面向行业自律机制建设的P2P网络借贷市场监管策略研究
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摘要
在信息技术的发展和支撑下,为了满足小额借款者的借款需求和小额投资者的投资需求,一种以网络信息技术为基础的P2P (peer-to-peer)网络借贷市场应运而生。该市场的出现不仅为借贷双方提供了更加高效、便捷的渠道,同时也是对传统借贷市场的重要补充。
从2005年全球第一家从事P2P网络借贷业务的平台建立以来,P2P网络借贷市场相继在多个国家出现并得到了迅速发展。P2P网络借贷市场于2007年进入中国,近两年在互联网金融发展的带动下,P2P网络借贷市场的发展和创新都非常迅速。然而,从P2P网络借贷市场在各国的发展情况来看,系统层面、平台层面以及借贷参与者层面的市场风险已经逐渐开始显现。与之同时,由于法律法规、信用体系等多方面的原因,P2P网络借贷市场在中国的创新又将该市场的风险更多地集中于平台经营与操作层面。近两年,中国的P2P网络借贷市场中,频频出现P2P网络借贷平台倒闭、提现困难以及经营者卷款跑路的情况,说明P2P网络借贷市场的发展发生了扭曲,P2P网络借贷市场的优势不能得到体现。因此,如何通过合理的监管纠正P2P网络借贷市场中存在的问题成为监管者、从业者以及研究者共同关注的问题。然而,对于一个还在起步发展阶段的新兴市场,既要对其风险和问题进行一定的控制,又要保护P2P网络借贷市场的创新能力,使其能够健康的、可持续的发展,因而,行业自律被监管当局作为中国P2P网络借贷市场的主要监管方式。所以,建立适度的行业自律机制从而激励参与主体的自律行为,对于P2P网络借贷市场的发展和监管具有非常重要的意义。更进一步,自律机制的建立本质上依赖于监管措施的制定。因而,如何实施合理、有效的监管措施以激励参与主体的行业自律行为,从而建立起有效的行业自律机制就变得及其重要。
根据文献研究可见,鉴于P2P网络借贷市场的特征,灵活而具有前瞻性的监管方式为学者们所推崇,行业自律为主的监管方式也被大多数学者所提倡。但是自律毕竟是由P2P网络借贷平台的行为直接反映的,而在P2P网络借贷市场的研究中对P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择及约束的研究很少。尽管在其他行业中有部分研究参与主体自律行为的文献,但由于P2P网络借贷市场中还没有统一、规范的行业自律机制,因此对其借鉴作用有限。同时,自律收益是影响主体自律行为选择的根本动力,政府的监管和惩戒则是P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的外部约束,只有当这两个方面的条件都具备时,行业自律才能得以实现。然而,在P2P网络借贷平台发展过程中,对自律行为产生的影响以及监管当局的监管措施对自律行为的约束作用的理论研究较少。对此,本文以行业自律机制建设为目的,分析了P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的影响因素以及平台自律行为选择与政府监管策略之间的相互关系和影响,通过剖析不同类型P2P网络借贷平台、不同发展阶段P2P网络借贷平台以及政府监管者不同的监管策略之间的相互影响,为制定以行业自律机制建设为目标的、符合中国实际情况的P2P网络借贷市场监管措施提供了理论依据和对策性建议。
本文的主体有三部分：第一部分主要包括第二章和第三章,对研究框架进行构建；第二部分是对研究问题的理论分析,主要包括第四、五、六章；第三部分是对比分析与借鉴研究,主要体现在第七章。
第一章为本文的绪论部分,主要介绍了论文的选题背景和意义,然后,结合现实情况,提出本文的研究目的及研究方法。最后,基于研究目的,给出研究框架和主要研究内容。
第二章主要是对监管理论的概述以及P2P网络借贷市场研究现状的评述。在对金融监管相关概念进行定义后,简述了行业自律与政府监管的关系。然后从市场发展特征、借贷双方行为特征研究以及P2P网络借贷市场的风险与监管三个方面对当前国内外P2P网络借贷市场研究现状进行了综述,指出当前研究的特点与范围。
第三章对P2P网络借贷市场的发展现状及监管现状进行了分析。从市场发展模式、市场特征对P2P网络借贷市场的发展现状进行了梳理,然后从系统层面、平台层面、借贷双方层面对P2P网络借贷市场的风险进行了分析,同时对我国P2P网络借贷市场的监管现状以及面临的挑战进行了讨论。
第四章开始是本文的理论研究部分,对P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的动机进行了分析,得到了影响P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的因素,同时分类讨论了在监管者不同的监管策略下,P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的变化。
在第四章的研究基础上,第五章进一步分类分析了主要影响因素对P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择所产生的影响。本章首先根据P2P网络借贷平台的内在差异,将P2P网络借贷平台分为自律平台和机会主义平台,分析自律选择影响因素对不同平台的影响,以及两种平台之间自律行为选择的相互影响。同时,讨论了在不同政府监管策略下,P2P网络借贷平台的自律选择变化。
P2P网络借贷平台在不同的发展阶段,由于面对不同的行为选择收益,也可能会产生自律行为选择的变化。所以,在第五章的研究基础上,第六章针对不同发展阶段P2P网络借贷平台的自律行为选择进行了分析,系统地分析了通过学习和模仿,不同发展阶段的P2P网络借贷平台的自律行为选择相互影响,及其对行业自律水平变化的影响。由于政府监管者对新进入P2P网络借贷平台的可控性更强,本章还对不同政府监管策略对新进入市场的P2P平台的自律行为选择的影响进行了深入地分析。在均衡结果分析的基础上,对政府监管者的监管措施及其对行业自律水平的调整办法进行了归纳。
第七章立足于从不同国家P2P网络借贷市场监管措施的对比分析中找出P2P网络借贷市场的监管要素。该部分结合前文的研究结论,比较了美国、英国和法国P2P网络借贷市场的监管现状,提炼出对我国P2P网络借贷市场的监管启示。
第八章对本文的主要结论、理论贡献及实践价值进行了总结,提出了当前研究存在的不足和未来研究的方向。
本文结合P2P网络借贷市场发展现状和特征,力图通过较为严密的演绎分析,采用理论与实际相结合、静态与动态分析相结合、对比分析与借鉴相结合的研究方法,对制定有利于提高我国P2P网络借贷市场行业自律水平、建立行业自律机制的政府监管措施提供理论依据和对策建议。纵观全文,本研究主要的创新和贡献包括以下几个方面：
第一,本文结合P2P网络借贷市场的特征,推导出P2P网络借贷平台自律选择与政府监管者的监管策略选择的相互影响及其影响因素,包括声誉收益、监管成本、自律成本等。对于处在行业自律机制建设过程中的P2P网络借贷市场的监管及监管措施的制定提供了借鉴。
第二,围绕P2P网络借贷平台自律选择与政府监管者的监管策略选择的相互影响及其影响因素这个核心问题,从不同维度,系统地对不同P2P网络借贷平台自律选择及内在相互影响分别进行了静态与动态分析。具体表现在以下三个方面：
首先,本文从P2P平台个体差异的角度,将其分为自律平台和机会主义平台,并针对不同的平台类型,对不同的自律行为选择影响因素分别进行了讨论,并总结出在不同自律水平下,政府监管者的策略选择对不同类型P2P平台自律行为选择的影响。同时,本文更为清晰地分析了政府监管者不同的惩罚措施对不同类型P2P平台自律行为选择产生影响的本质原因,为政府监管者了解和调整政府监管策略以维护行业自律的良好秩序、建立有效的自律行为约束机制提供了理论依据。
其次,在时间维度上,不同发展阶段的差异也可能使P2P平台在自律行为的选择上产生差异。因此,本文创新性地将P2P平台的自律选择进行了进一步地演化分析,将P2P平台分为在位P2P平台和新进入P2P平台分别进行分析。不同类别P2P平台自律行为的选择比例实际上也直接反映了P2P网络借贷市场的行业自律水平。在此基础上,本文不仅对在位P2P平台和新进入P2P平台自律行为选择的相互影响进行了分析,而且根据影响行为选择的参数之间关系的变化,对不同类别P2P平台自律行为选择比例之间的演化关系进行了分析。这些分析反映了随着P2P平台之间的不断学习和模仿,P2P网络借贷市场自律水平在不同情况下的演化过程。这种演化分析不仅是对市场主体自律行为选择理论研究的一种补充,同时也为政府监管者在不同市场环境下对P2P网络借贷市场行业自律水平进行调节,以形成有效的自律机制提供了参考。
最后,从参数关系变化的角度,本文详细分析了不同情况下新进入P2P平台的自律行为选择与政府监管者的监管策略选择之间的相互影响。事实上,不同的参数关系也就意味着不同的声誉评级、管理成本和监管成本。那么当某种因素对新进入P2P平台的自律选择产生影响时,政府监管者可以根据本文的分析结果采取相应的约束措施,调整新进入P2P平台群体的自律水平,从而达到维护和监督P2P网络借贷市场行业自律水平的目的。同时演化分析的框架,对于其他行业自律行为选择与政府监管可以提供一定的参考,较以往的文献研究更具有理论和现实意义。
总体来看,这部分内容对P2P网络借贷平台的内在差异、发展阶段差异下的自律行为选择进行了静态和动态的推演分析,系统地解析了P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择与政府监管者策略选择在动态演进中的相互影响,这些创新构成了本研究的重要特色所在。
第三,本文结合理论研究结论和国外P2P网络借贷市场监管现状,归纳出了P2P网络监管的要素和启示,并对我国以行业自律为主的P2P网络借贷市场的监管措施提出了建议。
限于P2P网络借贷市场监管数据获取的限制,本研究在理论假设和实证检验方面还存在不足。同时由于P2P网络借贷市场与互联网金融市场、实体经济发展以及银行体系的发展都有密切的关系,面向行业自律机制的监管措施如何与上述外部发展环境相适应,这也是未来进行进一步研究的方向。
本论文得到了国家社科基金重点项目(No.11AZD077),中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(No. JBK130503和No. JBK120505)和国家自然科学基金项目(No.71003081)的资助。
With the information technology development and support, in order to meet the investment needs of small borrowers and borrowing needs of small investors, P2P (peer-to-peer) lending market, based on information technology, have emerged. The market seems to not only provide a more efficient and convenient channels for both lenders and borrowers, but also be an important complement to traditional lending market.
Since the first P2P lending platform was established in2005, P2P lending market has been developing rapidly in many countries. China introduced the P2P lending market from2007. Recently, with the development of Internet financial market, P2P lending market has developed and innovated very fast. However, as the development of P2P lending market in countries, the market risk from system level, platform level and the participants is appearing gradually. Apart from that, due to various reasons such as laws and regulations, the credit system, risk of P2P lending market in China focuses more on the platform level. More and more collapsed platform, cash difficulties indicate the development of P2P lending market distortions occurred. So, how to do a reasonable regulation to correct the problem of P2P lending market becomes a problem concerned by regulators, practitioners and researchers. However, for an emerging market, it is necessary to control risk, but also protect the innovation capability of P2P lending market for sustainable development. Therefore, the industry self-regulation is regarded as a major measure for P2P lending market regulation by regulatory authorities. Thus, it is significant that building an industry self-regulatory mechanism to motivate self-regulation for P2P lending market regulation. Furthermore, self-regulatory mechanism is decided by regulatory measures. So how to implement reasonable and effective measures to encourage self-regulatory behaviors for establishing effective industry self-regulatory mechanism becomes extremely important.
According to the literature study, considering the characteristics of P2P lending market, flexible and forward-looking regulatory approach is respected by scholars. But, the self-regulatory behavior is decided by P2P lending platform directly, and there are little studies about P2P lending platform behavior of self-regulation. The revenue of self-regulation is the fundamental force of self-regulation, and government regulation and discipline are external constraints. When the conditions of these two aspects are in place, industry self-regulation can be achieved. In this regard, the thesis, for building industry self-regulatory mechanism, analyzes of the factors affecting the self-regulation behavior selection of P2P lending platform, the decision-making behavior of regulators, and the influence between them. Meanwhile, the influence between different regulatory strategies for different types or different stages of P2P lending platform is analyzed to provide a theoretical basis and suggestion for building effective industry self-regulation of P2P lending market.
This thesis is contained three main parts:the first part includes the Chapter Ⅱ and Chapter Ⅲ to build the research framework; the second part is theoretical analysis, including the Chapter Ⅳ, Chapter Ⅴ, Chapter Ⅵ; the third part is the comparative analysis, mainly in Chapter Ⅶ.
Chapter Ⅰ is the introduction part. Firstly, it introduces the background and implications of the research. Then, it proposes research purposes and research methods. Finally, based on research purposes, it gives the research framework and main content.
The second chapter is an overview of the financial market regulatory theory and literature review of P2P lending market. After delimiting the financial regulatory of related concepts, the thesis outlines the relationship between industry self-regulation and government regulation. The literature review of P2P lending market analyses by market characteristics, behavioral characteristics of lenders and borrowers as well as P2P lending market risk. Then it concludes the characteristics and scope of the current study. In Chapter Ⅲ, the situation and the regulatory status of P2P lending market are analyzed. And the regulatory status and challenges of P2P lending market are discussed.
On the basis of broad assumptions, self-regulation action selections of P2P lending platform are analyzed in Chapter IV. It derives factors that influence self-regulation action of P2P lending platform. And the changes of P2P lending platform self-regulation behaviors under different regulatory strategies are discussed.
Chapter V further analyzes the main factors affecting self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platform with different types. Firstly, based on the inherent differences of P2P lending platform, this chapter divides P2P lending platform into self-regulatory platform and opportunistic platform. Then it analyzes the influence of different factors affecting self-regulation behavior selections, as well as the interaction between the platforms with different types. Meanwhile,it discusses self-regulation action selections of P2P lending platform changes by different regulatory strategies.
P2P lending platforms in different developing stages have different options because of different revenues. Therefore, self-regulation behavior selections against P2P platform in different stages is analyzed systematically in Chapter Ⅵ. By learning and imitation, self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platforms in different developing stages influence each other. As the regulator is more controllable for the new entering P2P lending platform, this chapter also analyzes the effect of self-regulation behaviors of entering P2P lending platform with different regulatory strategies.
Chapter Ⅶ tries identify regulatory elements for P2P lending market based on the comparative analysis. Combining the foregoing conclusions, this chapter compares the regulatory status of P2P lending market in the United States, Britain and France to extracts regulatory implications for P2P lending market in China.
The final chapter is the conclusion part. It summarizes the main contributions as well as the limitations of this dissertation, and draws the future research directions.
Based on status and characteristics of P2P lending market, by combination of theory and practice, static and dynamic analysis, comparative and reference analysis, the research tries to provide a theoretical basis and suggestions of P2P lending market regulatory strategy for building industry self-regulatory mechanisms. As a whole, this dissertation might have following three innovations and contributions.
First, based on the characteristics of P2P lending market, the interactions between P2P platform self-regulatory behavior and governor regulatory strategies are analyzed firstly. Then it theoretically analyzes the factor of interaction, such as reputation revenue, regulatory costs and cost of self-regulation. It provides a reference for drawing up P2P lending market regulatory strategies during building industry self-regulatory mechanisms.
The second contribution includes the specific theoretical analysis. There are two chapters theoretically analyzing two important and related research questions, which are the influence between self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platform and governor regulatory strategies with different P2P lending platform types and developing stages. Furthermore, the evolutionary trends of self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platform with different developing stages, and the evolutionary trends of different governor regulatory strategies are analyzed. Because there is little theoretical research about the evolutionary trends of self-regulation behaviors and governor regulatory strategies, both of the two research questions that analyzed in this study seems to be an innovation in this field.
Third, according to the results concluded in the theoretical part, it concludes that understanding the influence between self-regulation behaviors selection and governor regulatory strategies is very important, especially for China under its special background. Finally, the advices of how to regulate P2P lending market for the Chinese government are given by comparative analysis.
Since the P2P lending market is associated with the Internet financial market, the real economy development and banking system, how to building industry self-regulation to adapt to the external is not analyzed in this research. Meanwhile, because of the difficulty of collecting regulatory data, the models have hypothesis, as well as few empirical analysis is taken in this dissertation. The two main limitations are also the main directions that this research will do in the future.
This research is supported by the National social Science Foundation Key Project of China (No.11AZD077), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. JBK130503&No. JBK120505), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.71003081)
从2005年全球第一家从事P2P网络借贷业务的平台建立以来,P2P网络借贷市场相继在多个国家出现并得到了迅速发展。P2P网络借贷市场于2007年进入中国,近两年在互联网金融发展的带动下,P2P网络借贷市场的发展和创新都非常迅速。然而,从P2P网络借贷市场在各国的发展情况来看,系统层面、平台层面以及借贷参与者层面的市场风险已经逐渐开始显现。与之同时,由于法律法规、信用体系等多方面的原因,P2P网络借贷市场在中国的创新又将该市场的风险更多地集中于平台经营与操作层面。近两年,中国的P2P网络借贷市场中,频频出现P2P网络借贷平台倒闭、提现困难以及经营者卷款跑路的情况,说明P2P网络借贷市场的发展发生了扭曲,P2P网络借贷市场的优势不能得到体现。因此,如何通过合理的监管纠正P2P网络借贷市场中存在的问题成为监管者、从业者以及研究者共同关注的问题。然而,对于一个还在起步发展阶段的新兴市场,既要对其风险和问题进行一定的控制,又要保护P2P网络借贷市场的创新能力,使其能够健康的、可持续的发展,因而,行业自律被监管当局作为中国P2P网络借贷市场的主要监管方式。所以,建立适度的行业自律机制从而激励参与主体的自律行为,对于P2P网络借贷市场的发展和监管具有非常重要的意义。更进一步,自律机制的建立本质上依赖于监管措施的制定。因而,如何实施合理、有效的监管措施以激励参与主体的行业自律行为,从而建立起有效的行业自律机制就变得及其重要。
根据文献研究可见,鉴于P2P网络借贷市场的特征,灵活而具有前瞻性的监管方式为学者们所推崇,行业自律为主的监管方式也被大多数学者所提倡。但是自律毕竟是由P2P网络借贷平台的行为直接反映的,而在P2P网络借贷市场的研究中对P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择及约束的研究很少。尽管在其他行业中有部分研究参与主体自律行为的文献,但由于P2P网络借贷市场中还没有统一、规范的行业自律机制,因此对其借鉴作用有限。同时,自律收益是影响主体自律行为选择的根本动力,政府的监管和惩戒则是P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的外部约束,只有当这两个方面的条件都具备时,行业自律才能得以实现。然而,在P2P网络借贷平台发展过程中,对自律行为产生的影响以及监管当局的监管措施对自律行为的约束作用的理论研究较少。对此,本文以行业自律机制建设为目的,分析了P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的影响因素以及平台自律行为选择与政府监管策略之间的相互关系和影响,通过剖析不同类型P2P网络借贷平台、不同发展阶段P2P网络借贷平台以及政府监管者不同的监管策略之间的相互影响,为制定以行业自律机制建设为目标的、符合中国实际情况的P2P网络借贷市场监管措施提供了理论依据和对策性建议。
本文的主体有三部分：第一部分主要包括第二章和第三章,对研究框架进行构建；第二部分是对研究问题的理论分析,主要包括第四、五、六章；第三部分是对比分析与借鉴研究,主要体现在第七章。
第一章为本文的绪论部分,主要介绍了论文的选题背景和意义,然后,结合现实情况,提出本文的研究目的及研究方法。最后,基于研究目的,给出研究框架和主要研究内容。
第二章主要是对监管理论的概述以及P2P网络借贷市场研究现状的评述。在对金融监管相关概念进行定义后,简述了行业自律与政府监管的关系。然后从市场发展特征、借贷双方行为特征研究以及P2P网络借贷市场的风险与监管三个方面对当前国内外P2P网络借贷市场研究现状进行了综述,指出当前研究的特点与范围。
第三章对P2P网络借贷市场的发展现状及监管现状进行了分析。从市场发展模式、市场特征对P2P网络借贷市场的发展现状进行了梳理,然后从系统层面、平台层面、借贷双方层面对P2P网络借贷市场的风险进行了分析,同时对我国P2P网络借贷市场的监管现状以及面临的挑战进行了讨论。
第四章开始是本文的理论研究部分,对P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的动机进行了分析,得到了影响P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的因素,同时分类讨论了在监管者不同的监管策略下,P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择的变化。
在第四章的研究基础上,第五章进一步分类分析了主要影响因素对P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择所产生的影响。本章首先根据P2P网络借贷平台的内在差异,将P2P网络借贷平台分为自律平台和机会主义平台,分析自律选择影响因素对不同平台的影响,以及两种平台之间自律行为选择的相互影响。同时,讨论了在不同政府监管策略下,P2P网络借贷平台的自律选择变化。
P2P网络借贷平台在不同的发展阶段,由于面对不同的行为选择收益,也可能会产生自律行为选择的变化。所以,在第五章的研究基础上,第六章针对不同发展阶段P2P网络借贷平台的自律行为选择进行了分析,系统地分析了通过学习和模仿,不同发展阶段的P2P网络借贷平台的自律行为选择相互影响,及其对行业自律水平变化的影响。由于政府监管者对新进入P2P网络借贷平台的可控性更强,本章还对不同政府监管策略对新进入市场的P2P平台的自律行为选择的影响进行了深入地分析。在均衡结果分析的基础上,对政府监管者的监管措施及其对行业自律水平的调整办法进行了归纳。
第七章立足于从不同国家P2P网络借贷市场监管措施的对比分析中找出P2P网络借贷市场的监管要素。该部分结合前文的研究结论,比较了美国、英国和法国P2P网络借贷市场的监管现状,提炼出对我国P2P网络借贷市场的监管启示。
第八章对本文的主要结论、理论贡献及实践价值进行了总结,提出了当前研究存在的不足和未来研究的方向。
本文结合P2P网络借贷市场发展现状和特征,力图通过较为严密的演绎分析,采用理论与实际相结合、静态与动态分析相结合、对比分析与借鉴相结合的研究方法,对制定有利于提高我国P2P网络借贷市场行业自律水平、建立行业自律机制的政府监管措施提供理论依据和对策建议。纵观全文,本研究主要的创新和贡献包括以下几个方面：
第一,本文结合P2P网络借贷市场的特征,推导出P2P网络借贷平台自律选择与政府监管者的监管策略选择的相互影响及其影响因素,包括声誉收益、监管成本、自律成本等。对于处在行业自律机制建设过程中的P2P网络借贷市场的监管及监管措施的制定提供了借鉴。
第二,围绕P2P网络借贷平台自律选择与政府监管者的监管策略选择的相互影响及其影响因素这个核心问题,从不同维度,系统地对不同P2P网络借贷平台自律选择及内在相互影响分别进行了静态与动态分析。具体表现在以下三个方面：
首先,本文从P2P平台个体差异的角度,将其分为自律平台和机会主义平台,并针对不同的平台类型,对不同的自律行为选择影响因素分别进行了讨论,并总结出在不同自律水平下,政府监管者的策略选择对不同类型P2P平台自律行为选择的影响。同时,本文更为清晰地分析了政府监管者不同的惩罚措施对不同类型P2P平台自律行为选择产生影响的本质原因,为政府监管者了解和调整政府监管策略以维护行业自律的良好秩序、建立有效的自律行为约束机制提供了理论依据。
其次,在时间维度上,不同发展阶段的差异也可能使P2P平台在自律行为的选择上产生差异。因此,本文创新性地将P2P平台的自律选择进行了进一步地演化分析,将P2P平台分为在位P2P平台和新进入P2P平台分别进行分析。不同类别P2P平台自律行为的选择比例实际上也直接反映了P2P网络借贷市场的行业自律水平。在此基础上,本文不仅对在位P2P平台和新进入P2P平台自律行为选择的相互影响进行了分析,而且根据影响行为选择的参数之间关系的变化,对不同类别P2P平台自律行为选择比例之间的演化关系进行了分析。这些分析反映了随着P2P平台之间的不断学习和模仿,P2P网络借贷市场自律水平在不同情况下的演化过程。这种演化分析不仅是对市场主体自律行为选择理论研究的一种补充,同时也为政府监管者在不同市场环境下对P2P网络借贷市场行业自律水平进行调节,以形成有效的自律机制提供了参考。
最后,从参数关系变化的角度,本文详细分析了不同情况下新进入P2P平台的自律行为选择与政府监管者的监管策略选择之间的相互影响。事实上,不同的参数关系也就意味着不同的声誉评级、管理成本和监管成本。那么当某种因素对新进入P2P平台的自律选择产生影响时,政府监管者可以根据本文的分析结果采取相应的约束措施,调整新进入P2P平台群体的自律水平,从而达到维护和监督P2P网络借贷市场行业自律水平的目的。同时演化分析的框架,对于其他行业自律行为选择与政府监管可以提供一定的参考,较以往的文献研究更具有理论和现实意义。
总体来看,这部分内容对P2P网络借贷平台的内在差异、发展阶段差异下的自律行为选择进行了静态和动态的推演分析,系统地解析了P2P网络借贷平台自律行为选择与政府监管者策略选择在动态演进中的相互影响,这些创新构成了本研究的重要特色所在。
第三,本文结合理论研究结论和国外P2P网络借贷市场监管现状,归纳出了P2P网络监管的要素和启示,并对我国以行业自律为主的P2P网络借贷市场的监管措施提出了建议。
限于P2P网络借贷市场监管数据获取的限制,本研究在理论假设和实证检验方面还存在不足。同时由于P2P网络借贷市场与互联网金融市场、实体经济发展以及银行体系的发展都有密切的关系,面向行业自律机制的监管措施如何与上述外部发展环境相适应,这也是未来进行进一步研究的方向。
本论文得到了国家社科基金重点项目(No.11AZD077),中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(No. JBK130503和No. JBK120505)和国家自然科学基金项目(No.71003081)的资助。
With the information technology development and support, in order to meet the investment needs of small borrowers and borrowing needs of small investors, P2P (peer-to-peer) lending market, based on information technology, have emerged. The market seems to not only provide a more efficient and convenient channels for both lenders and borrowers, but also be an important complement to traditional lending market.
Since the first P2P lending platform was established in2005, P2P lending market has been developing rapidly in many countries. China introduced the P2P lending market from2007. Recently, with the development of Internet financial market, P2P lending market has developed and innovated very fast. However, as the development of P2P lending market in countries, the market risk from system level, platform level and the participants is appearing gradually. Apart from that, due to various reasons such as laws and regulations, the credit system, risk of P2P lending market in China focuses more on the platform level. More and more collapsed platform, cash difficulties indicate the development of P2P lending market distortions occurred. So, how to do a reasonable regulation to correct the problem of P2P lending market becomes a problem concerned by regulators, practitioners and researchers. However, for an emerging market, it is necessary to control risk, but also protect the innovation capability of P2P lending market for sustainable development. Therefore, the industry self-regulation is regarded as a major measure for P2P lending market regulation by regulatory authorities. Thus, it is significant that building an industry self-regulatory mechanism to motivate self-regulation for P2P lending market regulation. Furthermore, self-regulatory mechanism is decided by regulatory measures. So how to implement reasonable and effective measures to encourage self-regulatory behaviors for establishing effective industry self-regulatory mechanism becomes extremely important.
According to the literature study, considering the characteristics of P2P lending market, flexible and forward-looking regulatory approach is respected by scholars. But, the self-regulatory behavior is decided by P2P lending platform directly, and there are little studies about P2P lending platform behavior of self-regulation. The revenue of self-regulation is the fundamental force of self-regulation, and government regulation and discipline are external constraints. When the conditions of these two aspects are in place, industry self-regulation can be achieved. In this regard, the thesis, for building industry self-regulatory mechanism, analyzes of the factors affecting the self-regulation behavior selection of P2P lending platform, the decision-making behavior of regulators, and the influence between them. Meanwhile, the influence between different regulatory strategies for different types or different stages of P2P lending platform is analyzed to provide a theoretical basis and suggestion for building effective industry self-regulation of P2P lending market.
This thesis is contained three main parts:the first part includes the Chapter Ⅱ and Chapter Ⅲ to build the research framework; the second part is theoretical analysis, including the Chapter Ⅳ, Chapter Ⅴ, Chapter Ⅵ; the third part is the comparative analysis, mainly in Chapter Ⅶ.
Chapter Ⅰ is the introduction part. Firstly, it introduces the background and implications of the research. Then, it proposes research purposes and research methods. Finally, based on research purposes, it gives the research framework and main content.
The second chapter is an overview of the financial market regulatory theory and literature review of P2P lending market. After delimiting the financial regulatory of related concepts, the thesis outlines the relationship between industry self-regulation and government regulation. The literature review of P2P lending market analyses by market characteristics, behavioral characteristics of lenders and borrowers as well as P2P lending market risk. Then it concludes the characteristics and scope of the current study. In Chapter Ⅲ, the situation and the regulatory status of P2P lending market are analyzed. And the regulatory status and challenges of P2P lending market are discussed.
On the basis of broad assumptions, self-regulation action selections of P2P lending platform are analyzed in Chapter IV. It derives factors that influence self-regulation action of P2P lending platform. And the changes of P2P lending platform self-regulation behaviors under different regulatory strategies are discussed.
Chapter V further analyzes the main factors affecting self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platform with different types. Firstly, based on the inherent differences of P2P lending platform, this chapter divides P2P lending platform into self-regulatory platform and opportunistic platform. Then it analyzes the influence of different factors affecting self-regulation behavior selections, as well as the interaction between the platforms with different types. Meanwhile,it discusses self-regulation action selections of P2P lending platform changes by different regulatory strategies.
P2P lending platforms in different developing stages have different options because of different revenues. Therefore, self-regulation behavior selections against P2P platform in different stages is analyzed systematically in Chapter Ⅵ. By learning and imitation, self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platforms in different developing stages influence each other. As the regulator is more controllable for the new entering P2P lending platform, this chapter also analyzes the effect of self-regulation behaviors of entering P2P lending platform with different regulatory strategies.
Chapter Ⅶ tries identify regulatory elements for P2P lending market based on the comparative analysis. Combining the foregoing conclusions, this chapter compares the regulatory status of P2P lending market in the United States, Britain and France to extracts regulatory implications for P2P lending market in China.
The final chapter is the conclusion part. It summarizes the main contributions as well as the limitations of this dissertation, and draws the future research directions.
Based on status and characteristics of P2P lending market, by combination of theory and practice, static and dynamic analysis, comparative and reference analysis, the research tries to provide a theoretical basis and suggestions of P2P lending market regulatory strategy for building industry self-regulatory mechanisms. As a whole, this dissertation might have following three innovations and contributions.
First, based on the characteristics of P2P lending market, the interactions between P2P platform self-regulatory behavior and governor regulatory strategies are analyzed firstly. Then it theoretically analyzes the factor of interaction, such as reputation revenue, regulatory costs and cost of self-regulation. It provides a reference for drawing up P2P lending market regulatory strategies during building industry self-regulatory mechanisms.
The second contribution includes the specific theoretical analysis. There are two chapters theoretically analyzing two important and related research questions, which are the influence between self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platform and governor regulatory strategies with different P2P lending platform types and developing stages. Furthermore, the evolutionary trends of self-regulation behaviors of P2P lending platform with different developing stages, and the evolutionary trends of different governor regulatory strategies are analyzed. Because there is little theoretical research about the evolutionary trends of self-regulation behaviors and governor regulatory strategies, both of the two research questions that analyzed in this study seems to be an innovation in this field.
Third, according to the results concluded in the theoretical part, it concludes that understanding the influence between self-regulation behaviors selection and governor regulatory strategies is very important, especially for China under its special background. Finally, the advices of how to regulate P2P lending market for the Chinese government are given by comparative analysis.
Since the P2P lending market is associated with the Internet financial market, the real economy development and banking system, how to building industry self-regulation to adapt to the external is not analyzed in this research. Meanwhile, because of the difficulty of collecting regulatory data, the models have hypothesis, as well as few empirical analysis is taken in this dissertation. The two main limitations are also the main directions that this research will do in the future.
This research is supported by the National social Science Foundation Key Project of China (No.11AZD077), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. JBK130503&No. JBK120505), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.71003081)
引文
3 《中国P2P借贷服务行业白皮书》,中国经济出版社,2013
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