终极控制股权结构对公司财务行为和公司业绩的影响研究
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摘要
自现代企业制度逐步建立以来,公司治理及其相关理论与实务研究逐步成为完善现代企业制度,提升企业绩效并推动社会发展的重要影响因素。公司治理领域的研究逻辑起点也经历了经理层和股东之间的委托代理关系、控制股东和小股东之间的委托代理关系、公司内部治理到外部治理、基于利益相关者理论与企业社会责任等发展过程。在公司治理的研究过程中,公司股权结构及其对公司治理结构的影响一直是该领域研究的热点和难点。公司股权结构对公司业绩与价值的提升,公司治理结构的完善,投资者利益的保护和资本市场的发展都发挥了及其重要的作用。自La Porta et al.(1999)提出终极控制权的概念后对于股权结构的研究有极大的推动作用,从上市公司终极控制股东的视角分析股权结构与公司治理的关系进行研究是近年来的研究热点。同时,股权分置改革已经基本完成,其对上市公司股权结构、控制股东的行为、上市公司的行为及其公司业绩和价值、投资者保护都影响深远。在此背景下从终极控制权层面分析股权结构类型及其对公司价值和公司财务行为的影响对于提升上市公司治理水平,完善资本市场具有重要的理论与现实意义。
股权分置改革实质上就是在改变股权分置状态下的不合理的股权结构,而由于在我国的上市公司中同时存在着控制性股东股权结构、多个大股东股权结构、股权分散的股权结构三种股权结构类型,它们会对公司价值和公司财务行为(投资、融资、股利分配)产生不同的影响,股权分置改革对这三种股权结构类型的影响以及股改前后这三种股权结构类型对公司财务行为和公司价值的影响是否相同将是我们研究的重点。本文主要分为四个部分来研究股改前后不同的股权结构类型对公司价值和公司财务行为的影响：
(1)、分析不同的股权结构对公司投资行为的影响。本文的研究发现：在控制性股东股权结构下,国有上市公司容易出现过度投资行为；在非控制性股东的股权结构下,国有上市公司的过度投资行为不显著。在控制性股东股权结构下,企业的过度投资行为与终极控制股东的控制权呈倒“U”型的关系；在多个大股东股权结构下,上市公司的终极控制权与过度投资是正相关的关系。在控制性股东股权结构下和多个大股东股权结构下,负债与上市公司的过度投资行为负相关,负债能够减少上市公司的过度投资行为；在股权分散的股权结构下,负债与上市公司的过度投资行为不相关。总体说来上市公司的金字塔层级与过度投资是倒“U”型的关系。
(2)、分析不同的股权结构对公司融资行为的影响。本文研究了在不同的股权结构下我国上市公司在股改前后的融资差异。研究发现：股改后我国上市公司的资产负债率和短期负债率下降但是长期负债水平提高。与多个大股东和股权分散的上市公司相比较,控制性股权结构的上市公司具有更显著的债务融资行为；在控制性股东股权结构下,我国国有控股的上市公司长期负债水平和短期负债水平较低。
(3)、分析不同的股权结构对公司股利分配的影响。研究发现,在全流通环境下,与股权结构为控制性股东的上市公司比较,多个大股东和股权分散的公司倾向于更多的现金股利。进一步对股改前后三种股权结构进行了对比,发现股改后分配的现金股利均低于股改前,只是控制性股东股权结构变化的幅度较大；终极控制人的性质不同会影响现金股利的分配,在绝对控股的股权结构中,相对于非国有控股上市公司,国有控股上市公司会支付更多的现金股利；在绝对控股的股权结构中,当最终控制人为地方政府时,较之中央政府倾向于支付更多的现金股利；在股权分散的上市公司中,管理者为职业经理人的公司支付的现金股利低于管理者为股东的上市公司。
(4)、分析不同的股权结构类型对公司业绩的影响。研究发现,股改前后不同的股权结构对公司业绩有显著影响。具体来说,相对于股权分散的公司,控制性股权结构、多个大股东股权结构更有助于公司业绩的增长,且股改前与股改后的结论一致。同时,本文分别对股改后三种股权结构类型的上市公司对公司业绩的影响进行了回归分析,结构显示：三种股权结构下终极控股股东的持股比例(股权分散按持股比例最高的股东),其只有在控制性股权结构下与公司业绩呈正相关关系；相对于控制性、多个大股东股权结构,股权分散的股权结构与公司业绩呈负相关关系；控制性股权结构、多个大股东股权结构相对于其他股权结构对公司业绩的影响均为正；控制层级在不同股权结构中对公司业绩均没有显著影响。
With the establishment of modern enterprise system, the research of corporate governance and its theory and practice has gradually become an important factor to improve modern enterprise system, increase corporate performance and drive society development. The logic of corporate governance research has experienced different development processes, such as, the principal agent relation between managers and shareholders, the principal agent relation between controlling and minority shareholders, interior and exterior corporate governance, stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility and so on. During the research of corporate governance, corporate ownership structure and its influence on governance structure have always been the focus and difficulty of the research in this area. The ownership structure of companies has played a critical role to increase corporate performance and value, perfect corporate governance structure, protect investors'interest and improve capital market. The concept of ultimate control rights proposed by La Porta et al.(1999) provided a crucial boost for the research of ownership structure, also, from the perspective of ultimate controlling shareholders in listed companies, the research of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance, has been a hotspot in recent years. Meanwhile, the completion of split-share reform has great impact on the ownership structure of listed companies, the behavior of controlling shareholders and listed companies, the performance and value of companies, and the protection of investors. Therefore, analyzed from the ultimate control rights level, the type of ownership structure and its effect on corporate value and behavior, would have great theoretical and practical significance to enhance the level of corporate governance and perfect capital market.
Split-share reform is essentially to change unreasonable ownership structure under the condition of split-share. There are three types of ownership structure exist in China's listed companies simultaneously:controlling shareholder ownership structure, multi-large shareholder ownership structure, dispersed ownership structure, which would have different effects on corporate value and behavior (investment, financing, dividend distribution). The influence of split-share reform on three types of ownership structure, and the influence of these three types on corporate value and behavior before and after the reform become the emphasis of our study. This paper is divided into four parts to study the influence of different types of ownership structure on corporate value and behavior before and after the share reform.
(1) The influence of different ownership structures on corporate investment behavior. The research found that:under controlling shareholder ownership structure, listed state-owned companies are more likely to appear the behavior of overinvestment; while overinvestment behavior of listed state-owned companies is not significant with non-controlling shareholder ownership structure. Under controlling shareholder ownership structure, companies'overinvestment behavior and the control rights of ultimate controlling shareholders present inverted-U-shape relation; under multi-large shareholder ownership structure, overinvestment is positively correlated with ultimate control rights. Under controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure, liabilities is negatively correlated with listed companies'overinvestment behavior, liability could reduce companies' overinvestment; while under dispersed ownership structure, liability is not related to overinvestment. Overall, pyramid level of listed companies and overinvestment is the relation of inverted-U-shape
(2) The influence of different ownership structures on corporate financing behavior. This paper studied that under different ownership structures, listed companies' financing difference before and after share reform. We found that, after the reform, debt to asset ratio and short-term debt ratio in listed companies declined but long-term debt level increased. Compared with listed companies of multi-large shareholders and dispersed ownership, companies with controlling shareholder ownership structure own more significant behavior of debt financing, and under controlling shareholder ownership structure, listed state-owned companies in our country have low long-term and short-term debt level.
(3) The influence of different ownership structures on dividend distribution of companies. Though the finding, under the environment of full circulation, and compared with listed companies with controlling shareholder ownership structure, a company of multi-large shareholders and dispersed ownership tend to distribute more cash dividend. To further compare these three ownership structure before and after share reform, we found that cash dividend distribution after the reform is lower than that before the reform, but the change range of controlling shareholder ownership structure is bigger. Different nature of ultimate controller would influence the distribution of cash dividend:under the ownership structure of absolute holding, listed state-owned companies would pay more cash dividends than non-state-owned companies, but local government, as ultimate controller, would pay more than central government. Under dispersed ownership structure, professional managers as a listed company's manger would pay less cash dividends than shareholders as the company's manager.
(4) The influence of different ownership structures on corporate performance. We found that different ownership structures before and after share reform have a significant effect on corporate performance. Specifically, relative to dispersed ownership structure, controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure help to increase corporate performance, and the conclusion before and after the reform are consistent. This paper made regression analysis of the effect of three types of ownership structure after the reform on corporate performance respectively, the result shows that:the shareholding ratio of ultimate controlling shareholders (the highest shareholding ratio under dispersed ownership structure), is positively related to corporate performance only in the company with controlling shareholder ownership structure; compared with controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure, dispersed ownership structure has a negative correlation with corporate performance; relative to other ownership structures, the influence of controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure on corporate performance are both positive; under different ownership structures, control level has no significant influence on corporate performance.
股权分置改革实质上就是在改变股权分置状态下的不合理的股权结构,而由于在我国的上市公司中同时存在着控制性股东股权结构、多个大股东股权结构、股权分散的股权结构三种股权结构类型,它们会对公司价值和公司财务行为(投资、融资、股利分配)产生不同的影响,股权分置改革对这三种股权结构类型的影响以及股改前后这三种股权结构类型对公司财务行为和公司价值的影响是否相同将是我们研究的重点。本文主要分为四个部分来研究股改前后不同的股权结构类型对公司价值和公司财务行为的影响：
(1)、分析不同的股权结构对公司投资行为的影响。本文的研究发现：在控制性股东股权结构下,国有上市公司容易出现过度投资行为；在非控制性股东的股权结构下,国有上市公司的过度投资行为不显著。在控制性股东股权结构下,企业的过度投资行为与终极控制股东的控制权呈倒“U”型的关系；在多个大股东股权结构下,上市公司的终极控制权与过度投资是正相关的关系。在控制性股东股权结构下和多个大股东股权结构下,负债与上市公司的过度投资行为负相关,负债能够减少上市公司的过度投资行为；在股权分散的股权结构下,负债与上市公司的过度投资行为不相关。总体说来上市公司的金字塔层级与过度投资是倒“U”型的关系。
(2)、分析不同的股权结构对公司融资行为的影响。本文研究了在不同的股权结构下我国上市公司在股改前后的融资差异。研究发现：股改后我国上市公司的资产负债率和短期负债率下降但是长期负债水平提高。与多个大股东和股权分散的上市公司相比较,控制性股权结构的上市公司具有更显著的债务融资行为；在控制性股东股权结构下,我国国有控股的上市公司长期负债水平和短期负债水平较低。
(3)、分析不同的股权结构对公司股利分配的影响。研究发现,在全流通环境下,与股权结构为控制性股东的上市公司比较,多个大股东和股权分散的公司倾向于更多的现金股利。进一步对股改前后三种股权结构进行了对比,发现股改后分配的现金股利均低于股改前,只是控制性股东股权结构变化的幅度较大；终极控制人的性质不同会影响现金股利的分配,在绝对控股的股权结构中,相对于非国有控股上市公司,国有控股上市公司会支付更多的现金股利；在绝对控股的股权结构中,当最终控制人为地方政府时,较之中央政府倾向于支付更多的现金股利；在股权分散的上市公司中,管理者为职业经理人的公司支付的现金股利低于管理者为股东的上市公司。
(4)、分析不同的股权结构类型对公司业绩的影响。研究发现,股改前后不同的股权结构对公司业绩有显著影响。具体来说,相对于股权分散的公司,控制性股权结构、多个大股东股权结构更有助于公司业绩的增长,且股改前与股改后的结论一致。同时,本文分别对股改后三种股权结构类型的上市公司对公司业绩的影响进行了回归分析,结构显示：三种股权结构下终极控股股东的持股比例(股权分散按持股比例最高的股东),其只有在控制性股权结构下与公司业绩呈正相关关系；相对于控制性、多个大股东股权结构,股权分散的股权结构与公司业绩呈负相关关系；控制性股权结构、多个大股东股权结构相对于其他股权结构对公司业绩的影响均为正；控制层级在不同股权结构中对公司业绩均没有显著影响。
With the establishment of modern enterprise system, the research of corporate governance and its theory and practice has gradually become an important factor to improve modern enterprise system, increase corporate performance and drive society development. The logic of corporate governance research has experienced different development processes, such as, the principal agent relation between managers and shareholders, the principal agent relation between controlling and minority shareholders, interior and exterior corporate governance, stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility and so on. During the research of corporate governance, corporate ownership structure and its influence on governance structure have always been the focus and difficulty of the research in this area. The ownership structure of companies has played a critical role to increase corporate performance and value, perfect corporate governance structure, protect investors'interest and improve capital market. The concept of ultimate control rights proposed by La Porta et al.(1999) provided a crucial boost for the research of ownership structure, also, from the perspective of ultimate controlling shareholders in listed companies, the research of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance, has been a hotspot in recent years. Meanwhile, the completion of split-share reform has great impact on the ownership structure of listed companies, the behavior of controlling shareholders and listed companies, the performance and value of companies, and the protection of investors. Therefore, analyzed from the ultimate control rights level, the type of ownership structure and its effect on corporate value and behavior, would have great theoretical and practical significance to enhance the level of corporate governance and perfect capital market.
Split-share reform is essentially to change unreasonable ownership structure under the condition of split-share. There are three types of ownership structure exist in China's listed companies simultaneously:controlling shareholder ownership structure, multi-large shareholder ownership structure, dispersed ownership structure, which would have different effects on corporate value and behavior (investment, financing, dividend distribution). The influence of split-share reform on three types of ownership structure, and the influence of these three types on corporate value and behavior before and after the reform become the emphasis of our study. This paper is divided into four parts to study the influence of different types of ownership structure on corporate value and behavior before and after the share reform.
(1) The influence of different ownership structures on corporate investment behavior. The research found that:under controlling shareholder ownership structure, listed state-owned companies are more likely to appear the behavior of overinvestment; while overinvestment behavior of listed state-owned companies is not significant with non-controlling shareholder ownership structure. Under controlling shareholder ownership structure, companies'overinvestment behavior and the control rights of ultimate controlling shareholders present inverted-U-shape relation; under multi-large shareholder ownership structure, overinvestment is positively correlated with ultimate control rights. Under controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure, liabilities is negatively correlated with listed companies'overinvestment behavior, liability could reduce companies' overinvestment; while under dispersed ownership structure, liability is not related to overinvestment. Overall, pyramid level of listed companies and overinvestment is the relation of inverted-U-shape
(2) The influence of different ownership structures on corporate financing behavior. This paper studied that under different ownership structures, listed companies' financing difference before and after share reform. We found that, after the reform, debt to asset ratio and short-term debt ratio in listed companies declined but long-term debt level increased. Compared with listed companies of multi-large shareholders and dispersed ownership, companies with controlling shareholder ownership structure own more significant behavior of debt financing, and under controlling shareholder ownership structure, listed state-owned companies in our country have low long-term and short-term debt level.
(3) The influence of different ownership structures on dividend distribution of companies. Though the finding, under the environment of full circulation, and compared with listed companies with controlling shareholder ownership structure, a company of multi-large shareholders and dispersed ownership tend to distribute more cash dividend. To further compare these three ownership structure before and after share reform, we found that cash dividend distribution after the reform is lower than that before the reform, but the change range of controlling shareholder ownership structure is bigger. Different nature of ultimate controller would influence the distribution of cash dividend:under the ownership structure of absolute holding, listed state-owned companies would pay more cash dividends than non-state-owned companies, but local government, as ultimate controller, would pay more than central government. Under dispersed ownership structure, professional managers as a listed company's manger would pay less cash dividends than shareholders as the company's manager.
(4) The influence of different ownership structures on corporate performance. We found that different ownership structures before and after share reform have a significant effect on corporate performance. Specifically, relative to dispersed ownership structure, controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure help to increase corporate performance, and the conclusion before and after the reform are consistent. This paper made regression analysis of the effect of three types of ownership structure after the reform on corporate performance respectively, the result shows that:the shareholding ratio of ultimate controlling shareholders (the highest shareholding ratio under dispersed ownership structure), is positively related to corporate performance only in the company with controlling shareholder ownership structure; compared with controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure, dispersed ownership structure has a negative correlation with corporate performance; relative to other ownership structures, the influence of controlling shareholder and multi-large shareholder ownership structure on corporate performance are both positive; under different ownership structures, control level has no significant influence on corporate performance.
引文
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