纵向一体化与技术授权研究
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摘要
本文研究纵向企业之间的技术转让问题，借助上下游双寡头竞争模型，即上下游市场竞争形式均为寡头竞争，从技术拥有企业及社会福利的角度，探讨技术拥有企业的最优技术转让策略问题，并对相应的社会福利进行分析。具体来说，主要从以下四个方面进行：
第一，利用上下游双寡头古诺竞争模型，分析上下游企业之间的技术授权问题。假设两个上游企业生产同质中间产品并进行产量竞争，两个下游企业生产同质的最终产品并进行产量竞争，其中一个下游企业拥有降低生产成本技术的情况。研究发现：技术拥有企业选择向一个企业还是两个企业转让技术主要取决于技术授权合同的收费形式及技术创新程度；对技术拥有企业而言，双重收费合同时其总利润最高，且技术授权会提高社会福利；同样，对于技术拥有企业而言，固定收费合同并非总是优于特许权收费合同。
第二，假设在一个纵向关联的市场中有两个上游企业和两个下游企业，上游企业之间进行价格竞争，下游企业之间进行产量竞争，且其中一个下游企业拥有降低生产成本技术的情况。研究发现：在双重收费合同及特许权收费合同情形下，技术拥有企业会向两个上游企业同时转让技术；而在固定收费合同情形下，技术拥有企业只向一个上游企业转让技术；对于技术拥有企业而言，特许权收费合同与双重收费合同情形下，其总利润相同，且特许权收费合同总是优于固定收费合同；当技术创新程度较低时，技术授权将会降低消费者剩余和社会福利。
第三，利用上下游双寡头竞争模型，分析上下游企业之间的纵向一体化和纵向技术授权问题。假设上游企业之间进行价格竞争或产量竞争，下游企业之间进行产量竞争，其中一个下游企业拥有降低生产成本的技术，技术授权的收费形式为双重收费合同。研究发现：技术拥有企业的技术授权对象及纵向并购对象的选择取决于技术创新程度和上游企业之间的竞争方式。对于技术拥有企业而言，其更偏好通过纵向并购转让技术；最优的双重收费合同中或只包含固定收费部分或者只包含单位产出费部分或者二者都有，这也取决于技术创新程度及上游企业之间的竞争方式。从社会福利的角度看，纵向并购时的社会福利高于技术授权时的社会福利；在技术授权情形下，与上游企业之间进行产量竞争相比，上游企业之间进行价格竞争时的产业利润可能会更高，而消费者剩余和社会福利可能会更低。
第四，假设市场中有两个上游企业和两个下游企业，上游企业之间进行产量竞争，下游企业间也进行产量竞争，与第三章不同的是，其中一个上游企业拥有降低生产成本的技术，探讨技术拥有企业通过一体化方式和技术授权转让技术的问题。研究发现：在固定收费合同和纵向一体化情形下，技术拥有企业的技术转让对象选择取决于技术创新程度；而在双重收费合同和特许权收费合同情形下，其会同时向两个下游企业转让技术。对技术拥有企业而言，通过技术授权转让技术时，双重收费合同条件下其总利润最大；当技术革新程度较低时，特许权收费合同优于固定收费合同。从社会福利的角度来看，技术授权可能会降低社会福利和消费者剩余；与技术授权情况相比，纵向一体化时的产业利润、消费者剩余及社会福利更高。
Using a bilateral duopoly model between upward and downward industries, thisdissertation analyzes how a patent holder chooses the types of technology diffusion:vertical licensing (and) or vertical integration, and the welfare properties oftechnology licensing and (or) vertical integration via vertical relationships. To bespecific, the following four aspects are:
First, in a bilateral Cournot model where two downward firms produce ahomogenous good, we analyze how a downward firm licenses its cost-reducinginnovation to upward firm(s). It is shown that, depending on both the types oflicensing contract and innovation size, equilibrium licensing could be either exclusiveor non-exclusive. Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, royalty licensing isnot always superior to fixed-fee licensing. In addition, two-part tariff licensing isoptimal for the patent holder, and licensing improves social welfare.
Second, we consider a vertically related market with two upstream producersand two downstream producers, where upstream firms compete against each other ala Bertrand and downstream firms compete against a la Cournot. It is shown that,under royalty contract or two-part tariff contract, selling license to both upward firmsis better, but under fixed fee contract, licensing to one upward firm is better.Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, licensing by means of royaltycontract is superior to by means of a fixed fee, and licensing by means of royaltycontract is the same to two-part tariff contract. In addition, technology licensing hurtsboth consumers and the society, if the innovation is small.
Third, in a bilateral duopoly model where a downstream firm owns acost-reducing innovation, this paper analyzes the welfare properties of backwardintegration and technology licensing via vertical relationships. We assume thatupstream firms compete against each other either a la Cournot or a la Bertrand, anddownstream firms competing in Cournot fashion produce a homogenous good. It isshown that, depending on both upstream competition mode and innovation size,equilibrium licensing could be either exclusive or non-exclusive, with a contract including either a fee, or a royalty, or both, and equilibrium integration could also beeither exclusive or non-exclusive. Moreover, for the patent holder and social welfare,backward integration is always superior to patent licensing. In addition, patentlicensing could lead to lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and highersocial welfare under upstream Cournot competition than under upstream Bertrand.
Last, using a bilateral Cournot model where two downward firms produce ahomogenous good, we analyze how a upward firm transfers its cost-reducinginnovation to downward firm(s). It is shown that, under fixed fee contract or forwardintegration, equilibrium licensing and integration could be either exclusive ornon-exclusive. Under royalty contract and two-part tariff contract, equilibriumlicensing is non-exclusive. Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, royaltylicensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing, if the innovation is small. In addition, inlicensing contracts, two-part tariff is optimal for the patent holder, but licensing maylowers social welfare. In addition, it could lead to lower industry profit, consumersurplus and social welfare under patent licensing than under forward integration.
第一，利用上下游双寡头古诺竞争模型，分析上下游企业之间的技术授权问题。假设两个上游企业生产同质中间产品并进行产量竞争，两个下游企业生产同质的最终产品并进行产量竞争，其中一个下游企业拥有降低生产成本技术的情况。研究发现：技术拥有企业选择向一个企业还是两个企业转让技术主要取决于技术授权合同的收费形式及技术创新程度；对技术拥有企业而言，双重收费合同时其总利润最高，且技术授权会提高社会福利；同样，对于技术拥有企业而言，固定收费合同并非总是优于特许权收费合同。
第二，假设在一个纵向关联的市场中有两个上游企业和两个下游企业，上游企业之间进行价格竞争，下游企业之间进行产量竞争，且其中一个下游企业拥有降低生产成本技术的情况。研究发现：在双重收费合同及特许权收费合同情形下，技术拥有企业会向两个上游企业同时转让技术；而在固定收费合同情形下，技术拥有企业只向一个上游企业转让技术；对于技术拥有企业而言，特许权收费合同与双重收费合同情形下，其总利润相同，且特许权收费合同总是优于固定收费合同；当技术创新程度较低时，技术授权将会降低消费者剩余和社会福利。
第三，利用上下游双寡头竞争模型，分析上下游企业之间的纵向一体化和纵向技术授权问题。假设上游企业之间进行价格竞争或产量竞争，下游企业之间进行产量竞争，其中一个下游企业拥有降低生产成本的技术，技术授权的收费形式为双重收费合同。研究发现：技术拥有企业的技术授权对象及纵向并购对象的选择取决于技术创新程度和上游企业之间的竞争方式。对于技术拥有企业而言，其更偏好通过纵向并购转让技术；最优的双重收费合同中或只包含固定收费部分或者只包含单位产出费部分或者二者都有，这也取决于技术创新程度及上游企业之间的竞争方式。从社会福利的角度看，纵向并购时的社会福利高于技术授权时的社会福利；在技术授权情形下，与上游企业之间进行产量竞争相比，上游企业之间进行价格竞争时的产业利润可能会更高，而消费者剩余和社会福利可能会更低。
第四，假设市场中有两个上游企业和两个下游企业，上游企业之间进行产量竞争，下游企业间也进行产量竞争，与第三章不同的是，其中一个上游企业拥有降低生产成本的技术，探讨技术拥有企业通过一体化方式和技术授权转让技术的问题。研究发现：在固定收费合同和纵向一体化情形下，技术拥有企业的技术转让对象选择取决于技术创新程度；而在双重收费合同和特许权收费合同情形下，其会同时向两个下游企业转让技术。对技术拥有企业而言，通过技术授权转让技术时，双重收费合同条件下其总利润最大；当技术革新程度较低时，特许权收费合同优于固定收费合同。从社会福利的角度来看，技术授权可能会降低社会福利和消费者剩余；与技术授权情况相比，纵向一体化时的产业利润、消费者剩余及社会福利更高。
Using a bilateral duopoly model between upward and downward industries, thisdissertation analyzes how a patent holder chooses the types of technology diffusion:vertical licensing (and) or vertical integration, and the welfare properties oftechnology licensing and (or) vertical integration via vertical relationships. To bespecific, the following four aspects are:
First, in a bilateral Cournot model where two downward firms produce ahomogenous good, we analyze how a downward firm licenses its cost-reducinginnovation to upward firm(s). It is shown that, depending on both the types oflicensing contract and innovation size, equilibrium licensing could be either exclusiveor non-exclusive. Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, royalty licensing isnot always superior to fixed-fee licensing. In addition, two-part tariff licensing isoptimal for the patent holder, and licensing improves social welfare.
Second, we consider a vertically related market with two upstream producersand two downstream producers, where upstream firms compete against each other ala Bertrand and downstream firms compete against a la Cournot. It is shown that,under royalty contract or two-part tariff contract, selling license to both upward firmsis better, but under fixed fee contract, licensing to one upward firm is better.Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, licensing by means of royaltycontract is superior to by means of a fixed fee, and licensing by means of royaltycontract is the same to two-part tariff contract. In addition, technology licensing hurtsboth consumers and the society, if the innovation is small.
Third, in a bilateral duopoly model where a downstream firm owns acost-reducing innovation, this paper analyzes the welfare properties of backwardintegration and technology licensing via vertical relationships. We assume thatupstream firms compete against each other either a la Cournot or a la Bertrand, anddownstream firms competing in Cournot fashion produce a homogenous good. It isshown that, depending on both upstream competition mode and innovation size,equilibrium licensing could be either exclusive or non-exclusive, with a contract including either a fee, or a royalty, or both, and equilibrium integration could also beeither exclusive or non-exclusive. Moreover, for the patent holder and social welfare,backward integration is always superior to patent licensing. In addition, patentlicensing could lead to lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and highersocial welfare under upstream Cournot competition than under upstream Bertrand.
Last, using a bilateral Cournot model where two downward firms produce ahomogenous good, we analyze how a upward firm transfers its cost-reducinginnovation to downward firm(s). It is shown that, under fixed fee contract or forwardintegration, equilibrium licensing and integration could be either exclusive ornon-exclusive. Under royalty contract and two-part tariff contract, equilibriumlicensing is non-exclusive. Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, royaltylicensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing, if the innovation is small. In addition, inlicensing contracts, two-part tariff is optimal for the patent holder, but licensing maylowers social welfare. In addition, it could lead to lower industry profit, consumersurplus and social welfare under patent licensing than under forward integration.
引文
9Nickerson J.1996,“Strategic objectives supported by licensing,” In: Parr R.L. and Sullivan P.H.(Eds),Technology Licensing: Corporate Strategies for Maximizing Value. Wiley, New York, pp.63–82.
10主要有Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2003)、Li(2005)，李长英、姜羽(2006)，李长英、宋娟(2006a，b)
25Kamien, M., and Tauman, Y.,1986,“Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent,” Quarterly Journalof Economics,101(3):471-491，后面简称K-T(1986)。
65案例来源：Nickerson J.1996,“Strategic objectives supported by licensing,” In: Parr R.L. and Sullivan P.H.
(Eds), Technology Licensing: Corporate Strategies for Maximizing Value. Wiley, New York, pp.63–82.
94其他文献有Symeonidis (2003), Zanchettin (2006), Arya et al.(2008) and Li and Ji (2010)。
95很多文献分析不同情况下的技术授权问题。例如： Kabiraj (2004), Poddar and Sinha (2004), Erkal (2005),Erutku and Richelle (2007)和Li and Geng (2008)。
122Streb, J., Shaping the national system of inter-industry knowledge exchange Vertical integration, licensing andrepeated knowledge transfer in the German plastics industry. Research Policy,2003,32:1125–1140.
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10主要有Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2003)、Li(2005)，李长英、姜羽(2006)，李长英、宋娟(2006a，b)
25Kamien, M., and Tauman, Y.,1986,“Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent,” Quarterly Journalof Economics,101(3):471-491，后面简称K-T(1986)。
65案例来源：Nickerson J.1996,“Strategic objectives supported by licensing,” In: Parr R.L. and Sullivan P.H.
(Eds), Technology Licensing: Corporate Strategies for Maximizing Value. Wiley, New York, pp.63–82.
94其他文献有Symeonidis (2003), Zanchettin (2006), Arya et al.(2008) and Li and Ji (2010)。
95很多文献分析不同情况下的技术授权问题。例如： Kabiraj (2004), Poddar and Sinha (2004), Erkal (2005),Erutku and Richelle (2007)和Li and Geng (2008)。
122Streb, J., Shaping the national system of inter-industry knowledge exchange Vertical integration, licensing andrepeated knowledge transfer in the German plastics industry. Research Policy,2003,32:1125–1140.
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