物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制研究
|
摘要
多维拍卖作为物流公共信息平台(Logistics Public Information Platform,LPIP)一种重要的交易方式,可以有效的配置物流服务资源。LPIP的拍卖机制设计对平台的运营至关重要,LPIP需要有一套成熟的多维拍卖理论对其运营进行指导。本文综合运用管理学、经济学以及信息技术等相关学科的理论与方法,借鉴国内外的研究成果,采用理论研究与案例分析相结合的方法,从分析物流公共信息平台的服务需求和服务模式出发,研究物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制。本文的研究将提升物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖理论,提高物流公共信息平台的交易效率和效益,达到为用户创造价值,实现参与各方共赢的目的。本论文的研究将增强物流公共信息平台运作的生命力,达到扩大和获得物流公共信息平台用户数的目的。
本文首先研究了物流公共信息平台的服务模式。根据交易方式和技术实现的难度,把物流公共信息平台的服务模式归结为信息资源共享、网上物流服务交易、价值链集成三种模式,并研究了各种服务模式的适用条件。在此基础上,分析了物流服务交易的特点,研究了物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制设计的原则、内容与流程,为研究物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制奠定了基础。
本文设计了物流公共信息平台的密封和英式多维拍卖机制。与传统单属性拍卖相比,多维拍卖的投标表现为最后的得分,把第一价格密封拍卖称为第一得分密封拍卖,第二价格密封拍卖称为第二得分密封拍卖,英式拍卖称为序列全信息显示英式拍卖。分别研究了第一得分密封拍卖机制、第二得分密封拍卖机制、序列全信息显示英式拍卖机制。设计了物流服务需求方(拍卖方)的效应函数,最优评分函数,并研究了物流服务供应商(投标方)的最优投标策略,以及第二得分密封拍卖和英式拍卖在多维条件下的等价性,同时确定了在英式多维拍卖中的最小投标增量的最优值。
针对最后时刻投标问题,设计了一种多阶段多维拍卖模型。网上拍卖存在最后时刻投标现象(狙击者),表现为拍卖结束前的最后数分钟大量投标者集中出价,本文设计了一种多阶段多维英式拍卖模型,以解决最后时刻投标所带来的效率损失,以提高拍卖方期望收益。研究包括模型设计,拍卖协议的描述、评分函数的确定,同时分析了投标方的投标策略和拍卖方的期望收益。
本文设计了多维拍卖中质量属性权重的调整模型。当物流服务供应商的投标,评分函数存在自身内在的缺陷,使物流服务需求方不能选出合适的供应商,拍卖双方不能达成一致时,需要重新调整投标质量属性权重。本文利用模糊数学的方法通过改良原有的评分函数,对买方(物流服务需求方)的询价请求(RFQ)和物流服务的属性权重进行调整,以提高交易成功的几率,并结合案例进行了分析。
最后,本文研究了佣金对物流公共信息平台多维拍卖结果的影响。分析了佣金的收取对物流公共信息平台拍卖的影响,以及物流公共信息平台不同费用投入模式下,平台收益的变化。研究了佣金比例的高低对拍卖方(物流服务需求方)、投标方(物流服务供应方)收益的影响,以及佣金比例的高低对LPIP收益的影响,并分析了平台费用的支出对LPIP收益的影响。
物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖是传统拍卖在网上物流服务交易的一个延伸,本质上是一种网上逆向物流服务采购拍卖。本文重点研究了物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制,而多维拍卖需要研究的内容还很多,其中,物流服务供应商(投标方)投标策略将是一个很有意义的研究主题。
Being as an important kind of bargaining mode on LPIP, multidimensional auction can effectively allocate logistics service resources. The design of auction mechanism is critical to LPIP, and LPIP need perfect auction theory to regulate its operation. In this thesis, the theory and method of management, economics and IT will be used, and the existing study outcome will be used for reference, and service model of LPIP (logistics public information platform) will be analyzed. The methods of case study and theoretic study are used. The auction theory of LPIP will be extended to multidimensional field. The multidimensional auction mechanism will be showed. The study of this thesis makes for enriching the theory of auction, optimizing auction mechanism, improving the efficiency of transaction and value of LPIP, creating value for users, and realizing all the participants' benefits. The study can also strengthen the vigor of LPIP operation and attract more users to be affiliated with LPIP. The main study as follow:
Firstly, the integrative frame, and system structure, and service model of LPIP are studied. The classification, and the integrative frame, and system structure of LPIP are analyzed. The model of LPIP service includes sharing of information resource, and transaction of logistics service, and integration of value chain. The applicable conditions of three models are discussed.
Secondly, the multidimensional auction characteristic and auction system are studied. The characteristic of auction on Internet, and its mechanism are analyzed. And multidimensional auction system is designed.
Thirdly, the sealed-bid and English multidimensional auction mechanism is proposed. In contrast to the single-attribute auction, a variation of the first-price sealed-bid protocol termed first-score sealed-bid, a variation of the second-price sealed-bid protocol termed second-score sealed-bid, and a variation of the English auction protocol termed sequential full information revelation. The second-score sealed bid auction is analyzed, and the equivalence between the second score sealed bid and the English auction for the case of multi-attribute items is demonstrated. In addition, it is proved that the buyer's expected payoff in the English auction is equal to the buyer's expected payoff from the first-score sealed-bid auction with the difference of the predefined constant D that represents the minimal bid increment allowed in the English protocol. The optimal value for the minimal increment which should be defined in the multi-attribute English auction is discussed.
Fourthly, a kind of multi-stage multidimensional auction mechanism is designed in order to resolve the late-bidding. There is phenomenon of late-bidding on Internet auction, in another word, a number of bidders decide to bid in the last few minutes, who aim to beaten the other bidder, and make them have no time to counterattack. Late-bidding is always the optimal strategy for the bidders on Internet auction, although it will lead to the lost of efficiency. The study of multi-stage multidimensional auction mechanism includes design of the auction model, and description of auction rule, and establishment of the score function. In addition, the bidder's bidding strategy and the buyer's expect payoff are analyzed.
Fifthly, modified model of the score function on multidimensional auction is designed. When logistics service suppliers' bidding, and the score function exist internal defection, logistics service buyer cannot choose appropriate supplier, and the buyer and the supplier cannot come to agreement. So the logistics service buyer should adjust the score function. This paper use the method of fuzzy mathematics to modify the primary score function, in order to improve the probability of bargaining success, and the method of case study is used.
Sixthly, the effects of rents to the results of LPIP multidimensional auction are studied. How the rate of rent impact the payoff of LPIP, and logistics service buyer, and logistics supplier, is studied. Finally, the relation between the payout of LPIP and the income of LPIP is analyzed.
Multidimensional auction on LPIP is extension of the traditional auction on Internet, which is essentially reverse logistics service provide auction. Multidimensional auction mechanism on LPIP is mainly studied in this paper, in fact, there are many areas which should be studied on multidimensional auction, and the bidding strategy of logistics service suppliers will be a significant area of research.
本文首先研究了物流公共信息平台的服务模式。根据交易方式和技术实现的难度,把物流公共信息平台的服务模式归结为信息资源共享、网上物流服务交易、价值链集成三种模式,并研究了各种服务模式的适用条件。在此基础上,分析了物流服务交易的特点,研究了物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制设计的原则、内容与流程,为研究物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制奠定了基础。
本文设计了物流公共信息平台的密封和英式多维拍卖机制。与传统单属性拍卖相比,多维拍卖的投标表现为最后的得分,把第一价格密封拍卖称为第一得分密封拍卖,第二价格密封拍卖称为第二得分密封拍卖,英式拍卖称为序列全信息显示英式拍卖。分别研究了第一得分密封拍卖机制、第二得分密封拍卖机制、序列全信息显示英式拍卖机制。设计了物流服务需求方(拍卖方)的效应函数,最优评分函数,并研究了物流服务供应商(投标方)的最优投标策略,以及第二得分密封拍卖和英式拍卖在多维条件下的等价性,同时确定了在英式多维拍卖中的最小投标增量的最优值。
针对最后时刻投标问题,设计了一种多阶段多维拍卖模型。网上拍卖存在最后时刻投标现象(狙击者),表现为拍卖结束前的最后数分钟大量投标者集中出价,本文设计了一种多阶段多维英式拍卖模型,以解决最后时刻投标所带来的效率损失,以提高拍卖方期望收益。研究包括模型设计,拍卖协议的描述、评分函数的确定,同时分析了投标方的投标策略和拍卖方的期望收益。
本文设计了多维拍卖中质量属性权重的调整模型。当物流服务供应商的投标,评分函数存在自身内在的缺陷,使物流服务需求方不能选出合适的供应商,拍卖双方不能达成一致时,需要重新调整投标质量属性权重。本文利用模糊数学的方法通过改良原有的评分函数,对买方(物流服务需求方)的询价请求(RFQ)和物流服务的属性权重进行调整,以提高交易成功的几率,并结合案例进行了分析。
最后,本文研究了佣金对物流公共信息平台多维拍卖结果的影响。分析了佣金的收取对物流公共信息平台拍卖的影响,以及物流公共信息平台不同费用投入模式下,平台收益的变化。研究了佣金比例的高低对拍卖方(物流服务需求方)、投标方(物流服务供应方)收益的影响,以及佣金比例的高低对LPIP收益的影响,并分析了平台费用的支出对LPIP收益的影响。
物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖是传统拍卖在网上物流服务交易的一个延伸,本质上是一种网上逆向物流服务采购拍卖。本文重点研究了物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制,而多维拍卖需要研究的内容还很多,其中,物流服务供应商(投标方)投标策略将是一个很有意义的研究主题。
Being as an important kind of bargaining mode on LPIP, multidimensional auction can effectively allocate logistics service resources. The design of auction mechanism is critical to LPIP, and LPIP need perfect auction theory to regulate its operation. In this thesis, the theory and method of management, economics and IT will be used, and the existing study outcome will be used for reference, and service model of LPIP (logistics public information platform) will be analyzed. The methods of case study and theoretic study are used. The auction theory of LPIP will be extended to multidimensional field. The multidimensional auction mechanism will be showed. The study of this thesis makes for enriching the theory of auction, optimizing auction mechanism, improving the efficiency of transaction and value of LPIP, creating value for users, and realizing all the participants' benefits. The study can also strengthen the vigor of LPIP operation and attract more users to be affiliated with LPIP. The main study as follow:
Firstly, the integrative frame, and system structure, and service model of LPIP are studied. The classification, and the integrative frame, and system structure of LPIP are analyzed. The model of LPIP service includes sharing of information resource, and transaction of logistics service, and integration of value chain. The applicable conditions of three models are discussed.
Secondly, the multidimensional auction characteristic and auction system are studied. The characteristic of auction on Internet, and its mechanism are analyzed. And multidimensional auction system is designed.
Thirdly, the sealed-bid and English multidimensional auction mechanism is proposed. In contrast to the single-attribute auction, a variation of the first-price sealed-bid protocol termed first-score sealed-bid, a variation of the second-price sealed-bid protocol termed second-score sealed-bid, and a variation of the English auction protocol termed sequential full information revelation. The second-score sealed bid auction is analyzed, and the equivalence between the second score sealed bid and the English auction for the case of multi-attribute items is demonstrated. In addition, it is proved that the buyer's expected payoff in the English auction is equal to the buyer's expected payoff from the first-score sealed-bid auction with the difference of the predefined constant D that represents the minimal bid increment allowed in the English protocol. The optimal value for the minimal increment which should be defined in the multi-attribute English auction is discussed.
Fourthly, a kind of multi-stage multidimensional auction mechanism is designed in order to resolve the late-bidding. There is phenomenon of late-bidding on Internet auction, in another word, a number of bidders decide to bid in the last few minutes, who aim to beaten the other bidder, and make them have no time to counterattack. Late-bidding is always the optimal strategy for the bidders on Internet auction, although it will lead to the lost of efficiency. The study of multi-stage multidimensional auction mechanism includes design of the auction model, and description of auction rule, and establishment of the score function. In addition, the bidder's bidding strategy and the buyer's expect payoff are analyzed.
Fifthly, modified model of the score function on multidimensional auction is designed. When logistics service suppliers' bidding, and the score function exist internal defection, logistics service buyer cannot choose appropriate supplier, and the buyer and the supplier cannot come to agreement. So the logistics service buyer should adjust the score function. This paper use the method of fuzzy mathematics to modify the primary score function, in order to improve the probability of bargaining success, and the method of case study is used.
Sixthly, the effects of rents to the results of LPIP multidimensional auction are studied. How the rate of rent impact the payoff of LPIP, and logistics service buyer, and logistics supplier, is studied. Finally, the relation between the payout of LPIP and the income of LPIP is analyzed.
Multidimensional auction on LPIP is extension of the traditional auction on Internet, which is essentially reverse logistics service provide auction. Multidimensional auction mechanism on LPIP is mainly studied in this paper, in fact, there are many areas which should be studied on multidimensional auction, and the bidding strategy of logistics service suppliers will be a significant area of research.
引文
[1]刘仲英,胡衍强,胡斌.物流公共信息平台的体系结构研究[J].管理学报,2005,11:188.
[2]戴定一.我国物流信息化的现状和发展.信息与电脑.2003,1:30-33.
[3]施先亮,建设物流信息平台促进现代物流发展,中国物流与采购,2002.7:25-29
[4]董敬欣.公用物流平台设计研究fD].西南交通大学硕士学位论文,2002,3:5.
[5]徐燕.区域物流系统的信息平台研究[D].武汉理工大学硕士学位论文,2002,5:26.
[6]董千里,袁毅.区域综合物流信息平台的功能与构建研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2002,02:74-78.
[7]G.Riley,W.F.Samuelson.Optimal Auctions.American Economic Review.1981a,71(3):381-392.
[8]W.Vickrey.Counter speculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders,The Journal of Finance.1961,30:9-37.
[9]Bichler M.An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auction[J].Decision Support System,2002,9:249-268.
[10]张锦.城市现代物流公共信息平台规划设计的理论和关键技术研究同济大学博士后研究工作报告[D].2005:3.
[11]Ganesh D.Bhatt.etc.An empirically derived model of the role of IS networks in:business process improvement initiatives.Omega 29(2001) 29-48.
[12]K.Kumar,H.G.Dissel,Sustainable collaboration:managing conflict and cooperation in interorganizational systems,MIS Quarterly(1996).
[13]T.W.Malone,J.Yates,R.I.Benjamin,Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies:effects of information technology and market structure and corporate strategies,Communications of the ACM(1987) 484-497.
[14]WilM.P.vander Aalst.Process-oriented architectures for electronic commerce and interorganizational workflow.Information systems vol.24,No.8,p:639-671.
[15]秦俊峰.物流园区信息化与公共物流平台建设[J],中国储运,2003,5:47.
[16]汪贻生等.虚拟物流信息平台结构分析与设计[J].商品储运与养护,2004,6:7.
[17]刘兴景,戴禾,杨东援.物流信息平台发展规划框架分析[J].管理现代化,2001,1:2-4.
[18]诸葛良等.物流园区电子信息平台的建设[J],中国信息导报,2002,9:52.
[19]朱鲤,李锦标,杨东援.区域物流公共信息平台的构建[J],中国储运,2005,4:42-43.
[20]赵振峰、崔南方、陈荣秋.区域公共物流信息平台的功能定位及运行机制研究[J].物流技术,2004,4:63-65
[21]谈冉,薛胜军.智能管理物流信息平台的研究[J].武汉理工大学学报,2005,4:139-141.
[22]刘兴景,戴禾,杨东援.物流共用信息平台系统分析[J].交通与计算机,2001,1:2-3.
[23]董雷,何世伟.区域物流信息平台的构建研究[J].物流科技,2005,28:71.
[24]王正文,物流信息平台建设[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2002,10(4):1-3.
[25]陈韬,苏小军.区域物流信息平台规划[J].管理现代化,2002,10.2-3.
[26]董千里.区域物流信息平台与资源整合[J].交通运输工程学报。2002,2(4):59-61.
[27]Kearney,A.T.Building the B2B Foundation - Positioning the Net Market Makers for Success(M).A.T.Kearney Inc,Chicago,IL,2000.
[28]L.G.Tornatzky,K.J.Klein.Innovation characteristics and innovation adoption implementation:a meta analysis of findings,IEEE transactions on engineering management 29(11),1982,pp.28-45.
[29]K.W.Rogers,Linking the economic bulletin board to the Internet:a case study,Internet Research 3(4),1993,pp.39-50.
[30]Kevin K.Y.Kuan,Patrick Y.K.Chau.A Perception-based model for EDI adoption in small business using a technology-organization-environment framework.Information &Management 38(2001) 507-521.
[31]C.W.Crook,R.L.Kumar,Electronic data interchange:a multi-industry investigation using grounded theory,Information & Management 34,1998,pp.75-89.
[32]Sangjae Lee,Gyoo Gun Lim.The impact of partnership attributes on EDI implementation success.Information & Management 41(2003) 135-148 28.V.Arunachalam,EDI:an analysis of adoption,uses,benefits and barriers,Journal of Systems Management,March/April(1995) 60-64.
[33]S.Banerjee,D.Y.Golhar,Electronic data interchange:characteristics of users and nonusers,Information & Management 26,1994,pp.65-74.
[34]M.Bensaou,Interorganizational cooperation:the role of information technology-an empirical comparison of US and Japanese supplier relations,Information Systems Research 8(2),1997,pp.107-124.
[35]F.Bergeron,L.Raymond,Managing EDI for corporate advantage:a longitudinal study,Information & Management 31,1997,pp.319-333.
[36]J.C.Brancheau,B.D.Janz,J.C.Wetherbe,Key issues in information systems management:1994-1995 SIM Delphi results,MIS Quarterly 20(2),1996,pp.225-242.
[37]C.W.Crook,R.L.Kumar,Electronic data interchange:a multi-industry investigation using grounded theory,Information & Management 34,1998,pp.75-89.
[38]P.J.Hart,C.S.Saunders,Emerging electronic partnerships:antecedents and dimensions of EDI use from the supplier's perspective,Journal of Management Information Systems 14(4),1998,pp.87-111.
[39]J.V.Hansen,N.C.Hill,Control and audit of electronic data interchange,MIS Quarterly 13(4),1989,pp.403-413.
[40]T.H.Kwon,R.W.Zmud,Unifying the fragmented models of information systems implementation,in:R.J.Boland,R.A.Hirschheim(Eds.),Critical Issues in Information Systems Research,Wiley,New York,1987.
[41]Gaski JF,Nevin JR.The differential effects of exercised and unexercised power sources in a marketing channel.J Mark Res 1985;22:130-42.
[42]Jaworski JB.Toward a theory of marketing control:environmental context,control types,and consequences.J Mark 1988;52:23-39(July).
[43]Premkumar G,King RK.Organizational characteristics and information systems planning:an empirical study.Inf Syst Res 1994;5(2):75-108.
[44] Benita Cox,Sherine Ghoneim. Strategic use of EDI in the public sector:the HMSO case study.Journal of Strategic information systems 7(1998) 37-51.
[45] Virpi Kristiina Tuunainen. Opportunities of effective integration of EDI for small businesses in the automotive industry. Information & Management 34 (1998) 361-375.
[46] Rebecca Angeles , Ravinder Nath. An empirical study of EDI trading partner selection criteria in customer-supplier relationships. Information & Management 37 (2000) 241-255.
[47] Martjin R.Hoogeweegen.etc. A comprehensive approach to assess the value of EDI. Information & Management 34 (1998) 117-127.
[48] R. P. McAfee, J. M. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature. 1987,7:699-738
[49] 马俊．拍卖模型及其应用研究(M)．中国财政经济出版社．2004,12：6．
[50] Friedman D. The Double Auction Market Institution: A Survey, The Double Auction Market: Institution, Theories, and Evidence [M]. Edited by Daniel Friedman and John Rust, Newyork, Addison-Wesley, 1993:3-25.
[51] Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman and William E. Walsh. A Parameterization of the Auction Design Space [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 35, Issues 1-2, April 2001, Pages 304-338
[52] Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode and Shyam Sunder. Double auction dynamics: structural effects of non-binding price controls[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 28, Issue 9, July 2004, Pages 1707-1731.
[53] Bichler, M., Kalagnanam, J., Katircioglu, K., King, A., Lawrence, D., Lee, H. S., Lin, G., Lu, Y. Applications of Flexible Pricing in Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce [J]. IBM Systems Journal, 2002, 42(2):287-302.
[54] Friedman, D. On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets American Economic Review.1956, 74(1):60-72.
[55] G.Riley, W. F. Samuelson. Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review. 1981b, 71(3):381-392.
[56] R. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operation Research. 1981a, (6):58-73.
[57] P. Milgrom, R. J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competive bidding. Ecoometrica. 1982,(50): 108-112.
[58] Maskin, Riley. Going, Going, Gone Information Week. 1994a: 45—50.
[59] R. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operation Research. 1981b, (6):58-73.
[60] Maskin, Riley. Going, Going, Gone Information Week. 1994b: 45—50.
[61] Lroger Myerson. The Emerging Role of Electronic Marketplaces on the Internet. Communications of the ACM. 1981, 41:35-42.
[62] John Riley, Willian Samuelson. An Experimental Analysis of Multi-Attribute Auctions. Decision Support Systems.1981,29:249-268.
[63] Milgrom, Robert Weber. Multi-Attribute Auctions for Electronic Procurement. In Proceedings of the First IBM LAC Workshop on Internet Based Negotiation Technologies.l982:123-150.
[64] Myerson. Uses and Consequences of Electronic Markets: An Empirical Investigation in the Aircraft Parts Industry. MIS Quarterly. 1981, 12:471-507.
[65]Coppinger,Smith.Incentive sand Behavior in English,Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions.Economic Inquiry.1982,18:1-22.
[66]Harrison,Artur Raviv.Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auction.Econometrical.1981,49:1477-1499.
[67]James C.Cox,Vernon L.Smith and James M.Walker.Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions[J].Economics Letters,1983,12(3-4):207-212.
[68]James C.Cox,Vernon L.Smith and James M.Walker.A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism[J].Journal of Economic Behavior &Organization,Volume 4,Issues 2-3,June-September 1983,Pages 205-219.
[69]Kagel,John H.and Dan Levin.the Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions,American Economic Review,1986,76:894-920.
[70]Hansen,Robert G.,and John R.Lott.the Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common 911 Value Auctions:Comment,American Economic Review,1991,81:347-361.
[71]Lind,Barry and Charles R.Plott.the Winner's Curse:Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers,American Economic Review,1991,81:335-346.
[72]James C.Cox,Vernon L.Smith and James M.Walker.A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism[J].Journal of Economic Behavior &Organization,Volume 4,Issues 2-3,June-September 1983,Pages 205-219.
[73]谢安石,李一军.拍卖理论的研究内容、方法与展望(J).2004b,7:46.
[74]Lucking-Reiley D.Auction on Internet:what's being auctioned,and how? Journal of Industrial Economics,2000,48:227-252.
[75]Beam,C.M.Auctioning and Bidding in Electronic Commerce:the Online Auction[D].Ph.D.Dissertation,University of California,Berkeley 1999.
[76]Jungpil Hahn.Elements of Online Auction Design.Working Paper,Information and Design Sciences,University of Minnesota,2000.
[77]Katkar,E.and Lucking-Reiley,D.Public Versus secret Reserve Price in eBay Auctions:Result from a Pokemon Field Experiment.University of Arizona Working paper,2000.
[78]Bajari,P.and Hortacsu,A.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions.Rand Journal of Economics,2003,1.3,2:329-355
[79]杜黎,胡奇英.网上分批拍卖中的保留价比较分析(J).系统科学与数学,2002,22(3):343-354.
[80]Melnik M.I and James Alm,Does a seller's e-commerce reputation matter? Evidence from eBay auctions.The Journal of Industrial Economics,2002,L:337--349.
[81]Zoltán Hidvégi,Wenli Wang and Andrew B.Whinston.Buy-price English auction[J].Journal of Economic Theory,Volume 129,Issue 1,July 2006,Pages 31-56.
[82]Indranil Chakraborty,Georgia Kosmopoulou.Auctions with endogenous entry.Economics Letters,Volume 72,Issue 2,August 2001,Pages 195-200.
[83]Alvin C.R and Ockenfels A.Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions:evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet.American Economic Review.2002,92:1093-1103.
[84]谢安石.面向电子商务的多属性网上拍卖理论研究(D).哈尔滨工业大学博士学位论文,2005:15.
[85]Monderer,Dov and Tennenholtz,Moshe.Optimal Auctions Revisited.Artificial Intelligence,2000,120:29-42.
[86]Vulkan.N.,Jennings,N.R.Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments.Decision support systems,2000a,28,5-19.
[87]J.Sairamesh,R.Mohan.A Platform for Business-To-Business Sell-Side,Private Exchanges and Marketplaces.IBM Systems Journal.2002,41(2):242-252.
[88]Koppius,O.R..Electronic multidimensional auctions:trading mechanism and applications.Paper represented at the Edispuut workshop '98:E-Commerce crossing Boundaries,Rotterdam,Netherlands.1998.
[89]J.Teich,H.Wallenius and J.Wallenius.A Multiple Unit Auction Algorithms:Some Theory and A Web Implementation In Electronic Markets International Journal of Electronic Commerce and Business Media,1999,(9):1-7.
[90]谢安石,李一军.基于模糊粗糙集的多属性网上拍卖决策(J).系统工程理论方法应用,2005.2:182-184.
[91]胡斌,刘仲英.基于智能代理的多维拍卖模型设计(J),计算机工程与应用,2005,1:8-10.
[92]Wurman,P.R.,Wellman M.P.,Walsh W.E.A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space.Games and Economic Behavior,2001,35:304-338.
[93]Vulkan.N.,Jennings,N.R.Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments.Decision support systems,2000b,28,5-19.
[94]Vidye Narayanan,Nicholas R.Jennings.An Adaptive Bilateral Negotiation Model for E-Commerce Setting.Proceeding of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05)
[95]谭煌,高春明.网上电子交易中的谈判协商模型.计算技术与自动化,2004,23(1):53
[96]Xudong Luo,Nicholas R.Jennings,Nigel Shadbolt,Ho-fung Leung,Jimmy Ho-man Lee.A fuzzy constraint based model for bilateral multi-issue negotiations in semi-competitive environments.Artificial Intelligence,2003,148:53-102
[97]Lee.H.G..Electronic Brokerage and Electronic Auction:the impact of IT on market structure.Proceedings of the 29th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,Maui,HI,1996,4,397-406.
[98]Branco,F..The design of multidimensional auctions,Rand journal of Economics,1997,28(1),63-81.
[99]Rema Ananthanarayanan,Manoj Kumar.Negotiation Support in Online Markets,with competition and co-operation.Proceeding of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05)
[100]Florian Lang,Constantin Brunn.Pareto-Efficiency without Giving-In:A Two-Phased Protocol for Multiple-Attribute Negotiations.Proceeding of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05)
[101]Blecherman B.Participation constraints on the adoption of fully automated negotiations.1998 Best Papers,Proceedings of the Fifty-eighth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management,1998.
[102]M.Bichler.Bidding Languages and Winner Determination in Multi-attributes Auctions.IBM Research Report RC 22478.1998:17-25.
[103]Dominik Deschner,.Oliver Hofman,Freimut Bodendorf,Agent-based coordination support for business processes,INFOR.Ottawa:Aug 2000,38(3):283-293.
[104]Y.K.Che.Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions.Rand Journal of Economics.1993,24(4):668-680.
[105]Bichler,M.An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions.Decision support systems,2000,29,249-268.
[106]柯伦柏著,钟鸿钧译.拍卖:理论与实践(M).中国人民大学出版社,2006,3:82.
[107]查先进.物流与供应链管理[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2003
[108]listairC ockhurn著,俞涓译.敏捷软件开发[M].北京:人民邮电出版社,2003.
[109]K.W.Rogers,Linking the economic bulletin board to the Internet:a case study,Internet Research 3(4),1993,pp.39-50.
[110]R.Reagle,The platform for privacy preferences,Communications of the ACM 42(2),1999,pp.48-51.
[111]Bailey,J.P.,Bakos,J.Y..An exploratory study of the emerging role of electronic intermediaries.International Journal of Electronic Commerce,1997,1(3):7-20.
[112]Bailey,Joseph.Intermediation and Electronic Markets:Aggregation and Pricing in Internet Commerce(D).Ph.D.Thesis,MIT,1998.
[113]Brynjolfsson and Michael Smith.Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers[J].Management Science,2000,46(4):563-585.
[114]Clemons,Eric,Il-Horn Hann,and Lorin Hitt.The Nature of Competition in Electronic Markets:An Empirical Investigation of Online Travel Agent Offerings[R].Working Paper,The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,1998,6.
[115]J.M.Snyder.Online Auction Fraud:Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud[J]? Federal Communications Law Journal.2000,52(2):453-472.
[116]C.Dellarocas.Efficiency and Robustness of eBay-like Online Feedback Mechanisms in Environments with Moral Hazard[R].Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge,MA,Working Paper,2003:56-89.
[117]R.Bapna,P.Goes.Insights and Analysis of Online Auctions[J].Communications of the ACM.2001,44(11):42-50.
[118]R.V.Tulder,M.Mol.Reverse Auctions or Auctions Reversed:First Experiments by Philips[J].European Management Journal.2002,20(5):447-458.
[119]D.M.Dias,S.L.Palmer.Ecommerce Interoperability with IBM's Web Sphere Commerce Products[J].IBM Systems Journal.2002,4 1(2):27-34.
[120]P.Bajari,A.Hortacsu.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions[J].The Rand Journal of Economics.2003,34(2):32 9-355.
[121]J.Abrache,T.G.Crainic,M.Gendreau.Design issues for combinatorial auctions[A].Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research.Dallas,2002:55-67.
[122]C.Beam.Auctions and bidding in electronic commerce:The online auction[D].Technical report,Ph D Dissertation,University of California Berkeley,USA,1999.
[123]Ravi Bapna,Paulo Goes,Alok Gupta.A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions.Information Technology and Management,2000,(1):1-23.
[124]Ockenfels, and Roth. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Prices Auctions: Evidence from eBay and amazon auctions on the Internet [A]. American Economic Review, 2002, 92:1093-1103.
[125]Bajari, P and Hortacsu. The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions [A]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 3 (2): 329-355.
[126] Robert E Easley, Rafael Tenorio. Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions. Management Science, 2004,10, 50 (10): 1407-1419
[127]Metha K, Lee B.T. An Empirical Evidence of Winner's Curse in Electronic Auction [R]. Proceedings of the 20～(th) International Conference on Information Systems, Charlotte, NC, 1999.
[128] Vickrey.W. Count erspeculation, Auctions and Competitive sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance, 1961, (16): 8-37.
[129]Lucking-Reiley. Using Field Experiment to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet [D]. American Economic Review, 1999, (89): 1063-1080.
[130]Katkar, E and Lucking-Reiley. Public Versus Secret Reserve Price in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokemon Field Experiment [R], University of Arizona Working Paper . 2000.
[131] Milgrom,P and R weber. Theory of Auction and Competitive Bidding [A], Econometrica, 1982, (50): 1089-1122.
[132]Myerson, R . Optimal Auction design. Mathematics of Operation Research, 1981, (6): 58-73.
[133] Vincent, D. Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May be Kept Screct[J], Journal of Economic Theory, 1995,(65): 75-84.
[134] Pinker E J, Seidmann A, Vakrat Y. Managing online auctions: current business and research issues [J]. Management Science,2003, 49 (11) :1457 ～1484.
[135]Ockenfels, and Roth. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Prices Auctions: Evidence from eBay and amazon auctions on the Internet [A]. American Economic Review, 2002, 92: 1093-1103.
[136] Vakrat Y,Seidmann A. Implications ofthe Bidders'Process on the Design of Online Auctions [A]. In:Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, R. Sprague, Maui, HI,IEEE Computer Society Press [C]. Los Alamitos,CA, 2000.
[137]Harstad R. M. Rothkopf M. H. On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions [J]. Europian Journal of Operations Research, 1994: 572-581.
[138] C. Beam. Auctions and bidding in electronic commerce: The online auction [D]. Technical report, Ph D Dissertation, University of California Berkeley, USA, 1999: 23.
[139] Fudenberg Drew, Jean Tirole, Game Theory [M], Boston, MIT Press, 1991.
[140] Rothkopf M H, Pekec A ,Harstad R M. Computationally, manageable combinatorial auctions [J]. Management Science, 1995, 44 (8):1131-1147.
[141] Chun J S, Kim M K. Shape optimization of electromagnetic devices using immune algorithm [J]. IEEE Trans on Magnetics, 1997, 33 (2):1876-1879.
[142] F. Branco, The design of multidimensional auctions, Rand Journal of Economics 28 (1) (1997) 63-81.
[143] S.S. Fatima, M.J. Wooldrige, N.R. Jennings, The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium, Proc. 4th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, 2002, pp. 180-193.
[144]P.S.A. Reitsma, P. Stone, J.A Csirik, M.L. Littman, Self enforcing strategic demand reduction, Proc. 4th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Bologna, Italy, 2002.
[145] J.G. Riley, W.F. Samuelson, Optimal auctions, American Economic Review 71 (1981) 381- 392.
[146] P. Stone, R.E. Schapire, J.A. Csirik, L. Littman, D. McAllester, ATTac-2001: a learning autonomous bidding agent, Agent mediated electronic commerce: IV. Designing mechanisms and systems of lecture notes in artificial intelligence, 2531, 2002, pp. 143-160.
[147] C. Chen-Ritzo, T. Harrison, M. KWasnica, D. Thomas, Better, faster, cheaper: a multi-attribute supply chain auction mechanism, in: Penn State University ISBM report 10-2003, 2003.
[148] J. E. Teich, H. Wallenius, J. Wallenius, O. R. Koppius, Emerging multiple issue e-auctions (invited review), European Journal of Operational Research 159 (1) 1-16.
[149] P. Milgrom, An economist's vision of the b-tob marketplace, An Executive White Paper October 2000.
[150] Y.K. Che, Design competition through multidimensional auctions, RAND Journal of Economics 24 (1993) 668-680.
[151] D.C. Parkes, J. Kalagnanam, Iterative multi-attribute vickrey auctions, Management Science, 2004, (http://www.eecs. harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/map.pdf).
[152] M. Bichler, J. Kalagnanam, Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions, European Journal of Operational Research 160 (2) (2005) 380- 394.
[153] S. Strecker, S. Seifert, Electronic sourcing with multi-attribute auctions, Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Science, 2004.
[154] G.J. Collins, G. Demir, M. Gini, Bidtree ordering in ida*combinatorial auction winner determination with side constraints, Proc. of the 4th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, 2002.
[155] B. Hudson, T. Sandholm, Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of AMEC-IV LNCS, vol. 2531,2002, pp. 180- 193.
[156] F. Kelly, R. Steinberg, A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service, Management Science 46 (4) (2000) 586- 596.
[157] N. Nisan, Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions, Proc. of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Minneapolis, MN, 2000, pp. 1-12.
[158] T. Sandholm, S. Suri, Improved algorithms for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations, Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 2003, pp. 90-97.
[159]A.V. Sunderam, D.C. Parkes, Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions, Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), 2003.
[160] G. Vignaux, Multi-attribute decision problems, Technical Report (2004) Victorya University of Wellington New Zealand.
[161]K.Yoon,C.Hwang,Multiple Attribute Decision-Making:An Introduction,Sage,Thousand Oaks,1995.
[162]P.Cramton,Ascending auctions,European Economic Review 42,(3-5),(1988),745-756.
[163]E.David,R.Azoulay-Schwartz,S.Kraus,Protocols and strategies for automated multi-attributes auctions,Proc.of the 1st Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,Bologna,Italy,2002,pp.77-85.
[164]P.Milgrom,R.Weber,A theory of auction and competitive bidding,Econometria 50(1982)1089-1122.
[165]M.H.Rothkopf,R.Harstad,On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions,European Journal of Operations Research 74(1994) 572-581.
[166]R.Bapna,A.A.G.P.Goes,Analysis and design of business-to consumer online auctions,Management Science 49(1)(2003) 85-101.
[167]R.Bapna,P.Goes,A.Gupta,A.Karuga,Optimal design on the online auction channel:analytical,empirical and computational insights,Decision Science 33(4)(2002) 557-577.
[168]Ockenfels,and Roth.Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Prices Auctions:Evidence from eBay and amazon auctions on the Internet[A].American Economic Review,2002,92:1093-1103.
[169]Bajari,P and Hortacsu.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions[A].Rand Journal of Economics,2003,3(2):329-355.
[170]Che.Design Competition through multidimensional auctions[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4):628-680.
[171]Branco F.The design of multidimensional auctions[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1997,28(1):63-81.
[172]Minkarch.Optimum markup for bidding:a preference-uncertainty trade off approach[J].Civ.Engrg.sys.1987,4:170-174.
[173]Mishra D,Veeraman D.A multi-attribute reverse auction for outsourcing[A].Proceedings of the 13~(th) International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications,2002:675-679.
[174]Dekrajanpetch.Interior-point linear programming algorithm for auction methods[A].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,2000,15(2):78-82.
[175]Vulkan,Jenings.Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments[J].Decision Support Systems,2000,28:5-19.
[176]谢安石,李一军等.拍卖理论的最新进展--多属性网上拍卖研究[J].管理工程学报,2006,3:17-22.
[177]胡春,鲁耀斌.采购拍卖的分阶段报价模型及其遗传算法[J].工业工程与管理,2005,2:76-80.
[178]W.L.Wang.Shill Bidding in Multi-round Online Auction[A].Proceeding of the 35~(th) Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.2002:1211-1234.
[179]Richer,Sheble.Genetic algorithm evolution of utility bidding strategies for the competitive marketplace[A].IEEE Transaction on Power Systems,1998,13(1):256-261.
[180]R.Bapna.When snipers become predators:Can mechanism design save online auctions?[J]Communications of the ACM.2003:9-45.
[181]岳超源.决策理论与方法,科学出版社2003:173-175.
[182]刘树林.多属性决策理论、方法与应用研究.北京航空航天大学博士论文,1997:23-78.
[183]S.Y.Chen.Theory and Application of Fuzzy System Decision Making.DLUT Press.Dalian China,1994:5 6-113.
[184]Zhang,O.,Chen,J.C.H.,He,Y.Q..Multiple attribute decision making:Approach integrating subjective and objective information.International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management,2003,5(4):338-361
[185]Xu,Z.S.,Da,Q.L..An overview of operators for aggregating information.International Journal of Intelligent Systems,2003,18(8):953-969
[186]Lau,H.C.W.,Wan Kai Pang,and Christina W.Y.Wong.Methodology for monitoring supply chain performance:a fuzzy logic approach.Logistics Information Management,2002,15(4):271-280.
[187]Paul A.Pavlou.Institution-based trust in interorganizational exchange relationships:the role of online B2B marketplaces on trust formation.Journal of Strategic Information Systems,2002,11:215-243.
[188]Herrera,F.,Herrera-Viedma,E.,Martinez,L..A fusion approach for managing multi-granularity linguistic term sets in decision making.Fuzzy Sets and Systems,2000,114(1):43-58.
[189]Herrera,F.,Herrera-Viedma,E.,Martinez,L..A sequential selection process in group decision making with a linguistic assessment approach.Informaiton Sciences 85(4):223-239.
[190]Filev,D.,Yager,R.R..Analytic properties of maximum entropy OWA operators.Information Sciences,1995,85(1-3):11-27
[191]吴宝峰.物流服务能力的系统化认知与战略性获取[D].同济大学博士学位论文,2006,5:82-84
[192]迟国泰,迟枫,罗忠彦,杨德礼.网上拍卖竞拍方个人信用风险管理理论与评价模型[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,8,15(4):374-375.
[193]田宇.第三方物流服务分包管理中的质量博弈行为研究[J].管理科学,2006,4:3-5.
[194]Alfredsson.M.How TPL Providers Create Effectiveness and Efficiency by Coordination of Customers Activities and Strategies[R].SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration,2001,10.
[2]戴定一.我国物流信息化的现状和发展.信息与电脑.2003,1:30-33.
[3]施先亮,建设物流信息平台促进现代物流发展,中国物流与采购,2002.7:25-29
[4]董敬欣.公用物流平台设计研究fD].西南交通大学硕士学位论文,2002,3:5.
[5]徐燕.区域物流系统的信息平台研究[D].武汉理工大学硕士学位论文,2002,5:26.
[6]董千里,袁毅.区域综合物流信息平台的功能与构建研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2002,02:74-78.
[7]G.Riley,W.F.Samuelson.Optimal Auctions.American Economic Review.1981a,71(3):381-392.
[8]W.Vickrey.Counter speculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders,The Journal of Finance.1961,30:9-37.
[9]Bichler M.An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auction[J].Decision Support System,2002,9:249-268.
[10]张锦.城市现代物流公共信息平台规划设计的理论和关键技术研究同济大学博士后研究工作报告[D].2005:3.
[11]Ganesh D.Bhatt.etc.An empirically derived model of the role of IS networks in:business process improvement initiatives.Omega 29(2001) 29-48.
[12]K.Kumar,H.G.Dissel,Sustainable collaboration:managing conflict and cooperation in interorganizational systems,MIS Quarterly(1996).
[13]T.W.Malone,J.Yates,R.I.Benjamin,Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies:effects of information technology and market structure and corporate strategies,Communications of the ACM(1987) 484-497.
[14]WilM.P.vander Aalst.Process-oriented architectures for electronic commerce and interorganizational workflow.Information systems vol.24,No.8,p:639-671.
[15]秦俊峰.物流园区信息化与公共物流平台建设[J],中国储运,2003,5:47.
[16]汪贻生等.虚拟物流信息平台结构分析与设计[J].商品储运与养护,2004,6:7.
[17]刘兴景,戴禾,杨东援.物流信息平台发展规划框架分析[J].管理现代化,2001,1:2-4.
[18]诸葛良等.物流园区电子信息平台的建设[J],中国信息导报,2002,9:52.
[19]朱鲤,李锦标,杨东援.区域物流公共信息平台的构建[J],中国储运,2005,4:42-43.
[20]赵振峰、崔南方、陈荣秋.区域公共物流信息平台的功能定位及运行机制研究[J].物流技术,2004,4:63-65
[21]谈冉,薛胜军.智能管理物流信息平台的研究[J].武汉理工大学学报,2005,4:139-141.
[22]刘兴景,戴禾,杨东援.物流共用信息平台系统分析[J].交通与计算机,2001,1:2-3.
[23]董雷,何世伟.区域物流信息平台的构建研究[J].物流科技,2005,28:71.
[24]王正文,物流信息平台建设[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2002,10(4):1-3.
[25]陈韬,苏小军.区域物流信息平台规划[J].管理现代化,2002,10.2-3.
[26]董千里.区域物流信息平台与资源整合[J].交通运输工程学报。2002,2(4):59-61.
[27]Kearney,A.T.Building the B2B Foundation - Positioning the Net Market Makers for Success(M).A.T.Kearney Inc,Chicago,IL,2000.
[28]L.G.Tornatzky,K.J.Klein.Innovation characteristics and innovation adoption implementation:a meta analysis of findings,IEEE transactions on engineering management 29(11),1982,pp.28-45.
[29]K.W.Rogers,Linking the economic bulletin board to the Internet:a case study,Internet Research 3(4),1993,pp.39-50.
[30]Kevin K.Y.Kuan,Patrick Y.K.Chau.A Perception-based model for EDI adoption in small business using a technology-organization-environment framework.Information &Management 38(2001) 507-521.
[31]C.W.Crook,R.L.Kumar,Electronic data interchange:a multi-industry investigation using grounded theory,Information & Management 34,1998,pp.75-89.
[32]Sangjae Lee,Gyoo Gun Lim.The impact of partnership attributes on EDI implementation success.Information & Management 41(2003) 135-148 28.V.Arunachalam,EDI:an analysis of adoption,uses,benefits and barriers,Journal of Systems Management,March/April(1995) 60-64.
[33]S.Banerjee,D.Y.Golhar,Electronic data interchange:characteristics of users and nonusers,Information & Management 26,1994,pp.65-74.
[34]M.Bensaou,Interorganizational cooperation:the role of information technology-an empirical comparison of US and Japanese supplier relations,Information Systems Research 8(2),1997,pp.107-124.
[35]F.Bergeron,L.Raymond,Managing EDI for corporate advantage:a longitudinal study,Information & Management 31,1997,pp.319-333.
[36]J.C.Brancheau,B.D.Janz,J.C.Wetherbe,Key issues in information systems management:1994-1995 SIM Delphi results,MIS Quarterly 20(2),1996,pp.225-242.
[37]C.W.Crook,R.L.Kumar,Electronic data interchange:a multi-industry investigation using grounded theory,Information & Management 34,1998,pp.75-89.
[38]P.J.Hart,C.S.Saunders,Emerging electronic partnerships:antecedents and dimensions of EDI use from the supplier's perspective,Journal of Management Information Systems 14(4),1998,pp.87-111.
[39]J.V.Hansen,N.C.Hill,Control and audit of electronic data interchange,MIS Quarterly 13(4),1989,pp.403-413.
[40]T.H.Kwon,R.W.Zmud,Unifying the fragmented models of information systems implementation,in:R.J.Boland,R.A.Hirschheim(Eds.),Critical Issues in Information Systems Research,Wiley,New York,1987.
[41]Gaski JF,Nevin JR.The differential effects of exercised and unexercised power sources in a marketing channel.J Mark Res 1985;22:130-42.
[42]Jaworski JB.Toward a theory of marketing control:environmental context,control types,and consequences.J Mark 1988;52:23-39(July).
[43]Premkumar G,King RK.Organizational characteristics and information systems planning:an empirical study.Inf Syst Res 1994;5(2):75-108.
[44] Benita Cox,Sherine Ghoneim. Strategic use of EDI in the public sector:the HMSO case study.Journal of Strategic information systems 7(1998) 37-51.
[45] Virpi Kristiina Tuunainen. Opportunities of effective integration of EDI for small businesses in the automotive industry. Information & Management 34 (1998) 361-375.
[46] Rebecca Angeles , Ravinder Nath. An empirical study of EDI trading partner selection criteria in customer-supplier relationships. Information & Management 37 (2000) 241-255.
[47] Martjin R.Hoogeweegen.etc. A comprehensive approach to assess the value of EDI. Information & Management 34 (1998) 117-127.
[48] R. P. McAfee, J. M. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature. 1987,7:699-738
[49] 马俊．拍卖模型及其应用研究(M)．中国财政经济出版社．2004,12：6．
[50] Friedman D. The Double Auction Market Institution: A Survey, The Double Auction Market: Institution, Theories, and Evidence [M]. Edited by Daniel Friedman and John Rust, Newyork, Addison-Wesley, 1993:3-25.
[51] Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman and William E. Walsh. A Parameterization of the Auction Design Space [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 35, Issues 1-2, April 2001, Pages 304-338
[52] Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode and Shyam Sunder. Double auction dynamics: structural effects of non-binding price controls[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 28, Issue 9, July 2004, Pages 1707-1731.
[53] Bichler, M., Kalagnanam, J., Katircioglu, K., King, A., Lawrence, D., Lee, H. S., Lin, G., Lu, Y. Applications of Flexible Pricing in Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce [J]. IBM Systems Journal, 2002, 42(2):287-302.
[54] Friedman, D. On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets American Economic Review.1956, 74(1):60-72.
[55] G.Riley, W. F. Samuelson. Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review. 1981b, 71(3):381-392.
[56] R. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operation Research. 1981a, (6):58-73.
[57] P. Milgrom, R. J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competive bidding. Ecoometrica. 1982,(50): 108-112.
[58] Maskin, Riley. Going, Going, Gone Information Week. 1994a: 45—50.
[59] R. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operation Research. 1981b, (6):58-73.
[60] Maskin, Riley. Going, Going, Gone Information Week. 1994b: 45—50.
[61] Lroger Myerson. The Emerging Role of Electronic Marketplaces on the Internet. Communications of the ACM. 1981, 41:35-42.
[62] John Riley, Willian Samuelson. An Experimental Analysis of Multi-Attribute Auctions. Decision Support Systems.1981,29:249-268.
[63] Milgrom, Robert Weber. Multi-Attribute Auctions for Electronic Procurement. In Proceedings of the First IBM LAC Workshop on Internet Based Negotiation Technologies.l982:123-150.
[64] Myerson. Uses and Consequences of Electronic Markets: An Empirical Investigation in the Aircraft Parts Industry. MIS Quarterly. 1981, 12:471-507.
[65]Coppinger,Smith.Incentive sand Behavior in English,Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions.Economic Inquiry.1982,18:1-22.
[66]Harrison,Artur Raviv.Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auction.Econometrical.1981,49:1477-1499.
[67]James C.Cox,Vernon L.Smith and James M.Walker.Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions[J].Economics Letters,1983,12(3-4):207-212.
[68]James C.Cox,Vernon L.Smith and James M.Walker.A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism[J].Journal of Economic Behavior &Organization,Volume 4,Issues 2-3,June-September 1983,Pages 205-219.
[69]Kagel,John H.and Dan Levin.the Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions,American Economic Review,1986,76:894-920.
[70]Hansen,Robert G.,and John R.Lott.the Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common 911 Value Auctions:Comment,American Economic Review,1991,81:347-361.
[71]Lind,Barry and Charles R.Plott.the Winner's Curse:Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers,American Economic Review,1991,81:335-346.
[72]James C.Cox,Vernon L.Smith and James M.Walker.A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism[J].Journal of Economic Behavior &Organization,Volume 4,Issues 2-3,June-September 1983,Pages 205-219.
[73]谢安石,李一军.拍卖理论的研究内容、方法与展望(J).2004b,7:46.
[74]Lucking-Reiley D.Auction on Internet:what's being auctioned,and how? Journal of Industrial Economics,2000,48:227-252.
[75]Beam,C.M.Auctioning and Bidding in Electronic Commerce:the Online Auction[D].Ph.D.Dissertation,University of California,Berkeley 1999.
[76]Jungpil Hahn.Elements of Online Auction Design.Working Paper,Information and Design Sciences,University of Minnesota,2000.
[77]Katkar,E.and Lucking-Reiley,D.Public Versus secret Reserve Price in eBay Auctions:Result from a Pokemon Field Experiment.University of Arizona Working paper,2000.
[78]Bajari,P.and Hortacsu,A.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions.Rand Journal of Economics,2003,1.3,2:329-355
[79]杜黎,胡奇英.网上分批拍卖中的保留价比较分析(J).系统科学与数学,2002,22(3):343-354.
[80]Melnik M.I and James Alm,Does a seller's e-commerce reputation matter? Evidence from eBay auctions.The Journal of Industrial Economics,2002,L:337--349.
[81]Zoltán Hidvégi,Wenli Wang and Andrew B.Whinston.Buy-price English auction[J].Journal of Economic Theory,Volume 129,Issue 1,July 2006,Pages 31-56.
[82]Indranil Chakraborty,Georgia Kosmopoulou.Auctions with endogenous entry.Economics Letters,Volume 72,Issue 2,August 2001,Pages 195-200.
[83]Alvin C.R and Ockenfels A.Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions:evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet.American Economic Review.2002,92:1093-1103.
[84]谢安石.面向电子商务的多属性网上拍卖理论研究(D).哈尔滨工业大学博士学位论文,2005:15.
[85]Monderer,Dov and Tennenholtz,Moshe.Optimal Auctions Revisited.Artificial Intelligence,2000,120:29-42.
[86]Vulkan.N.,Jennings,N.R.Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments.Decision support systems,2000a,28,5-19.
[87]J.Sairamesh,R.Mohan.A Platform for Business-To-Business Sell-Side,Private Exchanges and Marketplaces.IBM Systems Journal.2002,41(2):242-252.
[88]Koppius,O.R..Electronic multidimensional auctions:trading mechanism and applications.Paper represented at the Edispuut workshop '98:E-Commerce crossing Boundaries,Rotterdam,Netherlands.1998.
[89]J.Teich,H.Wallenius and J.Wallenius.A Multiple Unit Auction Algorithms:Some Theory and A Web Implementation In Electronic Markets International Journal of Electronic Commerce and Business Media,1999,(9):1-7.
[90]谢安石,李一军.基于模糊粗糙集的多属性网上拍卖决策(J).系统工程理论方法应用,2005.2:182-184.
[91]胡斌,刘仲英.基于智能代理的多维拍卖模型设计(J),计算机工程与应用,2005,1:8-10.
[92]Wurman,P.R.,Wellman M.P.,Walsh W.E.A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space.Games and Economic Behavior,2001,35:304-338.
[93]Vulkan.N.,Jennings,N.R.Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments.Decision support systems,2000b,28,5-19.
[94]Vidye Narayanan,Nicholas R.Jennings.An Adaptive Bilateral Negotiation Model for E-Commerce Setting.Proceeding of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05)
[95]谭煌,高春明.网上电子交易中的谈判协商模型.计算技术与自动化,2004,23(1):53
[96]Xudong Luo,Nicholas R.Jennings,Nigel Shadbolt,Ho-fung Leung,Jimmy Ho-man Lee.A fuzzy constraint based model for bilateral multi-issue negotiations in semi-competitive environments.Artificial Intelligence,2003,148:53-102
[97]Lee.H.G..Electronic Brokerage and Electronic Auction:the impact of IT on market structure.Proceedings of the 29th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,Maui,HI,1996,4,397-406.
[98]Branco,F..The design of multidimensional auctions,Rand journal of Economics,1997,28(1),63-81.
[99]Rema Ananthanarayanan,Manoj Kumar.Negotiation Support in Online Markets,with competition and co-operation.Proceeding of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05)
[100]Florian Lang,Constantin Brunn.Pareto-Efficiency without Giving-In:A Two-Phased Protocol for Multiple-Attribute Negotiations.Proceeding of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05)
[101]Blecherman B.Participation constraints on the adoption of fully automated negotiations.1998 Best Papers,Proceedings of the Fifty-eighth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management,1998.
[102]M.Bichler.Bidding Languages and Winner Determination in Multi-attributes Auctions.IBM Research Report RC 22478.1998:17-25.
[103]Dominik Deschner,.Oliver Hofman,Freimut Bodendorf,Agent-based coordination support for business processes,INFOR.Ottawa:Aug 2000,38(3):283-293.
[104]Y.K.Che.Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions.Rand Journal of Economics.1993,24(4):668-680.
[105]Bichler,M.An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions.Decision support systems,2000,29,249-268.
[106]柯伦柏著,钟鸿钧译.拍卖:理论与实践(M).中国人民大学出版社,2006,3:82.
[107]查先进.物流与供应链管理[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2003
[108]listairC ockhurn著,俞涓译.敏捷软件开发[M].北京:人民邮电出版社,2003.
[109]K.W.Rogers,Linking the economic bulletin board to the Internet:a case study,Internet Research 3(4),1993,pp.39-50.
[110]R.Reagle,The platform for privacy preferences,Communications of the ACM 42(2),1999,pp.48-51.
[111]Bailey,J.P.,Bakos,J.Y..An exploratory study of the emerging role of electronic intermediaries.International Journal of Electronic Commerce,1997,1(3):7-20.
[112]Bailey,Joseph.Intermediation and Electronic Markets:Aggregation and Pricing in Internet Commerce(D).Ph.D.Thesis,MIT,1998.
[113]Brynjolfsson and Michael Smith.Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers[J].Management Science,2000,46(4):563-585.
[114]Clemons,Eric,Il-Horn Hann,and Lorin Hitt.The Nature of Competition in Electronic Markets:An Empirical Investigation of Online Travel Agent Offerings[R].Working Paper,The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,1998,6.
[115]J.M.Snyder.Online Auction Fraud:Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud[J]? Federal Communications Law Journal.2000,52(2):453-472.
[116]C.Dellarocas.Efficiency and Robustness of eBay-like Online Feedback Mechanisms in Environments with Moral Hazard[R].Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge,MA,Working Paper,2003:56-89.
[117]R.Bapna,P.Goes.Insights and Analysis of Online Auctions[J].Communications of the ACM.2001,44(11):42-50.
[118]R.V.Tulder,M.Mol.Reverse Auctions or Auctions Reversed:First Experiments by Philips[J].European Management Journal.2002,20(5):447-458.
[119]D.M.Dias,S.L.Palmer.Ecommerce Interoperability with IBM's Web Sphere Commerce Products[J].IBM Systems Journal.2002,4 1(2):27-34.
[120]P.Bajari,A.Hortacsu.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions[J].The Rand Journal of Economics.2003,34(2):32 9-355.
[121]J.Abrache,T.G.Crainic,M.Gendreau.Design issues for combinatorial auctions[A].Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research.Dallas,2002:55-67.
[122]C.Beam.Auctions and bidding in electronic commerce:The online auction[D].Technical report,Ph D Dissertation,University of California Berkeley,USA,1999.
[123]Ravi Bapna,Paulo Goes,Alok Gupta.A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions.Information Technology and Management,2000,(1):1-23.
[124]Ockenfels, and Roth. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Prices Auctions: Evidence from eBay and amazon auctions on the Internet [A]. American Economic Review, 2002, 92:1093-1103.
[125]Bajari, P and Hortacsu. The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions [A]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 3 (2): 329-355.
[126] Robert E Easley, Rafael Tenorio. Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions. Management Science, 2004,10, 50 (10): 1407-1419
[127]Metha K, Lee B.T. An Empirical Evidence of Winner's Curse in Electronic Auction [R]. Proceedings of the 20～(th) International Conference on Information Systems, Charlotte, NC, 1999.
[128] Vickrey.W. Count erspeculation, Auctions and Competitive sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance, 1961, (16): 8-37.
[129]Lucking-Reiley. Using Field Experiment to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet [D]. American Economic Review, 1999, (89): 1063-1080.
[130]Katkar, E and Lucking-Reiley. Public Versus Secret Reserve Price in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokemon Field Experiment [R], University of Arizona Working Paper . 2000.
[131] Milgrom,P and R weber. Theory of Auction and Competitive Bidding [A], Econometrica, 1982, (50): 1089-1122.
[132]Myerson, R . Optimal Auction design. Mathematics of Operation Research, 1981, (6): 58-73.
[133] Vincent, D. Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May be Kept Screct[J], Journal of Economic Theory, 1995,(65): 75-84.
[134] Pinker E J, Seidmann A, Vakrat Y. Managing online auctions: current business and research issues [J]. Management Science,2003, 49 (11) :1457 ～1484.
[135]Ockenfels, and Roth. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Prices Auctions: Evidence from eBay and amazon auctions on the Internet [A]. American Economic Review, 2002, 92: 1093-1103.
[136] Vakrat Y,Seidmann A. Implications ofthe Bidders'Process on the Design of Online Auctions [A]. In:Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, R. Sprague, Maui, HI,IEEE Computer Society Press [C]. Los Alamitos,CA, 2000.
[137]Harstad R. M. Rothkopf M. H. On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions [J]. Europian Journal of Operations Research, 1994: 572-581.
[138] C. Beam. Auctions and bidding in electronic commerce: The online auction [D]. Technical report, Ph D Dissertation, University of California Berkeley, USA, 1999: 23.
[139] Fudenberg Drew, Jean Tirole, Game Theory [M], Boston, MIT Press, 1991.
[140] Rothkopf M H, Pekec A ,Harstad R M. Computationally, manageable combinatorial auctions [J]. Management Science, 1995, 44 (8):1131-1147.
[141] Chun J S, Kim M K. Shape optimization of electromagnetic devices using immune algorithm [J]. IEEE Trans on Magnetics, 1997, 33 (2):1876-1879.
[142] F. Branco, The design of multidimensional auctions, Rand Journal of Economics 28 (1) (1997) 63-81.
[143] S.S. Fatima, M.J. Wooldrige, N.R. Jennings, The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium, Proc. 4th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, 2002, pp. 180-193.
[144]P.S.A. Reitsma, P. Stone, J.A Csirik, M.L. Littman, Self enforcing strategic demand reduction, Proc. 4th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Bologna, Italy, 2002.
[145] J.G. Riley, W.F. Samuelson, Optimal auctions, American Economic Review 71 (1981) 381- 392.
[146] P. Stone, R.E. Schapire, J.A. Csirik, L. Littman, D. McAllester, ATTac-2001: a learning autonomous bidding agent, Agent mediated electronic commerce: IV. Designing mechanisms and systems of lecture notes in artificial intelligence, 2531, 2002, pp. 143-160.
[147] C. Chen-Ritzo, T. Harrison, M. KWasnica, D. Thomas, Better, faster, cheaper: a multi-attribute supply chain auction mechanism, in: Penn State University ISBM report 10-2003, 2003.
[148] J. E. Teich, H. Wallenius, J. Wallenius, O. R. Koppius, Emerging multiple issue e-auctions (invited review), European Journal of Operational Research 159 (1) 1-16.
[149] P. Milgrom, An economist's vision of the b-tob marketplace, An Executive White Paper October 2000.
[150] Y.K. Che, Design competition through multidimensional auctions, RAND Journal of Economics 24 (1993) 668-680.
[151] D.C. Parkes, J. Kalagnanam, Iterative multi-attribute vickrey auctions, Management Science, 2004, (http://www.eecs. harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/map.pdf).
[152] M. Bichler, J. Kalagnanam, Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions, European Journal of Operational Research 160 (2) (2005) 380- 394.
[153] S. Strecker, S. Seifert, Electronic sourcing with multi-attribute auctions, Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Science, 2004.
[154] G.J. Collins, G. Demir, M. Gini, Bidtree ordering in ida*combinatorial auction winner determination with side constraints, Proc. of the 4th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, 2002.
[155] B. Hudson, T. Sandholm, Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of AMEC-IV LNCS, vol. 2531,2002, pp. 180- 193.
[156] F. Kelly, R. Steinberg, A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service, Management Science 46 (4) (2000) 586- 596.
[157] N. Nisan, Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions, Proc. of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Minneapolis, MN, 2000, pp. 1-12.
[158] T. Sandholm, S. Suri, Improved algorithms for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations, Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 2003, pp. 90-97.
[159]A.V. Sunderam, D.C. Parkes, Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions, Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), 2003.
[160] G. Vignaux, Multi-attribute decision problems, Technical Report (2004) Victorya University of Wellington New Zealand.
[161]K.Yoon,C.Hwang,Multiple Attribute Decision-Making:An Introduction,Sage,Thousand Oaks,1995.
[162]P.Cramton,Ascending auctions,European Economic Review 42,(3-5),(1988),745-756.
[163]E.David,R.Azoulay-Schwartz,S.Kraus,Protocols and strategies for automated multi-attributes auctions,Proc.of the 1st Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,Bologna,Italy,2002,pp.77-85.
[164]P.Milgrom,R.Weber,A theory of auction and competitive bidding,Econometria 50(1982)1089-1122.
[165]M.H.Rothkopf,R.Harstad,On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions,European Journal of Operations Research 74(1994) 572-581.
[166]R.Bapna,A.A.G.P.Goes,Analysis and design of business-to consumer online auctions,Management Science 49(1)(2003) 85-101.
[167]R.Bapna,P.Goes,A.Gupta,A.Karuga,Optimal design on the online auction channel:analytical,empirical and computational insights,Decision Science 33(4)(2002) 557-577.
[168]Ockenfels,and Roth.Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Prices Auctions:Evidence from eBay and amazon auctions on the Internet[A].American Economic Review,2002,92:1093-1103.
[169]Bajari,P and Hortacsu.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions[A].Rand Journal of Economics,2003,3(2):329-355.
[170]Che.Design Competition through multidimensional auctions[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4):628-680.
[171]Branco F.The design of multidimensional auctions[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1997,28(1):63-81.
[172]Minkarch.Optimum markup for bidding:a preference-uncertainty trade off approach[J].Civ.Engrg.sys.1987,4:170-174.
[173]Mishra D,Veeraman D.A multi-attribute reverse auction for outsourcing[A].Proceedings of the 13~(th) International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications,2002:675-679.
[174]Dekrajanpetch.Interior-point linear programming algorithm for auction methods[A].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,2000,15(2):78-82.
[175]Vulkan,Jenings.Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments[J].Decision Support Systems,2000,28:5-19.
[176]谢安石,李一军等.拍卖理论的最新进展--多属性网上拍卖研究[J].管理工程学报,2006,3:17-22.
[177]胡春,鲁耀斌.采购拍卖的分阶段报价模型及其遗传算法[J].工业工程与管理,2005,2:76-80.
[178]W.L.Wang.Shill Bidding in Multi-round Online Auction[A].Proceeding of the 35~(th) Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.2002:1211-1234.
[179]Richer,Sheble.Genetic algorithm evolution of utility bidding strategies for the competitive marketplace[A].IEEE Transaction on Power Systems,1998,13(1):256-261.
[180]R.Bapna.When snipers become predators:Can mechanism design save online auctions?[J]Communications of the ACM.2003:9-45.
[181]岳超源.决策理论与方法,科学出版社2003:173-175.
[182]刘树林.多属性决策理论、方法与应用研究.北京航空航天大学博士论文,1997:23-78.
[183]S.Y.Chen.Theory and Application of Fuzzy System Decision Making.DLUT Press.Dalian China,1994:5 6-113.
[184]Zhang,O.,Chen,J.C.H.,He,Y.Q..Multiple attribute decision making:Approach integrating subjective and objective information.International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management,2003,5(4):338-361
[185]Xu,Z.S.,Da,Q.L..An overview of operators for aggregating information.International Journal of Intelligent Systems,2003,18(8):953-969
[186]Lau,H.C.W.,Wan Kai Pang,and Christina W.Y.Wong.Methodology for monitoring supply chain performance:a fuzzy logic approach.Logistics Information Management,2002,15(4):271-280.
[187]Paul A.Pavlou.Institution-based trust in interorganizational exchange relationships:the role of online B2B marketplaces on trust formation.Journal of Strategic Information Systems,2002,11:215-243.
[188]Herrera,F.,Herrera-Viedma,E.,Martinez,L..A fusion approach for managing multi-granularity linguistic term sets in decision making.Fuzzy Sets and Systems,2000,114(1):43-58.
[189]Herrera,F.,Herrera-Viedma,E.,Martinez,L..A sequential selection process in group decision making with a linguistic assessment approach.Informaiton Sciences 85(4):223-239.
[190]Filev,D.,Yager,R.R..Analytic properties of maximum entropy OWA operators.Information Sciences,1995,85(1-3):11-27
[191]吴宝峰.物流服务能力的系统化认知与战略性获取[D].同济大学博士学位论文,2006,5:82-84
[192]迟国泰,迟枫,罗忠彦,杨德礼.网上拍卖竞拍方个人信用风险管理理论与评价模型[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,8,15(4):374-375.
[193]田宇.第三方物流服务分包管理中的质量博弈行为研究[J].管理科学,2006,4:3-5.
[194]Alfredsson.M.How TPL Providers Create Effectiveness and Efficiency by Coordination of Customers Activities and Strategies[R].SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration,2001,10.