自愿性信息披露的实证研究：影响因素与经济后果
|
摘要
美国大法官路易斯·布兰戴斯(Louis Brandeis,1914)在其所著的《他人的金钱》(Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It)一书中写道：“公开是救治现代化社会及工业弊病的良药,阳光是最好的防腐剂,灯光是最好的警察”。作为公开原则的具体体现,充分、有效的信息披露是保证资本市场有效运转的基石。按照是否受到管制,信息披露可以分为强制性信息披露与自愿性信息披露。自愿性信息披露是指除强制披露之外,上市公司基于公司形象、投资者关系、回避诉讼风险等动机主动对外披露公司信息(何卫东,2003)。按照信号传递理论,自愿性信息披露有助于在上市公司与外部利益相关者之间架起一座沟通的桥梁,有助于向投资者介绍和解释公司的核心竞争力,使投资者对公司的发展潜力做出科学、合理的评价,从而做出正确的投资决策,提高资本配置的效率。同时,研究公司治理的学者认为：内部治理、外部治理和信息披露共同构成了一个完整的公司治理结构联结框架,公司信息披露水平提高有利于激励相容,形成外部经理市场压力和声誉激励,实现外部治理,提升公司价值。
国外学者自上世纪60年代就开始关注自愿性信息披露,并取得了丰硕的研究成果,最具代表性的是1994年美国注册会计师协会(AICPA)发布的报告《改进企业报告——面向用户》(Improving Business Reporting—A Customer Focus),报告从10个方面总结了投资者对上市公司自愿性信息披露的要求。以及2001年美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)发表的题为《改进财务报告：增强自愿性信息披露》(Improving Business Reporting:Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures)的研究报告,报告显示：在石油、化工、计算机等8个行业的美国上市公司主要围绕“核心能力”开展自愿性信息披露。在我国自愿性信息披露还是一个新鲜事物,直至2003年才在深圳证券交易所发布的《深圳证券交易所上市公司投资者关系管理指引》中,首次引入自愿性信息披露这一概念。在中国资本市场迅速发展,投资者信息需求日益膨胀并向多样化发展的今天,加强自愿性信息披露的研究,可谓是“形势所迫”,对完善我国上市公司的信息披露制度,保护广大投资者的利益具有深远的理论意义和广泛的现实意义。
本文选取上市公司年报为研究对象,借鉴著名学者Botosan(1997)的研究成果,并参考证监会发布的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号<年度报告的内容与格式>》(以下简称“年度报告的内容与格式”),删除《年度报告的内容与格式》中要求强制披露的项目,增加《年度报告的内容与格式》中鼓励自愿披露的项目,从而构建适用于我国上市公司的自愿性信息披露指数,用其对上市公司年报进行评分,并将评分值作为上市公司自愿性信息披露的数量维度；同时,以深圳证券交易所的信息披露评级考核结果作为自愿性信息披露的质量维度；最后,将数量维度与质量维度相融合,得出上市公司的自愿性信息披露水平。在此基础上,对自愿性信息披露的影响因素和经济后果进行了实证研究,得出如下主要结论：
(1)上市公司的自愿性信息披露水平较低。根据描述性统计,自愿性信息披露水平的最高值为31.8182%,最低值仅为0.6818%,均值为12.3654%,自愿性信息披露水平较低。进一步将自愿性信息披露水平分解为数量和质量两个维度,数量维度的最高值为36.3501%,最低值为1.1364%,均值为15.8786%,说明上市公司自愿性信息披露的意愿淡薄；从质量维度看,519个样本观测值中,有70个被深圳证券交易所评为“优秀”,315个被评为“良好”,优良率为74.18%,但20052007年优良率呈下降趋势,值得警惕。
(2)自愿性信息披露水平与独立董事比例、审计委员会、公司规模、公司成长性和发行股票类型存在显著的正相关关系。自愿性信息披露的数量维度与行业类型、独立董事比例、审计委员会、公司规模、公司成长性和发行股票类型存在显著的正相关关系。自愿性信息披露的质量维度与机构投资者持股比例、股权集中度、独立董事比例、审计委员会、公司业绩、公司成长性存在显著的正相关关系,与国有股比例呈显著负相关关系。笔者着重考察了会计专业背景独立董事,董事会秘书兼职情况和会计信息质量三个因素对自愿性信息披露的影响,研究发现：会计专业背景独立董事与自愿性信息披露水平和数量维度无显著相关关系,但与质量维度呈显著正相关关系；董事会秘书仅兼任董事和董事会秘书仅兼任副总与自愿性信息披露水平、数量维度和质量维度均无显著的相关关系,但董事会秘书同时兼任董事和副总却与自愿性信息披露水平、数量维度和质量维度显著正相关；可操纵应计利润与自愿性信息披露水平、数量维度和质量维度无显著相关关系。
(3)从投资者视角,研究了自愿性信息披露与股票价格之间的关系。运用事件研究法,分别选取[-5,5]和[-10,10]两个事件窗口,在20052007三个研究年度中,每年在所抽取的173家样本公司中,按照自愿性信息披露水平(VDI)由高到低的顺序抽取两个样本组合,取前50个自愿性信息披露水平(VDI)高的公司为“高组合”,取后50个自愿性信息披露水平(VDI)低的公司为“低组合”,通过比较“高组合”和“低组合”事件窗口期内的平均累计超额收益率(CAAR),笔者发现2005和2006年“高组合”的平均累计超额收益率显著高于“低组合”,而2007年“高组合”的平均累计超额收益率与“低组合”的平均累计超额收益率之间的差异并不显著。为了深入分析自愿性信息披露水平与超额收益之间的关系,笔者又进行了多元回归分析,回归结果表明,无论在[-5,5]的事件窗口内,还是在[-10,10]的事件窗口内,累计超额收益率(CAR)与自愿性信息披露水平、自愿信息披露质量维度均呈显著的正相关关系,但与自愿性信息披露数量维度均不存在显著的相关关系。说明经过多年的历练,中国的投资者正在逐渐变得成熟起来,对高质量的信息披露越来越敏感,能够准确甄别信息质量的高低,单纯向市场释放大量信息,而不注重信息的质量,不见得会收到预期的效果,不见得会对股票价格产生积极的影响。
(4)从上市公司视角,研究了自愿性信息披露与公司价值之间的关系。首先,运用两个样本均值差的参数检验方法和曼-惠特尼U检验(Mann-Whitney Signed-rank Test)的非参数检验方法,检验“高组合”和“低组合”滞后一个年度的公司价值代替变量的差异和显著性。检验结果均显示“高组合”的经济增加值和每股内涵价值显著高于“低组合”。其次,笔者进行了多元回归分析,结果显示经济增加值和每股内涵价值与自愿性信息披露水平、自愿性信息披露数量维度和自愿性信息披露质量维度均显著正相关,说明提高自愿性信息披露水平有助于降低信息不对称性,增强股票的流动性,降低资本成本；有助于缓解代理冲突,完善公司治理结构,提高公司价值。
(5)从管理层的视角出发,研究了自愿性信息披露与高管薪酬之间的关系。首先,进行了分组检验,参数检验和非参数检验的结果均显示,2007和2008年“高组合”的薪酬总额和薪酬前三名总额与“低组合”存在显著差异,而2006年“高组合”的薪酬总额和薪酬前三名总额与“低组合”不存在显著差异。为了充分揭示自愿性信息披露与高管薪酬之间的关系,笔者建立了多元回归模型,结果显示薪酬总额和薪酬前三名总额与自愿性信息披露水平、自愿性信息披露数量维度、自愿性信息披露质量维度均显著正相关,说明提高自愿性信息披露水平有助于降低信息不对称性,有助于缓解代理冲突,完善公司治理结构,改善公司业绩,提高高管薪酬。
最后,笔者对本文的实证分析结果进行了全面的归纳和总结,并结合我国自愿性信息披露的现状,提出了提高自愿性信息披露水平的政策建议,希望能够对监管部门的政策制定和上市公司的信息披露策略选择有所裨益。
Louis Brandeis, the big justice of the United States, had wrote that "Openness is the medicine for the modern society and the industrial ills, sunlight is the best preservative, lighting is the best police officers." in his book "Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It" in 1914. As a concrete manifestation of the principle of openness, sufficient and effective information disclosure will be the base of an effective capital market. Information disclosure would be divided into mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure, according to whether it is controlled. Voluntary disclosure is the actively disclosure of the listed company, in order to enhance the corporate image, improve the investor relationships, avoid the litigation risk and so on (He Weidong,2003). According to the signal theory, voluntary disclosure can build a bridge between the listed companies and the investors to introduce and explain the companies' core competencies to enable the investors make scientific and rational evaluation about the development potential of the companies, and thus make right investment decisions to make capital allocation more efficient. Meanwhile, the scholars who study corporate governance believe that the internal governance, external governance and information disclosure form a complete framework for corporate governance structure. The enhancement of the level of information disclosure is helpful to stimulate the managers, put the external manager market pressure and the reputation incentives to them to achieve external governance and enhance corporate value.
Foreign scholars began to paid attention to the voluntary disclosure since 1960s and have got fruitful research fruits. The most representative research in the United States is the report "Improving Business Reporting-A Customer Focus" issued by the Association of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1994, this report summarized the investors' requirements from 10 aspects. In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released a research report "Improving Business Reporting:Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures", the report shows that in petroleum, chemical, computer and other 5 industries voluntary disclosure mainly centre about the "core competitiveness". In China, voluntary disclosure is still a new thing. On November 11,2003 the Shenzhen Stock Exchange released "the investor relationship management guidelines for Shenzhen Stock Exchange companies", in this guideline the concept of voluntary disclosure was introduced in China for the first time. Now China's capital market is rapidly developing, the investors' information needs is expanding and becoming more and more diversified, enhancing the study of voluntary disclosure is very important to perfect the information disclosure system of listed companies, to protect the interests of investors. It has far-reaching theoretical significance and broad practical significance.
In this thesis, I selected the annual report of listed companies as research project, learned form the Botosan's research, and referred to the standard "the No.2 Standard of the Content and Format of the Information Disclosure for Public Company-the content and format of the annual report" issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, deleted mandatory disclosure projects set by the "the content and format of the annual report", increased the voluntary disclosure projects encouraged by "the content and format of the annual report" to build up a voluntary disclosure index for China's listed companies as the quantity dimension of the voluntary disclosure. By the same time, I chose the information disclosure rating result made by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure. And then I multiplied the quantity dimension by the quality dimension and use the result to measure the level of the voluntary disclosure of China's listed companies. I made an empirical study on the impact factors and economic consequences of the voluntary disclosure and reached the following main conclusions:
(1) The level of voluntary disclosure of the listed companies is very low. According to the descriptive statistics, the maximum value of the level of voluntary disclosure is 31.8182%, the minimum value is only 0.6818%, and the mean is 12.3654%. In particular, the maximum value of quantity dimensions is 36.3501%, the minimum value is 1.1364%, and the mean value is 15.8786%, indicating that voluntary disclosure will of listed companies is weak; there are 70 companies rated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as "excellent",315 companies rated as "good", the excellent and good rate is only 74.18%, and the mean value of the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure was declining form 2005-2007, we must certainly be vigilant.
(2) There are significant positive correlations between the voluntary disclosure level and the proportion of independent director, the audit committee, the company size, the company growth, the stock issuing type. There are significant positive correlations between the quantity dimension of the voluntary disclosure and the industry type, the proportion of independent director, the audit committee, the company size, the company growth, the he stock issuing type. There are significant positive correlations between the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure and the percentage of institutional investor ownership, the stock concentration, the proportion of independent director, the audit committee, the company performance, the company growth; but there is significant positive correlation between the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure and the percentage of state ownership. In addition, I also focused on the impact of the accounting independent directors, the part-time of the board secretary and the quality of accounting information on the voluntary disclosure, the study found:there is no significant correlation between accounting independent directors and the voluntary disclosure level and the quality dimensions, but there is a significant correlation between accounting independent directors and the quality dimension; when the board secretaries only doubling as director or vice president, they can do noting to do the level of voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension, but when the board secretaries doubling as director and vice president at the same time, they could enhance the level of the voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension; there is on significant correlation between discretionary accruals and the level of voluntary disclosure of information, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension there is no direct relationship between the quality of accounting information and the level of voluntary disclosure.
(3) I examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the stock price from investors'perspective. Using the event study method, I chose two event window [-5,5] and [-10,10], ranked the 173 sample companies in order of the level of the voluntary disclosure, and chose the first 50 companies as "high group" and the last 50 companies as "low group" in 2005-2007. The result shows that in 2005 and 2006 the CAAR_H was significantly higher than the CAAR_L, but in 2007 the difference between them was not significant. In order to analyze the relationship between the level of the voluntary disclosure and the CAAR in depth, I also set a multiple regression analysis model, the result shows that there are significant positive correlations between the CAAR and the level of the voluntary disclosure and the quantity dimension, but there is no significant positive correlations between CAAR and the quality dimension in [-5,5] and [-10,10]. It means that after several years of experience, China's investors are becoming mature; they are more and more sensitive to the high-quality disclosure and able to accurately identify the level of quality of information. Simplely releasing of large amounts of information to the market, but not focusing on the quality of information will not have the desired effect will not have paositive impact on the stock price.
(4) I examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the corporate value from the perspective of the listed companies. Firstly I used parametric test and the Mann-Whitney Signed-rank Test to test the difference and the significance of the mean of two samples. The result show that one year lagged corporate value of the "high group" is significantly higher than the "low group" in 2005-2007. Secondly, I carried out a multiple regression analysis. The result shows that there are significantly positive correlations between the corporate value and the level of the voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension. It means increasing the level of the voluntary disclosure would be helpful to reduce the information asymmetry and enhance the liquidity of the stock and lower capital cost; be helpful to ease the proxy conflict, improve the corporate governance structure and improve corporate value.
(5) I examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the executive pay from the managers'perspective. Firstly, I curried out a grouping test, the results of the parameter test and non-parametric test both show that the total remuneration and the remuneration top three managers of the "high group" are both significantly higher than the "low group" in 2007 and 2008, but in 2006 there is no significant difference between the "high group" and the "low group". In order to reveal the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the executive pay, I established a multiple regression model to analyze in depth. The result of the multiple regression analysis shows that there are significant positive correlations between the total remuneration, the remuneration of the top three managers and the level of voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension. It means that increasing the level of voluntary disclosure would be helpful to reduce the information asymmetry, alleviate agency conflict, improve the corporate governance structure, improve corporate performance, and increase executive pay.
Finally, I concluded and summarized the results of empirical analysis comprehensively and put forward some policy proposals about how to enhance the level of the voluntary disclosure and hoped it would be helpful for the policy-making of the regulatory and the strategic-choosing of the listed companies.
国外学者自上世纪60年代就开始关注自愿性信息披露,并取得了丰硕的研究成果,最具代表性的是1994年美国注册会计师协会(AICPA)发布的报告《改进企业报告——面向用户》(Improving Business Reporting—A Customer Focus),报告从10个方面总结了投资者对上市公司自愿性信息披露的要求。以及2001年美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)发表的题为《改进财务报告：增强自愿性信息披露》(Improving Business Reporting:Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures)的研究报告,报告显示：在石油、化工、计算机等8个行业的美国上市公司主要围绕“核心能力”开展自愿性信息披露。在我国自愿性信息披露还是一个新鲜事物,直至2003年才在深圳证券交易所发布的《深圳证券交易所上市公司投资者关系管理指引》中,首次引入自愿性信息披露这一概念。在中国资本市场迅速发展,投资者信息需求日益膨胀并向多样化发展的今天,加强自愿性信息披露的研究,可谓是“形势所迫”,对完善我国上市公司的信息披露制度,保护广大投资者的利益具有深远的理论意义和广泛的现实意义。
本文选取上市公司年报为研究对象,借鉴著名学者Botosan(1997)的研究成果,并参考证监会发布的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号<年度报告的内容与格式>》(以下简称“年度报告的内容与格式”),删除《年度报告的内容与格式》中要求强制披露的项目,增加《年度报告的内容与格式》中鼓励自愿披露的项目,从而构建适用于我国上市公司的自愿性信息披露指数,用其对上市公司年报进行评分,并将评分值作为上市公司自愿性信息披露的数量维度；同时,以深圳证券交易所的信息披露评级考核结果作为自愿性信息披露的质量维度；最后,将数量维度与质量维度相融合,得出上市公司的自愿性信息披露水平。在此基础上,对自愿性信息披露的影响因素和经济后果进行了实证研究,得出如下主要结论：
(1)上市公司的自愿性信息披露水平较低。根据描述性统计,自愿性信息披露水平的最高值为31.8182%,最低值仅为0.6818%,均值为12.3654%,自愿性信息披露水平较低。进一步将自愿性信息披露水平分解为数量和质量两个维度,数量维度的最高值为36.3501%,最低值为1.1364%,均值为15.8786%,说明上市公司自愿性信息披露的意愿淡薄；从质量维度看,519个样本观测值中,有70个被深圳证券交易所评为“优秀”,315个被评为“良好”,优良率为74.18%,但20052007年优良率呈下降趋势,值得警惕。
(2)自愿性信息披露水平与独立董事比例、审计委员会、公司规模、公司成长性和发行股票类型存在显著的正相关关系。自愿性信息披露的数量维度与行业类型、独立董事比例、审计委员会、公司规模、公司成长性和发行股票类型存在显著的正相关关系。自愿性信息披露的质量维度与机构投资者持股比例、股权集中度、独立董事比例、审计委员会、公司业绩、公司成长性存在显著的正相关关系,与国有股比例呈显著负相关关系。笔者着重考察了会计专业背景独立董事,董事会秘书兼职情况和会计信息质量三个因素对自愿性信息披露的影响,研究发现：会计专业背景独立董事与自愿性信息披露水平和数量维度无显著相关关系,但与质量维度呈显著正相关关系；董事会秘书仅兼任董事和董事会秘书仅兼任副总与自愿性信息披露水平、数量维度和质量维度均无显著的相关关系,但董事会秘书同时兼任董事和副总却与自愿性信息披露水平、数量维度和质量维度显著正相关；可操纵应计利润与自愿性信息披露水平、数量维度和质量维度无显著相关关系。
(3)从投资者视角,研究了自愿性信息披露与股票价格之间的关系。运用事件研究法,分别选取[-5,5]和[-10,10]两个事件窗口,在20052007三个研究年度中,每年在所抽取的173家样本公司中,按照自愿性信息披露水平(VDI)由高到低的顺序抽取两个样本组合,取前50个自愿性信息披露水平(VDI)高的公司为“高组合”,取后50个自愿性信息披露水平(VDI)低的公司为“低组合”,通过比较“高组合”和“低组合”事件窗口期内的平均累计超额收益率(CAAR),笔者发现2005和2006年“高组合”的平均累计超额收益率显著高于“低组合”,而2007年“高组合”的平均累计超额收益率与“低组合”的平均累计超额收益率之间的差异并不显著。为了深入分析自愿性信息披露水平与超额收益之间的关系,笔者又进行了多元回归分析,回归结果表明,无论在[-5,5]的事件窗口内,还是在[-10,10]的事件窗口内,累计超额收益率(CAR)与自愿性信息披露水平、自愿信息披露质量维度均呈显著的正相关关系,但与自愿性信息披露数量维度均不存在显著的相关关系。说明经过多年的历练,中国的投资者正在逐渐变得成熟起来,对高质量的信息披露越来越敏感,能够准确甄别信息质量的高低,单纯向市场释放大量信息,而不注重信息的质量,不见得会收到预期的效果,不见得会对股票价格产生积极的影响。
(4)从上市公司视角,研究了自愿性信息披露与公司价值之间的关系。首先,运用两个样本均值差的参数检验方法和曼-惠特尼U检验(Mann-Whitney Signed-rank Test)的非参数检验方法,检验“高组合”和“低组合”滞后一个年度的公司价值代替变量的差异和显著性。检验结果均显示“高组合”的经济增加值和每股内涵价值显著高于“低组合”。其次,笔者进行了多元回归分析,结果显示经济增加值和每股内涵价值与自愿性信息披露水平、自愿性信息披露数量维度和自愿性信息披露质量维度均显著正相关,说明提高自愿性信息披露水平有助于降低信息不对称性,增强股票的流动性,降低资本成本；有助于缓解代理冲突,完善公司治理结构,提高公司价值。
(5)从管理层的视角出发,研究了自愿性信息披露与高管薪酬之间的关系。首先,进行了分组检验,参数检验和非参数检验的结果均显示,2007和2008年“高组合”的薪酬总额和薪酬前三名总额与“低组合”存在显著差异,而2006年“高组合”的薪酬总额和薪酬前三名总额与“低组合”不存在显著差异。为了充分揭示自愿性信息披露与高管薪酬之间的关系,笔者建立了多元回归模型,结果显示薪酬总额和薪酬前三名总额与自愿性信息披露水平、自愿性信息披露数量维度、自愿性信息披露质量维度均显著正相关,说明提高自愿性信息披露水平有助于降低信息不对称性,有助于缓解代理冲突,完善公司治理结构,改善公司业绩,提高高管薪酬。
最后,笔者对本文的实证分析结果进行了全面的归纳和总结,并结合我国自愿性信息披露的现状,提出了提高自愿性信息披露水平的政策建议,希望能够对监管部门的政策制定和上市公司的信息披露策略选择有所裨益。
Louis Brandeis, the big justice of the United States, had wrote that "Openness is the medicine for the modern society and the industrial ills, sunlight is the best preservative, lighting is the best police officers." in his book "Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It" in 1914. As a concrete manifestation of the principle of openness, sufficient and effective information disclosure will be the base of an effective capital market. Information disclosure would be divided into mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure, according to whether it is controlled. Voluntary disclosure is the actively disclosure of the listed company, in order to enhance the corporate image, improve the investor relationships, avoid the litigation risk and so on (He Weidong,2003). According to the signal theory, voluntary disclosure can build a bridge between the listed companies and the investors to introduce and explain the companies' core competencies to enable the investors make scientific and rational evaluation about the development potential of the companies, and thus make right investment decisions to make capital allocation more efficient. Meanwhile, the scholars who study corporate governance believe that the internal governance, external governance and information disclosure form a complete framework for corporate governance structure. The enhancement of the level of information disclosure is helpful to stimulate the managers, put the external manager market pressure and the reputation incentives to them to achieve external governance and enhance corporate value.
Foreign scholars began to paid attention to the voluntary disclosure since 1960s and have got fruitful research fruits. The most representative research in the United States is the report "Improving Business Reporting-A Customer Focus" issued by the Association of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1994, this report summarized the investors' requirements from 10 aspects. In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released a research report "Improving Business Reporting:Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures", the report shows that in petroleum, chemical, computer and other 5 industries voluntary disclosure mainly centre about the "core competitiveness". In China, voluntary disclosure is still a new thing. On November 11,2003 the Shenzhen Stock Exchange released "the investor relationship management guidelines for Shenzhen Stock Exchange companies", in this guideline the concept of voluntary disclosure was introduced in China for the first time. Now China's capital market is rapidly developing, the investors' information needs is expanding and becoming more and more diversified, enhancing the study of voluntary disclosure is very important to perfect the information disclosure system of listed companies, to protect the interests of investors. It has far-reaching theoretical significance and broad practical significance.
In this thesis, I selected the annual report of listed companies as research project, learned form the Botosan's research, and referred to the standard "the No.2 Standard of the Content and Format of the Information Disclosure for Public Company-the content and format of the annual report" issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, deleted mandatory disclosure projects set by the "the content and format of the annual report", increased the voluntary disclosure projects encouraged by "the content and format of the annual report" to build up a voluntary disclosure index for China's listed companies as the quantity dimension of the voluntary disclosure. By the same time, I chose the information disclosure rating result made by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure. And then I multiplied the quantity dimension by the quality dimension and use the result to measure the level of the voluntary disclosure of China's listed companies. I made an empirical study on the impact factors and economic consequences of the voluntary disclosure and reached the following main conclusions:
(1) The level of voluntary disclosure of the listed companies is very low. According to the descriptive statistics, the maximum value of the level of voluntary disclosure is 31.8182%, the minimum value is only 0.6818%, and the mean is 12.3654%. In particular, the maximum value of quantity dimensions is 36.3501%, the minimum value is 1.1364%, and the mean value is 15.8786%, indicating that voluntary disclosure will of listed companies is weak; there are 70 companies rated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as "excellent",315 companies rated as "good", the excellent and good rate is only 74.18%, and the mean value of the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure was declining form 2005-2007, we must certainly be vigilant.
(2) There are significant positive correlations between the voluntary disclosure level and the proportion of independent director, the audit committee, the company size, the company growth, the stock issuing type. There are significant positive correlations between the quantity dimension of the voluntary disclosure and the industry type, the proportion of independent director, the audit committee, the company size, the company growth, the he stock issuing type. There are significant positive correlations between the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure and the percentage of institutional investor ownership, the stock concentration, the proportion of independent director, the audit committee, the company performance, the company growth; but there is significant positive correlation between the quality dimension of the voluntary disclosure and the percentage of state ownership. In addition, I also focused on the impact of the accounting independent directors, the part-time of the board secretary and the quality of accounting information on the voluntary disclosure, the study found:there is no significant correlation between accounting independent directors and the voluntary disclosure level and the quality dimensions, but there is a significant correlation between accounting independent directors and the quality dimension; when the board secretaries only doubling as director or vice president, they can do noting to do the level of voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension, but when the board secretaries doubling as director and vice president at the same time, they could enhance the level of the voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension; there is on significant correlation between discretionary accruals and the level of voluntary disclosure of information, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension there is no direct relationship between the quality of accounting information and the level of voluntary disclosure.
(3) I examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the stock price from investors'perspective. Using the event study method, I chose two event window [-5,5] and [-10,10], ranked the 173 sample companies in order of the level of the voluntary disclosure, and chose the first 50 companies as "high group" and the last 50 companies as "low group" in 2005-2007. The result shows that in 2005 and 2006 the CAAR_H was significantly higher than the CAAR_L, but in 2007 the difference between them was not significant. In order to analyze the relationship between the level of the voluntary disclosure and the CAAR in depth, I also set a multiple regression analysis model, the result shows that there are significant positive correlations between the CAAR and the level of the voluntary disclosure and the quantity dimension, but there is no significant positive correlations between CAAR and the quality dimension in [-5,5] and [-10,10]. It means that after several years of experience, China's investors are becoming mature; they are more and more sensitive to the high-quality disclosure and able to accurately identify the level of quality of information. Simplely releasing of large amounts of information to the market, but not focusing on the quality of information will not have the desired effect will not have paositive impact on the stock price.
(4) I examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the corporate value from the perspective of the listed companies. Firstly I used parametric test and the Mann-Whitney Signed-rank Test to test the difference and the significance of the mean of two samples. The result show that one year lagged corporate value of the "high group" is significantly higher than the "low group" in 2005-2007. Secondly, I carried out a multiple regression analysis. The result shows that there are significantly positive correlations between the corporate value and the level of the voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension. It means increasing the level of the voluntary disclosure would be helpful to reduce the information asymmetry and enhance the liquidity of the stock and lower capital cost; be helpful to ease the proxy conflict, improve the corporate governance structure and improve corporate value.
(5) I examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the executive pay from the managers'perspective. Firstly, I curried out a grouping test, the results of the parameter test and non-parametric test both show that the total remuneration and the remuneration top three managers of the "high group" are both significantly higher than the "low group" in 2007 and 2008, but in 2006 there is no significant difference between the "high group" and the "low group". In order to reveal the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and the executive pay, I established a multiple regression model to analyze in depth. The result of the multiple regression analysis shows that there are significant positive correlations between the total remuneration, the remuneration of the top three managers and the level of voluntary disclosure, the quantity dimension and the quality dimension. It means that increasing the level of voluntary disclosure would be helpful to reduce the information asymmetry, alleviate agency conflict, improve the corporate governance structure, improve corporate performance, and increase executive pay.
Finally, I concluded and summarized the results of empirical analysis comprehensively and put forward some policy proposals about how to enhance the level of the voluntary disclosure and hoped it would be helpful for the policy-making of the regulatory and the strategic-choosing of the listed companies.
引文
①国泰君安证券研究所.许运凯.QFII政策对我国资本市场的影响积极深远[N].证券日报,2003,(2003-01-22)。
①陈国辉.会计理论研究[M].第1版.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2007.
①根据中国证监会(CSRC)于2001年4月3日公布的《上市公司行业分类指引》中的分类标准作为行业的分类标准。
①《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号<年度报告的内容与格式>》中表述为“应披露”、“应说明”的项目,本文作为强制披露的项目。
②《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号<年度报告的内容与格式>》中表述为“可以披露”、“可以说明”的项目,本文作为鼓励自愿披露的项目。
③(Meek et al.,1995:Ahmed, 1996): (Chow et al.,1987:Botosan,1997)
④笔者在通读了519份年报后发现,我国上市公司一般在年报中披露近三年的历史信息,无一家上市公司披露三年以上的历史信息,为了提高自愿性信息披露指数的信度和效度,本文将Botosan(1997)所构建的指数中的三年以上历史信息项目删除。
②证监会《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(2001)的规定：在2003年6月30日前,上市公司董事会成员中至少包括三分之一的独立董事。
①来源：康雁、宋凤华.谁创造财富,谁消灭财富——2002年中国上市公司财富创造和毁灭排行榜[J].财经,2003,(21)：82-90.
①朱晓菁.沪市上市公司自愿性信息披露影响因素实证研究[D].东华大学,2007.
[1]白云霞、吴联生.信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：37-45.
[2]陈国辉.会计理论研究[M].第1版.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2007.
[3]陈国辉、崔刚、叶龙.上市公司信息披露体系中人文道德秩序的建构[J].会计研究,2003,(11)：39-43.
[4]陈国辉、韩海文.自愿性信息披露的价值效应检验.财经问题研究,2010(5)：60-68.
[5]陈钊.信息与激励经济学.第1版.上海：上海人民出版社,2005.
[6]陈晓、秦跃红.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界,2003,(3)：28-33.
[7]陈艳.会计信息披露方式的经济学思考[J].会计研究,2004,(8)：51-56.
[8]程新生等.自愿性信息披露与公司治理——董事会功能与大股东行为[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008,(7)：489-494.
[9]杜兴强、王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007, (1)； 58-66.
[10]方红星、孙翯.基于沪市公司2006年年报的内部控制信息披露研究：修正与拓展[J].财经问题研究,2008,(4)：75-79.
[11]方红星、孙翯.交叉上市保险公司内部控制信息披露及其市场反应——基于中国人寿和中国平安的经验研究[J].财经问题研究,2009,(8)：105-111.
[12]方红星、孙翯、金韵韵.公司特征、外部审计与内部控制信息的自愿披露——基于沪市上市公司2003—-2005年年报的经验研究[J].会计研究,2009,(10)：44-52.
[13]韩海文、张宏婧.自愿性信息披露的短期价值效应探析[J].审计与经济研究,2009,(4)：50-58.
[14]何卫东.上市公司自愿性信息披露研究[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告No.0070,2003.
[15]何卫东.鼓励引导自愿性信息披露[N].中国证券报,2002,(2002-12-23).
[16]黎文靖.会计信息披露政府监管的经济后果——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,(8)：13-21.
[17]李士萍.试论我国预测性信息披露制度的完善[J].社会科学战线,2003(6)：244-247.
[18]李翔、冯峥.会计信息披露需求：来自证券研究机构的分析[J].会计研究,2006,(3)：63-68.
[19]李维安.公司治理[M].第1版.天津：南开大学出版社,2001.
[20]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(1)24-30.
[21]林斌、饶静.上市公司为什么自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告?——基于信号传递理论的实证研究[J].会计研究,2009,(2)：45-52.
[22]刘永泽、陈艳.政府监管与行业自律导向的现实选择——对美国注册会计师行业监管模式的剖析引发的思考[J].会计研究,2002,(11)：28-31.
[23]刘明辉、胡波.公司治理、代理成本与审计定价——基于2001—-2003年我国A股上市公司的实证研究[J].财经问题研究,2006,(2)：72-79.
[24]刘玉廷.关于会计研究方法问题[J].会计研究,2000,(12)：9-13.
[25]刘淑莲.企业价值评估与价值创造战略研究——两种价值模式与六大驱动因素[J].会计研究,2004,(9)：67-71.
[26]吕富强.信息披露的法律透视[M].第1版.北京：人民法院出版社,2000.
[27]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J],会计研究,1999,(9)：25-35.
[28]蒋亚朋、杨洋.上市公司信息披露问题研究[M].第1版.沈阳：东北大学出版社,2005.
[29]毛洪涛、吉利.我国上市公司信息披露理论研究评估——兼论构建上市公司信息披露理论框架[J].会计研究,2005,(9)：26-31.
[30]青木昌彦、钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构：内部人控制和银行的作用[M].第1版.北京：中国经济出版社,1995.
[31]宋献忠.论核心能力信息的自愿披露[J].会计研究,2006,(2)：47-52.
[32]孙光国、赵相华.路,还有多远——基于11份企业社会责任报告的研读与思考[J].财务与会计,2008,(19)：18-20.
[33]万寿义、刘地亮.企业社会成本信息披露问题研究[J].会计师,2009,(7)：5-8.
[34]汪炜.公司信息披露理论与实证研究[M].第1版.杭州：浙江大学出版社,2005.
[35]汪炜、蒋高峰.信息披露、透明度与资本成本[J].经济研究,2004,(7)：101-114.
[36]王斌、梁欣欣.公司治理、财务状况与信息披露质量——来自深交所的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008,(3)：31-39.
[37]王怀明、宿金香.董事会特征与企业自愿信息披露[J].审计与经济研究,2007,(3)：73-76.
[38]王雄元、沈维成.公司控制结构对信息披露质量影响的实证研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(3)：44-50.
[39]王雨田.控制论、信息论、系统科学与哲学[M].第1版.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1988.
[40]巫升柱、王建玲、乔旭东.中国上市公司年度报告披露及时性实证研究[J].会计研究,2006,(2)：19-24.
[41]杨有红、汪薇.2006年沪市公司内部控制信息披露研究[J].会计研究,2008,(3)：35-42.
[42]殷枫.中国上市公司自愿性信息披露研究[M].第1版.北京：中国商务出版社,2006.
[43]余怒涛,等.董事会规模与公司价值关系的进一步检验—基于公司规模门槛效应的分析[J].中国会计评论,2008,(9)：237-254.
[44]曾颖、陆正飞.信息披露质量与股权融资成本[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：69-91.
[45]张力上.上市公司信息披露与分析[M].第1版.成都：西南财经大学出版社,2005.
[46]张纯、吕伟.信息披露、市场关注与融资约束[J].会计研究,2007,(11)：32-38.
[47]张纯、吕伟.信息披露、信息中介与企业过度投资[J].会计研究,2009,(1)：60-65.
[48]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].第1版.上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[49]张先治、袁克利.公司治理、财务契约与财务控制[J].会计研究,2005,(11)：21-25.
[50]张宗新、朱伟骅.我国上市公司信息披露质量的实证研究[J].南开经济研究,2007,(1)：45-116.
[51]张宗新、郭来生,等.上市公司自愿性信息披露的有效性研究[R].东北证券有限责任公司研究报告,2003.
[52]张宗新、张晓荣、廖士光.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗?——基于1998—2003年中国证券市场的检验[J].经济学(季刊),2005,(1)：369-386.
[53]张宗新、杨飞、袁庆梅.上市公司信息披露质量提升能否改进公司绩效?[J].会计研究,2007,(10)：16-24.
[54]周守华,等.激励强度、公司治理与企业业绩研究综述[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：60-65.
[55]AAA. A Statement of Basic Accounting theory [M]. American Accounting Association,1966:34-40.
[56]Ali, A., T. Chen and S. Radhakrishman. Corporate disclosures by family firms [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,2007(44):238-286.
[57]Amir, E. and Lev, B. Value relevance of non-financial information:the wireless communications industry [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1996(22):3-30.
[58]Anil K. Makhija, James M. Patton. The impact of firm ownership structure on voluntary disclosure empirical evidence from Czech annual reports [J]. Journal of Business,2004(3):457-491
[59]April Klein. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2002(33):375-400.
[60]Atiase R. K., L. S. Bamber, et al.. Timeliness of financial reporting, the firm size effect, and stock price reactions to annual earnings announcements [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1989 (2):526-552.
[61]Banghoj, J. and Plenborg, T. Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. Accounting and Finance,2008(48):159-180.
[62]Baxter Nevins D. Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital [J], Journal of Finance, 1967(22):395-403.
[63]Bhattacharya U., H. Daouk. & M. Welker. The world price of earnings opacity [J]. The Accounting Review 2003(78):641-678.
[64]Boqin. The influence of audit committee financial expertise on earnings quality U. S. Evidence [D]. Working paper. University of Groningen.2006.
[65]Botosan, C.A. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital [J]. The Accounting Review 1997(3):323-350.
[66]Botosan, C.A.and Plumlee, M., A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002(40):21-40.
[67]Brown, S., and S. Hillegeist. How disclosure quality affects the level of information asymmetry [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2007 (12):443-477.
[68]Bryan, D., Liu, M. H. C. & Tiras, S. L. The influence of independent and effective audit committee on earnings quality [D]. Working paper. State University of New York, 2004.
[69]Carcello J. V., Hermanson D. R., Neal, T. et al. Board characteristics and audit fee [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research 2002(19):365-384.
[70]Chambers A. E. and Penman S. H. Timeliness of reporting and the stock price reaction to earnings announcements [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1984(22):21-47.
[71]Chau K.G.and S.J.Gray, Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore, the International Journal of Accounting, 2002(37):247-265.
[72]Cheng & Courtenay. Board Composition, Regulatory Regime and Voluntary Disclosure [J]. The International Journal of Accounting 2006(41):290-299.
[73]Demsetz Harold.& Kenneth Lehn, The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequences [J], Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[74]Dulacha G. Barako, Phil Hancock & H. Y. Izan. Factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies [J]. Corporate Governance 2006(14):107-125.
[75]Ecker, F.; J. Francis; I. Kim; P. Olsson; AND K. Schipper. A returns-based representation of earnings quality [J]. The Accounting Review,2006(81):749-780.
[76]Einhorn, E. The nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2005 (43):593-621.
[77]Einhorn, E. Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,2007(43):245-274.
[78]Einhorn, E., and A. Ziv. Unbalanced information and the interaction between information acquisition, operating activities and voluntary disclosure [J]. The Accounting Review,2007(82):1171-1194.
[79]Fama, E. & M. C. Jensen. Separation of ownership and control [J]. Journal of Law & Economics,1983(26):301-325.
[80]FASB. Improving business reporting:insights into enhancing voluntary disclosures[R]. Steering committee report business reporting research project,2001.
[81]Gary K. Meek, Clare B. Roberts & Sidney J. Gray. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K. and continental European multinational corporations [J]. Journal of International Business Studies 1995(4):555-572.
[82]Garham, J., C. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,2005 (30):3-73.
[83]Gleb, D. & Zarowin, P. Corporate disclosure policy and the informativeness of stock Prices [D]. Working Paper, New York University,2000.
[84]Gietmann, M. B., and J. Ireland. Cost of capital, strategic disclosures and accounting choice [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 2005(32):599-634.
[85]Gigler, F. B. & Hemmer, T. Conservatism, optimal disclosure policy and the timeliness of financial reports[J]. The Accounting Review 2001(76):471-493.
[86]Grossman, S. J. & O. Hart. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids [J]. Journal of Finance 1980(35):323-34.
[87]Gu F. & J. Q. Li. The credibility of voluntary disclosure and insider stock transactions [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2007(4):45-68.
[88]Hassan, O.A.G. The economic consequences of increased disclosure in the Egyptian emerging capital market [D]. PhD Thesis, University of Abertay Dundee, UK,2006.
[89]Healy P., Hutton A. & Palepu K. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999a(16):485-520.
[90]Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature [J], Journal of Accounting & Economics 2001(31):405-440.
[91]Heflin, F., K. Shaw; and J. Wild. Disclosure quality and market liquidity:Impact of depth quotes and order sizes [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research 2005(22): 829-865.
[92]Hossain, M., Perera, M. M. B. & Rahman, A. R. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies [J]. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting,1995(6):69-87.
[93]Hutton, A., G. S. Miller and D. J. Skinner. The role of supplementary statements with management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 2003 (41):867-890.
[94]Hutton, A. A discussion of corporate disclosure by family firms. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2007 (44):287-297.
[95]Imhoff, E. The Representativeness of Management Earnings Forecasts [J]. The Accounting Review 1978 (53):836-850.
[96]Lambert, R. A., Leuz, C, & Verrecchia, R. E. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2007(45):385-420.
[97]Lang, M. & R. Lundholm. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1993 (31):246-271.
[98]Louis D. Brandeis. Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It [M]. New York, Stokes,1914.
[99]Jean Bedard, Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou & Lucie Courteau. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence and activity on affressive earnings management, auditing [J]. A Journal of Practice & Theory 2004(12):24-48.
[100]Jennifer Francis, Dhananjay Nanda & Per Olsson. Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2008(46):53-99.
[101]Jensen M. C. The modern industrial revolution exit and the failure of internal control systems [J]. Journal of Finance,1993(3):831-880.
[102]Karamanou, R., and N. Vafeas. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts:An empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2005 (43):453-473.
[103]Mcconnell J. & H. Servas, Equity ownership and the two faces of debt [J], Journal of Economics,1995(39):131-157.
[104]Mercer, M. How do investors assess the credibility of management disclosures? [J]. Accounting Horizons 2004 (18):185-196.
[105]Milgrom, P. Good News and Bad News:Representation Theorems and Applications [J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1981 (12):380-391.
[106]Miller, G. Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2002 (40):173-204.
[107]Morck R., Shleifer A. & R. Vishny, Management ownership and market valuation [J], Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):293-315.
[108]Nagar, V., D. Nanda and P. Wysocki. Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2003 (34):283-309.
[109]Noe, C. F. Voluntary disclosures and insider transactions [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 1999 (27):305-326.
[110]Pownall, G. & Waymire, G. Voluntary disclosure credibility and securities prices: evidence from management earnings forecasts [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1989(27):227-246.
[111]Raghaunandan K, Read W J. & Rama D V. Audit committee composition, gray directors and interaction with internal auditing[J]. Accounting Horizons 2001(15):105-118.
[112]Rogers, J., and P. Stocken. Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting Review 2005(80):1233-60.
[113]Sengupta P. Corporate disclosure quality and the costofdebt [J].The Accounting Review,1998(73):459-474.
[114]Suljs, J. Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2007(43):391-410.
[115]Tasker, S. Bridging the Information Gap:Quarterly Conference Calls as a Medium for Voluntary Disclosure[J]. Review of Accounting Studies 1998(3):137-67.
[116]Verrecchia, R. Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 1983(5):179-94.
[117]Verrecchia, R. Information Quality and Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 1990 (12):365-380.
[118]Villalonga, B., and R. Amit. How do family ownership, control, and management affect firm value?" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics 2006 (80):385-417.
[119]Walther, B. R. Discussion of information transparency and coordination failure: Theory and experiment. Journal of Accounting Research,2004(42):197-205.
[120]Waymire, G. Earnings Volatility and Voluntary Management Forecast Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1985(23):268-95.
①陈国辉.会计理论研究[M].第1版.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2007.
①根据中国证监会(CSRC)于2001年4月3日公布的《上市公司行业分类指引》中的分类标准作为行业的分类标准。
①《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号<年度报告的内容与格式>》中表述为“应披露”、“应说明”的项目,本文作为强制披露的项目。
②《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号<年度报告的内容与格式>》中表述为“可以披露”、“可以说明”的项目,本文作为鼓励自愿披露的项目。
③(Meek et al.,1995:Ahmed, 1996): (Chow et al.,1987:Botosan,1997)
④笔者在通读了519份年报后发现,我国上市公司一般在年报中披露近三年的历史信息,无一家上市公司披露三年以上的历史信息,为了提高自愿性信息披露指数的信度和效度,本文将Botosan(1997)所构建的指数中的三年以上历史信息项目删除。
②证监会《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(2001)的规定：在2003年6月30日前,上市公司董事会成员中至少包括三分之一的独立董事。
①来源：康雁、宋凤华.谁创造财富,谁消灭财富——2002年中国上市公司财富创造和毁灭排行榜[J].财经,2003,(21)：82-90.
①朱晓菁.沪市上市公司自愿性信息披露影响因素实证研究[D].东华大学,2007.
[1]白云霞、吴联生.信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：37-45.
[2]陈国辉.会计理论研究[M].第1版.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2007.
[3]陈国辉、崔刚、叶龙.上市公司信息披露体系中人文道德秩序的建构[J].会计研究,2003,(11)：39-43.
[4]陈国辉、韩海文.自愿性信息披露的价值效应检验.财经问题研究,2010(5)：60-68.
[5]陈钊.信息与激励经济学.第1版.上海：上海人民出版社,2005.
[6]陈晓、秦跃红.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界,2003,(3)：28-33.
[7]陈艳.会计信息披露方式的经济学思考[J].会计研究,2004,(8)：51-56.
[8]程新生等.自愿性信息披露与公司治理——董事会功能与大股东行为[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008,(7)：489-494.
[9]杜兴强、王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007, (1)； 58-66.
[10]方红星、孙翯.基于沪市公司2006年年报的内部控制信息披露研究：修正与拓展[J].财经问题研究,2008,(4)：75-79.
[11]方红星、孙翯.交叉上市保险公司内部控制信息披露及其市场反应——基于中国人寿和中国平安的经验研究[J].财经问题研究,2009,(8)：105-111.
[12]方红星、孙翯、金韵韵.公司特征、外部审计与内部控制信息的自愿披露——基于沪市上市公司2003—-2005年年报的经验研究[J].会计研究,2009,(10)：44-52.
[13]韩海文、张宏婧.自愿性信息披露的短期价值效应探析[J].审计与经济研究,2009,(4)：50-58.
[14]何卫东.上市公司自愿性信息披露研究[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告No.0070,2003.
[15]何卫东.鼓励引导自愿性信息披露[N].中国证券报,2002,(2002-12-23).
[16]黎文靖.会计信息披露政府监管的经济后果——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,(8)：13-21.
[17]李士萍.试论我国预测性信息披露制度的完善[J].社会科学战线,2003(6)：244-247.
[18]李翔、冯峥.会计信息披露需求：来自证券研究机构的分析[J].会计研究,2006,(3)：63-68.
[19]李维安.公司治理[M].第1版.天津：南开大学出版社,2001.
[20]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(1)24-30.
[21]林斌、饶静.上市公司为什么自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告?——基于信号传递理论的实证研究[J].会计研究,2009,(2)：45-52.
[22]刘永泽、陈艳.政府监管与行业自律导向的现实选择——对美国注册会计师行业监管模式的剖析引发的思考[J].会计研究,2002,(11)：28-31.
[23]刘明辉、胡波.公司治理、代理成本与审计定价——基于2001—-2003年我国A股上市公司的实证研究[J].财经问题研究,2006,(2)：72-79.
[24]刘玉廷.关于会计研究方法问题[J].会计研究,2000,(12)：9-13.
[25]刘淑莲.企业价值评估与价值创造战略研究——两种价值模式与六大驱动因素[J].会计研究,2004,(9)：67-71.
[26]吕富强.信息披露的法律透视[M].第1版.北京：人民法院出版社,2000.
[27]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J],会计研究,1999,(9)：25-35.
[28]蒋亚朋、杨洋.上市公司信息披露问题研究[M].第1版.沈阳：东北大学出版社,2005.
[29]毛洪涛、吉利.我国上市公司信息披露理论研究评估——兼论构建上市公司信息披露理论框架[J].会计研究,2005,(9)：26-31.
[30]青木昌彦、钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构：内部人控制和银行的作用[M].第1版.北京：中国经济出版社,1995.
[31]宋献忠.论核心能力信息的自愿披露[J].会计研究,2006,(2)：47-52.
[32]孙光国、赵相华.路,还有多远——基于11份企业社会责任报告的研读与思考[J].财务与会计,2008,(19)：18-20.
[33]万寿义、刘地亮.企业社会成本信息披露问题研究[J].会计师,2009,(7)：5-8.
[34]汪炜.公司信息披露理论与实证研究[M].第1版.杭州：浙江大学出版社,2005.
[35]汪炜、蒋高峰.信息披露、透明度与资本成本[J].经济研究,2004,(7)：101-114.
[36]王斌、梁欣欣.公司治理、财务状况与信息披露质量——来自深交所的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008,(3)：31-39.
[37]王怀明、宿金香.董事会特征与企业自愿信息披露[J].审计与经济研究,2007,(3)：73-76.
[38]王雄元、沈维成.公司控制结构对信息披露质量影响的实证研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(3)：44-50.
[39]王雨田.控制论、信息论、系统科学与哲学[M].第1版.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1988.
[40]巫升柱、王建玲、乔旭东.中国上市公司年度报告披露及时性实证研究[J].会计研究,2006,(2)：19-24.
[41]杨有红、汪薇.2006年沪市公司内部控制信息披露研究[J].会计研究,2008,(3)：35-42.
[42]殷枫.中国上市公司自愿性信息披露研究[M].第1版.北京：中国商务出版社,2006.
[43]余怒涛,等.董事会规模与公司价值关系的进一步检验—基于公司规模门槛效应的分析[J].中国会计评论,2008,(9)：237-254.
[44]曾颖、陆正飞.信息披露质量与股权融资成本[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：69-91.
[45]张力上.上市公司信息披露与分析[M].第1版.成都：西南财经大学出版社,2005.
[46]张纯、吕伟.信息披露、市场关注与融资约束[J].会计研究,2007,(11)：32-38.
[47]张纯、吕伟.信息披露、信息中介与企业过度投资[J].会计研究,2009,(1)：60-65.
[48]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].第1版.上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[49]张先治、袁克利.公司治理、财务契约与财务控制[J].会计研究,2005,(11)：21-25.
[50]张宗新、朱伟骅.我国上市公司信息披露质量的实证研究[J].南开经济研究,2007,(1)：45-116.
[51]张宗新、郭来生,等.上市公司自愿性信息披露的有效性研究[R].东北证券有限责任公司研究报告,2003.
[52]张宗新、张晓荣、廖士光.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗?——基于1998—2003年中国证券市场的检验[J].经济学(季刊),2005,(1)：369-386.
[53]张宗新、杨飞、袁庆梅.上市公司信息披露质量提升能否改进公司绩效?[J].会计研究,2007,(10)：16-24.
[54]周守华,等.激励强度、公司治理与企业业绩研究综述[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：60-65.
[55]AAA. A Statement of Basic Accounting theory [M]. American Accounting Association,1966:34-40.
[56]Ali, A., T. Chen and S. Radhakrishman. Corporate disclosures by family firms [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,2007(44):238-286.
[57]Amir, E. and Lev, B. Value relevance of non-financial information:the wireless communications industry [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1996(22):3-30.
[58]Anil K. Makhija, James M. Patton. The impact of firm ownership structure on voluntary disclosure empirical evidence from Czech annual reports [J]. Journal of Business,2004(3):457-491
[59]April Klein. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2002(33):375-400.
[60]Atiase R. K., L. S. Bamber, et al.. Timeliness of financial reporting, the firm size effect, and stock price reactions to annual earnings announcements [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1989 (2):526-552.
[61]Banghoj, J. and Plenborg, T. Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. Accounting and Finance,2008(48):159-180.
[62]Baxter Nevins D. Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital [J], Journal of Finance, 1967(22):395-403.
[63]Bhattacharya U., H. Daouk. & M. Welker. The world price of earnings opacity [J]. The Accounting Review 2003(78):641-678.
[64]Boqin. The influence of audit committee financial expertise on earnings quality U. S. Evidence [D]. Working paper. University of Groningen.2006.
[65]Botosan, C.A. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital [J]. The Accounting Review 1997(3):323-350.
[66]Botosan, C.A.and Plumlee, M., A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002(40):21-40.
[67]Brown, S., and S. Hillegeist. How disclosure quality affects the level of information asymmetry [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2007 (12):443-477.
[68]Bryan, D., Liu, M. H. C. & Tiras, S. L. The influence of independent and effective audit committee on earnings quality [D]. Working paper. State University of New York, 2004.
[69]Carcello J. V., Hermanson D. R., Neal, T. et al. Board characteristics and audit fee [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research 2002(19):365-384.
[70]Chambers A. E. and Penman S. H. Timeliness of reporting and the stock price reaction to earnings announcements [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1984(22):21-47.
[71]Chau K.G.and S.J.Gray, Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore, the International Journal of Accounting, 2002(37):247-265.
[72]Cheng & Courtenay. Board Composition, Regulatory Regime and Voluntary Disclosure [J]. The International Journal of Accounting 2006(41):290-299.
[73]Demsetz Harold.& Kenneth Lehn, The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequences [J], Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[74]Dulacha G. Barako, Phil Hancock & H. Y. Izan. Factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies [J]. Corporate Governance 2006(14):107-125.
[75]Ecker, F.; J. Francis; I. Kim; P. Olsson; AND K. Schipper. A returns-based representation of earnings quality [J]. The Accounting Review,2006(81):749-780.
[76]Einhorn, E. The nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2005 (43):593-621.
[77]Einhorn, E. Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,2007(43):245-274.
[78]Einhorn, E., and A. Ziv. Unbalanced information and the interaction between information acquisition, operating activities and voluntary disclosure [J]. The Accounting Review,2007(82):1171-1194.
[79]Fama, E. & M. C. Jensen. Separation of ownership and control [J]. Journal of Law & Economics,1983(26):301-325.
[80]FASB. Improving business reporting:insights into enhancing voluntary disclosures[R]. Steering committee report business reporting research project,2001.
[81]Gary K. Meek, Clare B. Roberts & Sidney J. Gray. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K. and continental European multinational corporations [J]. Journal of International Business Studies 1995(4):555-572.
[82]Garham, J., C. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,2005 (30):3-73.
[83]Gleb, D. & Zarowin, P. Corporate disclosure policy and the informativeness of stock Prices [D]. Working Paper, New York University,2000.
[84]Gietmann, M. B., and J. Ireland. Cost of capital, strategic disclosures and accounting choice [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 2005(32):599-634.
[85]Gigler, F. B. & Hemmer, T. Conservatism, optimal disclosure policy and the timeliness of financial reports[J]. The Accounting Review 2001(76):471-493.
[86]Grossman, S. J. & O. Hart. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids [J]. Journal of Finance 1980(35):323-34.
[87]Gu F. & J. Q. Li. The credibility of voluntary disclosure and insider stock transactions [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2007(4):45-68.
[88]Hassan, O.A.G. The economic consequences of increased disclosure in the Egyptian emerging capital market [D]. PhD Thesis, University of Abertay Dundee, UK,2006.
[89]Healy P., Hutton A. & Palepu K. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999a(16):485-520.
[90]Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature [J], Journal of Accounting & Economics 2001(31):405-440.
[91]Heflin, F., K. Shaw; and J. Wild. Disclosure quality and market liquidity:Impact of depth quotes and order sizes [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research 2005(22): 829-865.
[92]Hossain, M., Perera, M. M. B. & Rahman, A. R. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies [J]. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting,1995(6):69-87.
[93]Hutton, A., G. S. Miller and D. J. Skinner. The role of supplementary statements with management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 2003 (41):867-890.
[94]Hutton, A. A discussion of corporate disclosure by family firms. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2007 (44):287-297.
[95]Imhoff, E. The Representativeness of Management Earnings Forecasts [J]. The Accounting Review 1978 (53):836-850.
[96]Lambert, R. A., Leuz, C, & Verrecchia, R. E. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2007(45):385-420.
[97]Lang, M. & R. Lundholm. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1993 (31):246-271.
[98]Louis D. Brandeis. Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It [M]. New York, Stokes,1914.
[99]Jean Bedard, Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou & Lucie Courteau. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence and activity on affressive earnings management, auditing [J]. A Journal of Practice & Theory 2004(12):24-48.
[100]Jennifer Francis, Dhananjay Nanda & Per Olsson. Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2008(46):53-99.
[101]Jensen M. C. The modern industrial revolution exit and the failure of internal control systems [J]. Journal of Finance,1993(3):831-880.
[102]Karamanou, R., and N. Vafeas. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts:An empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2005 (43):453-473.
[103]Mcconnell J. & H. Servas, Equity ownership and the two faces of debt [J], Journal of Economics,1995(39):131-157.
[104]Mercer, M. How do investors assess the credibility of management disclosures? [J]. Accounting Horizons 2004 (18):185-196.
[105]Milgrom, P. Good News and Bad News:Representation Theorems and Applications [J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1981 (12):380-391.
[106]Miller, G. Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2002 (40):173-204.
[107]Morck R., Shleifer A. & R. Vishny, Management ownership and market valuation [J], Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):293-315.
[108]Nagar, V., D. Nanda and P. Wysocki. Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2003 (34):283-309.
[109]Noe, C. F. Voluntary disclosures and insider transactions [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 1999 (27):305-326.
[110]Pownall, G. & Waymire, G. Voluntary disclosure credibility and securities prices: evidence from management earnings forecasts [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1989(27):227-246.
[111]Raghaunandan K, Read W J. & Rama D V. Audit committee composition, gray directors and interaction with internal auditing[J]. Accounting Horizons 2001(15):105-118.
[112]Rogers, J., and P. Stocken. Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting Review 2005(80):1233-60.
[113]Sengupta P. Corporate disclosure quality and the costofdebt [J].The Accounting Review,1998(73):459-474.
[114]Suljs, J. Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response. Journal of Accounting & Economics 2007(43):391-410.
[115]Tasker, S. Bridging the Information Gap:Quarterly Conference Calls as a Medium for Voluntary Disclosure[J]. Review of Accounting Studies 1998(3):137-67.
[116]Verrecchia, R. Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 1983(5):179-94.
[117]Verrecchia, R. Information Quality and Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics 1990 (12):365-380.
[118]Villalonga, B., and R. Amit. How do family ownership, control, and management affect firm value?" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics 2006 (80):385-417.
[119]Walther, B. R. Discussion of information transparency and coordination failure: Theory and experiment. Journal of Accounting Research,2004(42):197-205.
[120]Waymire, G. Earnings Volatility and Voluntary Management Forecast Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1985(23):268-95.