我国国有上市公司股票期权激励实证分析
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摘要
20世纪30年代，随着股份公司股东股权的逐渐分散和管理技术的复杂多变，出现了所有者与经营者分离的现象；到了60年代变得更为突出，由于信息不对称，出现了股东不能够对管理者进行有效监督；80年代后期，世界各地的大多数公司开始采用股票期权作为对公司高管理人员的报酬激励，以实现所有者与经营者统一的目标；发展到90年代，股票期权激励已成为美国上市公司高管理人员的主要报酬，西方国家如英国、加拿大、法国等也开始使用股票期权激励公司的经营者。可见在西方国家，股票期权激励已经成为了公司高管激励所广泛采用的方式。但是，20世纪90年代后期，美国安然公司、世通公司等国际知名企业和会计师事务所共谋的财务舞弊让人们开始对股票期权产生质疑。如何看待股票期权这一激励手段，应该辩证的看待，可以比做一把“双刃剑”，既要关注其解决了委托代理关系的正面效应，也要看到起内在的缺陷。
近年来，我国国有上市公司把深化改革放在各项工作的首要位置，围绕公司发展，大力推进股份制改革，完善公司法人治理结构，为公司发展提供了强大的动力。随着国有企业改革的深入，国有的上市公司组织机构和经营机制也发生了重大变化，但国有企业的实际内部人控制以及道德风险问题逐渐显现出来，国企管理层利用手中的代理权与企业所有者的目标发生了偏离，由此造成国有资产严重流失，资产利用效率低下，企业发展缺乏活力，国有上市公司中存在着“激励机制与约束机制同样不足”的问题，并已经制约我国国有上市公司持续发展。所以，在股票期权激励机制进入我国以后，我国国有上市公司纷纷展开了积极的学习与实践。
本文将以国有上市公司做为研究对象，依据股权激励的理论，通过运用实证分析的研究方法，对我国国有上市公司在实施股票期权薪酬激励的现状、存在的一些实践问题进行了分析，并借鉴了西方发达国家在实施股票期权这一薪酬激励中的实践经验，针对我国国有上市公司在运用股票期权激励存在的问题，设计一个能够适应我国国有上市公司的股票期权激励计划框架。论文最后从宏观与微观两个方面分析股票期权激励制度在我国应用存在的问题，并对完善我国国有上市公司股票期权激励制度提出有效的解决措施。
In the1930’s, with the gradually disperse of listed companies’ stake in the controllingshareholder and complexity of management techniques, the phenomenon of Owner and operatorseparation emerges. This phenomenon becomes prominent since1960’s. Due to the informationasymmetry, the owner cannot effective supervise the operator. In the late1980’s, stock optionincentive is used by most listed companies for senior management to synchronize the targetbetween owner and operator. In the1990’s, stock option incentive becomes the main income ofsenior management. Western countries, such as United Kingdoms, Canadian and French startedusing stock option incentive. It can be seen that stock option incentive has been widely accepted.However, in the late1990’s, Some well-known enterprises and accounting firms, such as Enron andWorldCom, have attracted questions for conspired financial fraud. The stock option incentiveshould be dialectically inspected. As a double edged sword, it have positive effects on PrincipleAgent Relationship while there are certain defects.
In recent years, deepening reforming is placed as the first location beyond all other works bystate-owned listed companies in china. Around the companies’ development, they vigorouslypromoted the shareholding system, perfected the corporate governance structure and provide strongpower for the development of the company. Alongside the deepening of state owned enterprises’reform, the Organization and management system of listed companies have changed greatly.However, the inner control and morality risk emerged gradually. State-owned enterprisesmanagement has different targets with the owner and use the power of attorney. This will lead toSerious loss of state-owned assets, the low efficiency of the utilization of assets and lack of energyin enterprises. There exists co-deficient of Incentive mechanism and restricting mechanism. Thishas Restrict state-owned listed company's sustainable development in our country. Therefore, listedcompanies study and practice stock option incentive warmly after it is introduced into our country.
This dissertation takes the state-owned listed companies as study object. It is based on thestock option incentive theory and use empirical analysis to analyze the current state and practicalproblems in performing stock option incentive. It also take examples from western developedcountries’ practice in stock option incentive. Aimed at the problems of the practice in stock optionincentive of stated owned listed companies, a specialized stock option incentive framework isdesigned according to the practical situation of our country. Finally, the problems in applying stockoption incentive in our country is analyze from both macroscopic and microscopic perspective. Meanwhile, effective solutions are proposed to improve current stock option incentive system ofstate owned listed companies in our country.
近年来，我国国有上市公司把深化改革放在各项工作的首要位置，围绕公司发展，大力推进股份制改革，完善公司法人治理结构，为公司发展提供了强大的动力。随着国有企业改革的深入，国有的上市公司组织机构和经营机制也发生了重大变化，但国有企业的实际内部人控制以及道德风险问题逐渐显现出来，国企管理层利用手中的代理权与企业所有者的目标发生了偏离，由此造成国有资产严重流失，资产利用效率低下，企业发展缺乏活力，国有上市公司中存在着“激励机制与约束机制同样不足”的问题，并已经制约我国国有上市公司持续发展。所以，在股票期权激励机制进入我国以后，我国国有上市公司纷纷展开了积极的学习与实践。
本文将以国有上市公司做为研究对象，依据股权激励的理论，通过运用实证分析的研究方法，对我国国有上市公司在实施股票期权薪酬激励的现状、存在的一些实践问题进行了分析，并借鉴了西方发达国家在实施股票期权这一薪酬激励中的实践经验，针对我国国有上市公司在运用股票期权激励存在的问题，设计一个能够适应我国国有上市公司的股票期权激励计划框架。论文最后从宏观与微观两个方面分析股票期权激励制度在我国应用存在的问题，并对完善我国国有上市公司股票期权激励制度提出有效的解决措施。
In the1930’s, with the gradually disperse of listed companies’ stake in the controllingshareholder and complexity of management techniques, the phenomenon of Owner and operatorseparation emerges. This phenomenon becomes prominent since1960’s. Due to the informationasymmetry, the owner cannot effective supervise the operator. In the late1980’s, stock optionincentive is used by most listed companies for senior management to synchronize the targetbetween owner and operator. In the1990’s, stock option incentive becomes the main income ofsenior management. Western countries, such as United Kingdoms, Canadian and French startedusing stock option incentive. It can be seen that stock option incentive has been widely accepted.However, in the late1990’s, Some well-known enterprises and accounting firms, such as Enron andWorldCom, have attracted questions for conspired financial fraud. The stock option incentiveshould be dialectically inspected. As a double edged sword, it have positive effects on PrincipleAgent Relationship while there are certain defects.
In recent years, deepening reforming is placed as the first location beyond all other works bystate-owned listed companies in china. Around the companies’ development, they vigorouslypromoted the shareholding system, perfected the corporate governance structure and provide strongpower for the development of the company. Alongside the deepening of state owned enterprises’reform, the Organization and management system of listed companies have changed greatly.However, the inner control and morality risk emerged gradually. State-owned enterprisesmanagement has different targets with the owner and use the power of attorney. This will lead toSerious loss of state-owned assets, the low efficiency of the utilization of assets and lack of energyin enterprises. There exists co-deficient of Incentive mechanism and restricting mechanism. Thishas Restrict state-owned listed company's sustainable development in our country. Therefore, listedcompanies study and practice stock option incentive warmly after it is introduced into our country.
This dissertation takes the state-owned listed companies as study object. It is based on thestock option incentive theory and use empirical analysis to analyze the current state and practicalproblems in performing stock option incentive. It also take examples from western developedcountries’ practice in stock option incentive. Aimed at the problems of the practice in stock optionincentive of stated owned listed companies, a specialized stock option incentive framework isdesigned according to the practical situation of our country. Finally, the problems in applying stockoption incentive in our country is analyze from both macroscopic and microscopic perspective. Meanwhile, effective solutions are proposed to improve current stock option incentive system ofstate owned listed companies in our country.
引文
【1】曹阳.中国上市公司高管层股权激励实施效果研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社.2008.P66-98
【2】聂皖生.股票期权计划——理论、方案与实务[M].上海:上海交通大学出版社.2007.P127-145
【3】陈清泰，吴敬琏.股票期权激励制度法规政策研究报告[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2001.P78-81
【4】郑贤玲.股票期权制理论与实践[M].北京：经济管理出版社出版.2003.P137-153
【5】胡经生.凸性激励——股票期权相关问题研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社.2008.P10-29
【6】银路,赵振元.高新技术企业激励理论与操作实务[M].北京：科学出版社.2004.P78-90
【7】陈文.股权激励与公司治理法律实务[M].北京：法律出版社.2005.P156-189
【8】吴叔平,虞俊健.股权激励——企业长期激励制度研究与实践[M].上海：上海远东出版社.2000.P80-81
【9】徐振斌.期权激励与公司长期绩效通论[M].北京：中国劳动社会保障出版社.2003.P116-153
【10】李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究.2000,11.P24-30
【11】罗丽萍，周晓东，郭岚.基于EVA的知识型员工股票期权激励模式[J].经济研究导刊.2011,1.P72-73
【12】顾斌，周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究.2007,2.P79-92
【13】徐晨.股票期权的特点与效应分析[J].当代石油石化.2010,9.P25-27
【14】郑晓玲.美国股票期权激励的经验和启示[J].国际金融研究.2007,4.P32-38
【15】刘永春，赵亮.上市公司管理层股权激励与公司绩效研究[J].重庆工学院学报.2007,8.P23-27
【16】黄婧.股票期权的激励机制及在中国运用的思考[J].财经界.2007,6.P265-266
【17】袁国良,王怀芳.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[J].中国社会科学.2000,9.P24-32
【18】张小宁,邵建馨.期权激励的机理分析与变通设计[J].中国工业经济.2000,5.P13-15
【19】李豫湘,史长勇.股票期权计划及在国企中的运用探讨[J].商业研究.2003,9.P23-25
【20】陈平平,张文贤.论国企高管职务消费的财务监控[J].生产理研究.2008(19).P137-139
【21】张宏敏.中国上市公司高管股票期权激励有效性研究[D].西南财经大学.2009,6.P12-41
【22】李亚军.中国A股上市公司股票期权激励研究[D].首都经贸大学.2008,5.P6-19
【23】郑晓玲.上市公司股票期权激励有效性研究[D].苏州大学.2009,11.P43-75
【24】王劲松.经理股票期权的契约优化研究[D].吉林大学.2009,4.P7-42
【25】孙武斌.股票期权的激励制度、激励效应与绩效研究[D].西北工业大学.2003,7.P33-53
【26】尤建强.经理股票期权定价问题研究[D].浙江大学.2006,6.P79-100
【27】魏鹏.国有上市公司经营者股票期权激励制度研究[D].山东农业大学.2008,6.P14-40
【28】 Jeffrey L. Coles, Michael Hertzel, and Swaminathan Kalpathy. Earningsmanagement around employee stock option reissues[M].Journal of Accounting andEconomics,2006(41).P173-200
【29】Long.M.The incentives behind the adoption of executive stock option plans inU.S.corporations[M].Financial Managment.Autumn,1992(12).P21
【30】Matsunaga.S. The effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use of Employee StockOptions[M].The Accounting Review,1995(7).P1-2
【2】聂皖生.股票期权计划——理论、方案与实务[M].上海:上海交通大学出版社.2007.P127-145
【3】陈清泰，吴敬琏.股票期权激励制度法规政策研究报告[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2001.P78-81
【4】郑贤玲.股票期权制理论与实践[M].北京：经济管理出版社出版.2003.P137-153
【5】胡经生.凸性激励——股票期权相关问题研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社.2008.P10-29
【6】银路,赵振元.高新技术企业激励理论与操作实务[M].北京：科学出版社.2004.P78-90
【7】陈文.股权激励与公司治理法律实务[M].北京：法律出版社.2005.P156-189
【8】吴叔平,虞俊健.股权激励——企业长期激励制度研究与实践[M].上海：上海远东出版社.2000.P80-81
【9】徐振斌.期权激励与公司长期绩效通论[M].北京：中国劳动社会保障出版社.2003.P116-153
【10】李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究.2000,11.P24-30
【11】罗丽萍，周晓东，郭岚.基于EVA的知识型员工股票期权激励模式[J].经济研究导刊.2011,1.P72-73
【12】顾斌，周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究.2007,2.P79-92
【13】徐晨.股票期权的特点与效应分析[J].当代石油石化.2010,9.P25-27
【14】郑晓玲.美国股票期权激励的经验和启示[J].国际金融研究.2007,4.P32-38
【15】刘永春，赵亮.上市公司管理层股权激励与公司绩效研究[J].重庆工学院学报.2007,8.P23-27
【16】黄婧.股票期权的激励机制及在中国运用的思考[J].财经界.2007,6.P265-266
【17】袁国良,王怀芳.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[J].中国社会科学.2000,9.P24-32
【18】张小宁,邵建馨.期权激励的机理分析与变通设计[J].中国工业经济.2000,5.P13-15
【19】李豫湘,史长勇.股票期权计划及在国企中的运用探讨[J].商业研究.2003,9.P23-25
【20】陈平平,张文贤.论国企高管职务消费的财务监控[J].生产理研究.2008(19).P137-139
【21】张宏敏.中国上市公司高管股票期权激励有效性研究[D].西南财经大学.2009,6.P12-41
【22】李亚军.中国A股上市公司股票期权激励研究[D].首都经贸大学.2008,5.P6-19
【23】郑晓玲.上市公司股票期权激励有效性研究[D].苏州大学.2009,11.P43-75
【24】王劲松.经理股票期权的契约优化研究[D].吉林大学.2009,4.P7-42
【25】孙武斌.股票期权的激励制度、激励效应与绩效研究[D].西北工业大学.2003,7.P33-53
【26】尤建强.经理股票期权定价问题研究[D].浙江大学.2006,6.P79-100
【27】魏鹏.国有上市公司经营者股票期权激励制度研究[D].山东农业大学.2008,6.P14-40
【28】 Jeffrey L. Coles, Michael Hertzel, and Swaminathan Kalpathy. Earningsmanagement around employee stock option reissues[M].Journal of Accounting andEconomics,2006(41).P173-200
【29】Long.M.The incentives behind the adoption of executive stock option plans inU.S.corporations[M].Financial Managment.Autumn,1992(12).P21
【30】Matsunaga.S. The effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use of Employee StockOptions[M].The Accounting Review,1995(7).P1-2