我国上市公司财务报告舞弊特征及识别研究
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摘要
会计是一种通用的商业语言,客观、完整的会计信息不仅可以为有关各方的经济决策提供有效基础,更是资本市场稳定发展的基石。财务报告舞弊行为的存在,严重损害了投资者尤其是中小投资者的利益,干扰了资本市场的正常秩序。研究财务报告舞弊公司的特征,构建财务报告舞弊的识别模型,对于提高监管效率,抑制财务报告舞弊行为的发生,保护投资者利益具有重要意义。
本文首先结合舞弊理论,以2004-2009年证监会处罚公告中为基础,分析了我国上市公司财务报告舞弊动机的演变,并根据舞弊动机和手段的不同,将舞弊公司分为调节利润舞弊和非调节利润舞弊两类,以便针对性地研究不同舞弊行为的特征,构建针对性的舞弊识别模型。
其次,本文分析了调节利润类舞弊公司的财务特征和治理机制特征。研究发现,在财务特征方面,调节利润类舞弊公司具有更高比例的应收账款和其他应收款,有更低比例的存货和固定资产原值,有更高的资产负债率和较低的总资产周转率。在公司治理机制特征方面,当面临同样的盈利压力的情况下,第一大股东的股权性质和持股比例对财务报告舞弊行为有重大影响,而公司内部治理机制对抑制财务报告舞弊行为没有显著作用;与正常公司相比,第一大股东的股权性质和持股比例、股东大会出席率对财务报告舞弊行为存在重大影响;调节利润类舞弊公司的董事会规模、监事会规模显著小于正常公司,董事会、监事会和高管持股比例显著低于正常公司。另外,无论是与同利润水平的非舞弊公司相比,还是与正常公司相比,注册会计师均能对舞弊行为保持较高的职业谨慎,对舞弊公司出具非标准审计意见的可能性更高。
再次,本文研究了非调节利润类舞弊公司的财务特征和治理机制特征。研究发现,在财务特征方面,非调节利润类舞弊公司具有更高比例的应收账款和其他应收款,更低比例的存货和固定资产原值,更高的资产负债率、管理费用率和财务费用率;舞弊公司的总资产周转率和应收账款周转率显著低于非舞弊公司。在公司治理机制特征方面,舞弊公司仅有四个指标显著不同于非舞弊公司,一是审计意见,舞弊公司的审计意见显著差于非舞弊公司,注册会计师对舞弊公司的非调节利润舞弊行为保持了较高的职业谨慎;二是提供审计服务的事务所规模,当为上市公司提供审计服务的事务所规模处于前二十大时,较少发生非调节利润类的舞弊;三是监事会会议次数,舞弊公司的监事会会议次数显著高于非舞弊公司;四是高管持股比例,舞弊公司的高管持股比例显著低于非舞弊公司。
最后,论文将所有样本按年限分为训练样本集和测试样本集,运用LibSVM算法中的RBF核函数和线性核函数分别构建了调节利润舞弊公司的识别模型和非调节利润舞弊公司的识别模型,并将模型结果与传统的Logistic回归模型进行了比较。结果表明,在构建调节利润舞弊识别模型时,SVM算法RBF核函数预测精度达到86.67%,总体正确率87.5%;SVM算法线性核函数的预测精度83.33%,总体正确率86.61%; Logistic回归模型的预测精度为80%,总体正确率83.04%,SVM算法RBF核函数模型的预测精度和总体正确率均最高,识别效果最好。在构建非调节利润舞弊识别模型时,SVM算法RBF核函数模型预测精度83.33%,总体正确率87.97%;SVM算法线性核函数的预测精度87.5%,总体正确率83.54%; Logistic回归模型的预测精度为83.33%,总体正确率80.38%,线性核函数的预测精度最高,预测效果更好。综合而言,在构建调节利润舞弊识别模型时,采用SVM算法RBF核函数更为有效;在构建非调节利润舞弊识别模型时,采用SVM算法线性核函数更为有效。
基于上述研究,本文提出了具有改进价值的政策建议:完善上市公司的退市制度;完善上市公司的董事会决策制度;完善上市公司的股权激励计划,适当提高董监高的持股比例;完善独立董事制度,使独立董事真正发挥监督作用。
Accounting is a universal Commercial language. Objective and impartial accounting information can provide an effective basis for economic decisions, and it is also useful in maintaining the capital market stability. The financial reporting fraud inflicts on investors(especially small investors) seriously, disrupts the normal order of capital market. Study on the characteristics and detection model of financial reporting fraud is necessary, which can improve the efficiency of supervision, reduce the incidence of financial reporting fraud and protect the investors.
This paper analyzes the motive of financial reporting fraud, using the data of the Chinese listed companies penalized by SEC in 2004-2009. Then, all the fraud companies are divided into two categories according to the motive of fraud, in order to study the specific characteristics of various fraudulent practices in financial reporting, and build targeted fraud detectiing models.
Based on the data of 56 fraudulent financial reportings and 56 non-fraudulent financial reportings, characteristics of the companies implemented FFR to regulate profits is illustrated. The results of the research show that the companies implemented FFR to regulate profits have a higher proportion of accounts receivable and other receivables, a lower proportion of inventories and fixed assets, a higher asset-liability ratio and a lower total asset turnover. When faced with the same profit pressures, nature of the largest shareholders and the proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholders have major impact on the occurrence of FFR; while the inhibition of internal corporate governance mechanisms have no affect on the financial reporting fraud. Compared with the normal company, the board size, supervisors board size and proportion of shares owned by board, supervisors boardand and executives is significantly less than the non- fraudulent company. And in both cases, CPA can identify FFR.
Based on the data of 79 fraudulent financial reportings and 79 non-fraudulent financial reportings, characteristics of the companies implemented FFR not to regulate profits is illustrated. It is concluded that the companies implemented FFR not to regulate profits have a higher proportion of accounts receivable and other receivables, a lower proportion of inventories and fixed assets, a higher asset-liability ratio, a higher operating expenses ratio and financial expense ratio; a lower total asset turnover and receivables turnover. There are four variables to be possible indicators of non- regulating profits FFR.These included audit opinion, accounting firms, frequency of supervisors board meetings, the proportion of shares owned by the executives.
Finally, all the samples are divided into two groups, one group is the training sample set, the other is test sample. With the data of training sample set, the detection models of FFR are constructed using LibSVM algorithm of RBF kernel and linear kernel. Then, the prediction accuracy of the model is tested with the data of test sample set. Finally, the paper compares the prediction accuracy of the LicSVM models and the Logistic regression models.
It turns out that the prediction accuracy of LibSVM algorithm for RBF kernel function model to detect regulating-profits FFR is 86.67%, the overall accuracy is 87.5%. Corresponding to the model of LibSVM linear kernel function algorithm, the prediction accuracy is 83.33%, the overall accuracy rate of 86.61%. the accuracy of the Logistic regression model is 80% and 83.04%.
Corresponding to the model to detect non-regulating-profits FFR, the prediction accuracy of LibSVM algorithm for RBF kernel function model is 83.33%, the overall accuracy is 87.97%. The prediction accuracy of the model of LibSVM linear kernel function algorithm is 87.5%, the overall accuracy rate is 83.54%. The accuracy of the Logistic regression model is 83.33% and 80.38%. In general, the model of the RBF kernel function with SVM algorithm is more effective for detecting regulating-profits FFR, and the model of the linear kernel function with SVM algorithm is more effective for detecting non-regulating-profits FFR.
On the basis of above research, this paper put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. There should be adequately game in order to reduce the financial reporting fraud. Decision-making institution of Board should be perfect. There should be a Employee Stock Ownership Institution to improve the proportion of shares owned by the executives, board and supervisors. And independent director system should be improved, To ensure that independent directors can really play a role in the listed companies.
本文首先结合舞弊理论,以2004-2009年证监会处罚公告中为基础,分析了我国上市公司财务报告舞弊动机的演变,并根据舞弊动机和手段的不同,将舞弊公司分为调节利润舞弊和非调节利润舞弊两类,以便针对性地研究不同舞弊行为的特征,构建针对性的舞弊识别模型。
其次,本文分析了调节利润类舞弊公司的财务特征和治理机制特征。研究发现,在财务特征方面,调节利润类舞弊公司具有更高比例的应收账款和其他应收款,有更低比例的存货和固定资产原值,有更高的资产负债率和较低的总资产周转率。在公司治理机制特征方面,当面临同样的盈利压力的情况下,第一大股东的股权性质和持股比例对财务报告舞弊行为有重大影响,而公司内部治理机制对抑制财务报告舞弊行为没有显著作用;与正常公司相比,第一大股东的股权性质和持股比例、股东大会出席率对财务报告舞弊行为存在重大影响;调节利润类舞弊公司的董事会规模、监事会规模显著小于正常公司,董事会、监事会和高管持股比例显著低于正常公司。另外,无论是与同利润水平的非舞弊公司相比,还是与正常公司相比,注册会计师均能对舞弊行为保持较高的职业谨慎,对舞弊公司出具非标准审计意见的可能性更高。
再次,本文研究了非调节利润类舞弊公司的财务特征和治理机制特征。研究发现,在财务特征方面,非调节利润类舞弊公司具有更高比例的应收账款和其他应收款,更低比例的存货和固定资产原值,更高的资产负债率、管理费用率和财务费用率;舞弊公司的总资产周转率和应收账款周转率显著低于非舞弊公司。在公司治理机制特征方面,舞弊公司仅有四个指标显著不同于非舞弊公司,一是审计意见,舞弊公司的审计意见显著差于非舞弊公司,注册会计师对舞弊公司的非调节利润舞弊行为保持了较高的职业谨慎;二是提供审计服务的事务所规模,当为上市公司提供审计服务的事务所规模处于前二十大时,较少发生非调节利润类的舞弊;三是监事会会议次数,舞弊公司的监事会会议次数显著高于非舞弊公司;四是高管持股比例,舞弊公司的高管持股比例显著低于非舞弊公司。
最后,论文将所有样本按年限分为训练样本集和测试样本集,运用LibSVM算法中的RBF核函数和线性核函数分别构建了调节利润舞弊公司的识别模型和非调节利润舞弊公司的识别模型,并将模型结果与传统的Logistic回归模型进行了比较。结果表明,在构建调节利润舞弊识别模型时,SVM算法RBF核函数预测精度达到86.67%,总体正确率87.5%;SVM算法线性核函数的预测精度83.33%,总体正确率86.61%; Logistic回归模型的预测精度为80%,总体正确率83.04%,SVM算法RBF核函数模型的预测精度和总体正确率均最高,识别效果最好。在构建非调节利润舞弊识别模型时,SVM算法RBF核函数模型预测精度83.33%,总体正确率87.97%;SVM算法线性核函数的预测精度87.5%,总体正确率83.54%; Logistic回归模型的预测精度为83.33%,总体正确率80.38%,线性核函数的预测精度最高,预测效果更好。综合而言,在构建调节利润舞弊识别模型时,采用SVM算法RBF核函数更为有效;在构建非调节利润舞弊识别模型时,采用SVM算法线性核函数更为有效。
基于上述研究,本文提出了具有改进价值的政策建议:完善上市公司的退市制度;完善上市公司的董事会决策制度;完善上市公司的股权激励计划,适当提高董监高的持股比例;完善独立董事制度,使独立董事真正发挥监督作用。
Accounting is a universal Commercial language. Objective and impartial accounting information can provide an effective basis for economic decisions, and it is also useful in maintaining the capital market stability. The financial reporting fraud inflicts on investors(especially small investors) seriously, disrupts the normal order of capital market. Study on the characteristics and detection model of financial reporting fraud is necessary, which can improve the efficiency of supervision, reduce the incidence of financial reporting fraud and protect the investors.
This paper analyzes the motive of financial reporting fraud, using the data of the Chinese listed companies penalized by SEC in 2004-2009. Then, all the fraud companies are divided into two categories according to the motive of fraud, in order to study the specific characteristics of various fraudulent practices in financial reporting, and build targeted fraud detectiing models.
Based on the data of 56 fraudulent financial reportings and 56 non-fraudulent financial reportings, characteristics of the companies implemented FFR to regulate profits is illustrated. The results of the research show that the companies implemented FFR to regulate profits have a higher proportion of accounts receivable and other receivables, a lower proportion of inventories and fixed assets, a higher asset-liability ratio and a lower total asset turnover. When faced with the same profit pressures, nature of the largest shareholders and the proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholders have major impact on the occurrence of FFR; while the inhibition of internal corporate governance mechanisms have no affect on the financial reporting fraud. Compared with the normal company, the board size, supervisors board size and proportion of shares owned by board, supervisors boardand and executives is significantly less than the non- fraudulent company. And in both cases, CPA can identify FFR.
Based on the data of 79 fraudulent financial reportings and 79 non-fraudulent financial reportings, characteristics of the companies implemented FFR not to regulate profits is illustrated. It is concluded that the companies implemented FFR not to regulate profits have a higher proportion of accounts receivable and other receivables, a lower proportion of inventories and fixed assets, a higher asset-liability ratio, a higher operating expenses ratio and financial expense ratio; a lower total asset turnover and receivables turnover. There are four variables to be possible indicators of non- regulating profits FFR.These included audit opinion, accounting firms, frequency of supervisors board meetings, the proportion of shares owned by the executives.
Finally, all the samples are divided into two groups, one group is the training sample set, the other is test sample. With the data of training sample set, the detection models of FFR are constructed using LibSVM algorithm of RBF kernel and linear kernel. Then, the prediction accuracy of the model is tested with the data of test sample set. Finally, the paper compares the prediction accuracy of the LicSVM models and the Logistic regression models.
It turns out that the prediction accuracy of LibSVM algorithm for RBF kernel function model to detect regulating-profits FFR is 86.67%, the overall accuracy is 87.5%. Corresponding to the model of LibSVM linear kernel function algorithm, the prediction accuracy is 83.33%, the overall accuracy rate of 86.61%. the accuracy of the Logistic regression model is 80% and 83.04%.
Corresponding to the model to detect non-regulating-profits FFR, the prediction accuracy of LibSVM algorithm for RBF kernel function model is 83.33%, the overall accuracy is 87.97%. The prediction accuracy of the model of LibSVM linear kernel function algorithm is 87.5%, the overall accuracy rate is 83.54%. The accuracy of the Logistic regression model is 83.33% and 80.38%. In general, the model of the RBF kernel function with SVM algorithm is more effective for detecting regulating-profits FFR, and the model of the linear kernel function with SVM algorithm is more effective for detecting non-regulating-profits FFR.
On the basis of above research, this paper put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. There should be adequately game in order to reduce the financial reporting fraud. Decision-making institution of Board should be perfect. There should be a Employee Stock Ownership Institution to improve the proportion of shares owned by the executives, board and supervisors. And independent director system should be improved, To ensure that independent directors can really play a role in the listed companies.
引文
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