制度、行为与国有企业资本结构优化
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摘要
随着国家市场化经济转轨进程的持续推进,体制外经济的发展取得了举世瞩目的成就。与之相比,体制内经济的发展要逊色得多。如何搞活国有经济,使国有经济主体成为不依赖垄断力量而真正具备竞争优势的、有活力的,高效的社会主义市场经济的微观基础,是摆在政府、企业界及诸多专家学者面前的一项紧迫任务。鉴于资本结构对于企业市场价值的重要意义,这个问题的解决对于搞活国有企业,提升国有企业业绩至关重要。
西方资本结构理论以传统资本结构理论为起点,始于20世纪50年代。在经历了传统资本结构理论、现代资本结构理论、新资本结构理论三个阶段后,到现在已经形成了公认以静态权衡理论和优序融资理论等主流资本结构理论为核心、兼有多个流派和分支的趋于成熟的理论体系。但我国始于20世纪90年代的资本结构理论及实证研究却表明,国外这些先进的资本结构理论并不能对我国企业尤其是国有企业的融资实践作出很好的解释,作为西方主流资本结构理论的静态权衡理论和优序融资理论在现阶段的中国并不适用。据此,国内的许多研究认为中国上市公司偏好股权融资是不理性的。笔者认为这种分析未免过于简单。
本文以我国转轨经济的特殊制度背景为基点,通过对我国国有企业资本结构形成的宏观背景——转轨经济、我国国有企业资本结构形成的微观背景——治理机制和我国国有企业经理人(以国有控股上市公司为例)的投资行为特征这些直接影响国有企业资本机构形成因素的理论和实证研究得出了一些与以往研究不相同的结论,主要有:
(1)资本结构研究主体资格的忽视和不规范是导致国外、国内研究结果差异的一个主要原因。西方资本结构理论是深深植根于成熟市场经济国家,并以其中的上市公司为研究对象而得出的。能够基于市场变化主动和灵活地调节自身资本结构而不受融资方式和融资渠道的约束是这些公司的基本特征,也是作为资本结构研究对象的基本前提,从这个意义上讲,我国目前尚不存在具备资本结构研究主体资格的研究对象。这是导致国外学者的研究方法和研究结论在我国难以适用的主要原因之一。
(2)转轨经济中制度的快速变迁使之成为影响中国国有企业资本结构形成的内生性决定力量。这与深植于西方发达国家的制度环境,将制度作为外生条件,研究在既定制度条件下市场各方力量变化如何影响企业资本结构的西方现代资本结构理论有着本质的差异。我国国有企业资本结构的选择在很大程度上带有一种体制性特征,主要受转轨经济的进程及阶段性特征的影响并随之变化而逐渐变化的。
(3)现阶段低效的公司治理环境是影响国有企业资本结构形成的重要因素。国有股和法人股为股东主体、股权高度集中、管理层持股比例低的股权结构特征,直接导致了以董事会为首的内部控制制度和管理层激励等其他各种内部治理机制的失效。加之,经理人市场发育不成熟,产品市场竞争不充分,投资者利益保护的法律制度不健全,负债治理的软约束,控制权市场的功能难以发挥等外部治理机制的缺失,使得整个公司治理机制“形似实神不致”,这种公司治理的现状对于我国企业资本结构的形成有着直接而重大的影响力。
(4)现阶段我国转轨经济的宏观背景和治理缺失的微观背景构成的制度体系为我国国有企业包括投资行为在内的各种不规范经营行为的实施提供了便利条件。本文的实证研究表明,国有控股上市公司经理人在进行投资决策时没有将破产因素作为一个重要决策变量,而非国有控股上市公司经理人在进行投资决策时考虑了破产因素影响。投资风险缺失引致的“资金饥渴”是影响我国国有企业经理人资本结构选择的重要因素。
(5)国企——政府——银行的三方博弈中,政府官员的行政目标函数Max[I_g,γI_e,a_(2g),a_(3g),]U_g、国有企业经营者的经营目标函数Max[I_e,a_(2e),a_(3e),β]U_e、商业银行经营者的经营目标函数Max[△(L_b-γI_e),C_b,a_(3b)]U_b决定了政府官员帮助国有企业融资,商业银行经营者响应政府官员对信贷配置的干预是三方的理性选择,可以实现三方的效用最大化。正是基于这样一种博弈过程,我国国有企业获得了绝大多数的金融信贷资源,获得了绝大多数的股市资源和获得了绝大多数的债市资源。
(6)我国国有企业资本结构的形成机理是:在政府强制性经济转轨这一特殊的体制背景下,在社会资金稀缺、融资渠道缺乏、投资冲动强烈、而破产机制及公司治理机制均不完善的条件下,对政府官员、企业管理者、银行管理者相互博弈结果的综合反映。可以说,我国现阶段国有企业的资本结构主要是由目前市场化经济转轨进程的体制性特征所决定的。因此,大力推进经济体制转轨并同时完善市场化的公司治理才是优化我国国有企业资本结构的主要途径。
With the sustained upgrading of our country's marketed-oriented economic transfer,the non-system economy made great progress,but the economic within the system did not.How to vitalize the national economy by reforming the state owned enterprises and make them become the microcosmic base of the socialism market economy with energy and efficiency is a urgent problem of the government、enterprises and scholars.Owing to the great influence imposed on the market value by the capital structure of the enterprises,the problem is solved good or not is crucial to vitalize the national economy and improve the enterprises' performance.
The western capital structure theory started in 1950s,with the traditional capital structure being the initial stage.Now after experienced three stages of traditional capital structure theory、modern capital structure theory and new capital structure theory,the capital structure theory is becoming a perfect theory system with many genres and among which the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are the recognized mainstream capital structure theory.But the domestic correlative theoretical and empirical studies which started at 1990s show that these foreign advanced theories did not give satisfied expression to the financing actions of the state-owned enterprises of our country.The mainstream capital structure theory including trade-off theory and pecking order theory does not fit our country in the current time.So many researchers think that it isn't rational for enterprises to prefer equity financing,but the author don't agree this kind of simple thinking.
Based on the special institutional background of transition economy and by analysis of the directly deciding factors to form the capital structure,such as the macro background——transfer economy、the micro background——governance mechanism and the managers' investment actions,this paper got some conclusions that different from before.They are:
(1)The neglect and nonstandard of the qualification of research subjects on capital structure is a main reason for the differences between the domestic and the foreign results.The western capital structure theory grew out of countries which are completed market economy,and by use of samples in which that they obtained their conclusions.The basic characteristic or precondition of companies that they used as the research subject is that it can adjust its capital structure actively and flexibly according to the changes of the market without restrain of the choice of financing channels or methods.From this viewpoint,there does not exists research subject that meeting these above conditions.But I think this is one of the main reasons made the foreigners' research methods and conclusions unfit for that of our country.
(2)Fast changing of institution in transition economy made it the endogenous deciding power to influence the forming of Chinese enterprises' capital structure.This is essentially different from the western capital structure theory which grew out of completed market economy and looked the institution as exogenous variables and researched the ways of changes of the market how to influence the capital structure under the unchanged institution.The choice of our enterprises' capital structure is mainly decided by the evolution and systematic characteristics of the transfer economy and changes with them.So the characteristics of Chinese enterprises' capital structure in the current time are the reflection of the systematic characteristics in the great degree.
(3)Inefficient corporate governance environment at the present stage is an important deciding factor influences the forming of the Chinese enterprises' capital structure.State shares and legal person shares being the main part、high centralization and low Managerial Stockholding Level are the ownership structure characteristics of our country at the present time.That directly leads to invalidation of the enterprise internal control system leaded by board of directors and management incentive and some other internal governance mechanisms.Additionally,most external governance mechanisms including managerial labor market、product market competition、laws for investors' interest protection、debt governance、the market for corporate control etc have their frameworks but did not play their roles in practice.That plays an important role on the forming of the Chinese enterprises' capital structure.
(4)Now the law and institution system of macro background of transfer economy and the micro background of inefficient governance mechanism bring convenience to some irregular behaviors including investment.Empirical analysis of this paper show that the managers of state-owned charging share listed companies didn't consider bankruptcy as an important variable,but the managers of non state-owned charging share listed companies did.The "thirst for money" owing to shortage of risk of the manager's investment behaviors plays an important role on the select of capital structure.
(5)In the three-side game by enterprises,government and banks,the objective function of governors is Max[I_g,γI_e,a_(2g),a_(3g)]U_g,the objective function of the entrepreneurs of state-owned enterprises is Max[I_e,a_(2e),a_(3e),β]U_e and the objective function of the managers of state-owned commercial banks is Max[△(L_b-γI_e),C_b,a_(3b)]U_b,which decide that the governors help state-owned enterprises finance and the managers of state-owned commercial banks give positive respondence to the administration interference are their rational selection.Just based on that,the state-owned enterprises got mostly of all the credit resources,stock market resources and bond resources.
(6)At present stage,the capital structure of state-owned enterprises is a comprehensive reflection of the results of interaction among governors,entrepreneurs of state-owned enterprises and the managers of state-owned commercial banks,under conditions of transfer economy,short of social fund,being restrained by financing channels and methods,investment impulsion,inefficacy bankrupt mechanism and governance mechanism.That is the causal mechanism of the capital structure of state-owned enterprises.So we can get the conclusion that the capital structure of state-owned enterprises at the present time is mainly decided by the systematic characteristics of the evolution of the market-oriented transfer economy.So the best way to optimize the capital structure of state-owned enterprises at the present time is energetically boosting the evolution of the market-oriented transfer economy and perfecting the corporate governance mechanism at the same time.
西方资本结构理论以传统资本结构理论为起点,始于20世纪50年代。在经历了传统资本结构理论、现代资本结构理论、新资本结构理论三个阶段后,到现在已经形成了公认以静态权衡理论和优序融资理论等主流资本结构理论为核心、兼有多个流派和分支的趋于成熟的理论体系。但我国始于20世纪90年代的资本结构理论及实证研究却表明,国外这些先进的资本结构理论并不能对我国企业尤其是国有企业的融资实践作出很好的解释,作为西方主流资本结构理论的静态权衡理论和优序融资理论在现阶段的中国并不适用。据此,国内的许多研究认为中国上市公司偏好股权融资是不理性的。笔者认为这种分析未免过于简单。
本文以我国转轨经济的特殊制度背景为基点,通过对我国国有企业资本结构形成的宏观背景——转轨经济、我国国有企业资本结构形成的微观背景——治理机制和我国国有企业经理人(以国有控股上市公司为例)的投资行为特征这些直接影响国有企业资本机构形成因素的理论和实证研究得出了一些与以往研究不相同的结论,主要有:
(1)资本结构研究主体资格的忽视和不规范是导致国外、国内研究结果差异的一个主要原因。西方资本结构理论是深深植根于成熟市场经济国家,并以其中的上市公司为研究对象而得出的。能够基于市场变化主动和灵活地调节自身资本结构而不受融资方式和融资渠道的约束是这些公司的基本特征,也是作为资本结构研究对象的基本前提,从这个意义上讲,我国目前尚不存在具备资本结构研究主体资格的研究对象。这是导致国外学者的研究方法和研究结论在我国难以适用的主要原因之一。
(2)转轨经济中制度的快速变迁使之成为影响中国国有企业资本结构形成的内生性决定力量。这与深植于西方发达国家的制度环境,将制度作为外生条件,研究在既定制度条件下市场各方力量变化如何影响企业资本结构的西方现代资本结构理论有着本质的差异。我国国有企业资本结构的选择在很大程度上带有一种体制性特征,主要受转轨经济的进程及阶段性特征的影响并随之变化而逐渐变化的。
(3)现阶段低效的公司治理环境是影响国有企业资本结构形成的重要因素。国有股和法人股为股东主体、股权高度集中、管理层持股比例低的股权结构特征,直接导致了以董事会为首的内部控制制度和管理层激励等其他各种内部治理机制的失效。加之,经理人市场发育不成熟,产品市场竞争不充分,投资者利益保护的法律制度不健全,负债治理的软约束,控制权市场的功能难以发挥等外部治理机制的缺失,使得整个公司治理机制“形似实神不致”,这种公司治理的现状对于我国企业资本结构的形成有着直接而重大的影响力。
(4)现阶段我国转轨经济的宏观背景和治理缺失的微观背景构成的制度体系为我国国有企业包括投资行为在内的各种不规范经营行为的实施提供了便利条件。本文的实证研究表明,国有控股上市公司经理人在进行投资决策时没有将破产因素作为一个重要决策变量,而非国有控股上市公司经理人在进行投资决策时考虑了破产因素影响。投资风险缺失引致的“资金饥渴”是影响我国国有企业经理人资本结构选择的重要因素。
(5)国企——政府——银行的三方博弈中,政府官员的行政目标函数Max[I_g,γI_e,a_(2g),a_(3g),]U_g、国有企业经营者的经营目标函数Max[I_e,a_(2e),a_(3e),β]U_e、商业银行经营者的经营目标函数Max[△(L_b-γI_e),C_b,a_(3b)]U_b决定了政府官员帮助国有企业融资,商业银行经营者响应政府官员对信贷配置的干预是三方的理性选择,可以实现三方的效用最大化。正是基于这样一种博弈过程,我国国有企业获得了绝大多数的金融信贷资源,获得了绝大多数的股市资源和获得了绝大多数的债市资源。
(6)我国国有企业资本结构的形成机理是:在政府强制性经济转轨这一特殊的体制背景下,在社会资金稀缺、融资渠道缺乏、投资冲动强烈、而破产机制及公司治理机制均不完善的条件下,对政府官员、企业管理者、银行管理者相互博弈结果的综合反映。可以说,我国现阶段国有企业的资本结构主要是由目前市场化经济转轨进程的体制性特征所决定的。因此,大力推进经济体制转轨并同时完善市场化的公司治理才是优化我国国有企业资本结构的主要途径。
With the sustained upgrading of our country's marketed-oriented economic transfer,the non-system economy made great progress,but the economic within the system did not.How to vitalize the national economy by reforming the state owned enterprises and make them become the microcosmic base of the socialism market economy with energy and efficiency is a urgent problem of the government、enterprises and scholars.Owing to the great influence imposed on the market value by the capital structure of the enterprises,the problem is solved good or not is crucial to vitalize the national economy and improve the enterprises' performance.
The western capital structure theory started in 1950s,with the traditional capital structure being the initial stage.Now after experienced three stages of traditional capital structure theory、modern capital structure theory and new capital structure theory,the capital structure theory is becoming a perfect theory system with many genres and among which the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are the recognized mainstream capital structure theory.But the domestic correlative theoretical and empirical studies which started at 1990s show that these foreign advanced theories did not give satisfied expression to the financing actions of the state-owned enterprises of our country.The mainstream capital structure theory including trade-off theory and pecking order theory does not fit our country in the current time.So many researchers think that it isn't rational for enterprises to prefer equity financing,but the author don't agree this kind of simple thinking.
Based on the special institutional background of transition economy and by analysis of the directly deciding factors to form the capital structure,such as the macro background——transfer economy、the micro background——governance mechanism and the managers' investment actions,this paper got some conclusions that different from before.They are:
(1)The neglect and nonstandard of the qualification of research subjects on capital structure is a main reason for the differences between the domestic and the foreign results.The western capital structure theory grew out of countries which are completed market economy,and by use of samples in which that they obtained their conclusions.The basic characteristic or precondition of companies that they used as the research subject is that it can adjust its capital structure actively and flexibly according to the changes of the market without restrain of the choice of financing channels or methods.From this viewpoint,there does not exists research subject that meeting these above conditions.But I think this is one of the main reasons made the foreigners' research methods and conclusions unfit for that of our country.
(2)Fast changing of institution in transition economy made it the endogenous deciding power to influence the forming of Chinese enterprises' capital structure.This is essentially different from the western capital structure theory which grew out of completed market economy and looked the institution as exogenous variables and researched the ways of changes of the market how to influence the capital structure under the unchanged institution.The choice of our enterprises' capital structure is mainly decided by the evolution and systematic characteristics of the transfer economy and changes with them.So the characteristics of Chinese enterprises' capital structure in the current time are the reflection of the systematic characteristics in the great degree.
(3)Inefficient corporate governance environment at the present stage is an important deciding factor influences the forming of the Chinese enterprises' capital structure.State shares and legal person shares being the main part、high centralization and low Managerial Stockholding Level are the ownership structure characteristics of our country at the present time.That directly leads to invalidation of the enterprise internal control system leaded by board of directors and management incentive and some other internal governance mechanisms.Additionally,most external governance mechanisms including managerial labor market、product market competition、laws for investors' interest protection、debt governance、the market for corporate control etc have their frameworks but did not play their roles in practice.That plays an important role on the forming of the Chinese enterprises' capital structure.
(4)Now the law and institution system of macro background of transfer economy and the micro background of inefficient governance mechanism bring convenience to some irregular behaviors including investment.Empirical analysis of this paper show that the managers of state-owned charging share listed companies didn't consider bankruptcy as an important variable,but the managers of non state-owned charging share listed companies did.The "thirst for money" owing to shortage of risk of the manager's investment behaviors plays an important role on the select of capital structure.
(5)In the three-side game by enterprises,government and banks,the objective function of governors is Max[I_g,γI_e,a_(2g),a_(3g)]U_g,the objective function of the entrepreneurs of state-owned enterprises is Max[I_e,a_(2e),a_(3e),β]U_e and the objective function of the managers of state-owned commercial banks is Max[△(L_b-γI_e),C_b,a_(3b)]U_b,which decide that the governors help state-owned enterprises finance and the managers of state-owned commercial banks give positive respondence to the administration interference are their rational selection.Just based on that,the state-owned enterprises got mostly of all the credit resources,stock market resources and bond resources.
(6)At present stage,the capital structure of state-owned enterprises is a comprehensive reflection of the results of interaction among governors,entrepreneurs of state-owned enterprises and the managers of state-owned commercial banks,under conditions of transfer economy,short of social fund,being restrained by financing channels and methods,investment impulsion,inefficacy bankrupt mechanism and governance mechanism.That is the causal mechanism of the capital structure of state-owned enterprises.So we can get the conclusion that the capital structure of state-owned enterprises at the present time is mainly decided by the systematic characteristics of the evolution of the market-oriented transfer economy.So the best way to optimize the capital structure of state-owned enterprises at the present time is energetically boosting the evolution of the market-oriented transfer economy and perfecting the corporate governance mechanism at the same time.
引文
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