媒体治理视角下在职消费与公司价值的关系研究
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摘要
近年来，国内外媒体对在职消费的高频率曝光，使在职消费逐渐成为学术界关注的热点话题。在我国，在职消费现象由来已久并且根深蒂固，目前学术界对高管薪酬的研究仍主要局限于货币薪酬与股权激励，对高管薪酬的重要组成部分——在职消费的研究却远远滞后于实践发展的需要。因此，加强对在职消费的研究，具有重要的现实意义与理论价值。
关于在职消费的现有文献主要形成了两种相悖的观点：代理观和效率观。代理观认为在职消费是企业代理成本的一种，有损于公司价值的最大化，效率观则认为在职消费有助于提高管理层工作效率与企业运营效率，为公司价值的创造发挥了积极作用。基于现有研究，本文首先通过博弈分析法，构建了考虑在职消费后的最优薪酬契约模型，并在高管存在道德风险的情形下，对在职消费与公司价值的关系进行了理论推导。
媒体的信息传播职能极大地改善了股东与高管之间的信息不对称状况，通过媒体舆论引导与监督职能的发挥，媒体的公司治理功能也逐渐显现。基于媒体治理论，本文进一步从理论上分析了媒体治理影响在职消费的作用机制，并从媒体治理的视角，提出了媒体治理影响在职消费和公司价值关系的传导机制。
在理论分析的基础上，本文手工收集了2004-2012年间我国上市公司高管在职消费、媒体治理等变量的相关数据，通过描述性统计、相关性分析、单变量分析、面板数据回归模型等统计与计量分析方法，分别检验了在职消费与公司价值之间的关系、媒体治理对在职消费的影响以及媒体治理对在职消费和公司价值关系的影响，并对上述实证检验结果进行了详细的讨论。通过理论分析与实证检验，本文得出如下研究结论：
（1）高管薪酬契约结构的不同，导致在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”的并存现状。具体来说，当在职消费与货币薪酬之间存在替代关系（“高货币薪酬-低在职消费”、“低货币薪酬-高在职消费”）时，支持在职消费的“效率观”；而当在职消费与货币薪酬存在互补关系（“高货币薪酬-高在职消费”、“低货币薪酬-低在职消费”）时，支持在职消费的“代理观”。
（2）媒体治理作为一种外部公司治理机制，对高管在职消费具有较强的监督治理功能。首先，当上市公司高管在职消费过高，尤其是超额在职消费较高时，上市公司会受到媒体的广泛关注，媒体发挥了积极的监督治理功能；其次，媒体对上市公司关注度的提升，不仅有利于降低高管超额在职消费水平，同时对高管薪酬契约结构的调整亦会产生显著影响，从而发挥了积极的公司治理功能。
（3）媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值的关系起到了显著而积极的调节作用。即使将媒体区分为政策导向型与市场导向型两种类型，媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值的关系依然具有较强的正面影响，尤其在互补型薪酬契约结构下，媒体治理能够有效抑制在职消费对公司价值的消极影响。
本文的创新之处主要有：
第一，构建了一个考虑在职消费后的最优薪酬契约模型，得出在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”各自的适用情形，为学术界关于在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”的激烈争论提供了一种新的理论解释。通过理论模型推导，并利用我国上市公司样本数据进行实证检验，研究发现在职消费与货币薪酬之间同时存在着替代关系与互补关系，而不同的薪酬契约结构导致了在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”并存的局面。
第二，通过手工采集大量数据及编程处理，本文系统研究了媒体对高管在职消费的治理作用，研究表明，媒体治理对超额在职消费具有显著的抑制作用；并从媒体治理的角度提出了治理在职消费的方法与手段，为各类监管机构有效监督高管在职消费提供了经验证据和决策参考依据。本文不同于现有文献选取特殊的小样本数据，克服了小样本研究结论普适性不强的局限，并拓展了现有研究对媒体治理功能的认识，对公司治理领域其他相关研究也具有一定的借鉴意义。
第三，本文从媒体治理的视角切入，综合运用管理学、经济学与传媒学等领域的相关理论，分析了媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值关系的影响机制，并进行了相应的实证检验。研究发现媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值的关系具有积极的调节效应，这一研究结论不仅提供了基于新兴市场国家媒体治理作用的经验证据，而且拓展了“媒体治理论”的研究范畴，为法律外制度的公司治理机制研究作出了一定贡献。同时，本文详细检验了媒体类型可能对媒体治理功能产生的影响，揭示了我国市场导向型媒体与政策导向型媒体的治理效应差异，丰富了“媒体有偏论”研究领域的现有研究成果。
In recent years, the domestic and foreign media exposure executive perquisitesfrequently, making perquisites become a hot topic in academia. In China, the phenomenon ofexecutive perquisites have been a long time and deeply rooted. However, the current study onexecutive compensation in academia is still confined to monetary compensation and incentive,research on executive perquisites which is an important part of executive pay is far laggingbehind the need of the practice development. Therefore, research on perks have importantpractical significance and theoretical value.
The existing literature on perks mainly formed two contrary viewpoints: the agent viewand the view of efficiency. The agent view holds that perks are detrimental to corporate value,while the efficiency concept considers that perks help to improve the managements’ workefficiency and the company’s operational efficiency, playing an active role of creatingcorporate value. On the basis of existing research, using the game analysis method, this paperfirstly constructs an optimal compensation contract model after considering executive perks,and theoretical deduces the relationship between perks and corporate value in the case ofexecutive moral hazard.
Information dissemination functions of the media greatly eliminates the informationasymmetry between management and shareholders, through the media supervision and byguiding public opinion, the role of media governance has gradually appeared. Based on thetheory of media governance, this paper analyzes the media governance mechanism onexecutive perks, and presents the transmission mechanism between executive perks andcorporate value from the media governance perspective.
Based on the theoretical analysis, this paper manually collected the data of executiveperks, media governance and other variables in Chinese listed companies during2004to2012.Using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, univariate analysis, panel data regressionmodels and other statistical and quantitative analysis methods, the paper tested therelationship between the media governance, executive perks and corporate value, anddiscussed the empirical results in detail. Through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,this paper drawed the following conclusions:
(1) The different structure of executive compensation contracts result in the coexistenceof agency concept and efficiency concept. Specifically, when there are substitutes betweenperquisite consumption and monetary compensation (high monetary compensation and lowperquisite consumption, or low monetary compensation and high perquisite consumption), the efficient view is supported; and when the perquisite consumption and monetary compensationare complementary to each other (high monetary compensation and high perquisiteconsumption, or low monetary compensation and low perquisite consumption), the agentview is supported.
(2) Media governance as an external corporate governance mechanism has thesupervision and governance function on executive perquisites. First of all, the media plays anactive monitoring function, when executive perquisite is too high, especially a higher excessperks, the media attention on listed companies will be strengthen, playing a positivesupervision function; secondly, the media attention on the listed companies can play asignificant inhibitory effect on executive excess perks and have a significant impact on thestructure adjustment of executive compensation contracts.
(3) Media plays a significantly positive regulatory role on the relationship of executiveperks and corporate value. Even after the distinction media ownership, the corporategovernance role of media still has stronger positive impact on perks and corporate value,especially having a strong inhibitory effect on the negative relationship of perks and corporatevalue under the complementary structure.
The main innovation of this paper are as follows:
Firstly, the paper constructed an optimal compensation contract model after consideringperks, and drawed on the applicable circumstances of the agent concept and efficiency viewrespectively, which provides a new theoretical explanation for the current debate. Through theanalysis of the theoretical model as well as empirical test on Chinese listed companies, thepaper found that there has a substitutive and complementary relationship between perquisiteconsumption and monetary compensation at the same time, different compensation structureled to the agent view and the efficiency view coexist phenomenon.
Second, by handing collect and programming acquisition lots of data, this papersystematically studied the media's corporate governance role on executive perks of Chineselisted companies. The research showed that media governance has a significant inhibitoryeffect on excess perks, providing the governance methods for executive perks from theperspective of the media governance and offering decision-making reference which will helpthe regulatory agencies to supervise on executive perks effectively. This study is differentfrom the existing literature which select special small sample data and the conclusion is notuniversal. What’s more, this paper expands the existing literature on media governance, andhas other certain significance for the field of corporate governance research.
Third, from the perspective of media governance, the paper integrated management theory, economics and mass media theory, theoretical analyzed and empirical tested the affectof media governance on the relationship between perks and corporate value, and found thatmedia governance has a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between perks andcorporate value. The conclusion not only provides empirical evidence of the mediagovernance role in the capital markets of emerging countries, but also expands the research on"media governance theory", making a certain contribution for the ex-legal corporategovernance research. Meanwhile, this paper further considered the different types of mediagovernance effect and provides empirical evidences of market-oriented and policy-orientedmedia governance effect, which enriches the existing empirical research on "media biastheory".
关于在职消费的现有文献主要形成了两种相悖的观点：代理观和效率观。代理观认为在职消费是企业代理成本的一种，有损于公司价值的最大化，效率观则认为在职消费有助于提高管理层工作效率与企业运营效率，为公司价值的创造发挥了积极作用。基于现有研究，本文首先通过博弈分析法，构建了考虑在职消费后的最优薪酬契约模型，并在高管存在道德风险的情形下，对在职消费与公司价值的关系进行了理论推导。
媒体的信息传播职能极大地改善了股东与高管之间的信息不对称状况，通过媒体舆论引导与监督职能的发挥，媒体的公司治理功能也逐渐显现。基于媒体治理论，本文进一步从理论上分析了媒体治理影响在职消费的作用机制，并从媒体治理的视角，提出了媒体治理影响在职消费和公司价值关系的传导机制。
在理论分析的基础上，本文手工收集了2004-2012年间我国上市公司高管在职消费、媒体治理等变量的相关数据，通过描述性统计、相关性分析、单变量分析、面板数据回归模型等统计与计量分析方法，分别检验了在职消费与公司价值之间的关系、媒体治理对在职消费的影响以及媒体治理对在职消费和公司价值关系的影响，并对上述实证检验结果进行了详细的讨论。通过理论分析与实证检验，本文得出如下研究结论：
（1）高管薪酬契约结构的不同，导致在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”的并存现状。具体来说，当在职消费与货币薪酬之间存在替代关系（“高货币薪酬-低在职消费”、“低货币薪酬-高在职消费”）时，支持在职消费的“效率观”；而当在职消费与货币薪酬存在互补关系（“高货币薪酬-高在职消费”、“低货币薪酬-低在职消费”）时，支持在职消费的“代理观”。
（2）媒体治理作为一种外部公司治理机制，对高管在职消费具有较强的监督治理功能。首先，当上市公司高管在职消费过高，尤其是超额在职消费较高时，上市公司会受到媒体的广泛关注，媒体发挥了积极的监督治理功能；其次，媒体对上市公司关注度的提升，不仅有利于降低高管超额在职消费水平，同时对高管薪酬契约结构的调整亦会产生显著影响，从而发挥了积极的公司治理功能。
（3）媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值的关系起到了显著而积极的调节作用。即使将媒体区分为政策导向型与市场导向型两种类型，媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值的关系依然具有较强的正面影响，尤其在互补型薪酬契约结构下，媒体治理能够有效抑制在职消费对公司价值的消极影响。
本文的创新之处主要有：
第一，构建了一个考虑在职消费后的最优薪酬契约模型，得出在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”各自的适用情形，为学术界关于在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”的激烈争论提供了一种新的理论解释。通过理论模型推导，并利用我国上市公司样本数据进行实证检验，研究发现在职消费与货币薪酬之间同时存在着替代关系与互补关系，而不同的薪酬契约结构导致了在职消费“代理观”与“效率观”并存的局面。
第二，通过手工采集大量数据及编程处理，本文系统研究了媒体对高管在职消费的治理作用，研究表明，媒体治理对超额在职消费具有显著的抑制作用；并从媒体治理的角度提出了治理在职消费的方法与手段，为各类监管机构有效监督高管在职消费提供了经验证据和决策参考依据。本文不同于现有文献选取特殊的小样本数据，克服了小样本研究结论普适性不强的局限，并拓展了现有研究对媒体治理功能的认识，对公司治理领域其他相关研究也具有一定的借鉴意义。
第三，本文从媒体治理的视角切入，综合运用管理学、经济学与传媒学等领域的相关理论，分析了媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值关系的影响机制，并进行了相应的实证检验。研究发现媒体治理对在职消费与公司价值的关系具有积极的调节效应，这一研究结论不仅提供了基于新兴市场国家媒体治理作用的经验证据，而且拓展了“媒体治理论”的研究范畴，为法律外制度的公司治理机制研究作出了一定贡献。同时，本文详细检验了媒体类型可能对媒体治理功能产生的影响，揭示了我国市场导向型媒体与政策导向型媒体的治理效应差异，丰富了“媒体有偏论”研究领域的现有研究成果。
In recent years, the domestic and foreign media exposure executive perquisitesfrequently, making perquisites become a hot topic in academia. In China, the phenomenon ofexecutive perquisites have been a long time and deeply rooted. However, the current study onexecutive compensation in academia is still confined to monetary compensation and incentive,research on executive perquisites which is an important part of executive pay is far laggingbehind the need of the practice development. Therefore, research on perks have importantpractical significance and theoretical value.
The existing literature on perks mainly formed two contrary viewpoints: the agent viewand the view of efficiency. The agent view holds that perks are detrimental to corporate value,while the efficiency concept considers that perks help to improve the managements’ workefficiency and the company’s operational efficiency, playing an active role of creatingcorporate value. On the basis of existing research, using the game analysis method, this paperfirstly constructs an optimal compensation contract model after considering executive perks,and theoretical deduces the relationship between perks and corporate value in the case ofexecutive moral hazard.
Information dissemination functions of the media greatly eliminates the informationasymmetry between management and shareholders, through the media supervision and byguiding public opinion, the role of media governance has gradually appeared. Based on thetheory of media governance, this paper analyzes the media governance mechanism onexecutive perks, and presents the transmission mechanism between executive perks andcorporate value from the media governance perspective.
Based on the theoretical analysis, this paper manually collected the data of executiveperks, media governance and other variables in Chinese listed companies during2004to2012.Using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, univariate analysis, panel data regressionmodels and other statistical and quantitative analysis methods, the paper tested therelationship between the media governance, executive perks and corporate value, anddiscussed the empirical results in detail. Through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,this paper drawed the following conclusions:
(1) The different structure of executive compensation contracts result in the coexistenceof agency concept and efficiency concept. Specifically, when there are substitutes betweenperquisite consumption and monetary compensation (high monetary compensation and lowperquisite consumption, or low monetary compensation and high perquisite consumption), the efficient view is supported; and when the perquisite consumption and monetary compensationare complementary to each other (high monetary compensation and high perquisiteconsumption, or low monetary compensation and low perquisite consumption), the agentview is supported.
(2) Media governance as an external corporate governance mechanism has thesupervision and governance function on executive perquisites. First of all, the media plays anactive monitoring function, when executive perquisite is too high, especially a higher excessperks, the media attention on listed companies will be strengthen, playing a positivesupervision function; secondly, the media attention on the listed companies can play asignificant inhibitory effect on executive excess perks and have a significant impact on thestructure adjustment of executive compensation contracts.
(3) Media plays a significantly positive regulatory role on the relationship of executiveperks and corporate value. Even after the distinction media ownership, the corporategovernance role of media still has stronger positive impact on perks and corporate value,especially having a strong inhibitory effect on the negative relationship of perks and corporatevalue under the complementary structure.
The main innovation of this paper are as follows:
Firstly, the paper constructed an optimal compensation contract model after consideringperks, and drawed on the applicable circumstances of the agent concept and efficiency viewrespectively, which provides a new theoretical explanation for the current debate. Through theanalysis of the theoretical model as well as empirical test on Chinese listed companies, thepaper found that there has a substitutive and complementary relationship between perquisiteconsumption and monetary compensation at the same time, different compensation structureled to the agent view and the efficiency view coexist phenomenon.
Second, by handing collect and programming acquisition lots of data, this papersystematically studied the media's corporate governance role on executive perks of Chineselisted companies. The research showed that media governance has a significant inhibitoryeffect on excess perks, providing the governance methods for executive perks from theperspective of the media governance and offering decision-making reference which will helpthe regulatory agencies to supervise on executive perks effectively. This study is differentfrom the existing literature which select special small sample data and the conclusion is notuniversal. What’s more, this paper expands the existing literature on media governance, andhas other certain significance for the field of corporate governance research.
Third, from the perspective of media governance, the paper integrated management theory, economics and mass media theory, theoretical analyzed and empirical tested the affectof media governance on the relationship between perks and corporate value, and found thatmedia governance has a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between perks andcorporate value. The conclusion not only provides empirical evidence of the mediagovernance role in the capital markets of emerging countries, but also expands the research on"media governance theory", making a certain contribution for the ex-legal corporategovernance research. Meanwhile, this paper further considered the different types of mediagovernance effect and provides empirical evidences of market-oriented and policy-orientedmedia governance effect, which enriches the existing empirical research on "media biastheory".
引文
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