中美知识产权保护摩擦的政治经济学分析
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摘要
伴随着中美贸易的迅速发展,中美之间的贸易摩擦也随之而频繁发生,其中中美知识产权保护摩擦自上世纪80年代末以来延续至今。当前,中国知识产权保护问题仍然是美国在中美经贸关系中关注的中心问题。本文试图从贸易的政治经济学视角对中美知识产权保护摩擦的演变历程、特点、形成机制及其对中国知识产权实际保护水平的影响进行研究。这不仅有利于深刻认识中美知识产权保护摩擦的本质、和成因,也为我国应对当前和未来激烈的知识产权保护摩擦提供启示。
首先,本文就研究背景、意义进行了阐述,并对相关国内外研究成果进行了梳理。现有研究主要包括三方面的成果：(1)对知识产权保护经济效应的研究,尤其是开放经济条件下知识产权保护对技术进步、经济增长与社会福利等研究强调了南北国家之间在知识产权保护方面的利益冲突；(2)对中国知识产权保护制度发展过程以及中国面临的知识产权保护摩擦的法学研究和少量的经济学研究；(3)贸易摩擦的政治经济学研究,从贸易政治经济学角度揭示了各种贸易摩擦的内生过程。本文将从贸易的政治经济学视角对中美知识产权保护摩擦进行系统的理论和经验研究。
其次,本文对中美知识产权保护摩擦的发展演变过程和表现形式进行概述,并对其政治经济学特征进行分析。中美知识产权保护摩擦主要有三种形式：“特别301”条款下的争端显示出美国对我国知识产权保护和市场准入情况的高度不满；“337”调查争端中,中国是美国的头号目标国,而“337”制度的多次修改也反映了美国知识产权密集型行业强化知识产权保护的政治诉求；在世贸组织下的中美知识产权争端也主要反映了美国知识产权利益集团对中国履行TRIPS义务的不满。中美知识产权保护摩擦背后呈现出明显的政治经济学特征,突出表现在美国以国际知识产权联盟(ⅡPA)为代表的知识产权利益集团通过各种频繁的政治活动来推动美国政府施压中国提高知识产权保护水平。
第三,从政治经济学视角分析了美国和中国在知识产权保护政策方面的决策机制及其政策特点。随着美国上世纪70年代出现贸易逆差,霸权地位逐渐衰退,美国开始推行知识产权国际保护战略,以此重振其霸权地位。这一战略在新世纪被进一步强化,表现为美国国会、总统领导的政府部门、知识产权利益集团一致地支持高水平的知识产权国际保护。中国是美国加强知识产权国际保护的重点对象。中美知识产权保护摩擦是美国强力推行知识产权国际保护战略的必然结果。在“依存市场的国家主义”的政治决策体制下,中国政府在20世纪70年代末以来引入现代知识产权保护制度是最高领导人作出改革开放重大决策后的一个配套举措。中国的利益集团活动只对知识产权保护决策起到“边际性”的影响。近几年来,我国政府在加强知识产权保护方面显示了更大的政府主动性,2008年颁布的《国家知识产权战略纲要》中,加强知识产权保护的一个重要目的在于激励自主创新。
第四、对中美知识产权保护摩擦是否促进中国知识产权保护水平的提高进行了计量研究和案例分析。在对知识产权保护水平度量的相关研究基础上,运用我国1985-2009年的相关数据构建时间序列模型,得到了18个回归方程。结果表明,美国在“特别301”条款下对我国施加的单边压力并没有显著地带来中国知识产权保护水平的上升；但TRIPS所代表的多边压力却显著而有力地导致了我国知识产权实际保护水平的提高。由于TRIPS协定本身体现了美国加强知识产权国际保护的战略及美国国内知识产权利益集团的保护要求,因此中美知识产权保护摩擦给中国施加的保护知识产权压力的确促进了我国知识产权保护水平的提高,我国知识产权保护加强的过程呈现出明显的国际政治经济学特征。中美版权摩擦与中国软件正版化过程的案例表明以BSA为首的美国利益集团一方面加剧了中美版权摩擦,但同时也和中国国内利益集团一起推动了中国软件正版化进程。
最后,本文对中美知识产权保护摩擦的未来发展态势进行了预测,认为中美之间的这一摩擦将会长期存在,并且呈现出较大的复杂性,但这不会影响中美经贸关系的整体发展,在此基础上提出了中国应对知识产权摩擦的战略性对策建议,并从理论研究和经验研究两个方面提出了未来的研究方向。
As the trade between China and USA grows rapidly, trade frictions between these two countries have also been happening frequently, among which, the intellectual property protection (IPP) friction since 1980s has been evolving until now and China's protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is still the focus of United States in the bilateral trade relations. This paper has made an effort to research on the characters of IPP friction and its formation mechanism and the effect of IPP friction on China's actual protection level of IPRs from the perspective of political economy of trade. By doing so will not only help to understand the causes and effects of IPP friction, but also help to reply to IPP friction from the aspect of political economy.
Firstly, the research background and significance was elaborated and the literature review was conducted. The existing research related this topic is from three aspects:many research was about the effect of IPP, such as the effect of IPP to technical progress, economic growth and social welfare or the effect of IPP to international trade, FDI, international transfer of technology. These studies emphasized the conflict of economic interests between Northern countries and Southern countries. The second stream of research was about the development of Chinese IPRs system, IPP frictions especially those between US. and China from the aspect of law; the third stream was about the political economy of trade friction which modeled the endogenous formation progress of various kinds of trade protection friction. Based on these researches, the political economy of IIP friction between Sino and US was conducted in this paper.
Secondly, the evolving progress of various kinds of IPP frictions between China and USA was reviewed and the political economy characteristics behind these frictions were illuminated. Three kinds of IPP friction were prominent, one is that China was frequently listed on the annual "Special 301" report as "Priority Foreign Country" or "Priority Watch Country" or "Section 306 monitoring". China was also the No.1 object of USA's "337" investigations from 2002 to 2010. China also suffered a claim related with China's compliance of TRIPS raised by USA to the WTO dispute settlement body in 2007. Behind all these frictions, the political and economic factors have played important roles. U.S. interest groups, with IIPA a prominent example, have participated in and promoted the IPP frictions by acting aggressively in the political stages by various means. Interest groups have been working to bring "special 301" system come into place and been affecting its enforcement. They have worked to make several revisions of "337" clause and make it a protectionist tool to target foreign competitors from exporting high technology goods to US market. They also have worked to push USTR to bring China to WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 2007.
Thirdly, the IPP decision mechanism of USA and China was explored from the perspective of political economy. Since 1970s US has begun to be a trade deficit country and its hegemony has begun to decay. U.S has made a strategy by linking its trade partner' protection of US IPRs with the market access opportunity given to this partner, with the hope of maintain or strengthening its hegemony. This strategy was strengthened in the 21st century, with its Congress, the administration and interest groups from iprs-intensive industries have been consistently advocating high level of IPRs international protection and have been working closely to achieve this goal. China has been the most important target of US. Under the "market-preserving federalism" political system, Chinese government has begun to introduce modern IPP systems into China as a measure to execute the open-door strategy which was mainly the idea of China's supreme leaders. Under this strategy, China's foreign trade policy and IPRs policy was decided by the leaders by trading off the benefits and costs of strengthening IPP under the outer pressure and internal development demand. Interest groups and their activities only had a "marginal" effect to China's IPP decision, but with the development of science and technology, economy, social and law systems, more supporting strengths have emerged and making higher degree of IPP benefit China more. After China's WTO accession, the IPP legislation level has approached that in developed countries and the enforcement of IPRs is still the focus of USA's monitoring. Chinese government has made great effort to fulfill the requirements of US and international agreements of IPP but in recent years China has been more actively in enforcing IPRs with a view to stimulating indigenous innovation.
Fourthly, the empirical analysis of Sino-US IPP friction on China's actual IPP level was conducted. After review of the measurement of actual IPP level, a times-series econometrical model was constructed with the data from 1985-2009 and 18 specific equations were regressed. Results showed that the pressure under the "special 301" system has not significantly affected China's actual level of IPP, but "Trips" has significantly and immensely promoted the increase of IPP level. Considering that "Trips" is also a channel by USA to strengthen international protection of IPRs which was brought into WTO by USA and other developed countries. It was concluded that the IPP friction between USA and China has truly promoted the increase of the IPP actual level in China and made the process of our country's IPP evolvement an international political economic progress. The case study to the Sino-Us copyright friction and the progress of promoting use of authorized software showed that BSA has on one hand intensify the copyright friction between USA and China, on the other hand BSA has worked with domestic interest groups to pressure Chinese government promote the authorization of software in China.
Finally, the future trend of IPP friction between USA and China and its effect on the bilateral trade relations was analyzed. In a long period in the future, the IPP friction will not stop and will show a great sophistication but it will not affect the whole bilateral trade relations. Based on these judgments, some strategic counter-measures for China to respond to the IPP friction were put forward and the future research topics were raised from both the theoretical and empirical aspects.
首先,本文就研究背景、意义进行了阐述,并对相关国内外研究成果进行了梳理。现有研究主要包括三方面的成果：(1)对知识产权保护经济效应的研究,尤其是开放经济条件下知识产权保护对技术进步、经济增长与社会福利等研究强调了南北国家之间在知识产权保护方面的利益冲突；(2)对中国知识产权保护制度发展过程以及中国面临的知识产权保护摩擦的法学研究和少量的经济学研究；(3)贸易摩擦的政治经济学研究,从贸易政治经济学角度揭示了各种贸易摩擦的内生过程。本文将从贸易的政治经济学视角对中美知识产权保护摩擦进行系统的理论和经验研究。
其次,本文对中美知识产权保护摩擦的发展演变过程和表现形式进行概述,并对其政治经济学特征进行分析。中美知识产权保护摩擦主要有三种形式：“特别301”条款下的争端显示出美国对我国知识产权保护和市场准入情况的高度不满；“337”调查争端中,中国是美国的头号目标国,而“337”制度的多次修改也反映了美国知识产权密集型行业强化知识产权保护的政治诉求；在世贸组织下的中美知识产权争端也主要反映了美国知识产权利益集团对中国履行TRIPS义务的不满。中美知识产权保护摩擦背后呈现出明显的政治经济学特征,突出表现在美国以国际知识产权联盟(ⅡPA)为代表的知识产权利益集团通过各种频繁的政治活动来推动美国政府施压中国提高知识产权保护水平。
第三,从政治经济学视角分析了美国和中国在知识产权保护政策方面的决策机制及其政策特点。随着美国上世纪70年代出现贸易逆差,霸权地位逐渐衰退,美国开始推行知识产权国际保护战略,以此重振其霸权地位。这一战略在新世纪被进一步强化,表现为美国国会、总统领导的政府部门、知识产权利益集团一致地支持高水平的知识产权国际保护。中国是美国加强知识产权国际保护的重点对象。中美知识产权保护摩擦是美国强力推行知识产权国际保护战略的必然结果。在“依存市场的国家主义”的政治决策体制下,中国政府在20世纪70年代末以来引入现代知识产权保护制度是最高领导人作出改革开放重大决策后的一个配套举措。中国的利益集团活动只对知识产权保护决策起到“边际性”的影响。近几年来,我国政府在加强知识产权保护方面显示了更大的政府主动性,2008年颁布的《国家知识产权战略纲要》中,加强知识产权保护的一个重要目的在于激励自主创新。
第四、对中美知识产权保护摩擦是否促进中国知识产权保护水平的提高进行了计量研究和案例分析。在对知识产权保护水平度量的相关研究基础上,运用我国1985-2009年的相关数据构建时间序列模型,得到了18个回归方程。结果表明,美国在“特别301”条款下对我国施加的单边压力并没有显著地带来中国知识产权保护水平的上升；但TRIPS所代表的多边压力却显著而有力地导致了我国知识产权实际保护水平的提高。由于TRIPS协定本身体现了美国加强知识产权国际保护的战略及美国国内知识产权利益集团的保护要求,因此中美知识产权保护摩擦给中国施加的保护知识产权压力的确促进了我国知识产权保护水平的提高,我国知识产权保护加强的过程呈现出明显的国际政治经济学特征。中美版权摩擦与中国软件正版化过程的案例表明以BSA为首的美国利益集团一方面加剧了中美版权摩擦,但同时也和中国国内利益集团一起推动了中国软件正版化进程。
最后,本文对中美知识产权保护摩擦的未来发展态势进行了预测,认为中美之间的这一摩擦将会长期存在,并且呈现出较大的复杂性,但这不会影响中美经贸关系的整体发展,在此基础上提出了中国应对知识产权摩擦的战略性对策建议,并从理论研究和经验研究两个方面提出了未来的研究方向。
As the trade between China and USA grows rapidly, trade frictions between these two countries have also been happening frequently, among which, the intellectual property protection (IPP) friction since 1980s has been evolving until now and China's protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is still the focus of United States in the bilateral trade relations. This paper has made an effort to research on the characters of IPP friction and its formation mechanism and the effect of IPP friction on China's actual protection level of IPRs from the perspective of political economy of trade. By doing so will not only help to understand the causes and effects of IPP friction, but also help to reply to IPP friction from the aspect of political economy.
Firstly, the research background and significance was elaborated and the literature review was conducted. The existing research related this topic is from three aspects:many research was about the effect of IPP, such as the effect of IPP to technical progress, economic growth and social welfare or the effect of IPP to international trade, FDI, international transfer of technology. These studies emphasized the conflict of economic interests between Northern countries and Southern countries. The second stream of research was about the development of Chinese IPRs system, IPP frictions especially those between US. and China from the aspect of law; the third stream was about the political economy of trade friction which modeled the endogenous formation progress of various kinds of trade protection friction. Based on these researches, the political economy of IIP friction between Sino and US was conducted in this paper.
Secondly, the evolving progress of various kinds of IPP frictions between China and USA was reviewed and the political economy characteristics behind these frictions were illuminated. Three kinds of IPP friction were prominent, one is that China was frequently listed on the annual "Special 301" report as "Priority Foreign Country" or "Priority Watch Country" or "Section 306 monitoring". China was also the No.1 object of USA's "337" investigations from 2002 to 2010. China also suffered a claim related with China's compliance of TRIPS raised by USA to the WTO dispute settlement body in 2007. Behind all these frictions, the political and economic factors have played important roles. U.S. interest groups, with IIPA a prominent example, have participated in and promoted the IPP frictions by acting aggressively in the political stages by various means. Interest groups have been working to bring "special 301" system come into place and been affecting its enforcement. They have worked to make several revisions of "337" clause and make it a protectionist tool to target foreign competitors from exporting high technology goods to US market. They also have worked to push USTR to bring China to WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 2007.
Thirdly, the IPP decision mechanism of USA and China was explored from the perspective of political economy. Since 1970s US has begun to be a trade deficit country and its hegemony has begun to decay. U.S has made a strategy by linking its trade partner' protection of US IPRs with the market access opportunity given to this partner, with the hope of maintain or strengthening its hegemony. This strategy was strengthened in the 21st century, with its Congress, the administration and interest groups from iprs-intensive industries have been consistently advocating high level of IPRs international protection and have been working closely to achieve this goal. China has been the most important target of US. Under the "market-preserving federalism" political system, Chinese government has begun to introduce modern IPP systems into China as a measure to execute the open-door strategy which was mainly the idea of China's supreme leaders. Under this strategy, China's foreign trade policy and IPRs policy was decided by the leaders by trading off the benefits and costs of strengthening IPP under the outer pressure and internal development demand. Interest groups and their activities only had a "marginal" effect to China's IPP decision, but with the development of science and technology, economy, social and law systems, more supporting strengths have emerged and making higher degree of IPP benefit China more. After China's WTO accession, the IPP legislation level has approached that in developed countries and the enforcement of IPRs is still the focus of USA's monitoring. Chinese government has made great effort to fulfill the requirements of US and international agreements of IPP but in recent years China has been more actively in enforcing IPRs with a view to stimulating indigenous innovation.
Fourthly, the empirical analysis of Sino-US IPP friction on China's actual IPP level was conducted. After review of the measurement of actual IPP level, a times-series econometrical model was constructed with the data from 1985-2009 and 18 specific equations were regressed. Results showed that the pressure under the "special 301" system has not significantly affected China's actual level of IPP, but "Trips" has significantly and immensely promoted the increase of IPP level. Considering that "Trips" is also a channel by USA to strengthen international protection of IPRs which was brought into WTO by USA and other developed countries. It was concluded that the IPP friction between USA and China has truly promoted the increase of the IPP actual level in China and made the process of our country's IPP evolvement an international political economic progress. The case study to the Sino-Us copyright friction and the progress of promoting use of authorized software showed that BSA has on one hand intensify the copyright friction between USA and China, on the other hand BSA has worked with domestic interest groups to pressure Chinese government promote the authorization of software in China.
Finally, the future trend of IPP friction between USA and China and its effect on the bilateral trade relations was analyzed. In a long period in the future, the IPP friction will not stop and will show a great sophistication but it will not affect the whole bilateral trade relations. Based on these judgments, some strategic counter-measures for China to respond to the IPP friction were put forward and the future research topics were raised from both the theoretical and empirical aspects.
引文
①我国1980年就加入了世界知识产权组织,WIPO.
①来自联合国世界知识产权组织网站的介绍,available at:http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/zh/. "Intellectual Property, What is It?" available at:www.stopfakes.gov.
②英国知识产权委员会(CIPR)：《整合知识产权与发展政策》,2002年12月
①郑成思.中国知识产权制度的建立与知识产权保护现状(上)韶关学院学报(社会科学版).2005(7)：2.商业秘密被列为财产权(亦即知识产权)中的一项,是在世界贸易组织成立之后。
②TRIPS协定中的七类知识产权包括：版权及其邻接权、商标权、地理标志、工业品外观设计、专利权、集成电路的布图设计(拓扑图)、未经披露的信息(商业秘密)。但中美知识产权保护摩擦中涉及的知识产权主要有四种：版权,商标,专利和商业秘密。
①自1984年成立以来,ⅡPA一直参与301条款和特别301条款下对韩国、印度、巴西、中国等进行的知识产权调查。
②International Intellectual Property Alliance:2002 Special 301 Report, pp.38,50, available at:www.iipa.com.
①关于“337”条款的修订内容参考了于洋的博士学位论文《美国337条款实施机制研究》复旦大学,2010。
①As reported by the Semiconductor Industry Association in its comments to the February 2010 FRN, and based on the ITC database (industry defned at a six digit North American Industry Classifcation System level.)
②As reported by the BSA in its comments to the February 2010 FRN, and based on the OECD STAN Database, available on line at http://stats oecd org/Index aspx?DatasetCode=STAN08BIS&lang=en "Software and related services" are those businesses that fall under code 72 in the ISIC rev3 industry classification.
③As reported by the Motion Picture Association of America in its submission to the February 2010 FRN, and based on analysis of total jobs and wages (direct and indirect) using U S Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) data and SIC to NAICS bridge, industry data, and the RIMS Ⅱ model of the U S Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and analysis of employment and payments data, using income and sales tax rates
④Ibid., pg 52.
⑤Stephen E Siwek, "The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U. S. Economy", Policy Report 189, Institute for Policy Innovation,10/3/2007.
United States Government Accountability Office,“Intellectual Property:Observations on Eforts to Quantify the Economy Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,” GAO-10-423, April 2010.
①浦树柔.勾画国家知识产权战略.燎望,2006(4)：14
①圣晖.世界知识产权保护新趋势.中国信息报,2007-05-23.转引自刘恩东.中美利益集团与政府决策的比较研究.中共中央党校,2008：176。
①Robert G. Sutter,U.S. Policy toward China—An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups(Lanham,Md.:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1998), p.61转引自何兴强.中国加入世贸组织以来的中美知识产权争端.美国研究,2008(2)：56.
②曲三强.被动立法的百年轮迥—谈中国知识产权保护的发展历程.中处法学,1999(2)：121.
③表3-4～3-6的数据来源于Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy:The 2003-2007 Report, by Stephen e. Siwek of economists incorporated, prepared for the international intellectual property alliance (iipa), June 2009, available at www.iipa.com.经笔者整理。
①美国2000-2010年已经与多国进行自由贸易协定谈判,其中已实施的包括：约旦、新加坡,智利,澳大利亚,摩洛哥,CAFTA-DR哥斯达黎加,巴西萨尔瓦多,瓜地马拉,洪都拉斯,尼加拉瓜和多米尼加共和国，巴林,阿曼和秘鲁。而与哥伦比亚,巴拿马和韩国的协定正等待国会批准。此外,ⅡPA也积极支持美国在目前正在进行的环太平洋合作关系(TPP)谈判中加强知识产权保护。
②1996年在WIPO外交大会上达成了两个网络协定-WCT和WPPT,截至2009年5月,已有70个国家批准了WIPO版权协定WCT,68个国家批准了WIPO表演与录音协定,中国在2007年6月9日已经加入这两个协定。
③如美国在2010年11月已经与37个国家签订的反假冒贸易协定(ACTA),主要用来打击知识产权侵权尤其是假冒和盗版问题,包括民事、刑事、边境措施以及电子虚拟环境下的知识产权执法措施和合作机制。
④鉴于网络盗版的盛行,ⅡPA和其成员积极推动WCT和WPPT在世界范围内完全和立即实施。
⑤当然,由于假药也会影响到社会公共安全,因此政府打击假药的行动既体现了对社会福利的关注,也体现了医药行业的游说能力。
①从FDI存量水平来看,2009年,中国是美国对外直接投资的第19大接受国。USDOC, BEA, International Economic Accounts:"Operations of Multinationals Abroad; U.S. Direct Investment Abroad."
①例如,1992年第一次修改《专利法》的同一年,中国加入《伯尔尼公约》和《世界版权公约》,第二年修改《商标法》、颁布《反不正当竞争法》；2000年第二次修改《专利法》的第二年,修改《著作权法》和《商标法》。
①选取指标的理由及各指标构建的具体方法参见原文。韩玉雄.李怀祖.关于中国知识产权保护水平的定量分析.科学学研究,2005(3)：377-381.
②许春明，陈敏(2008)计算“执法强度”时考虑了五个方面的因素：司法保护水平、行政保护水平、经济发展水平、社会公众意识以及国际监督制衡,这五个方面各用一个代理指标来度量,有四个代理指标构建的具体方法与H-L(2005)中的四个指标基本相同,增加了成人识字率指标,用来度量社会公众意识。具体构建方法见原文。
③姚利民,饶艳(2009)同样借鉴了HL法的修正思路,用“执行效果”指标去修正GPI值的缺陷。其“执行效果”从4个方面来考察：(1)社会法制化程度；(2)政府的执法态度；(3)相关服务机构配备；(4)社会知识产权保护意识。这些指标与韩玉雄和李怀祖(2005)中用来度量“执行力度”的指标有所不同。这四个方面分别用一个代理指标来度量,分别用(1)律师比例；(2)专利侵权案件的审结率；(3)能办理知识产权相关事务的律所的比例”；(4)“人均专利的申请量”来代理。具体的指标构建方法参见原文。姚利民,饶艳(2009)《中国知识产权保护的水平测量和地区差异》国际贸易问题2009年(1)：114-120.遗憾的是他们并没有在文章中给出各省区修正后的知识产权保护指数值,而仅仅给出了平均值。
①值得注意的是,与HL法计算执法强度时不同,孙旭玉在计算执法强度时没有考虑人均GDP。具体计算方法参见原文：孙旭玉.中国知识产权保护水平与影响因素的实证分析.理论学刊,2010(7)：55-59.
②其中许春明,陈敏(2008)和孙玉旭(2010)给出的GP值相同；沈国兵,刘佳(2009)给出的GP值偏高；韩玉雄、李怀祖(2005)和姚利民,饶艳(2009)给出的GP值相同。
①Reuters, Jan.20,1995转引自La Croix and Konan (2002) page 6.
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①来自联合国世界知识产权组织网站的介绍,available at:http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/zh/. "Intellectual Property, What is It?" available at:www.stopfakes.gov.
②英国知识产权委员会(CIPR)：《整合知识产权与发展政策》,2002年12月
①郑成思.中国知识产权制度的建立与知识产权保护现状(上)韶关学院学报(社会科学版).2005(7)：2.商业秘密被列为财产权(亦即知识产权)中的一项,是在世界贸易组织成立之后。
②TRIPS协定中的七类知识产权包括：版权及其邻接权、商标权、地理标志、工业品外观设计、专利权、集成电路的布图设计(拓扑图)、未经披露的信息(商业秘密)。但中美知识产权保护摩擦中涉及的知识产权主要有四种：版权,商标,专利和商业秘密。
①自1984年成立以来,ⅡPA一直参与301条款和特别301条款下对韩国、印度、巴西、中国等进行的知识产权调查。
②International Intellectual Property Alliance:2002 Special 301 Report, pp.38,50, available at:www.iipa.com.
①关于“337”条款的修订内容参考了于洋的博士学位论文《美国337条款实施机制研究》复旦大学,2010。
①As reported by the Semiconductor Industry Association in its comments to the February 2010 FRN, and based on the ITC database (industry defned at a six digit North American Industry Classifcation System level.)
②As reported by the BSA in its comments to the February 2010 FRN, and based on the OECD STAN Database, available on line at http://stats oecd org/Index aspx?DatasetCode=STAN08BIS&lang=en "Software and related services" are those businesses that fall under code 72 in the ISIC rev3 industry classification.
③As reported by the Motion Picture Association of America in its submission to the February 2010 FRN, and based on analysis of total jobs and wages (direct and indirect) using U S Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) data and SIC to NAICS bridge, industry data, and the RIMS Ⅱ model of the U S Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and analysis of employment and payments data, using income and sales tax rates
④Ibid., pg 52.
⑤Stephen E Siwek, "The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U. S. Economy", Policy Report 189, Institute for Policy Innovation,10/3/2007.
United States Government Accountability Office,“Intellectual Property:Observations on Eforts to Quantify the Economy Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,” GAO-10-423, April 2010.
①浦树柔.勾画国家知识产权战略.燎望,2006(4)：14
①圣晖.世界知识产权保护新趋势.中国信息报,2007-05-23.转引自刘恩东.中美利益集团与政府决策的比较研究.中共中央党校,2008：176。
①Robert G. Sutter,U.S. Policy toward China—An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups(Lanham,Md.:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1998), p.61转引自何兴强.中国加入世贸组织以来的中美知识产权争端.美国研究,2008(2)：56.
②曲三强.被动立法的百年轮迥—谈中国知识产权保护的发展历程.中处法学,1999(2)：121.
③表3-4～3-6的数据来源于Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy:The 2003-2007 Report, by Stephen e. Siwek of economists incorporated, prepared for the international intellectual property alliance (iipa), June 2009, available at www.iipa.com.经笔者整理。
①美国2000-2010年已经与多国进行自由贸易协定谈判,其中已实施的包括：约旦、新加坡,智利,澳大利亚,摩洛哥,CAFTA-DR哥斯达黎加,巴西萨尔瓦多,瓜地马拉,洪都拉斯,尼加拉瓜和多米尼加共和国，巴林,阿曼和秘鲁。而与哥伦比亚,巴拿马和韩国的协定正等待国会批准。此外,ⅡPA也积极支持美国在目前正在进行的环太平洋合作关系(TPP)谈判中加强知识产权保护。
②1996年在WIPO外交大会上达成了两个网络协定-WCT和WPPT,截至2009年5月,已有70个国家批准了WIPO版权协定WCT,68个国家批准了WIPO表演与录音协定,中国在2007年6月9日已经加入这两个协定。
③如美国在2010年11月已经与37个国家签订的反假冒贸易协定(ACTA),主要用来打击知识产权侵权尤其是假冒和盗版问题,包括民事、刑事、边境措施以及电子虚拟环境下的知识产权执法措施和合作机制。
④鉴于网络盗版的盛行,ⅡPA和其成员积极推动WCT和WPPT在世界范围内完全和立即实施。
⑤当然,由于假药也会影响到社会公共安全,因此政府打击假药的行动既体现了对社会福利的关注,也体现了医药行业的游说能力。
①从FDI存量水平来看,2009年,中国是美国对外直接投资的第19大接受国。USDOC, BEA, International Economic Accounts:"Operations of Multinationals Abroad; U.S. Direct Investment Abroad."
①例如,1992年第一次修改《专利法》的同一年,中国加入《伯尔尼公约》和《世界版权公约》,第二年修改《商标法》、颁布《反不正当竞争法》；2000年第二次修改《专利法》的第二年,修改《著作权法》和《商标法》。
①选取指标的理由及各指标构建的具体方法参见原文。韩玉雄.李怀祖.关于中国知识产权保护水平的定量分析.科学学研究,2005(3)：377-381.
②许春明，陈敏(2008)计算“执法强度”时考虑了五个方面的因素：司法保护水平、行政保护水平、经济发展水平、社会公众意识以及国际监督制衡,这五个方面各用一个代理指标来度量,有四个代理指标构建的具体方法与H-L(2005)中的四个指标基本相同,增加了成人识字率指标,用来度量社会公众意识。具体构建方法见原文。
③姚利民,饶艳(2009)同样借鉴了HL法的修正思路,用“执行效果”指标去修正GPI值的缺陷。其“执行效果”从4个方面来考察：(1)社会法制化程度；(2)政府的执法态度；(3)相关服务机构配备；(4)社会知识产权保护意识。这些指标与韩玉雄和李怀祖(2005)中用来度量“执行力度”的指标有所不同。这四个方面分别用一个代理指标来度量,分别用(1)律师比例；(2)专利侵权案件的审结率；(3)能办理知识产权相关事务的律所的比例”；(4)“人均专利的申请量”来代理。具体的指标构建方法参见原文。姚利民,饶艳(2009)《中国知识产权保护的水平测量和地区差异》国际贸易问题2009年(1)：114-120.遗憾的是他们并没有在文章中给出各省区修正后的知识产权保护指数值,而仅仅给出了平均值。
①值得注意的是,与HL法计算执法强度时不同,孙旭玉在计算执法强度时没有考虑人均GDP。具体计算方法参见原文：孙旭玉.中国知识产权保护水平与影响因素的实证分析.理论学刊,2010(7)：55-59.
②其中许春明,陈敏(2008)和孙玉旭(2010)给出的GP值相同；沈国兵,刘佳(2009)给出的GP值偏高；韩玉雄、李怀祖(2005)和姚利民,饶艳(2009)给出的GP值相同。
①Reuters, Jan.20,1995转引自La Croix and Konan (2002) page 6.
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