效率视角下的自然垄断规制研究
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摘要
自然垄断在传统分析框架中因为其“垄断性”排斥竞争,偏离帕累托效率而被“公认”为典型的“市场失灵”领域,需要政府规制予以修正“市场失灵”和挽救效率,似乎已“盖棺定论”。然而规制产生的自然垄断行业产品质次价高、效率低下且服务低劣,又一直为人们所诟病,传统规制并没有替代市场给社会带来效率,实践表明自然垄断规制是令人大失所望的。也就是说,规制仅仅是“以政府失灵替代市场失灵”。这样,自然垄断产业规制成为一个世界性难题,围绕要不要规制和如何规制等问题学者们争论不休,而政府也在规制还是不规制以及如何规制上反复权衡,政策随风飘摆。现代经济学理论对自然垄断的认识和对规制的解释,自从约翰·穆勒第一次描述至今200多年,并没有给人们提供一个明确的答案和令人信服的解释。
本文正是从这个“迷惑”入手,展开对自然垄断及其规制的研究,去重新认识自然垄断及其规制,希望揭开所谓“市场失灵”和“政府失灵”这个“两难”的谜底。破解难题的关键在于寻找路径和钥匙,这个路径和钥匙就是效率理论。传统自然垄断和规制理论都是在传统理论框架中生成的,即以新古典经济学的帕累托效率作为判别自然垄断及其规制合理性的准绳。在传统理论框架中,人们难以走出自然垄断这个“迷宫”,也难以解开市场失灵与政府失灵“两难”之谜。本文创新性地提出社会总效率理论,并以此作为论文的理论支点,否定帕累托效率的狭隘标准,突破传统理论的束缚,终于找到了打开“迷宫”的路径和钥匙,重新解释自然垄断及其规制,一切困扰人们的难题迎刃而解。
本文以社会总效率理论为分析框架,以论证本文核心论点为线索,重新认识生产效率与配置效率、生产成本与交易成本、分工与合作、竞争与垄断、市场结构与市场行为、自然垄断与政府规制等一系列重要理论问题,并作出新的解释。全文共分6章。第1章为导论。正文部分共5章,可归纳为三部分,即第一部分(为第2章)认真梳理以往理论文献,找出以往研究的空白和不足；第二部分(包括第3、4章)建立和阐述效率理论,起承上启下的作用；第三大部分(包括第5、6章)是社会总效率理论的运用,用于对自然垄断和规制的分析,论证核心论点,提出政策措施。全文内容简介如下：
第1章,提出本文研究的论题,在分析该论题的研究背景和研究意义的基础之上,提出了本文的核心论点和理论支点以及逻辑框图(“两点一框”),并对本文的研究内容和研究方法以及观点创新和不足进行了简要介绍。
第2章,对效率理论与自然垄断、规制理论进行了述评,首先对以往的效率理论与自然垄断、规制理论进行了综述回顾,梳理了理论的发展脉络和观点之争,之后对这些理论予以简要评论,指出其研究的不足和空白之处。效率理论是现代经济学的核心部分,由古典效率理论开始,发展到主流的新古典效率理论——帕累托效率,在对帕累托效率理论进行批判时,新奥地利学派和新制度学派的动态效率理论引人注目。帕累托效率的静态方法和狭隘性,忽视现实经济生活中丰富多彩的效率现象,对真实世界缺乏解释力；而动态效率理论在否定帕累托静态效率理论的同时,也显得单调,不能全面、合理解释经济现象。
第3章,研究生产效率与配置效率。在对效率概念进行界定和分析的基础上分别研究了生产效率与配置效率的影响因素,生产效率与生产成本、配置效率与交易成本的关系,生产和配置中的竞争与垄断,市场结构与市场行为的关系等理论问题,得出了生产效率决定市场结构、四种市场形态均有效率、竞争和垄断各有利弊等重要结论,为下文分析铺垫了理论基础。
第4章,提出社会总效率理论。社会总效率是在前一章分析的基础上,在对生产效率和配置效率的对立统一和转化关系进行分析以及对“马歇尔冲突”进行剖析之后提出的新概念。本章的中心就是社会总效率概念,在对其内涵和外延予以界定的基础上,重点分析了社会总效率的四种形态。社会总效率是生产效率与配置效率的总和,由于生产效率和配置效率的不一致而呈现高低各不同的四种形态,即社会总效率Ⅰ(生产高效率+配置高效率)、社会总效率Ⅱ(生产低效率+配置低效率)、社会总效率Ⅲ(生产高效率+配置低效率)和社会总效率Ⅳ(生产低效率+配置高效率)。社会总效率是比帕累托效率更全面刻划经济体系效率状况、更好地解释真实世界的概念。在社会总效率分析框架里,“马歇尔冲突”有解,完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断和完全垄断四种市场形态均有效率,不存在哪种市场形态缺乏效率或“市场失灵”、的问题。社会总效率理论颠覆了帕累托效率标准,其作为本文的理论支点,是分析自然垄断及其规制和规制改革的理论基础。
第5章,对自然垄断的效率进行分析。从效率视角界定自然垄断,提出自然垄断是指在所有相关产出范围内,在任意的产出水平,生产总成本具有严格劣加性以及社会总价值或总效用函数或社会净收益函数具有严格优加性,使得整个产业由独家企业提供市场所需要的全部产出最有效率的产业。同时通过对自然垄断的社会总效率分析,可将自然垄断分为自然垄断Ⅰ和自然垄断Ⅱ。自然垄断Ⅰ是真正意义上的自然垄断,由于生产效率较高并且配置效率较高,因而拥有社会总效率Ⅰ；而自然垄断Ⅱ由于夹杂着行政垄断而缺乏效率,特别是中国自然垄断产业的社会总效率可能主要表现为社会总效率Ⅱ(即生产效率和配置效率均低)和Ⅳ(即配置效率高而生产效率低)两种状态,与自然垄断Ⅰ所具有的社会总效率Ⅰ相距甚远。自然垄断Ⅰ由于其生产总成本的严格劣加性和社会净收益的严格优加性,是由市场内生的,随着市场的动态竞争,自然垄断Ⅰ必将收敛到网络经济上来,最终将达到网络“大一统”；而现实经济生活中存在的源于行政垄断而不是市场动态竞争的“自然垄断”产业并不是真正意义上的自然垄断,对其所实施的规制有必要修正。从效率视角对自然垄断的深入剖析,特别是对自然垄断Ⅰ和自然垄断Ⅱ的区分,为下一章——基于效率的自然垄断规制的研究作了理论准备。
第6章,研究了基于效率的自然垄断规制。以社会总效率理论为分析框架,对以往自然垄断规制理论进行了批判,提出对于自然垄断Ⅰ(真正意义上的自然垄断)和自然垄断Ⅱ(现实中的自然垄断)应采取不同的治理态度。自然垄断Ⅰ由于拥有社会总效率Ⅰ(高生产效率+高配置效率),没必要也无法进行规制,所需要规制的是自然垄断Ⅱ(现实中存在的自然垄断产业)。在对自然垄断Ⅱ的规制进行分析时,以社会总效率为评价标准,分别对自然垄断结构方面的规制,包括进入规制、投资规制和退出规制和对自然垄断企业行为的规制如价格规制、信息规制、质量规制和普遍服务规制进行了研究,得出前者的规制是缺乏效率的,而后者的规制是有效率的结论。最后提出“以效率为目标的我国自然垄断产业规制改革”的政策建议,主张对自然垄断的规制对象、规制基础和规制方式进行修正,逐步放开体制性障碍规制,健全完善不正当垄断行为规制,积极推进激励性规制,大力强化社会性规制,动态调整规制政策组合。
In the analysis under traditional framework, the natural monopoly has been "recognized" as a typical "market failure" because it excludes competition, and deviates from the Pareto efficiency. So government regulation is necessary to amend "market failure" and retrieve efficiency. This has become a "ironclad" conclusion. However, products and services provided by natural monopolizers resulted by regulation have been criticized because of inferior quality, high price, low efficiency and poor services. Traditional regulatory systems disappointingly fail to bring effciency to society as an alternative of market. In other words, regulation is only to "replace market failure with government failure." Thus, the natural monopoly industry regulation has become a worldwide puzzle. Scholars are arguing whether regulation is necessary and how regulation should be carried out. As well as the governments swing in policy makng. Exploration and interpretation of modern economic theory on natural monopoly regulation have not presented any clear answer or convincing explanation since initially described by John Stuart Mill over 200 years ago.
Beginning with the confusion, this article carries on research onregulation of natural monopoly with an effort to re-explain the natural monopoly and its regulation, hoping to open the "Labyrinth" of natural monopoly, and discover the "dilemma" of so-called "market failure" and "government failure". The key to this path is the Efficiency Theory. Traditional natural monopoly and regulation theory existing in the traditional theoretical framework, takes pareto efficiency of the new classical economics as a yardstick to distinguish the rationality of natural monopoly and its regulation. In the traditional theory framework, it could neither find a way out of the labyrinth of natural monopoly, nor solve the dilemma of market failure and government failure. This dissertation proposes the Total Social Efficiency Theory as an innovation, and overturns the narrow standard of pareto efficiency, breaks the shackles of traditional theory, and finally finds out the path and the key to open the labyrinth by re-interpreting the natural Monopoly and Its regulation, solves all troubling problems based on the theoretical fulcrum.
This dissertation redefines a series of important theoretical issues including production efficiency and allocative efficiency, division of labor and cooperation, competition and monopoly, government regulation of natural monopoly following the argument of the core viewpoint of this dissertation in the analytical framework of Total Social Efficiency Theory. It is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction. Other five chapters can be summarized into three parts, part 1 (as in chapter 2) seriously sorts out the exxisting theoretical literature, to identify gaps and deficiencies in previous studies; part 2 (including chapters 3 and 4), as a link, establishes and expatiates Total Social Efficiency Theory; part 3 (including chapters 5 and 6) is the application of Total Social Efficiency Theory. The regulation of natural monopoly is analyzed, the core viewpoint is argued and policies and measures are suggested in this part. The contents of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 mainly comments efficiency theory, natural monopoly and regulation theory. Firstly, The Author reviews the former efficiency theory, natural monopoly, regulations theory, combs the theory development-vein and the struggle-viewpoint, then give a brief commentary to these theories, points out the insufficiency and the blank place of them. Efficiency theory is the core of modern economics, it starts from the classical efficiency theory, develops the mainstream neoclassic efficiency theory---Pareto efficiency, when carries on critique to Pareto efficiency theory, the new Austrian schools and the new institutional school's dynamic efficiency theory is noticeable. The static method and narrowness of Pareto efficiency neglects the colorful efficiency phenomenon of reality, lacks the explanation strength to the real world; the dynamic efficiency theory appears monotonous while denies the Pareto static state efficiency theory, cannot explain the comprehensive economic phenomena.
Chapter 3 studies production efficiency and allocation efficiency. On the basis of definition and analysis of the efficiency concept, has studied influencing factor of production efficiency and allocation efficiency separately, the relationship between production efficiency and the production cost, the allocation effects and the transaction cost, competition and the monopoly in production and allocation, market mechanism and market behavior etc, conclusion that the production efficiency to decide the market mechanism, four kind of market all have effectiveness, the competition and the monopoly had the advantages respectively, Settled the theory to the following study.
Chapter 4 statements the total social efficiency theory. The total social efficiency is the new Concept based on the preceding chapter, the concept which is on the production efficiency and allocation effects'unification of opposites and on the analysis "Marshall Conflicts". The core of this chapter is the total social efficiency index concept, on basis of its connotation and the extension, analysis four kind of shapes to society overall effectiveness index. The total social efficiency index is the sum total of production efficiency and the allocation effects, for the production efficiency and the allocation effects vary different four kind of shapes, namely total social efficiency index I (high production efficiency+high allocationefficiency), the total social efficiency index II (production low efficiency+allocation low efficiency), the total social efficiency index III (to high production efficiency+allocation low efficiency) and the total social efficiency index IV (production low efficiency+high allocationefficiency). The total social efficiency is the better concept which compared to the Pareto efficiency in scoring economic system efficiency condition and explaining the real world. In the total social efficiency index analysis frame, "Marshall Conflicts" has the solution in completely competition, monopoly competition, and oligopoly and monopolizes market shapes, it does not exist which market shape lack the efficiency or "Market failure". The total social efficiency theory has subverted the Pareto efficiency standard, is the theory pivot of this article, and is theory basis of the analysis natural monopoly, regulations and regulations reform.
Chapter 5 analysis the natural monopoly's efficiency. From the efficiency view, proposed that the natural monopoly is refers to all related product scope and level, the production total cost has strict poor additive as well as the social total value,the total utility function or the social net income function has strictly superior additive, causing the entire industry to provide by one enterprise delivers the most effective industry which the market needs. Meanwhile through analysis to natural monopoly's total social efficiency index, natural monopoly may divide into natural monopolyⅠand natural monopolyⅡ.
Chapter 6 studies efficiency-based natural monopoly regulation. This chapter animadverts on traditional natural monopoly regulation theory under the analytical framework of Total Social Efficiency Theory.. And proposes different attitudes towards regulation of natural monopolyⅠ(necessary natural monopoly), and natural monopoliesⅡ(existing natural monopoly). natural monopolyⅠneeds no regulation because of its total social efficiency (high production efficiency&
high allocative efficiency), what should be regulated is natural monopolyⅡ(monopolizers in reality). In analysis on the regulation of natural monopoliesⅡ, this chapter studies on structure regulation (entry regulation, investment regulation and dropout regulation) and conduct regulation (price regulation, information regulation, quality regulation and universal service regulation) respectively under the criteria of overall social efficiency. It concluded the former regulatory system is inefficient, while the latter is efficient. Finally this dissertation suggests "efficiency-oriented reform on China's natural monopoly regulation", and declares amendment of regulatees, regulation base and regulatory approach, gradual opening-up of institutional barriers to regulation, improvement of regulation on improper monopolistic behavior, active promotion of incentive regulation, intensification of social regulation and dynamic adjustment of regulatory policy mix.
本文正是从这个“迷惑”入手,展开对自然垄断及其规制的研究,去重新认识自然垄断及其规制,希望揭开所谓“市场失灵”和“政府失灵”这个“两难”的谜底。破解难题的关键在于寻找路径和钥匙,这个路径和钥匙就是效率理论。传统自然垄断和规制理论都是在传统理论框架中生成的,即以新古典经济学的帕累托效率作为判别自然垄断及其规制合理性的准绳。在传统理论框架中,人们难以走出自然垄断这个“迷宫”,也难以解开市场失灵与政府失灵“两难”之谜。本文创新性地提出社会总效率理论,并以此作为论文的理论支点,否定帕累托效率的狭隘标准,突破传统理论的束缚,终于找到了打开“迷宫”的路径和钥匙,重新解释自然垄断及其规制,一切困扰人们的难题迎刃而解。
本文以社会总效率理论为分析框架,以论证本文核心论点为线索,重新认识生产效率与配置效率、生产成本与交易成本、分工与合作、竞争与垄断、市场结构与市场行为、自然垄断与政府规制等一系列重要理论问题,并作出新的解释。全文共分6章。第1章为导论。正文部分共5章,可归纳为三部分,即第一部分(为第2章)认真梳理以往理论文献,找出以往研究的空白和不足；第二部分(包括第3、4章)建立和阐述效率理论,起承上启下的作用；第三大部分(包括第5、6章)是社会总效率理论的运用,用于对自然垄断和规制的分析,论证核心论点,提出政策措施。全文内容简介如下：
第1章,提出本文研究的论题,在分析该论题的研究背景和研究意义的基础之上,提出了本文的核心论点和理论支点以及逻辑框图(“两点一框”),并对本文的研究内容和研究方法以及观点创新和不足进行了简要介绍。
第2章,对效率理论与自然垄断、规制理论进行了述评,首先对以往的效率理论与自然垄断、规制理论进行了综述回顾,梳理了理论的发展脉络和观点之争,之后对这些理论予以简要评论,指出其研究的不足和空白之处。效率理论是现代经济学的核心部分,由古典效率理论开始,发展到主流的新古典效率理论——帕累托效率,在对帕累托效率理论进行批判时,新奥地利学派和新制度学派的动态效率理论引人注目。帕累托效率的静态方法和狭隘性,忽视现实经济生活中丰富多彩的效率现象,对真实世界缺乏解释力；而动态效率理论在否定帕累托静态效率理论的同时,也显得单调,不能全面、合理解释经济现象。
第3章,研究生产效率与配置效率。在对效率概念进行界定和分析的基础上分别研究了生产效率与配置效率的影响因素,生产效率与生产成本、配置效率与交易成本的关系,生产和配置中的竞争与垄断,市场结构与市场行为的关系等理论问题,得出了生产效率决定市场结构、四种市场形态均有效率、竞争和垄断各有利弊等重要结论,为下文分析铺垫了理论基础。
第4章,提出社会总效率理论。社会总效率是在前一章分析的基础上,在对生产效率和配置效率的对立统一和转化关系进行分析以及对“马歇尔冲突”进行剖析之后提出的新概念。本章的中心就是社会总效率概念,在对其内涵和外延予以界定的基础上,重点分析了社会总效率的四种形态。社会总效率是生产效率与配置效率的总和,由于生产效率和配置效率的不一致而呈现高低各不同的四种形态,即社会总效率Ⅰ(生产高效率+配置高效率)、社会总效率Ⅱ(生产低效率+配置低效率)、社会总效率Ⅲ(生产高效率+配置低效率)和社会总效率Ⅳ(生产低效率+配置高效率)。社会总效率是比帕累托效率更全面刻划经济体系效率状况、更好地解释真实世界的概念。在社会总效率分析框架里,“马歇尔冲突”有解,完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断和完全垄断四种市场形态均有效率,不存在哪种市场形态缺乏效率或“市场失灵”、的问题。社会总效率理论颠覆了帕累托效率标准,其作为本文的理论支点,是分析自然垄断及其规制和规制改革的理论基础。
第5章,对自然垄断的效率进行分析。从效率视角界定自然垄断,提出自然垄断是指在所有相关产出范围内,在任意的产出水平,生产总成本具有严格劣加性以及社会总价值或总效用函数或社会净收益函数具有严格优加性,使得整个产业由独家企业提供市场所需要的全部产出最有效率的产业。同时通过对自然垄断的社会总效率分析,可将自然垄断分为自然垄断Ⅰ和自然垄断Ⅱ。自然垄断Ⅰ是真正意义上的自然垄断,由于生产效率较高并且配置效率较高,因而拥有社会总效率Ⅰ；而自然垄断Ⅱ由于夹杂着行政垄断而缺乏效率,特别是中国自然垄断产业的社会总效率可能主要表现为社会总效率Ⅱ(即生产效率和配置效率均低)和Ⅳ(即配置效率高而生产效率低)两种状态,与自然垄断Ⅰ所具有的社会总效率Ⅰ相距甚远。自然垄断Ⅰ由于其生产总成本的严格劣加性和社会净收益的严格优加性,是由市场内生的,随着市场的动态竞争,自然垄断Ⅰ必将收敛到网络经济上来,最终将达到网络“大一统”；而现实经济生活中存在的源于行政垄断而不是市场动态竞争的“自然垄断”产业并不是真正意义上的自然垄断,对其所实施的规制有必要修正。从效率视角对自然垄断的深入剖析,特别是对自然垄断Ⅰ和自然垄断Ⅱ的区分,为下一章——基于效率的自然垄断规制的研究作了理论准备。
第6章,研究了基于效率的自然垄断规制。以社会总效率理论为分析框架,对以往自然垄断规制理论进行了批判,提出对于自然垄断Ⅰ(真正意义上的自然垄断)和自然垄断Ⅱ(现实中的自然垄断)应采取不同的治理态度。自然垄断Ⅰ由于拥有社会总效率Ⅰ(高生产效率+高配置效率),没必要也无法进行规制,所需要规制的是自然垄断Ⅱ(现实中存在的自然垄断产业)。在对自然垄断Ⅱ的规制进行分析时,以社会总效率为评价标准,分别对自然垄断结构方面的规制,包括进入规制、投资规制和退出规制和对自然垄断企业行为的规制如价格规制、信息规制、质量规制和普遍服务规制进行了研究,得出前者的规制是缺乏效率的,而后者的规制是有效率的结论。最后提出“以效率为目标的我国自然垄断产业规制改革”的政策建议,主张对自然垄断的规制对象、规制基础和规制方式进行修正,逐步放开体制性障碍规制,健全完善不正当垄断行为规制,积极推进激励性规制,大力强化社会性规制,动态调整规制政策组合。
In the analysis under traditional framework, the natural monopoly has been "recognized" as a typical "market failure" because it excludes competition, and deviates from the Pareto efficiency. So government regulation is necessary to amend "market failure" and retrieve efficiency. This has become a "ironclad" conclusion. However, products and services provided by natural monopolizers resulted by regulation have been criticized because of inferior quality, high price, low efficiency and poor services. Traditional regulatory systems disappointingly fail to bring effciency to society as an alternative of market. In other words, regulation is only to "replace market failure with government failure." Thus, the natural monopoly industry regulation has become a worldwide puzzle. Scholars are arguing whether regulation is necessary and how regulation should be carried out. As well as the governments swing in policy makng. Exploration and interpretation of modern economic theory on natural monopoly regulation have not presented any clear answer or convincing explanation since initially described by John Stuart Mill over 200 years ago.
Beginning with the confusion, this article carries on research onregulation of natural monopoly with an effort to re-explain the natural monopoly and its regulation, hoping to open the "Labyrinth" of natural monopoly, and discover the "dilemma" of so-called "market failure" and "government failure". The key to this path is the Efficiency Theory. Traditional natural monopoly and regulation theory existing in the traditional theoretical framework, takes pareto efficiency of the new classical economics as a yardstick to distinguish the rationality of natural monopoly and its regulation. In the traditional theory framework, it could neither find a way out of the labyrinth of natural monopoly, nor solve the dilemma of market failure and government failure. This dissertation proposes the Total Social Efficiency Theory as an innovation, and overturns the narrow standard of pareto efficiency, breaks the shackles of traditional theory, and finally finds out the path and the key to open the labyrinth by re-interpreting the natural Monopoly and Its regulation, solves all troubling problems based on the theoretical fulcrum.
This dissertation redefines a series of important theoretical issues including production efficiency and allocative efficiency, division of labor and cooperation, competition and monopoly, government regulation of natural monopoly following the argument of the core viewpoint of this dissertation in the analytical framework of Total Social Efficiency Theory. It is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction. Other five chapters can be summarized into three parts, part 1 (as in chapter 2) seriously sorts out the exxisting theoretical literature, to identify gaps and deficiencies in previous studies; part 2 (including chapters 3 and 4), as a link, establishes and expatiates Total Social Efficiency Theory; part 3 (including chapters 5 and 6) is the application of Total Social Efficiency Theory. The regulation of natural monopoly is analyzed, the core viewpoint is argued and policies and measures are suggested in this part. The contents of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 mainly comments efficiency theory, natural monopoly and regulation theory. Firstly, The Author reviews the former efficiency theory, natural monopoly, regulations theory, combs the theory development-vein and the struggle-viewpoint, then give a brief commentary to these theories, points out the insufficiency and the blank place of them. Efficiency theory is the core of modern economics, it starts from the classical efficiency theory, develops the mainstream neoclassic efficiency theory---Pareto efficiency, when carries on critique to Pareto efficiency theory, the new Austrian schools and the new institutional school's dynamic efficiency theory is noticeable. The static method and narrowness of Pareto efficiency neglects the colorful efficiency phenomenon of reality, lacks the explanation strength to the real world; the dynamic efficiency theory appears monotonous while denies the Pareto static state efficiency theory, cannot explain the comprehensive economic phenomena.
Chapter 3 studies production efficiency and allocation efficiency. On the basis of definition and analysis of the efficiency concept, has studied influencing factor of production efficiency and allocation efficiency separately, the relationship between production efficiency and the production cost, the allocation effects and the transaction cost, competition and the monopoly in production and allocation, market mechanism and market behavior etc, conclusion that the production efficiency to decide the market mechanism, four kind of market all have effectiveness, the competition and the monopoly had the advantages respectively, Settled the theory to the following study.
Chapter 4 statements the total social efficiency theory. The total social efficiency is the new Concept based on the preceding chapter, the concept which is on the production efficiency and allocation effects'unification of opposites and on the analysis "Marshall Conflicts". The core of this chapter is the total social efficiency index concept, on basis of its connotation and the extension, analysis four kind of shapes to society overall effectiveness index. The total social efficiency index is the sum total of production efficiency and the allocation effects, for the production efficiency and the allocation effects vary different four kind of shapes, namely total social efficiency index I (high production efficiency+high allocationefficiency), the total social efficiency index II (production low efficiency+allocation low efficiency), the total social efficiency index III (to high production efficiency+allocation low efficiency) and the total social efficiency index IV (production low efficiency+high allocationefficiency). The total social efficiency is the better concept which compared to the Pareto efficiency in scoring economic system efficiency condition and explaining the real world. In the total social efficiency index analysis frame, "Marshall Conflicts" has the solution in completely competition, monopoly competition, and oligopoly and monopolizes market shapes, it does not exist which market shape lack the efficiency or "Market failure". The total social efficiency theory has subverted the Pareto efficiency standard, is the theory pivot of this article, and is theory basis of the analysis natural monopoly, regulations and regulations reform.
Chapter 5 analysis the natural monopoly's efficiency. From the efficiency view, proposed that the natural monopoly is refers to all related product scope and level, the production total cost has strict poor additive as well as the social total value,the total utility function or the social net income function has strictly superior additive, causing the entire industry to provide by one enterprise delivers the most effective industry which the market needs. Meanwhile through analysis to natural monopoly's total social efficiency index, natural monopoly may divide into natural monopolyⅠand natural monopolyⅡ.
Chapter 6 studies efficiency-based natural monopoly regulation. This chapter animadverts on traditional natural monopoly regulation theory under the analytical framework of Total Social Efficiency Theory.. And proposes different attitudes towards regulation of natural monopolyⅠ(necessary natural monopoly), and natural monopoliesⅡ(existing natural monopoly). natural monopolyⅠneeds no regulation because of its total social efficiency (high production efficiency&
high allocative efficiency), what should be regulated is natural monopolyⅡ(monopolizers in reality). In analysis on the regulation of natural monopoliesⅡ, this chapter studies on structure regulation (entry regulation, investment regulation and dropout regulation) and conduct regulation (price regulation, information regulation, quality regulation and universal service regulation) respectively under the criteria of overall social efficiency. It concluded the former regulatory system is inefficient, while the latter is efficient. Finally this dissertation suggests "efficiency-oriented reform on China's natural monopoly regulation", and declares amendment of regulatees, regulation base and regulatory approach, gradual opening-up of institutional barriers to regulation, improvement of regulation on improper monopolistic behavior, active promotion of incentive regulation, intensification of social regulation and dynamic adjustment of regulatory policy mix.
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