks of this method are obvious, how many variables to select is based on subjective judgment, whether those variables selected can well measure managerial power is unknown, if those variables are highly related themselves they can not provide more information. The other modified method is to integrate several factors into one variable, but only3-5factors. Too few factors make the information missing inevitable. This dissertation selects factors from shareholders control, organization influence, executive seniority, executive reputation, and corporate governance. Integrating factors from these5aspects will have more explanation power.
本文探讨经理权力与公司投资行为之间的关系,对公司投资行为从并购、多元化和研发投资三个方面进行研究。并购是公司外部投资行为,经理可以运用权力影响是否并购、以何种形式并购以及并购规模等方面。多元化既包括外部投资也包括内部投资,公司通过多元化将业务拓展到不同行业可以分散经营风险,也可以为公司带来更多的利润,从个人利益出发经理有动机推动多元化投资。研发投资是公司内部投资行为,更容易受到经理权力的影响。研发投资能够对公司竞争优势的获得和未来的发展产生积极影响,对经理薪酬和职业发展前景也有积极的影响。本文从投资扩大规模、降低风险和增强竞争力三方面效果选择并购、多元化和研发投资三种投资行为,研究经理权力对公司投资行为的影响,并考虑了薪酬激励对两者关系的影响,力求更全面地考察经理权力与投资行为之间错综复杂的关系。
经理运用权力影响公司投资行为不仅是可能的,也是可行的,因为投资活动可以为经理带来个人收益,也需要经理的参与和判断,所以经理权力与投资行为之间存在联系。在上述投资行为三方面的研究中虽然已有很多学者探讨了不同投资行为的影响因素,但尚未考虑经理权力的影响。投资活动作为经理攫取租金的重要手段之一,将其引入经理权力的研究框架有重要的理论意义和现实意义。本文的研究对于公司相关政策的制定、调整,以及更合理的机制设计都有重要的意义,也是理论界和实务界密切关注的问题。
本文分为七个部分,研究结构如下：
第一章导论。主要介绍了本文选题的背景和研究意义；阐述了本文的研究思路和创新点,勾勒出本文研究的总体框架。
第二章文献综述。对国内外经理权力和公司投资行为方面的实证研究进行了系统梳理,评述现有文献存在的不足之处,并为后文的研究提供切入点。同时也为相关变量的选取和定义提供依据。
第三章理论基础和制度背景。给出了本文研究的理论基础,主要包括代理理论、最优契约理论和经理权力理论。接着阐述了经理权力的衡量和权力如何通过对董事会、薪酬委员会、薪酬顾问等影响以攫取租金,还归纳了改革开放以来我国投资体制改革的历程和证券市场对公司并购的相关规定。这些制度背景将为后续的实证研究提供必要的支撑。
第四章经理权力与并购。主要是对经理权力影响公司并购进行实证检验,经理运用权力影响并购的动机在于并购能为经理带来个人收益,经理薪酬会因为并购所带来的公司规模扩大而得到增加,因此本章检验经理是否运用权力增加并购发生的概率和并购规模。国有企业经理薪酬往往会受到管制,当薪酬受到管制后并购则成为经理获取非货币替代性补偿的手段之一,因此本章还考虑了薪酬管制下经理权力对并购行为的影响。最后,本章还检验了受经理权力影响的并购对公司价值的影响。
第五章经理权力与多元化。多元化可以分散公司的经营风险,也有利于经理分散其对公司的专用性人力资本投资风险。通过在不同行业、领域进行经营可以应对某个特定行业的不景气和公司转型的挑战,缓解经理面临的职业生涯的压力和声誉的考验。多元化导致公司规模扩大之后经理薪酬和在职消费也会相应提高,因此经理会积极推动多元化。本章检验经理是否会运用权力提高多元化程度。当经理薪酬低于同行业平均水平时,表明公司主营业务盈利能力堪忧,经理会推动多元化投资以提高公司整体盈利能力,进而提高薪酬,本章对此进行了检验。最后检验受经理权力影响的多元化对公司价值产生的影响。
第六章经理权力与研发投资。与并购和多元化不同,研发投资属于公司的内部投资行为,因此受经理的影响比较明显。由于研发投资可以提高公司的市场竞争力,对公司未来发展能够产生深远的影响,而且经理薪酬和职业稳定性也会受其影响,因此本章检验经理权力对研发投资的影响。在经理获得高薪的情况下,经理会增加研发投资强度以增强公司的竞争优势、保持薪酬的领先水平,所以本章接下来检验经理高薪时权力对研发投资的影响。最后检验经理积极提高研发投资强度是否得到产品市场和股票市场的认可。
第七章全文结论和政策建议。在以上各章理论分析和实证检验的基础上总结出本文的主要研究结论,并依据实证检验结果为我国公司投资行为相关的制度规范提供相应的政策建议。最后就本文的研究局限性进行总结,并展望未来的研究方向。
本文采用实证研究的方法来探讨经理权力与投资行为之间的关系,针对不同问题采用的具体方法有所不同。经理权力的度量采用因子分析法将14个经理权力的影响因素综合为一个指标；并购绩效采用事件研究法估计并购公告日前后若干交易日累积超额收益率(CAR)和并购公告月前后若干月份的购买并持有超额收益(BHAR):不同变量之间的线性关系则采用最小二乘回归法,如经理权力对不同投资行为的影响、不同激励影响下经理权力与投资行为关系的变化等。本文研究数据主要来源于CSMAR各研究数据库,多元化数据来源于CCER数据库,部分项目参照上市公司年报进行了手工调整。数据的处理和分析运用软件Stata11.2。
通过理论分析和实证检验,本文得到如下研究结论：
第一,经理权力没有对是否并购产生明显的影响,而是对并购类型产生了显著影响,即经理权力越大,越倾向于进行本地并购。本文还发现受到薪酬管制影响的国有企业进行本地并购的概率更高,且并购规模更大。结果表明当地政府对国有企业干预程度比较深,从政府社会目标考虑会促进当地国有企业进行本地并购。经理受到薪酬管制的影响后为了获得非货币替代性补偿利用权力进行规模更大的并购。由于经理对并购的影响主要是基于个人利益,受经理权力影响大的并购对公司价值的损害更严重。
第二,在股东对公司的控制能力薄弱的情况下经理运用权力提高了多元化程度。当经理薪酬高于同行业平均水平时,表明公司有较强的盈利能力,有实力推行多元化投资。那些薪酬高于行业平均水平的公司经理可以得到较多的补偿,从而更有效地推动多元化投资。多元化存在折价现象,经理运用权力推动多元化在一定程度上加重了多元化折价,但是效果并不明显。
第三,研发投资对公司市场竞争优势和未来发展有重要影响,经理权力对研发投资有积极的正向影响。当经理获得高薪,能够补偿研发投资造成的短期业绩损失时,经理权力对研发投资的正向影响会越大。为保持薪酬的领先水平经理会增加研发投资强度以使公司在市场竞争中保持优势地位。研发投资能够通过产品市场体现出其价值,但是股票市场的反应并不明显,表明投资者对研发投资持谨慎的态度。
本文的主要改进和创新体现在以下方面：
第一,研究问题上,在理论上扩展了经理权力的运用范围。目前经理权力方面的研究主要关注经理权力对薪酬的影响,但是经理除了通过对董事会、薪酬委员会等公司治理机制的影响外,还可以通过其他方式。投资活动多属例外管理,需要经理的参与和判断,可以为经理运用权力攫取租金提供机会。并购、多元化和研发投资这些投资方面的研究多是关注投资给公司带来的价值,尚未有研究关注经理权力的影响。所以本文试图将经理权力和公司投资行为联系起来,从而扩展经理权力的运用范围。
第二,研究内容上,最优契约理论和经理权力理论关注的焦点都是薪酬,因此本文从薪酬激励的角度分析经理权力与公司投资行为之间的关系。当公司给予经理很高的薪酬激励时,为了保持薪酬的领先水平,经理权力对公司投资的影响一定程度上能够增加股东利益,此时最优契约理论更适用。当公司限制经理薪酬时,为了获得非货币替代性补偿,经理更可能基于个人利益对投资进行影响,最终则会损害股东价值,此时经理权力理论更适用。本文的研究表明最优契约理论和经理权力理论不是非此即彼的替代关系,而是各自有不同的适用环境,环境的影响很重要,从而推动了这两种理论的发展。
第三,变量设计上,对经理权力的度量更全面、更多元。经理权力的来源不是单一的,从多方面、多角度进行度量更符合客观事实、更有说服力。对经理权力的度量目前多见的是两种方式：一种是选择若干变量通过主成分分析等方法合成为一个综合的指标,另一种是以若干变量从不同角度分别度量。以若干变量从不同角度进行度量的缺陷是很显然的,一是若干变量的选取比较主观,选取的若干变量能在多大程度上代理经理权力也值得怀疑；二是选取的若干变量之间如果本身就存在较强的相关性,虽然是从不同角度进行了度量,但是增量信息却非常有限。将若干变量综合成一个合成指标以度量经理权力是比较好的方法,但目前的文献中用来度量经理权力的变量一般只有几个,对其进行主成分分析难以达到降维的效果,也容易出现信息的缺失,本文综合了已有文献在经理权力方面的度量方式,选择了14个指标从5个方面,涉及了股东、经理、组织、治理等内容,更全面地衡量了经理权力,对经理权力的度量做了有益的尝试。
Under optimal contracting approach, executive compensation practices are viewed as a mechanism designed to maximize the wealth of shareholders, and minimize the agency costs that exist between executives and shareholders. However, contrary to the optimal contracting approach, managerial power approach, which analyzes from the perspective focuses on the ability of executives to influence their own compensation scheme, points out that compensation arrangements approved by boards often deviate from optimal contracting. Executives have the power to receive compensation in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders; this excessive compensation constitutes rents. Executive compensation itself becomes part of agency problem. Investment is an important way to expend the firm size, as the firm size becomes bigger, executives have more control on firm resource, steadier position, and higher compensation. What's further, investment is by and large non-routine management, which means it needs executives' judgments. Subjective judgments facilitate executives to gain more private benefits in investment decision. Whether to invest, how to invest, and investment scale, all of these decision processes are more or less influenced by executives, thus, investment activities provide good opportunities to study how executives extract rent via their managerial power.
This dissertation focuses on the relation between managerial power and investment behaviors. Investment behaviors are subdivided into three parts: mergers and acquisitions (M&A), diversification, and research and development (R&D). M&A is external investment behavior. Executives can influence the decision of whether to implement M&A, which way to M&A, and M&A scale. When executive compensation is restricted by law or firm institution, executive tend to make more M&A to obtain alternative non-monetary compensation, like controllable resource, promotion, and personal reputation. Diversification could be either external investment or internal investment, or both. Although diversification is a way to expend firm size, its outstanding feature is risk-diversification. It also can gain more benefits from other industries. Thus, risk-aversion executives have motivation to diversify. R&D is totally internal investment behavior, could be influenced easily by executives. R&D is vital for a firm to gain competitive advantage in the market, and is also positive for executives to gain more compensation and promising future. When highly compensated, executives will be motivated to enhance R&D investment to keep compensation in leading level. These three parts of investment behavior from external perspective to internal perspective, reveal a comprehensive view of how managerial power influences investment behavior.
It is not only possible, but also feasible that executives influence investment behaviors via managerial power, because investment can bring executives private benefits, and investment also need executives'participation. Previous literature has enormous studies on M&A, diversification, and R&D, and also plenty of literature studies the managerial power and its relation with executive compensation. There is little literature study on the relation between managerial power and investment behavior directly. Investment is an important way to extract rent, so introducing investment to the research domain of managerial power has significance on both of theoretical and practice. The results of this dissertation can also provide some guidance for policy makers to design and modify incentive mechanism, and to supervise executive behavior.
The dissertation is composed of seven parts, it is arranged as follows:
Chapter1:Introduction. This chapter introduces the research incentives and study background, and the research significance for academia and practice. This chapter also elaborates the research idea and contribution, and draws the outline of the whole study.
Chapter2:Literature review. This chapter has a comprehensive review on the foreign and Chinese literature of managerial power and investment behavior. The review will give a panorama of the research frontier in these fields, and facilitates the following studies. Meanwhile, the review also provides literature evidence for the research variables selection and definition.
Chapter3:Theoretical analysis and institutional background. This chapter demonstrates three main theories which will be cited frequently in the whole dissertation, they are agency theory, optimal contracting theory and managerial power theory. This chapter also explains the literature how to measure the managerial power and executives how to extract rent through board of directors, compensation committee and compensation consultants. In institutional background, the chapter presents the investment systems reform in China since1979and regulations on mergers and acquisitions in capital market, these backgrounds will provide thorough insight on investment behaviors in China, and provide necessary support for following empirical studies.
Chapter4:Managerial power and M&A. This chapter is the empirical research of the influence of managerial power on M&A, executives have incentives to influence the M&A to gain private benefits. First of all, this chapter examines whether executives use managerial power to influence the M&A possibility and M&A scale. This chapter also considers the reality that many executive compensation in State-owned enterprises are restricted by government, under this specific situation, M&A provides a way for executives to gain alternative non-monetary compensation. Lastly, the chapter examines the performance of M&A, to explore the economic consequence of M&A influenced by executives.
Chapter5:Managerial power and diversification. Operating in different industries can diversify the firm risk and executives'human capital risk. Diversification is helpful for those recession industries which face the challenge of business transformation. It can also alleviate executives'pressure from occupation and reputation. Executive compensation and perquisite will increase as the firm size increases. Therefore, this chapter examines whether managerial power has positive influence on diversification. When executive compensation is less than industry average level, it means that the profitability of core businesses is bad, this chapter also examines whether managerial power promotes diversification in this situation. Lastly, this chapter tests the relation between firm value and diversification, which is influenced by managerial power.
Chapter6:Managerial power and R&D. since R&D is internal investment, executives have more influence on it. R&D can enhance firm's competitive advantage, thus, R&D has profound influence on firm's further development and on executive compensation and job stability. This chapter examines whether managerial power can strengthen R&D investment, and then examines the relation between managerial power and R&D under the situation that executives are highly compensated. The value of R&D will be reflected in the product market and securities market, this chapter will also examine whether the influence of managerial power on R&D can improve its value.
Chapter7:Conclusions and suggestions. Conclude the theoretical analysis and empirical results in above chapters, and provide some suggestions to improve the regulation on investment behaviors. Finally this chapter makes some comments on the limitations of the dissertation, and gives some clues for further studies.
This dissertation adopts empirical method to study the relation between managerial power and investment. Different methods are used for different purpose, for instance, factor analysis is adopted to integrate14managerial power factors to be a comprehensive one variable. Event study is applied to calculate the cumulative abnormal return to measure M&A performance before and after M&A announcement. Linear regression is used to test the linear relation among variables. The research data is collected from CSMAR database, but diversification data is collected from CCER database, I examine those data with the reference of annual reports. Stata11.2is the software used to clear up the data and to analyze the data.
The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:
Managerial power has no significant influence on whether to M&A or not, but has influence on M&A type, the more powerful of executives the higher possibility of local M&A. the State-owned enterprises with compensation restriction are more incline to local M&A, and have larger M&A scale. Influence of managerial power on M&A deteriorates firm value.
When shareholders have weak control on firms, executives use use managerial power to make operation more diversified. When compensation is higher than industry average level, executives have more motivation to diversify. Diversification deteriorates firm value; the influence of managerial power on diversification makes firm value worse, but the magnitude is not significant.
R&D has profound Influence on competitive advantage and development opportunities, executives have motivation to increase R&D investment. When compensation is higher, it can compensate executives for the short time loss caused by R&D investment, executive could further improve R&D investment to keep the compensation leading level. Product market reacts significantly positively to R&D, managerial power make this more significantly. However, securities market doesn't react significantly to R&D, even managerial power doesn't change the situation.
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
This study fills the gap between managerial power and investment, extends the scope of managerial power approach. Now managerial power literature focuses on compensation, while investment, like M&A, diversification, and R&D mainly concern on investment performance, some literature study the factors of investment, but managerial power is not included. Investment is non-routine management, executives can participate deeply in the decision making process. Executives have opportunities to extract rent via investment, study the relation between managerial power and investment could contribute to academia and practice.
Both optimal contracting approach and managerial power approach focus on compensation; this dissertation just analyzes the relation between managerial power and corporate investment from the perspective of compensation. When executives are highly compensated, in order to keep compensation in leading level, executives will positively influence investment decision, which is good for shareholder benefits; optimal contracting approach has good explanation on this. When executive compensation is restricted, in order to get alternative non-monetary compensation, executives negatively influence investment decision; managerial power approach has good explanation on this. This dissertation points out that optimal contracting approach and managerial power approach are not substituted, environment will make someone more explainable. This dissertation has contribution to the development of these two theories.
This study integrates14managerial power factors into one comprehensive and diversified variable to measure how powerful executives are. Previous literature has two kind of method to measure managerial power, one method is to select different variables to measure managerial power from different perspective. The drawbacks of this method are obvious, how many variables to select is based on subjective judgment, whether those variables selected can well measure managerial power is unknown, if those variables are highly related themselves they can not provide more information. The other modified method is to integrate several factors into one variable, but only3-5factors. Too few factors make the information missing inevitable. This dissertation selects factors from shareholders control, organization influence, executive seniority, executive reputation, and corporate governance. Integrating factors from these5aspects will have more explanation power.
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