流域梯级水电站联盟策略的博弈研究
|
摘要
近年来，我国加快了流域水电能源开发的进程，随着电力市场化改革逐步深入，流域梯级电站参与电力市场是必然的趋势，因此流域开发公司需要根据市场规则，制定市场环境下流域梯级水电站的最优竞价策略，这也是优化流域水资源能源结构、实现流域可持续发展的需要。流域梯级水电站具有特殊的技术、经济特性，在参与市场竞争的同时还需要统筹协调水资源以实现社会效益，在市场竞争环境下如何保证水电资源的最优配置成为近期研究的热点之一。本文运用联盟博弈理论与方法，结合我国电力市场规则，在借鉴国内外梯级水电站参与上网侧电力市场竞争经验的基础上，研究了流域梯级水电站的联盟策略、联盟形式与结盟条件等问题，为梯级电站联盟上网竞争提供理论依据，同时为以“同网同质同价”为目标的电价机制改革提供参考。
流域梯级电站如果隶属于同一投资主体，则具备天然的联盟条件，在竞价时必然充分考虑电站间水力联系，以实现梯级总收益的最大化；而不同投资主体下的水电站，由于电站间的水资源联系和提高自身市场竞争力的需要，在一定条件下也具备联盟的可能性。本文为了探讨流域梯级水电站联盟的存在条件和内部形成动因，做了以下工作：
首先建立了静态的博弈模型，该模型是在详细分析了电力市场技术经济特点和交易规则的基础上，结合水电站自身特征和梯级电站之间的水力联系现实依据建立的。模型对水电成本函数、需求函数及物理约束等进行了量化，并给出了合理的假设条件，模型通过增广拉格朗日法求解，比较在单次竞价中，流域“一站一价”和“统一电价”两种结算方式对电站收益的影响，分析了电站联盟存在的外部条件。
其次，在联盟的形成动因方面，论文做了理论上的探究。着重讨论联盟博弈的解概念，包括稳定集、核心和Shapley值等，这些静态的解概念不能有效解决梯级电站联盟的动态性问题。为此，论文对基于远见性的联盟博弈理论做了探讨，在最大一致集概念的基础上，针对梯级电站联盟策略的历史依赖性，以完全无覆盖路径作为描述梯级电站联盟形成过程的方法和判定稳定性的理论依据。
再次，在静态模型和理论研究的基础上，论文建立了完全信息条件下的动态联盟博弈模型，以分析流域梯级电站在多次竞价中，处于不同市场环境下的联盟形成过程。模型假设梯级电站三种潜在的联盟形式，联盟作为整体参与市场竞价，上报相同电价和联盟总发电量，中标后联盟内部充分考虑上下游电站水力联系协调发电，实现联盟总利润的最大化。在算例研究中，利用粒子群算法求解，分析了不同弹性需求条件下，流域梯级电站联盟形式的变化路径和最终稳定状态。
最后，为了使模型更加符合电力市场实际，论文进行了不完全信息下的梯级电站联盟博弈分析。应用预测对手报价的方法解决参与者的不完全信息问题。为提高预测准确度，对灰色预测模型GM(1,1)做出修正，并用NORD-POOL电力市场的实际数据验证了预测模型的可行性，进而能够将其应用到博弈模型中。通过算例得出，在不完全信息下，电站的利润发生变化，由此决定电站对联盟形式的偏好顺序相应变化，这将会影响梯级电站联盟的稳定性。
In recent years, China is gradually accelerating the development process of hydropower.Along with the reform of the power market, it is becoming inevitable for cascadedhydropower stations to participant in electricity market. Thus the basin developmentcompanies need to optimalize their bidding strategies in competitive electricity market accordingto market rules, which is of great practial significance for upgrading the water resourceenergy construction and realizing sustainable development of river basins. Cascadedhydropower stations have special technical and economic characteristics. They have to becoordinate as a whole to schedule water resource while competing with each other. How tooptimize the water and power resources by bidding in market has always been the forefrontand hotspot of academic research. This thesis focuses on cascaded hydropower station’salliance strategy, coalition formation and stability referring to successful cases of foreignpower market with participation of hydropower and combining the national conditions ofChina. The conclusion provides a theory reference for cascaded hydropower stations’bidding strategy and can be considered as a police suggest on pricing reforming which aimsto equal price for the same electricity quality on the same power network.
Hydropower stations which are belonged to the same investment entity tend tocoordinate naturally. They would rather bid cooperatively than individually on the target ofmaximize the profit of the coalition considering adequately water and power resourcerelations among stations. The coalition could exist as hydropower stations need unifiedmanagement even if hydropower stations belong to different investment entities. To explorethe outer condition and inner motivation of hydropower stations forming coalition, astatic game model is proposed firstly basing on the technological and economic charactersof electricity market place considering intricate relationships among hydropower stations.The model quantifies constraint of cost and demand functions. An extended Lagrangemultiplier method is adopted to resolve the model. The impacts of two clearing form,different and unified pricing, on profit of stations are compared by the simulation exampleas the outer condition of coalitions.
Secondly, theory on the motivation of coalition forming is studied. The resolve conceptsincluding stable set, core and Shapley value are discussed mainly to analyze the stabilityand dynamics of coalitions. But those resolve concepts are all static and lack the effect onthe dynamics of coalitions. Coalitional game theory based on farsightedness is researchedon the base of the largest consistent set. The ultimated uncovered path is considered as thejudgment of coalition’s stability as cascaded hydropower stations’ alliance strategy relyingon history path.
On the next section, the dynamic coalitional game model is proposed on the achievementof above static model and theory to analyze the coalition forming process in differentmarket places during repeatedly bidding. Three potential coalition contractures areconsidered. Once coalition forms, the stations bid as a whole, declaring unified price andtotal generate quality. The generate quality is dispatched cardinally in coalition to maximizethe coalition’s profit considering the relationship among stations. This model is solved bygenetic algorithm to provide the moving of cascaded hydropower stations coalition andultimate state.
Finally, the dynamic model is updated by the method of forecasting opponent’s biddingprice, relaxing the assumption of complete information to be more practical. The classicalgray predict model GM(1,1) is improved to gain a more accuracy result. The predict modelis proved feasible on the test of NORD-POOL power market actual data and embeddedsuccessfully in the game model. The simulation result shows the varying of profit ofstations, which changes the reference of coalition structure in a incomplete informationsystem. So the cascaded hydropower station coalition stability is challenged.
流域梯级电站如果隶属于同一投资主体，则具备天然的联盟条件，在竞价时必然充分考虑电站间水力联系，以实现梯级总收益的最大化；而不同投资主体下的水电站，由于电站间的水资源联系和提高自身市场竞争力的需要，在一定条件下也具备联盟的可能性。本文为了探讨流域梯级水电站联盟的存在条件和内部形成动因，做了以下工作：
首先建立了静态的博弈模型，该模型是在详细分析了电力市场技术经济特点和交易规则的基础上，结合水电站自身特征和梯级电站之间的水力联系现实依据建立的。模型对水电成本函数、需求函数及物理约束等进行了量化，并给出了合理的假设条件，模型通过增广拉格朗日法求解，比较在单次竞价中，流域“一站一价”和“统一电价”两种结算方式对电站收益的影响，分析了电站联盟存在的外部条件。
其次，在联盟的形成动因方面，论文做了理论上的探究。着重讨论联盟博弈的解概念，包括稳定集、核心和Shapley值等，这些静态的解概念不能有效解决梯级电站联盟的动态性问题。为此，论文对基于远见性的联盟博弈理论做了探讨，在最大一致集概念的基础上，针对梯级电站联盟策略的历史依赖性，以完全无覆盖路径作为描述梯级电站联盟形成过程的方法和判定稳定性的理论依据。
再次，在静态模型和理论研究的基础上，论文建立了完全信息条件下的动态联盟博弈模型，以分析流域梯级电站在多次竞价中，处于不同市场环境下的联盟形成过程。模型假设梯级电站三种潜在的联盟形式，联盟作为整体参与市场竞价，上报相同电价和联盟总发电量，中标后联盟内部充分考虑上下游电站水力联系协调发电，实现联盟总利润的最大化。在算例研究中，利用粒子群算法求解，分析了不同弹性需求条件下，流域梯级电站联盟形式的变化路径和最终稳定状态。
最后，为了使模型更加符合电力市场实际，论文进行了不完全信息下的梯级电站联盟博弈分析。应用预测对手报价的方法解决参与者的不完全信息问题。为提高预测准确度，对灰色预测模型GM(1,1)做出修正，并用NORD-POOL电力市场的实际数据验证了预测模型的可行性，进而能够将其应用到博弈模型中。通过算例得出，在不完全信息下，电站的利润发生变化，由此决定电站对联盟形式的偏好顺序相应变化，这将会影响梯级电站联盟的稳定性。
In recent years, China is gradually accelerating the development process of hydropower.Along with the reform of the power market, it is becoming inevitable for cascadedhydropower stations to participant in electricity market. Thus the basin developmentcompanies need to optimalize their bidding strategies in competitive electricity market accordingto market rules, which is of great practial significance for upgrading the water resourceenergy construction and realizing sustainable development of river basins. Cascadedhydropower stations have special technical and economic characteristics. They have to becoordinate as a whole to schedule water resource while competing with each other. How tooptimize the water and power resources by bidding in market has always been the forefrontand hotspot of academic research. This thesis focuses on cascaded hydropower station’salliance strategy, coalition formation and stability referring to successful cases of foreignpower market with participation of hydropower and combining the national conditions ofChina. The conclusion provides a theory reference for cascaded hydropower stations’bidding strategy and can be considered as a police suggest on pricing reforming which aimsto equal price for the same electricity quality on the same power network.
Hydropower stations which are belonged to the same investment entity tend tocoordinate naturally. They would rather bid cooperatively than individually on the target ofmaximize the profit of the coalition considering adequately water and power resourcerelations among stations. The coalition could exist as hydropower stations need unifiedmanagement even if hydropower stations belong to different investment entities. To explorethe outer condition and inner motivation of hydropower stations forming coalition, astatic game model is proposed firstly basing on the technological and economic charactersof electricity market place considering intricate relationships among hydropower stations.The model quantifies constraint of cost and demand functions. An extended Lagrangemultiplier method is adopted to resolve the model. The impacts of two clearing form,different and unified pricing, on profit of stations are compared by the simulation exampleas the outer condition of coalitions.
Secondly, theory on the motivation of coalition forming is studied. The resolve conceptsincluding stable set, core and Shapley value are discussed mainly to analyze the stabilityand dynamics of coalitions. But those resolve concepts are all static and lack the effect onthe dynamics of coalitions. Coalitional game theory based on farsightedness is researchedon the base of the largest consistent set. The ultimated uncovered path is considered as thejudgment of coalition’s stability as cascaded hydropower stations’ alliance strategy relyingon history path.
On the next section, the dynamic coalitional game model is proposed on the achievementof above static model and theory to analyze the coalition forming process in differentmarket places during repeatedly bidding. Three potential coalition contractures areconsidered. Once coalition forms, the stations bid as a whole, declaring unified price andtotal generate quality. The generate quality is dispatched cardinally in coalition to maximizethe coalition’s profit considering the relationship among stations. This model is solved bygenetic algorithm to provide the moving of cascaded hydropower stations coalition andultimate state.
Finally, the dynamic model is updated by the method of forecasting opponent’s biddingprice, relaxing the assumption of complete information to be more practical. The classicalgray predict model GM(1,1) is improved to gain a more accuracy result. The predict modelis proved feasible on the test of NORD-POOL power market actual data and embeddedsuccessfully in the game model. The simulation result shows the varying of profit ofstations, which changes the reference of coalition structure in a incomplete informationsystem. So the cascaded hydropower station coalition stability is challenged.
引文
[1]国家发展和改革委员会.可再生能源中长期发展规划.国家发展改革委员会,2007.
[2]周定山.西方国家电力体制改革实践及经验教训.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2005.
[3]国家电力监管委员会.欧洲、澳洲电力市场.北京:中国电力出版社,2005.
[4]Bunn D W, Day C J. Computational modelling of price formation in the electricitypool of England and Wales. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.2009,33(2):363-376.
[5]Stern J. Introducing competition into England and Wales water industry–Lessonsfrom UK and EU energy market liberalisation. Utilities Policy.2010,18(3):120-128.
[6]曾鸣,周健,于滢等.国外电力改革对我国电力零售市场建设的启示.改革与战略.2009,25(004):179-182.
[7]Sioshansi R, Denholm P, Jenkin T et al. Estimating the value of electricity storage inPJM: Arbitrage and some welfare effects. Energy Economics.2009,31(2):269-277.
[8]Sueyoshi T. Beyond economics for guiding large public policy issues: Lessons fromthe Bell System divestiture and the California electricity crisis. Decision SupportSystems.2010,48(3):457-469.
[9]Rosellón J, Myslíková Z, Zenón E. Incentives for transmission investment in the PJMelectricity market: FTRs or regulation (or both?). Utilities Policy.2011,19(1):3-13.
[10]Walawalkar R, Fernands S, Thakur N et al. Evolution and current status of demandresponse (DR) in electricity markets: Insights from PJM and NYISO. Energy.2010,35(4):1553-1560.
[11]Cartea á, Villaplana P. Spot price modeling and the valuation of electricity forwardcontracts: The role of demand and capacity. Journal of Banking&Finance.2008,32(12):2502-2519.
[12]Daskalakis G, Markellos R N. Are electricity risk premia affected by emissionallowance prices? Evidence from the EEX, Nord Pool and Powernext. Energy Policy.2009,37(7):2594-2604.
[13]Betz R, Owen A D. The implications of Australia's carbon pollution reductionscheme for its National Electricity Market. Energy Policy.2010,38(9):4966-4977.
[14]王峰峰.日本电力体制改革最新动向分析.电力技术经济.2009,(003):22-27.
[15]Zhang Q, Ishihara K N, Mclellan B C et al. Scenario analysis on future electricitysupply and demand in Japan. Energy.2012,38(1):376-385.
[16]Korppoo A, Luukkanen J, Vehmas J et al. What goes down must come up? Trends ofindustrial electricity use in the North-West of Russia. Energy Policy.2008,36(9):3588-3597.
[17]谢红胜.梯级电站群短期优化调度模型与定价方案选择:[博士学位论文].武汉:华中科技大学,2008.
[18]国务院.关于印发《电力体制改革方案》的通知.国发[2002]5号,2002.
[19]国家电力监管委员会.关于印发《东北区域电力市场初期运营规则(暂行)》的通知.电监供电[2003]54号令,2003.
[20]国家电力监管委员会.华东电力市场运行规则.电监市场[2004]13号令,2004.
[21]国家发展和改革委员会.关于规范电能交易价格管理等有关问题的通知.发改价格[2009]2474号,2009.
[22]国家发展和改革委员会.关于印发电价改革实施办法的通知.发改价格[2005]514号,2005.
[23]国家发展和改革委员会.关于调整华中电网电价的通知.发改价格[2011]2623号,2011.
[24]联合国可持续发展大会中国筹委会.中华人民共和国可持续发展国家报告.联合国可持续发展大会中国筹委会,2011.
[25]Chang X L, Liu X, Zhou W. Hydropower in China at present and its furtherdevelopment. Energy.2010,35(11):4400-4406.
[26]国网北京经济技术研究院.流域水电上网电价机制及政策研究报告.国网北京经济技术研究院,2006.
[27]吴世勇,马光文.水电竞价理论与方法.北京:中国电力出版社,2008.
[28]Thompson M, Davison M, Rasmussen H. Valuation and optimal operation of electricpower plants in competitive markets. Operations Research.2004,52(4):546-562.
[29]Aparicio J, Ferrando J C, Meca A et al. Strategic bidding in continuous electricityauctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market. Annals of OperationsResearch.2008,158(1):229-241.
[30]Kanakasabapathy P, Shanti Swarup K. Bidding strategy for pumped-storage plant inpool-based electricity market. Energy Conversion and Management.2010,51(3):572-579.
[31]Fleten S E, Kristoffersen T K. Stochastic programming for optimizing biddingstrategies of a Nordic hydropower producer. European Journal of OperationalResearch.2007,181(2):916-928.
[32]Faria E, Fleten S E. Day-ahead market bidding for a Nordic hydropower producer:taking the Elbas market into account. Computational Management Science.2009,8(1):75-101.
[33]Lino P, Barroso L, Pereira M et al. Bid-based dispatch of hydrothermal systems incompetitive markets. Annals of Operations Research.2003,120(1):81-97.
[34]张粒子,韩冰,舒隽.考虑备用的梯级水电站日前竞价模型.中国电力.2008,41(6):33-37.
[35]陈明千,李嘉,安瑞冬.基于纳什-古诺均衡和Chatterjee-Samuelson议价模型的梯级水库水调决策研究.四川大学学报:工程科学版.2009,41(2):42-47.
[36]Soleymani S, Ranjbar A M, Shirani A R. New approach for strategic bidding ofGencos in energy and spinning reserve markets. Energy Conversion and Management.2007,48(7):2044-2052.
[37]Ferrero R W, Rivera J F, Shahidehpour S M. Application of games with incompleteinformation for pricing electricity in deregulated power pools. IEEE Transactions onPower Systems.2002,13(1):184-189.
[38]Li T, Shahidehpour M. Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained GENCOs withincomplete information. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2005,20(1):437-447.
[39]Azadeh A, Ghaderi S F, Pourvalikhan Nokhandan B et al. A new genetic algorithmapproach for optimizing bidding strategy viewpoint of profit maximization of ageneration company. Expert Systems with Applications.2012,39(1):1565-1574.
[40]Soleymani S, Ranjbar A M, Shirani A R. New approach to bidding strategies ofgenerating companies in day ahead energy market. Energy Conversion andManagement.2008,49(6):1493-1499.
[41]Wen F S, David A K. Optimal bidding strategy and modeling of incompleteinformation among competitive generators. IEEE Transactions on Power System.2001,16(1):1123-1132.
[42]Liu A L. Repeated-game models of competitive electricity markets: Formulations andalgorithms:[PhD Dissertation]. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University,2009.
[43]任玉珑,刘贞,粟增德.基于多主体的发电企业二阶段博弈模型仿真.中国电机工程学报.2006,26(017):6-11.
[44]易伟,罗云峰.电力市场中电厂报价的重复博弈分析.华中科技大学学报:自然科学版.2003,31(002):75-77.
[45]张庆辉,赵继军.多寡头动态电力市场的分析.青岛大学学报:工程技术版.2008,23(003):58-62.
[46]Pettersen E, Philpott A B, Wallace S W. An electricity market game betweenconsumers, retailers and network operators. Decision Support Systems.2005,40(3-4):427-438.
[47]Badri A, Jadid S, Rashidinejad M et al. Optimal bidding strategies in oligopolymarkets considering bilateral contracts and transmission constraints. Electric PowerSystems Research.2008,78(6):1089-1098.
[48]Bompard E, Carpaneto E, Ciwei G et al. A game theory simulator for assessing theperformances of competitive electricity markets. Electric Power Systems Research.2008,78(2):217-227.
[49]韩富春,陶伟强,吕迎春.博弈理论在发电商竞价策略中的应用.太原理工大学学报.2004,35(001):61-63.
[50]张宇波,任慧,罗先觉.电力市场中的拍卖方式及竞标策略分析.电力系统保护与控制.2009,(016):7-10.
[51]Tishler A, Newman J, Spekterman I et al. Assessing the options for a competitiveelectricity market in Israel. Utilities Policy.2008,16(1):21-29.
[52]Ahn N, Niemeyer V. Modeling market power in Korea's emerging power market.Energy Policy.2007,35(2):899-906.
[53]Lampart M. Stability of the Cournot equilibrium for a Cournot oligopoly model with ncompetitors. Chaos, Solitons&Fractals.2012,45(9):1081-1085.
[54]Gao F, Sheble G B. Electricity market equilibrium model with resource constraint andtransmission congestion. Electric Power Systems Research.2010,80(1):9-18.
[55]Farhat I A, El-Hawary M E. Optimization methods applied for solving the short-termhydrothermal coordination problem. Electric Power Systems Research.2009,79(9):1308-1320.
[56]Lusztig C, Feldberg P, Orans R et al. A survey of transmission tariffs in NorthAmerica. Energy.2006,31(6):1017-1039.
[57]Dijk J, Willems B. The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets.Energy Policy.2011.
[58]杨燕,文福拴,李力等.可用输电容量协调决策的多目标机会约束规划模型与方法.电力系统自动化.2011,35(13):37-43.
[59]Neuhoff K, Barquin J, Boots M G et al. Network-constrained Cournot models ofliberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details. Energy Economics.2005,27(3):495-525.
[60]Hobbs B F, Pang J S. Nash-Cournot equilibria in electric power markets withpiecewise linear demand functions and joint constraints. Operations Research.2007,55(1):113-127.
[61]杨洪明,赖明勇.考虑输电网约束的电力市场有限理性古诺博弈的动态演化研究.中国电机工程学报.2005,25(023):71-79.
[62]叶佳明,吴刚.电力市场有限理性古诺动态博弈的经济评价及其混沌控制.云南电力技术.2009,37(4):3-6.
[63]吉伟卓,马军海.发电市场不同决策规则三寡头博弈模型研究.系统工程学报.2008,23(3):257-363.
[64]Pozo D, Contreras J, Caballero á et al. Long-term Nash equilibria in electricitymarkets. Electric Power Systems Research.2011,81(2):329-339.
[65]Lotfi M M, Ghaderi S F. Possibilistic programming approach for mid-term electricpower planning in deregulated markets. International Journal of Electrical Power&Energy Systems.2012,34(1):161-170.
[66]Van den Berg A, Bos I, Herings J J et al. Dynamic Cournot Duopoly withIntertemporal Capacity Constraints. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2011,30(2):174-192.
[67]卫斐,王喜成.基于线性规划博弈的供应链配送问题.经济数学.2009,26(4):54-60.
[68]周四清.电力市场一类分段线性供应函数纳什均衡解的存在性.暨南大学学报:自然科学与医学版.2008,29(5):451-456.
[69]Holmberg P, Newbery D. The supply function equilibrium and its policy implicationsfor wholesale electricity auctions. Utilities Policy.2010,18(4):209-226.
[70]Baldick R, Grant R, Kahn E. Theory and application of linear supply functionequilibrium in electricity markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics.2004,25(2):143-167.
[71]Yu C W, Zhang S H, Wang X et al. Modeling and analysis of strategic forwardcontracting in transmission constrained power markets. Electric Power SystemsResearch.2010,80(3):354-361.
[72]Genc T S, Reynolds S S. Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints andpivotal suppliers. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2011,29(4):432-442.
[73]杨建林,严正.求解计及输电约束的线性供给函数均衡模型的分支定界方法.中国电机工程学报.2010,30(13).
[74]Foley A M, ó Gallachóir B P, Hur J et al. A strategic review of electricity systemsmodels. Energy.2010,35(12):4522-4530.
[75]Bautista G, Quintana V H, Aguado J A. An oligopolistic model of an integratedmarket for energy and spinning reserve. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2006,21(1):132-142.
[76]Homayoun-Far M, Ganji A, Khalili D et al. Two solution methods for dynamic gamein reservoir operation. Advances in Water Resources.2010,33(7):752-761.
[77]马豫超,蒋传文,候志俭等.基于猜测供给函数的需求弹性对电力市场运行的影响.中国电机工程学报.2006,26(13):50-55.
[78]Díaz C A, Campos F A, Villar J et al. Endogenous computation of conjectured supplyfunctions with network constraints. Electric Power Systems Research.2012,90(9):117-125.
[79]王瑞庆,李渝曾,张少华.基于猜测变量的期权与现货市场均衡分析.电力系统及其自动化学报.2008,20(5):24-28.
[80]Lo Prete C, Hobbs B F, Norman C S et al. Sustainability and reliability assessment ofmicrogrids in a regional electricity market. Energy.2011,41(1):192-202.
[81]Díaz C A, Villar J, Campos F A et al. Electricity market equilibrium based onconjectural variations. Electric Power Systems Research.2010,80(12):1572-1579.
[82]Díaz C A, Villar J, Campos F A et al. A new algorithm to compute conjectured supplyfunction equilibrium in electricity markets. Electric Power Systems Research.2011,81(2):384-392.
[83]宋依群,张维文,金磊.发电批发市场和配电零售市场的联合均衡分析.上海交通大学学报.2009,42(12):2006-2009.
[84]Stanford W. Pure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects ofStackelberg players. Operations Research Letters.2010,38(2):94-96.
[85]胡荣,夏洪山.有限理性双寡头动态序贯竞争的建模与仿真.系统仿真技术.2011,7(2):109-115.
[86]Bigdeli N, Afshar K. Characterization of Iran electricity market indices withpay-as-bid payment mechanism. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and itsApplications.2009,388(8):1577-1592.
[87]Bigdeli N, Afshar K, Amjady N. Market data analysis and short-term price forecastingin the Iran electricity market with pay-as-bid payment mechanism. Electric PowerSystems Research.2009,79(6):888-898.
[88]言茂松,李晓刚.适合国情的实用当量电价法.电力系统自动化.2000,24(4):1-5.
[89]马国顺,宋伟伟.结算报价与市场清除价模式下的发电侧竞价动态分析.华东电力.2010,(8):1114-1118.
[90]唐昭霞.中国电力市场结构规制改革研究:[博士学位论文].成都:西南财经大学,2008.
[91]H st P, Holmberg P. Some inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions.Applied Mathematics Letters.2006,19(8):814-819.
[92]Haghighat H, Seifi H, Rahimi Kian A. The role of market pricing mechanism underimperfect competition. Decision Support Systems.2008,45(2):267-277.
[93]Li G, Shi J, Qu X. Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy optimization in theliberalized electricity spot market-A state-of-the-art review. Energy.2011,36(8):4686-4700.
[94]Nielsen S. Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity systemwith a high penetration of renewable energy sources-A comparison of marginalpricing and pay-as-bid. Energy.2011,36(7):4434-4444.
[95]Liu Z, Zhang X, Lieu J. Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auctionmarket based on the signaling game theory. Energy.2010,35(4):1813-1819.
[96]Rahimiyan M, Rajabi Mashhadi H. Supplier's optimal bidding strategy in electricitypay-as-bid auction: Comparison of the Q-learning and a model-based approach.Electric Power Systems Research.2008,78(1):165-175.
[97]Rahimiyan M, Rajabi Mashhadi H. Risk analysis of bidding strategies in an electricitypay as bid auction: A new theorem. Energy Conversion and Management.2007,48(1):131-137.
[98]陈云华.“一条江”的水电开发新模式.四川水力发电.2011,30(4):137-138.
[99]张粒子,韩冰,舒隽.考虑不确定性的小水电代理竞争市场均衡分析.电力系统自动化.2008,32(11):39-43.
[100]张年朝.完善上网电价形成机制,推进水电开发事业持续发展.红水河.2008,27(5):14-15.
[101]刘金焕.大渡河流域梯级电站统一调度的初步研究.水力发电.2007,33(7):5-8.
[102]周佳,马光文,李永利等.流域梯级水电站统一上网电价研究.水电能源科学.2010,28(5):166-168.
[103]杨道辉,马光文,高福荣等.流域梯级水电站统一上网电价的探讨.水力发电.2006,32(8):1-3.
[104]冰韩,张粒子,舒隽.梯级水电站代理竞价模型及均衡求解.中国电机工程学报.2008,28(22):94-99.
[105]曾次玲.电力市场中发电企业的报价策略及相关问题研究:[博士学位论文].武汉:华中科技大学,2005.
[106]丁乐群,常冬玲,涂进等.基于进化博弈的电力市场竞价规则研究.继电器.2007,35(1):72-76.
[107]高春生.深化电价改革促进电力企业可持续发展——关于贵州乌江梯级电站实行统一上网电价的调查.价格理论与实践.2011,(11):4-5.
[108]李红军,李英,李成仁等.梯级水电站上网电价模型设计.电力技术经济.2008,20(6):57-62.
[109]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海人民出版社,2009.
[110]Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O. Theory of games and economic behavior. NewJersey: The Princeton University Press,1944.
[111]Shapley L S. A value for n-person games. Annals of Mathematics studies.1953,(28):307-317.
[112]Borghetti A, Massucco S, Silvestro F. Influence of feasibility constrains on thebidding strategy selection in a day-ahead electricity market session. Electric PowerSystems Research.2009,79(12):1727-1737.
[113]Okada A. The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games.Journal of Economic Theory.2010,145(6):2356-2379.
[114]Soleymani S, Ranjbar A M, Shirani A R. Strategic bidding with regard to demandelasticity. Iranian Journal of Science&Technology.2006,30(B6):691-700.
[115]Hu Z, Yang L, Wang Z et al. A game-theoretic model for electricity markets withtight capacity constraints. International Journal of Electrical Power and EnergySystems.2008,30(3):207-215.
[116]He Y, Song Y H. The study of the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategiesof GENCOs. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2003,18(3):1086-1093.
[117]李刚,何怡刚.区域电力市场中的寡头发电厂商博弈分析.华北电力大学学报.2007,34(4):43-46.
[118]Jia N X, Yokoyama R. Profit allocation of independent power producers based oncooperative Game theory. International Journal of Electrical Power&EnergySystems.2003,25(8):633-641.
[119]艾学山,范文涛,王先甲.梯级水库群运行模式及合作效益分配研究.水力发电学报.2009,28(003):42-46.
[120]伍永刚,王献奇,裴哲义.电力市场中水电厂间补偿效益的分摊方法.水力发电.2006,32(010):17-20.
[121]Pinto T, Morais H, Oliveira P et al. A new approach for multi-agent coalitionformation and management in the scope of electricity markets. Energy.2011,36(8):5004-5015.
[122]Chen X, He Y, Song Y H et al. Study of impacts of physical contracts and financialcontracts on bidding strategies of GENCOs. International Journal of Electrical Power&Energy Systems.2004,26(9):715-723.
[123]Menniti D, Pinnarelli A, Sorrentino N. Simulation of producers behaviour in theelectricity market by evolutionary games. Electric Power Systems Research.2008,78(3):475-483.
[124]Al-Agtash S Y. Supply curve bidding of electricity in constrained power networks.Energy.2010,35(7):2886-2892.
[125]Hafalir I E. Efficiency in coalition games with externalities. Games and EconomicBehavior.2007,61(2):242-258.
[126]Mahvi M, Ardehali M M. Optimal bidding strategy in a competitive electricity marketbased on agent-based approach and numerical sensitivity analysis. Energy.2011,36(11):6367-6374.
[127]乔晗,高红伟.一个具有变化联盟结构的动态合作博弈模型.运筹与管理.2009,18(4):60-66.
[128]Klusch M, Gerber A. Dynamic coalition formation among rational agents. IntelligentSystems, IEEE.2002,17(3):42-47.
[129]Kawasaki R. Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchangeeconomy with indivisible goods. Mathematical Social Sciences.2010,59(1):46-52.
[130]Fiestras-Janeiro M G, García-Jurado I, Meca A et al. Cooperative game theory andinventory management. European Journal of Operational Research.2011,210(3):459-466.
[131]Vartiainen H. Dynamic coalitional equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory.2011,146(2):672-698.
[132]Konishi H, Ray D. Coalition formation as a dynamic process. Journal of EconomicTheory.2003,110(1):1-41.
[133]郑士源.合作博弈理论的研究进展——联盟的形成机制及稳定性研究综述.上海海事大学学报.2012,32(4):53-59.
[134]Lessmann K, Edenhofer O. Research cooperation and international standards in amodel of coalition stability. Resource and Energy Economics.2011,33(1):36-54.
[135]Banal-Esta ol A, Micola A R. Behavioural simulations in spot electricity markets.European Journal of Operational Research.2011,214(1):147-159.
[136]Branzei R, Dimitrov D, Tijs S. Models in cooperative game theory. Springer,2008.
[137]高红伟,彼得罗相.动态合作博弈.北京:科学出版社,2009.
[138]Shapley L S, Shubik M. Quasi-cores in a monetary economy with nonconvexpreferences. Econometrica.1966,34(4):805-827.
[139]Kalai E, Samet D. On weighted Shapley values. International Journal of Game Theory.1987,16(3):205-222.
[140]Aumann R J, Dreze J H. Cooperative games with coalition structures. InternationalJournal of Game Theory.1974,3(4):217-237.
[141]Aumann R J, Maschler M. The bargaining set for cooperative games. PrincetonUniversity,1961.
[142]Davis M, Maschler M. The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research LogisticsQuarterly.2006,12(3):223-259.
[143]谭春桥,张强.合作对策理论及应用.北京:科学出版社,2011.
[144]Nagarajan M, So i G. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chainagents: Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational Research.2008,187(3):719-745.
[145]Suh S C. An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nashequilibria. Mathematical Social Sciences.2001,41(1):103-110.
[146]Hirai T, Masuzawa T, Nakayama M. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in astrategic pure exchange game of bads. Mathematical Social Sciences.2006,51(2):162-170.
[147]Xue L. Coalitional stability under perfect foresight. Economic Theory.1998,11(3):603-627.
[148]Arnold T, Schwalbe U. Dynamic coalition formation and the core. Journal ofEconomic Behavior&Organization.2002,49(3):363-380.
[149]Belenky A S. Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in themarketplace. Mathematical and Computer Modelling.2002,36(11):1279-1291.
[150]Maruta T, Okada A. Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner s dilemma.Games and Economic Behavior.2012,74(1):269-284.
[151]Liu W Y, Yue K, Wu T Y et al. An approach for multi-objective categorization basedon the game theory and Markov process. Applied Soft Computing.2011,11(6):4087-4096.
[152]Chwe M S Y. Farsighted coalitional stability. Journal of Economic Theory.1994,63(2):299-325.
[153]刘玮.电力市场环境下发电企业成本分析及竞价策略研究:[博士学位论文].北京:华北电力大学,2010.
[154]韩冰.水电站参与市场竞争的代理机制设计:[博士学位论文].北京:华北电力大学,2008.
[155]苏艺,孙康,张盛开.动态联盟形成与谈判集.经济数学.2006,23(1).
[156]郑士源,王浣尘.基于动态合作博弈理论的航空联盟稳定性.系统工程理论与实践.2009,(4):184-192.
[157]朱宝昌,史雷.不完全信息下的发电商风险竞价决策分析.天津电力技术.2009,(1):41-44.
[158]Wang J, Shahidehpour M, Li Z et al. Strategic generation capacity expansion planningwith incomplete information. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2009,24(2):1002-1010.
[159]王剑辉,庞宏立,谭忠富.不完全信息静态博弈在发电商报价策略研究中的应用.现代电力.2004,21(2):91-94.
[160]张新华,叶泽.不完全信息下发电商竞价策略贝叶斯博弈分析.管理工程学报.2007,21(4).
[161]丁乐群,黎永亮,潘忠志.不完全信息下电力市场竞价的博弈模型.哈尔滨工业大学学报.2003,35(11):1366-1368.
[162]Zou X, Ren Y. Auction Mechanism Design in Wholesale Electricity MarketConsidering Impacts of Long-term Contract. Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice.2007,27(8):118-126.
[163]Zou X. Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizingsocial welfare. Energy Policy.2009,37(11):4231-4239.
[164]Silva C, Wollenberg B F, Zheng C Z. Application of mechanism design to electricpower markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2001,16(4):862-869.
[165]Besaw L E, Rizzo D M, Bierman P R et al. Advances in ungauged streamflowprediction using artificial neural networks. Journal of Hydrology.2010,386(1):27-37.
[166]Pourmousavi Kani S A, Ardehali M M. Very short-term wind speed prediction: Anew artificial neural network–Markov chain model. Energy Conversion andManagement.2011,52(1):738-745.
[167]Tien T L. A research on the grey prediction model GM (1, n). Applied Mathematicsand Computation.2011,218(9):4903-4961.
[168]刘思峰,邓聚龙. GM (1,1)模型的适用范围.系统工程理论与实践.2000,5(1):121-124.
[2]周定山.西方国家电力体制改革实践及经验教训.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2005.
[3]国家电力监管委员会.欧洲、澳洲电力市场.北京:中国电力出版社,2005.
[4]Bunn D W, Day C J. Computational modelling of price formation in the electricitypool of England and Wales. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.2009,33(2):363-376.
[5]Stern J. Introducing competition into England and Wales water industry–Lessonsfrom UK and EU energy market liberalisation. Utilities Policy.2010,18(3):120-128.
[6]曾鸣,周健,于滢等.国外电力改革对我国电力零售市场建设的启示.改革与战略.2009,25(004):179-182.
[7]Sioshansi R, Denholm P, Jenkin T et al. Estimating the value of electricity storage inPJM: Arbitrage and some welfare effects. Energy Economics.2009,31(2):269-277.
[8]Sueyoshi T. Beyond economics for guiding large public policy issues: Lessons fromthe Bell System divestiture and the California electricity crisis. Decision SupportSystems.2010,48(3):457-469.
[9]Rosellón J, Myslíková Z, Zenón E. Incentives for transmission investment in the PJMelectricity market: FTRs or regulation (or both?). Utilities Policy.2011,19(1):3-13.
[10]Walawalkar R, Fernands S, Thakur N et al. Evolution and current status of demandresponse (DR) in electricity markets: Insights from PJM and NYISO. Energy.2010,35(4):1553-1560.
[11]Cartea á, Villaplana P. Spot price modeling and the valuation of electricity forwardcontracts: The role of demand and capacity. Journal of Banking&Finance.2008,32(12):2502-2519.
[12]Daskalakis G, Markellos R N. Are electricity risk premia affected by emissionallowance prices? Evidence from the EEX, Nord Pool and Powernext. Energy Policy.2009,37(7):2594-2604.
[13]Betz R, Owen A D. The implications of Australia's carbon pollution reductionscheme for its National Electricity Market. Energy Policy.2010,38(9):4966-4977.
[14]王峰峰.日本电力体制改革最新动向分析.电力技术经济.2009,(003):22-27.
[15]Zhang Q, Ishihara K N, Mclellan B C et al. Scenario analysis on future electricitysupply and demand in Japan. Energy.2012,38(1):376-385.
[16]Korppoo A, Luukkanen J, Vehmas J et al. What goes down must come up? Trends ofindustrial electricity use in the North-West of Russia. Energy Policy.2008,36(9):3588-3597.
[17]谢红胜.梯级电站群短期优化调度模型与定价方案选择:[博士学位论文].武汉:华中科技大学,2008.
[18]国务院.关于印发《电力体制改革方案》的通知.国发[2002]5号,2002.
[19]国家电力监管委员会.关于印发《东北区域电力市场初期运营规则(暂行)》的通知.电监供电[2003]54号令,2003.
[20]国家电力监管委员会.华东电力市场运行规则.电监市场[2004]13号令,2004.
[21]国家发展和改革委员会.关于规范电能交易价格管理等有关问题的通知.发改价格[2009]2474号,2009.
[22]国家发展和改革委员会.关于印发电价改革实施办法的通知.发改价格[2005]514号,2005.
[23]国家发展和改革委员会.关于调整华中电网电价的通知.发改价格[2011]2623号,2011.
[24]联合国可持续发展大会中国筹委会.中华人民共和国可持续发展国家报告.联合国可持续发展大会中国筹委会,2011.
[25]Chang X L, Liu X, Zhou W. Hydropower in China at present and its furtherdevelopment. Energy.2010,35(11):4400-4406.
[26]国网北京经济技术研究院.流域水电上网电价机制及政策研究报告.国网北京经济技术研究院,2006.
[27]吴世勇,马光文.水电竞价理论与方法.北京:中国电力出版社,2008.
[28]Thompson M, Davison M, Rasmussen H. Valuation and optimal operation of electricpower plants in competitive markets. Operations Research.2004,52(4):546-562.
[29]Aparicio J, Ferrando J C, Meca A et al. Strategic bidding in continuous electricityauctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market. Annals of OperationsResearch.2008,158(1):229-241.
[30]Kanakasabapathy P, Shanti Swarup K. Bidding strategy for pumped-storage plant inpool-based electricity market. Energy Conversion and Management.2010,51(3):572-579.
[31]Fleten S E, Kristoffersen T K. Stochastic programming for optimizing biddingstrategies of a Nordic hydropower producer. European Journal of OperationalResearch.2007,181(2):916-928.
[32]Faria E, Fleten S E. Day-ahead market bidding for a Nordic hydropower producer:taking the Elbas market into account. Computational Management Science.2009,8(1):75-101.
[33]Lino P, Barroso L, Pereira M et al. Bid-based dispatch of hydrothermal systems incompetitive markets. Annals of Operations Research.2003,120(1):81-97.
[34]张粒子,韩冰,舒隽.考虑备用的梯级水电站日前竞价模型.中国电力.2008,41(6):33-37.
[35]陈明千,李嘉,安瑞冬.基于纳什-古诺均衡和Chatterjee-Samuelson议价模型的梯级水库水调决策研究.四川大学学报:工程科学版.2009,41(2):42-47.
[36]Soleymani S, Ranjbar A M, Shirani A R. New approach for strategic bidding ofGencos in energy and spinning reserve markets. Energy Conversion and Management.2007,48(7):2044-2052.
[37]Ferrero R W, Rivera J F, Shahidehpour S M. Application of games with incompleteinformation for pricing electricity in deregulated power pools. IEEE Transactions onPower Systems.2002,13(1):184-189.
[38]Li T, Shahidehpour M. Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained GENCOs withincomplete information. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2005,20(1):437-447.
[39]Azadeh A, Ghaderi S F, Pourvalikhan Nokhandan B et al. A new genetic algorithmapproach for optimizing bidding strategy viewpoint of profit maximization of ageneration company. Expert Systems with Applications.2012,39(1):1565-1574.
[40]Soleymani S, Ranjbar A M, Shirani A R. New approach to bidding strategies ofgenerating companies in day ahead energy market. Energy Conversion andManagement.2008,49(6):1493-1499.
[41]Wen F S, David A K. Optimal bidding strategy and modeling of incompleteinformation among competitive generators. IEEE Transactions on Power System.2001,16(1):1123-1132.
[42]Liu A L. Repeated-game models of competitive electricity markets: Formulations andalgorithms:[PhD Dissertation]. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University,2009.
[43]任玉珑,刘贞,粟增德.基于多主体的发电企业二阶段博弈模型仿真.中国电机工程学报.2006,26(017):6-11.
[44]易伟,罗云峰.电力市场中电厂报价的重复博弈分析.华中科技大学学报:自然科学版.2003,31(002):75-77.
[45]张庆辉,赵继军.多寡头动态电力市场的分析.青岛大学学报:工程技术版.2008,23(003):58-62.
[46]Pettersen E, Philpott A B, Wallace S W. An electricity market game betweenconsumers, retailers and network operators. Decision Support Systems.2005,40(3-4):427-438.
[47]Badri A, Jadid S, Rashidinejad M et al. Optimal bidding strategies in oligopolymarkets considering bilateral contracts and transmission constraints. Electric PowerSystems Research.2008,78(6):1089-1098.
[48]Bompard E, Carpaneto E, Ciwei G et al. A game theory simulator for assessing theperformances of competitive electricity markets. Electric Power Systems Research.2008,78(2):217-227.
[49]韩富春,陶伟强,吕迎春.博弈理论在发电商竞价策略中的应用.太原理工大学学报.2004,35(001):61-63.
[50]张宇波,任慧,罗先觉.电力市场中的拍卖方式及竞标策略分析.电力系统保护与控制.2009,(016):7-10.
[51]Tishler A, Newman J, Spekterman I et al. Assessing the options for a competitiveelectricity market in Israel. Utilities Policy.2008,16(1):21-29.
[52]Ahn N, Niemeyer V. Modeling market power in Korea's emerging power market.Energy Policy.2007,35(2):899-906.
[53]Lampart M. Stability of the Cournot equilibrium for a Cournot oligopoly model with ncompetitors. Chaos, Solitons&Fractals.2012,45(9):1081-1085.
[54]Gao F, Sheble G B. Electricity market equilibrium model with resource constraint andtransmission congestion. Electric Power Systems Research.2010,80(1):9-18.
[55]Farhat I A, El-Hawary M E. Optimization methods applied for solving the short-termhydrothermal coordination problem. Electric Power Systems Research.2009,79(9):1308-1320.
[56]Lusztig C, Feldberg P, Orans R et al. A survey of transmission tariffs in NorthAmerica. Energy.2006,31(6):1017-1039.
[57]Dijk J, Willems B. The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets.Energy Policy.2011.
[58]杨燕,文福拴,李力等.可用输电容量协调决策的多目标机会约束规划模型与方法.电力系统自动化.2011,35(13):37-43.
[59]Neuhoff K, Barquin J, Boots M G et al. Network-constrained Cournot models ofliberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details. Energy Economics.2005,27(3):495-525.
[60]Hobbs B F, Pang J S. Nash-Cournot equilibria in electric power markets withpiecewise linear demand functions and joint constraints. Operations Research.2007,55(1):113-127.
[61]杨洪明,赖明勇.考虑输电网约束的电力市场有限理性古诺博弈的动态演化研究.中国电机工程学报.2005,25(023):71-79.
[62]叶佳明,吴刚.电力市场有限理性古诺动态博弈的经济评价及其混沌控制.云南电力技术.2009,37(4):3-6.
[63]吉伟卓,马军海.发电市场不同决策规则三寡头博弈模型研究.系统工程学报.2008,23(3):257-363.
[64]Pozo D, Contreras J, Caballero á et al. Long-term Nash equilibria in electricitymarkets. Electric Power Systems Research.2011,81(2):329-339.
[65]Lotfi M M, Ghaderi S F. Possibilistic programming approach for mid-term electricpower planning in deregulated markets. International Journal of Electrical Power&Energy Systems.2012,34(1):161-170.
[66]Van den Berg A, Bos I, Herings J J et al. Dynamic Cournot Duopoly withIntertemporal Capacity Constraints. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2011,30(2):174-192.
[67]卫斐,王喜成.基于线性规划博弈的供应链配送问题.经济数学.2009,26(4):54-60.
[68]周四清.电力市场一类分段线性供应函数纳什均衡解的存在性.暨南大学学报:自然科学与医学版.2008,29(5):451-456.
[69]Holmberg P, Newbery D. The supply function equilibrium and its policy implicationsfor wholesale electricity auctions. Utilities Policy.2010,18(4):209-226.
[70]Baldick R, Grant R, Kahn E. Theory and application of linear supply functionequilibrium in electricity markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics.2004,25(2):143-167.
[71]Yu C W, Zhang S H, Wang X et al. Modeling and analysis of strategic forwardcontracting in transmission constrained power markets. Electric Power SystemsResearch.2010,80(3):354-361.
[72]Genc T S, Reynolds S S. Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints andpivotal suppliers. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2011,29(4):432-442.
[73]杨建林,严正.求解计及输电约束的线性供给函数均衡模型的分支定界方法.中国电机工程学报.2010,30(13).
[74]Foley A M, ó Gallachóir B P, Hur J et al. A strategic review of electricity systemsmodels. Energy.2010,35(12):4522-4530.
[75]Bautista G, Quintana V H, Aguado J A. An oligopolistic model of an integratedmarket for energy and spinning reserve. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2006,21(1):132-142.
[76]Homayoun-Far M, Ganji A, Khalili D et al. Two solution methods for dynamic gamein reservoir operation. Advances in Water Resources.2010,33(7):752-761.
[77]马豫超,蒋传文,候志俭等.基于猜测供给函数的需求弹性对电力市场运行的影响.中国电机工程学报.2006,26(13):50-55.
[78]Díaz C A, Campos F A, Villar J et al. Endogenous computation of conjectured supplyfunctions with network constraints. Electric Power Systems Research.2012,90(9):117-125.
[79]王瑞庆,李渝曾,张少华.基于猜测变量的期权与现货市场均衡分析.电力系统及其自动化学报.2008,20(5):24-28.
[80]Lo Prete C, Hobbs B F, Norman C S et al. Sustainability and reliability assessment ofmicrogrids in a regional electricity market. Energy.2011,41(1):192-202.
[81]Díaz C A, Villar J, Campos F A et al. Electricity market equilibrium based onconjectural variations. Electric Power Systems Research.2010,80(12):1572-1579.
[82]Díaz C A, Villar J, Campos F A et al. A new algorithm to compute conjectured supplyfunction equilibrium in electricity markets. Electric Power Systems Research.2011,81(2):384-392.
[83]宋依群,张维文,金磊.发电批发市场和配电零售市场的联合均衡分析.上海交通大学学报.2009,42(12):2006-2009.
[84]Stanford W. Pure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects ofStackelberg players. Operations Research Letters.2010,38(2):94-96.
[85]胡荣,夏洪山.有限理性双寡头动态序贯竞争的建模与仿真.系统仿真技术.2011,7(2):109-115.
[86]Bigdeli N, Afshar K. Characterization of Iran electricity market indices withpay-as-bid payment mechanism. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and itsApplications.2009,388(8):1577-1592.
[87]Bigdeli N, Afshar K, Amjady N. Market data analysis and short-term price forecastingin the Iran electricity market with pay-as-bid payment mechanism. Electric PowerSystems Research.2009,79(6):888-898.
[88]言茂松,李晓刚.适合国情的实用当量电价法.电力系统自动化.2000,24(4):1-5.
[89]马国顺,宋伟伟.结算报价与市场清除价模式下的发电侧竞价动态分析.华东电力.2010,(8):1114-1118.
[90]唐昭霞.中国电力市场结构规制改革研究:[博士学位论文].成都:西南财经大学,2008.
[91]H st P, Holmberg P. Some inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions.Applied Mathematics Letters.2006,19(8):814-819.
[92]Haghighat H, Seifi H, Rahimi Kian A. The role of market pricing mechanism underimperfect competition. Decision Support Systems.2008,45(2):267-277.
[93]Li G, Shi J, Qu X. Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy optimization in theliberalized electricity spot market-A state-of-the-art review. Energy.2011,36(8):4686-4700.
[94]Nielsen S. Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity systemwith a high penetration of renewable energy sources-A comparison of marginalpricing and pay-as-bid. Energy.2011,36(7):4434-4444.
[95]Liu Z, Zhang X, Lieu J. Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auctionmarket based on the signaling game theory. Energy.2010,35(4):1813-1819.
[96]Rahimiyan M, Rajabi Mashhadi H. Supplier's optimal bidding strategy in electricitypay-as-bid auction: Comparison of the Q-learning and a model-based approach.Electric Power Systems Research.2008,78(1):165-175.
[97]Rahimiyan M, Rajabi Mashhadi H. Risk analysis of bidding strategies in an electricitypay as bid auction: A new theorem. Energy Conversion and Management.2007,48(1):131-137.
[98]陈云华.“一条江”的水电开发新模式.四川水力发电.2011,30(4):137-138.
[99]张粒子,韩冰,舒隽.考虑不确定性的小水电代理竞争市场均衡分析.电力系统自动化.2008,32(11):39-43.
[100]张年朝.完善上网电价形成机制,推进水电开发事业持续发展.红水河.2008,27(5):14-15.
[101]刘金焕.大渡河流域梯级电站统一调度的初步研究.水力发电.2007,33(7):5-8.
[102]周佳,马光文,李永利等.流域梯级水电站统一上网电价研究.水电能源科学.2010,28(5):166-168.
[103]杨道辉,马光文,高福荣等.流域梯级水电站统一上网电价的探讨.水力发电.2006,32(8):1-3.
[104]冰韩,张粒子,舒隽.梯级水电站代理竞价模型及均衡求解.中国电机工程学报.2008,28(22):94-99.
[105]曾次玲.电力市场中发电企业的报价策略及相关问题研究:[博士学位论文].武汉:华中科技大学,2005.
[106]丁乐群,常冬玲,涂进等.基于进化博弈的电力市场竞价规则研究.继电器.2007,35(1):72-76.
[107]高春生.深化电价改革促进电力企业可持续发展——关于贵州乌江梯级电站实行统一上网电价的调查.价格理论与实践.2011,(11):4-5.
[108]李红军,李英,李成仁等.梯级水电站上网电价模型设计.电力技术经济.2008,20(6):57-62.
[109]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海人民出版社,2009.
[110]Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O. Theory of games and economic behavior. NewJersey: The Princeton University Press,1944.
[111]Shapley L S. A value for n-person games. Annals of Mathematics studies.1953,(28):307-317.
[112]Borghetti A, Massucco S, Silvestro F. Influence of feasibility constrains on thebidding strategy selection in a day-ahead electricity market session. Electric PowerSystems Research.2009,79(12):1727-1737.
[113]Okada A. The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games.Journal of Economic Theory.2010,145(6):2356-2379.
[114]Soleymani S, Ranjbar A M, Shirani A R. Strategic bidding with regard to demandelasticity. Iranian Journal of Science&Technology.2006,30(B6):691-700.
[115]Hu Z, Yang L, Wang Z et al. A game-theoretic model for electricity markets withtight capacity constraints. International Journal of Electrical Power and EnergySystems.2008,30(3):207-215.
[116]He Y, Song Y H. The study of the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategiesof GENCOs. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2003,18(3):1086-1093.
[117]李刚,何怡刚.区域电力市场中的寡头发电厂商博弈分析.华北电力大学学报.2007,34(4):43-46.
[118]Jia N X, Yokoyama R. Profit allocation of independent power producers based oncooperative Game theory. International Journal of Electrical Power&EnergySystems.2003,25(8):633-641.
[119]艾学山,范文涛,王先甲.梯级水库群运行模式及合作效益分配研究.水力发电学报.2009,28(003):42-46.
[120]伍永刚,王献奇,裴哲义.电力市场中水电厂间补偿效益的分摊方法.水力发电.2006,32(010):17-20.
[121]Pinto T, Morais H, Oliveira P et al. A new approach for multi-agent coalitionformation and management in the scope of electricity markets. Energy.2011,36(8):5004-5015.
[122]Chen X, He Y, Song Y H et al. Study of impacts of physical contracts and financialcontracts on bidding strategies of GENCOs. International Journal of Electrical Power&Energy Systems.2004,26(9):715-723.
[123]Menniti D, Pinnarelli A, Sorrentino N. Simulation of producers behaviour in theelectricity market by evolutionary games. Electric Power Systems Research.2008,78(3):475-483.
[124]Al-Agtash S Y. Supply curve bidding of electricity in constrained power networks.Energy.2010,35(7):2886-2892.
[125]Hafalir I E. Efficiency in coalition games with externalities. Games and EconomicBehavior.2007,61(2):242-258.
[126]Mahvi M, Ardehali M M. Optimal bidding strategy in a competitive electricity marketbased on agent-based approach and numerical sensitivity analysis. Energy.2011,36(11):6367-6374.
[127]乔晗,高红伟.一个具有变化联盟结构的动态合作博弈模型.运筹与管理.2009,18(4):60-66.
[128]Klusch M, Gerber A. Dynamic coalition formation among rational agents. IntelligentSystems, IEEE.2002,17(3):42-47.
[129]Kawasaki R. Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchangeeconomy with indivisible goods. Mathematical Social Sciences.2010,59(1):46-52.
[130]Fiestras-Janeiro M G, García-Jurado I, Meca A et al. Cooperative game theory andinventory management. European Journal of Operational Research.2011,210(3):459-466.
[131]Vartiainen H. Dynamic coalitional equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory.2011,146(2):672-698.
[132]Konishi H, Ray D. Coalition formation as a dynamic process. Journal of EconomicTheory.2003,110(1):1-41.
[133]郑士源.合作博弈理论的研究进展——联盟的形成机制及稳定性研究综述.上海海事大学学报.2012,32(4):53-59.
[134]Lessmann K, Edenhofer O. Research cooperation and international standards in amodel of coalition stability. Resource and Energy Economics.2011,33(1):36-54.
[135]Banal-Esta ol A, Micola A R. Behavioural simulations in spot electricity markets.European Journal of Operational Research.2011,214(1):147-159.
[136]Branzei R, Dimitrov D, Tijs S. Models in cooperative game theory. Springer,2008.
[137]高红伟,彼得罗相.动态合作博弈.北京:科学出版社,2009.
[138]Shapley L S, Shubik M. Quasi-cores in a monetary economy with nonconvexpreferences. Econometrica.1966,34(4):805-827.
[139]Kalai E, Samet D. On weighted Shapley values. International Journal of Game Theory.1987,16(3):205-222.
[140]Aumann R J, Dreze J H. Cooperative games with coalition structures. InternationalJournal of Game Theory.1974,3(4):217-237.
[141]Aumann R J, Maschler M. The bargaining set for cooperative games. PrincetonUniversity,1961.
[142]Davis M, Maschler M. The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research LogisticsQuarterly.2006,12(3):223-259.
[143]谭春桥,张强.合作对策理论及应用.北京:科学出版社,2011.
[144]Nagarajan M, So i G. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chainagents: Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational Research.2008,187(3):719-745.
[145]Suh S C. An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nashequilibria. Mathematical Social Sciences.2001,41(1):103-110.
[146]Hirai T, Masuzawa T, Nakayama M. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in astrategic pure exchange game of bads. Mathematical Social Sciences.2006,51(2):162-170.
[147]Xue L. Coalitional stability under perfect foresight. Economic Theory.1998,11(3):603-627.
[148]Arnold T, Schwalbe U. Dynamic coalition formation and the core. Journal ofEconomic Behavior&Organization.2002,49(3):363-380.
[149]Belenky A S. Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in themarketplace. Mathematical and Computer Modelling.2002,36(11):1279-1291.
[150]Maruta T, Okada A. Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner s dilemma.Games and Economic Behavior.2012,74(1):269-284.
[151]Liu W Y, Yue K, Wu T Y et al. An approach for multi-objective categorization basedon the game theory and Markov process. Applied Soft Computing.2011,11(6):4087-4096.
[152]Chwe M S Y. Farsighted coalitional stability. Journal of Economic Theory.1994,63(2):299-325.
[153]刘玮.电力市场环境下发电企业成本分析及竞价策略研究:[博士学位论文].北京:华北电力大学,2010.
[154]韩冰.水电站参与市场竞争的代理机制设计:[博士学位论文].北京:华北电力大学,2008.
[155]苏艺,孙康,张盛开.动态联盟形成与谈判集.经济数学.2006,23(1).
[156]郑士源,王浣尘.基于动态合作博弈理论的航空联盟稳定性.系统工程理论与实践.2009,(4):184-192.
[157]朱宝昌,史雷.不完全信息下的发电商风险竞价决策分析.天津电力技术.2009,(1):41-44.
[158]Wang J, Shahidehpour M, Li Z et al. Strategic generation capacity expansion planningwith incomplete information. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2009,24(2):1002-1010.
[159]王剑辉,庞宏立,谭忠富.不完全信息静态博弈在发电商报价策略研究中的应用.现代电力.2004,21(2):91-94.
[160]张新华,叶泽.不完全信息下发电商竞价策略贝叶斯博弈分析.管理工程学报.2007,21(4).
[161]丁乐群,黎永亮,潘忠志.不完全信息下电力市场竞价的博弈模型.哈尔滨工业大学学报.2003,35(11):1366-1368.
[162]Zou X, Ren Y. Auction Mechanism Design in Wholesale Electricity MarketConsidering Impacts of Long-term Contract. Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice.2007,27(8):118-126.
[163]Zou X. Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizingsocial welfare. Energy Policy.2009,37(11):4231-4239.
[164]Silva C, Wollenberg B F, Zheng C Z. Application of mechanism design to electricpower markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.2001,16(4):862-869.
[165]Besaw L E, Rizzo D M, Bierman P R et al. Advances in ungauged streamflowprediction using artificial neural networks. Journal of Hydrology.2010,386(1):27-37.
[166]Pourmousavi Kani S A, Ardehali M M. Very short-term wind speed prediction: Anew artificial neural network–Markov chain model. Energy Conversion andManagement.2011,52(1):738-745.
[167]Tien T L. A research on the grey prediction model GM (1, n). Applied Mathematicsand Computation.2011,218(9):4903-4961.
[168]刘思峰,邓聚龙. GM (1,1)模型的适用范围.系统工程理论与实践.2000,5(1):121-124.