农地经营权抵押贷款供需分析与效率评价研究
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摘要
本研究以盘活、释放农地融资功能为着眼点,以农地经营权抵押贷款活动为研究对象,结合中国农村的实际,在认真分析、总结农村土地经营权抵押贷款实践经验的基础上,对农村土地经营权抵押贷款需求与供给影响机理进行了深入剖析。以河南省四个具有代表性的试点县(濮阳县、固始县、杞县、汝阳县)调查资料为依据,站在农户需求、金融机构供给层面,对农地经营权抵押贷款需求、供给及其影响因素进行了实证分析。同时,以河南省四个具有代表性的试点县(濮阳县、固始县、杞县、汝阳县)调查资料为基础,从农户层面、金融机构层面对农地经营权抵押贷款效率进行了评价。最后,对德国、美国、日本等国农地抵押贷款实践经验总结基础上,基于交易成本经济学和契约经济学的理论,从金融机构、农户、政府之间的利益互动视角,对农地经营权抵押贷款业务开展的组织设计、风险防范、配套改革进行了设计。本研究的主要研究结论,可以概括为以下三个方面：
第一,农地经营权抵押贷款业务的开展有效地解决了农户贷款抵押品缺乏的困境,为我国农村金融改革及农村金融系统重组提供了理论与实践依据,为金融支持“三农”、服务“三农”提供了新思路、新方法。
第二,农地经营权抵押贷款业务的开展较好地契合了农民正规信贷需求,农地经营权抵押贷款业务全面开展已是大势所趋。然而,农地经营权抵押贷款业务开展过程中,仍然存在融资成本高、潜在需求低、金融机构贷款供给意愿低、政策性强等一系列问题(金融机构供给积极性主要来源于行政激励、经济激励两个方面)。
第三,农地经营权抵押贷款业务的开展对农村金融机构经营绩效有明显改善作用,对农户信贷可得性、生产经营收入的改善产生了积极影响。然而,由于交易成本(费用)、风险监控制度的之间差异,我国农地经营权抵押贷款运行效率不容乐观,仍然存在帕累托改进的空间。为此,政府应充分发挥主导、监管功能,进一步完善政府、金融机构、农户之间互动的关系,以克服“市场失灵”,减缓“政府失效所带来的负面影响。
Focusing on revitalizing and liberating rural financial functions, taking RLML (rual land management mortgage) as the object of study, combining with the current realities in China's rural areas, this research presents an in depth analysis of demand and supply impact mechanism for RLML on the basis of careful analysis and summary of the practical experience and performance of RLML. Based on the survey data from4representative experimental counties(Puyang county, Gushi county, Qixian county and Ruyang county) in Henan province, from the perspectives of both village household demand for RLML and supply from credit institutions, the research conducts an empirical analysis on demand and supply of RLORML and its impact factors. Meanwhile, also on the basis survey data from the4representative experimental counties (Puyang county, Gushi county, Qixian county and Ruyang county) in Henan province, the research gives a practical efficiency evaluation on RLORML from positions of both village households and credit institutions. Finally, on the practical experience summing-ups of rural land financing systems in countries like Germany, United States and Japan, by using catallactics and contract economics theories, seeing from the interest interactive perspective of government, credit institutions and village households, the research outlines plannings and designings in organizing, risk preventing and coordinated reforming for RLORML institutional innovation.
The conclusions drawn by the research can be summarized in the following3respects:
Firstly, the development of RLML solves the problem of lack of mortgages, which has been confronting village households for a long time. RLML also provides theoretical and practical basis for our country's rural financial reform and reconstruction of rural financial system. Furthermore, with further development of RLML, it effectively expands the rural financial business scope and puts forward new approaches and ways on financial support for the development of "The Three Elements Concerning Agriculture, Rural Areas, and Farmers".
Secondly, RLMLcan better meet the farmers' requirements for formal credit loans and it has becoming a general trend in rural financial development. However, problems like high cost of financing and low potential demand generally exist in the business operation and development of RLML. Meantime, the motivation for operating RLML business comes simply from administrative incentive and economic incentive, coupling with discouraging and obstacling factors composed by the self-construction of credit institutions, credit institutions' capability construction and external environment. Hence, there are a series of problems like low willingness to supply and strong policy support in RLML operation.
Thirdly, the development of RLML markedly improves the performance and efficiency of rural credit institutions, credit availability for rural households and has positive impacts on raising their production and management income. However, due to the transaction cost and the differences in risk control systems, the efficiency of the on going RLML operation is far beyond optimism in our country. With the lack of efficiency in operating mechanism, the system efficiency of RLML still has much room for Pareto improvement. Therefore, in the process of RLML operation and development, government should fully exert its function in directing and supervising in order to better the interactive relationship between credit institutions, government and village households, so that the negative effects brought by so called "Government Failure" and "Market Failure" can be eased and overcome.
第一,农地经营权抵押贷款业务的开展有效地解决了农户贷款抵押品缺乏的困境,为我国农村金融改革及农村金融系统重组提供了理论与实践依据,为金融支持“三农”、服务“三农”提供了新思路、新方法。
第二,农地经营权抵押贷款业务的开展较好地契合了农民正规信贷需求,农地经营权抵押贷款业务全面开展已是大势所趋。然而,农地经营权抵押贷款业务开展过程中,仍然存在融资成本高、潜在需求低、金融机构贷款供给意愿低、政策性强等一系列问题(金融机构供给积极性主要来源于行政激励、经济激励两个方面)。
第三,农地经营权抵押贷款业务的开展对农村金融机构经营绩效有明显改善作用,对农户信贷可得性、生产经营收入的改善产生了积极影响。然而,由于交易成本(费用)、风险监控制度的之间差异,我国农地经营权抵押贷款运行效率不容乐观,仍然存在帕累托改进的空间。为此,政府应充分发挥主导、监管功能,进一步完善政府、金融机构、农户之间互动的关系,以克服“市场失灵”,减缓“政府失效所带来的负面影响。
Focusing on revitalizing and liberating rural financial functions, taking RLML (rual land management mortgage) as the object of study, combining with the current realities in China's rural areas, this research presents an in depth analysis of demand and supply impact mechanism for RLML on the basis of careful analysis and summary of the practical experience and performance of RLML. Based on the survey data from4representative experimental counties(Puyang county, Gushi county, Qixian county and Ruyang county) in Henan province, from the perspectives of both village household demand for RLML and supply from credit institutions, the research conducts an empirical analysis on demand and supply of RLORML and its impact factors. Meanwhile, also on the basis survey data from the4representative experimental counties (Puyang county, Gushi county, Qixian county and Ruyang county) in Henan province, the research gives a practical efficiency evaluation on RLORML from positions of both village households and credit institutions. Finally, on the practical experience summing-ups of rural land financing systems in countries like Germany, United States and Japan, by using catallactics and contract economics theories, seeing from the interest interactive perspective of government, credit institutions and village households, the research outlines plannings and designings in organizing, risk preventing and coordinated reforming for RLORML institutional innovation.
The conclusions drawn by the research can be summarized in the following3respects:
Firstly, the development of RLML solves the problem of lack of mortgages, which has been confronting village households for a long time. RLML also provides theoretical and practical basis for our country's rural financial reform and reconstruction of rural financial system. Furthermore, with further development of RLML, it effectively expands the rural financial business scope and puts forward new approaches and ways on financial support for the development of "The Three Elements Concerning Agriculture, Rural Areas, and Farmers".
Secondly, RLMLcan better meet the farmers' requirements for formal credit loans and it has becoming a general trend in rural financial development. However, problems like high cost of financing and low potential demand generally exist in the business operation and development of RLML. Meantime, the motivation for operating RLML business comes simply from administrative incentive and economic incentive, coupling with discouraging and obstacling factors composed by the self-construction of credit institutions, credit institutions' capability construction and external environment. Hence, there are a series of problems like low willingness to supply and strong policy support in RLML operation.
Thirdly, the development of RLML markedly improves the performance and efficiency of rural credit institutions, credit availability for rural households and has positive impacts on raising their production and management income. However, due to the transaction cost and the differences in risk control systems, the efficiency of the on going RLML operation is far beyond optimism in our country. With the lack of efficiency in operating mechanism, the system efficiency of RLML still has much room for Pareto improvement. Therefore, in the process of RLML operation and development, government should fully exert its function in directing and supervising in order to better the interactive relationship between credit institutions, government and village households, so that the negative effects brought by so called "Government Failure" and "Market Failure" can be eased and overcome.
引文
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