地方工业污染防治中的利益冲突问题研究
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摘要
进入21世纪,人类社会面临着一个重要的挑战——既要保证社会经济高速发展,又要保护和维持地球的生态环境。从工业革命开始,既带来了经济快速发展和技术进步,也对自然环境造成了巨大破坏。当人们开始反思人类的活动时,逐渐认识到权衡经济增长与环境质量之间关系的重要性。
改革开放以来,我国经济建设取得了举世瞩目的成就,也付出了巨大的代价。我国的资源能源消耗不断增加,企业污染物排放量居高不下,生态环境状况日益恶化,工业污染问题日益突出,经济增长面临着严峻的环境形势。中国环境状况公报显示：近年来,中国的环境治理“虽局部有所改善,但总体还在恶化”。如何解决当前我国的环境污染问题,进一步完善和发展我国现行的环境规制体系,是目前亟待解决的重要问题。
环境规制问题历来都是经济学界关注的热点问题,但从利益集团的角度对地方工业污染防治中的利益冲突问题进行研究却极为少见。因此,本文基于利益集团的视角,围绕利益集团的特点、利益取向、行为方式和作用影响展开讨论,分析利益集团间的利益冲突产生的原因,寻找合理的解决途径,不但是研究视角的创新,也为今后相关问题的解决提供了新方法。在研究过程中,本文独辟蹊径,将公共选择学派的规制俘获理论和政府管治经济学理论引入环境问题分析,打破了环境经济学的纯理论研究方法,扩展了环境经济学的外延。以利益集团为研究视角对地方工业污染防治问题进行讨论,也扩大了环境规制理论研究的视野,拓展了环境规制的研究领域。
具体而言,本文首先对我国工业污染防治的现状及绩效进行评析,探讨我国目前工业污染防治过程所取得的成绩及存在的问题。强调说明近年来我国环境管理绩效的取得是各利益集团追逐自身利益,求得利益平衡的结果。其次,对地方工业污染防治中各重要利益集团的特点、利益取向及行为方式进行具体分析和探讨,阐明不同利益集团由于目标函数不同,规制效用不同,其行为方式也不尽相同,从而导致不同行为方式对工业污染防治政策体系的影响及作用力也不完全相同。正因为如此,当前我国的地方工业污染防治政策依然是各利益集团所偏好的“以命令与控制”为主体的政策体系,而以市场机制为补充及以群众参与为辅助的工业污染防治政策体系尚未完全建立。再次,基于利益集团的视角,采用博弈论和委托——代理理论等工具,从宏观和微观视角对利益集团之间的利益冲突及产生原因进行分析,分别构建地方政府与中央政府、地方政府与相邻地方政府、地方政府与地方环保部门、企业与企业、地方政府与企业、公众与企业、政府与企业及公众之间的利益博弈模型,探讨地方工业污染防治过程中重要利益集团之间的利益关系及利益冲突产生的原因。最后,针对因各利益集团之间的利益冲突而导致地方工业污染的政策体系失效和低效率的问题提出对策,以协调利益集团之间的利益,即建立“政府主导、公众参与、企业实施”的“三位一体”的工业污染防治制度体系。
In 21 Century, human society facing an important challenge that not only the requirement for high speed development of social economy should be ensured but the nature resources should also be protected and kept. The extensive damages to nature environment caused by high speed development of economy and technology started from Industrial Revolution also make problems of environment degradation. When human being introspect their activities they realize to balance the important relationship between economic growth and environmental quality gradually.
This is a true fact that the economy of our country increased in high speed since reform and opening up. And economic construction we made got an attractive worldwide attention. But in obtaining high speed economy grows we paid the huge price. Nature resources and energy consumption is increasing; emissions of pollution remain at high level; nature resources and environment deteriorate day by day; industrial pollution becomes more important and economy grows face a severe situation. According to the report on the State of Environment in China, in recent years, China's environment management improved partly, but deteriorates generally. How to solve the problem about environmental pollution and perfect and develop the environmental regulation system becomes an important problem need to be solved at present.
All through the ages of environmental regulation problem is a hot issue to be researched and analyzed in economics, but it is extremely rare for researching the problem of conflict of interest in prevention and control of local industrial pollution from the interest group perspective. Therefore, based on the perspective of interest group and around the profit-oriented, behavior pattern and effect, the reason of conflict of interest between interest groups and reasonable solutions will be discussed in this paper. This is not only a new research perspective but it also provides new methods for solving relevant issues. During the research, compasses make captive theory of Public choice school and government governance economics theories are introduced in the environmental problem analysis. It breaks rationalism research method of environmental economy and extends the environmental economy. Discussing local industrial pollution prevention from the interest group perspective expands the research view of environmental regulation theory and develops research field of environmental regulation theory.
Specifically speaking, we analyzed and discussed the important interest groups' profit-oriented and behavior pattern of local industrial pollution prevention firstly. It clarified that as the target function, regulation and utility and other behavior patterns of different interest groups are different, the different behavior patterns lead different influences and efforts of local industrial pollution prevention system. Secondly, based on the interest group perspective, we analyzed the development history and performance of our country's industrial pollution prevention. It points out that the subject of policy on industrial pollution prevention is "order and control", industrial pollution prevention policy with market mechanism added and public participation assisted is not well developed. Thirdly, based on the interest group perspective, using Game Theory and Agent Theory we analyzed the conflict of interest between interest groups and conflict reasons on views of macro perspective and micro perspective. We build the interest and game theory models between local government and central government, local government and neighboring local government, local government and local environment department, local government and enterprise, public and enterprise, government and enterprise and public, and discuss the relationship of interest and the reasons of conflict between important interest groups in the process of local industrial pollution preventing. Finally, for the invalidation, inefficiency of local industrial pollution prevention policy system caused by unbalance interest of interest groups, interest groups provide the interest coordinate countermeasure. It means building the trinity industrial pollution prevention policy system of "Government-led, Public-entered and Enterprise-completed".
改革开放以来,我国经济建设取得了举世瞩目的成就,也付出了巨大的代价。我国的资源能源消耗不断增加,企业污染物排放量居高不下,生态环境状况日益恶化,工业污染问题日益突出,经济增长面临着严峻的环境形势。中国环境状况公报显示：近年来,中国的环境治理“虽局部有所改善,但总体还在恶化”。如何解决当前我国的环境污染问题,进一步完善和发展我国现行的环境规制体系,是目前亟待解决的重要问题。
环境规制问题历来都是经济学界关注的热点问题,但从利益集团的角度对地方工业污染防治中的利益冲突问题进行研究却极为少见。因此,本文基于利益集团的视角,围绕利益集团的特点、利益取向、行为方式和作用影响展开讨论,分析利益集团间的利益冲突产生的原因,寻找合理的解决途径,不但是研究视角的创新,也为今后相关问题的解决提供了新方法。在研究过程中,本文独辟蹊径,将公共选择学派的规制俘获理论和政府管治经济学理论引入环境问题分析,打破了环境经济学的纯理论研究方法,扩展了环境经济学的外延。以利益集团为研究视角对地方工业污染防治问题进行讨论,也扩大了环境规制理论研究的视野,拓展了环境规制的研究领域。
具体而言,本文首先对我国工业污染防治的现状及绩效进行评析,探讨我国目前工业污染防治过程所取得的成绩及存在的问题。强调说明近年来我国环境管理绩效的取得是各利益集团追逐自身利益,求得利益平衡的结果。其次,对地方工业污染防治中各重要利益集团的特点、利益取向及行为方式进行具体分析和探讨,阐明不同利益集团由于目标函数不同,规制效用不同,其行为方式也不尽相同,从而导致不同行为方式对工业污染防治政策体系的影响及作用力也不完全相同。正因为如此,当前我国的地方工业污染防治政策依然是各利益集团所偏好的“以命令与控制”为主体的政策体系,而以市场机制为补充及以群众参与为辅助的工业污染防治政策体系尚未完全建立。再次,基于利益集团的视角,采用博弈论和委托——代理理论等工具,从宏观和微观视角对利益集团之间的利益冲突及产生原因进行分析,分别构建地方政府与中央政府、地方政府与相邻地方政府、地方政府与地方环保部门、企业与企业、地方政府与企业、公众与企业、政府与企业及公众之间的利益博弈模型,探讨地方工业污染防治过程中重要利益集团之间的利益关系及利益冲突产生的原因。最后,针对因各利益集团之间的利益冲突而导致地方工业污染的政策体系失效和低效率的问题提出对策,以协调利益集团之间的利益,即建立“政府主导、公众参与、企业实施”的“三位一体”的工业污染防治制度体系。
In 21 Century, human society facing an important challenge that not only the requirement for high speed development of social economy should be ensured but the nature resources should also be protected and kept. The extensive damages to nature environment caused by high speed development of economy and technology started from Industrial Revolution also make problems of environment degradation. When human being introspect their activities they realize to balance the important relationship between economic growth and environmental quality gradually.
This is a true fact that the economy of our country increased in high speed since reform and opening up. And economic construction we made got an attractive worldwide attention. But in obtaining high speed economy grows we paid the huge price. Nature resources and energy consumption is increasing; emissions of pollution remain at high level; nature resources and environment deteriorate day by day; industrial pollution becomes more important and economy grows face a severe situation. According to the report on the State of Environment in China, in recent years, China's environment management improved partly, but deteriorates generally. How to solve the problem about environmental pollution and perfect and develop the environmental regulation system becomes an important problem need to be solved at present.
All through the ages of environmental regulation problem is a hot issue to be researched and analyzed in economics, but it is extremely rare for researching the problem of conflict of interest in prevention and control of local industrial pollution from the interest group perspective. Therefore, based on the perspective of interest group and around the profit-oriented, behavior pattern and effect, the reason of conflict of interest between interest groups and reasonable solutions will be discussed in this paper. This is not only a new research perspective but it also provides new methods for solving relevant issues. During the research, compasses make captive theory of Public choice school and government governance economics theories are introduced in the environmental problem analysis. It breaks rationalism research method of environmental economy and extends the environmental economy. Discussing local industrial pollution prevention from the interest group perspective expands the research view of environmental regulation theory and develops research field of environmental regulation theory.
Specifically speaking, we analyzed and discussed the important interest groups' profit-oriented and behavior pattern of local industrial pollution prevention firstly. It clarified that as the target function, regulation and utility and other behavior patterns of different interest groups are different, the different behavior patterns lead different influences and efforts of local industrial pollution prevention system. Secondly, based on the interest group perspective, we analyzed the development history and performance of our country's industrial pollution prevention. It points out that the subject of policy on industrial pollution prevention is "order and control", industrial pollution prevention policy with market mechanism added and public participation assisted is not well developed. Thirdly, based on the interest group perspective, using Game Theory and Agent Theory we analyzed the conflict of interest between interest groups and conflict reasons on views of macro perspective and micro perspective. We build the interest and game theory models between local government and central government, local government and neighboring local government, local government and local environment department, local government and enterprise, public and enterprise, government and enterprise and public, and discuss the relationship of interest and the reasons of conflict between important interest groups in the process of local industrial pollution preventing. Finally, for the invalidation, inefficiency of local industrial pollution prevention policy system caused by unbalance interest of interest groups, interest groups provide the interest coordinate countermeasure. It means building the trinity industrial pollution prevention policy system of "Government-led, Public-entered and Enterprise-completed".
引文
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