我国投资银行内部控制研究
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摘要
面对复杂多变的外部环境,日益激烈的行业竞争,健全有效的内部控制是企业持续经营,实现经营目标的保证。2013年的光大事件以及南京证券、民生证券、平安证券、联合证券4家公司均因保荐业务违规受处罚事件,再一次向人们证明,完善内部控制、加强风险管理对投资银行的重要性,也再一次向人们证明,投资银行内控失效对市场造成的影响。
从综合治理结束到现在,已有6年时间,我国投资银行内部控制的发展情况值得关注。同时,2013年,美国反欺诈财务报告全国委员会的发起委员会(Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission,简称COSO委员会)发布了新的《内部控制—整体框架(2013)》,将内部控制的理论与实践又向前推进了一步,内部控制的新发展对我国投资银行来说是否适用?有哪些我们可以借鉴?我国投资银行的内部控制目前处于一个什么阶段?在光大事件、保荐事件发生后,结合国内外内部控制理论及实践的发展,对我国投资银行内部控制的新进展作一总结,对存在的问题作一梳理,并提出相应的解决方法,对下一步的发展提出新的思路是有意义的。
围绕这样的研究思路,本文第一章介绍了研究背景、相关文献综述。
第二章首先对内部控制的发展进行了简要回顾,对4个核心概念,即公司治理、风险管理、合规管理、外部监管与内部控制的关系进行了辨析,明确其关系。在此基础上,发现内部控制的范围在不断扩大、内容系统化和体系化,与外部环境形成了紧密的联系,其发展动力来自社会经济环境的变化及企业利益相关者的需求。说明不同的企业由于有不同的风险偏好,不同的内外部环境,这种差异可体现在其内部控制上。因此,在对我国投资银行内部控制制度进行了分析后,对我国投资银行内部控制所处的阶段及性质作了分析判断,对我国投资银行内部控制的内涵进行了界定。
第三章先分析了我国投资银行的发展历程,发现由于我国投资银行产生初期就存在体制缺陷、制度缺失、监管缺失,导致我国投资银行业早期内部控制失效,风险丛生。因此,从行业竞争、风险管理、外部监管角度分析了我国投资银行进行内部控制建设的动因或必要性。为了在竞争中胜出,同时,投资银行作为金融机构,其经营本质是承担风险、管理风险,并从中获利,所以内部控制是其进行风险管理、实现经营目标的保证,投资银行有从事高风险业务的内在冲动,因此,有效的监管并从外部推动其内部控制是必要的。接下来梳理总结了综合治理前后,投资银行内部控制的发展演变和特点。并结合光大事件,分析了现阶段我国投资银行内部控制存在的问题。
他山之石,可以攻玉。第四章对美国独立投行的内部控制进行了分析。与其他文献不同,本章是先从美国独立投行的发展模式、外部环境的变化对独立投行造成的影响出发,分析了独立投行经营特征,并在此基础上,分析了独立投行内部控制的特点。认为独立投行内部控制的形成及内部控制在次贷危机中的表现实际上是其发展模式所形成的内控目标、内控环境、控制措施中所存在的缺陷与问题造成的。最后,思考了美国独立投行内部控制的经验对我国投行的启示。认为我国投行内部控制的建设要正确把握投资银行的功能定位,合理设计安排投行的委托代理机制,建立合理的内部治理结构以形成有效的制衡机制,建立合理的激励机制,内部控制与组织体系合理化对应、注重内部控制的执行。
第五章、第六章对我国投资银行内部控制建设提出了建议。第五章先对我国投资银行内部控制进行了定位,基于投资银行的管理核心是风险收益对应,其全面风险管理的前提应该是有良好的运行有效的内部控制。所以,第五章提出我国投资银行内部控制的整体框架,对内部控制的每一要素进行了详细的分析和构建,第六章则从内部控制机制、内部控制制度中能体现我国投资银行内部控制特色的方面提出了建议。
本文的创新点有：
1.对现阶段我国投资银行内部控制的内涵及发展路径进行了界定。内部控制的理论与实践经历了五个阶段,五个阶段分别是：以查错防弊为主的内部牵制阶段；划分为内部会计控制和内部管理控制两类的控制制度阶段；包含控制环境、会计制度和控制程序三要素的控制结构阶段；包含一个定义、三个目标、五个要素的内部控制整体框架阶段；包含一个定义、四个目标,八个要素的全面风险管理阶段。
内部控制已发展至全面风险管理阶段,但根据我国投资银行的现状：规模普遍较小,业务以经纪业务为主,比较单一、同质化,分析比较了财政部等五部委2008年发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》,我国证监会2003年修订的《证券公司内部控制指引》,COSO委员发布的《内部控制—整体框架》(Internal Control-Integrated Framework)报告(以下简称COSO报告)1994年版和2013年版,2004年COSO委员会发布的《企业风险管理—总体框架》(Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework,简称ERM报告),认为我国投资银行内部控制仍处于内部控制阶段,证监会《证券公司内部控制指引》中关于内部控制的定义仍适用于当前我国投资银行,我国投资银行内部控制的发展路径：是先建设好内部控制体系,再在此基础上,稳打稳扎提升自己的风险管理水平。
2.美国投资银行发展模式的变迁形成的经营特征充分影响其内部控制特征,这是美国独立投资银行内部控制的特点,也是导致其内部控制在次贷危机中失效的原因。
美国投资银行发展模式的变迁体现了与商业银行分离、融合、再分离、到再融合的过程。再融合后,美国成立了近500家金融控股公司,许多大型商业银行都变更为金融控股公司,2008年金融危机前,华尔街仅剩下以五大投行(高盛、摩根士丹利、美林、雷曼、贝尔斯登)为代表的不多的独立投行。它们与以金融控股公司为代表的金融集团展开竞争。竞争迫使独立投行从以“卖方”为主,转向以“买方”为主,由合伙制变为股份制,为了解决委托代理问题而引入了股权激励,这些都造成了其追求高风险高收益的经营特征,将内部控制抛在脑后,内部控制让位于短期利益、公司内部人的利益,最后独立投行消失。所以其风险的演变过程是：经营模式→业务表现、经营风格→内部控制失效→风险累积→风险爆发。
3.我国投资银行内部控制体现了与美国独立投行不同的发展路径。我国投资银行内部控制薄弱,内部控制更多是一种内部合规性管理,所以内部控制从一开始就是不健全不规范的,而且这种不健全不规范更多是从内部产生的。我国投行成立之初,业务前景很好,人们对投资有很大的热情,但初期我国投行内部控制缺失严重,内部人对利益的无限追求,导致其无视制度规范,从而发生了一系列重大违规事件,使我国投行面临较大的风险,不得不由政府出面进行综合治理。综合治理后,我国投行基本上开展了内部控制建设,而不仅仅是合规性建设。因此,我国投行的内部控制在综合治理后应该定性为重建。其发展路径为：内部合规管理→内部控制失效→风险累积→综合治理→重新构建。
4.从中美投行的经验得出结论：(1)内部控制最重要的是：在对投资银行进行功能定位的基础上进行整体设计,尤其是组织架构的合理性,能否形成有效的制衡机制,是内控是否有效的关键。中美投行内部控制失效的表现都是内控让位于公司对利润的无限追求,说明公司内部没有力量对这种不利提出反对,制衡机制失去作用。其次才是制度的制定,否则任何制度都是苍白的。(2)内部控制要体现出企业的特点,形成特色。良好的内部控制可以有助于形成投行的声誉的形成。
5.建议投资银行引入以经济资本管理为核心的绩效考核制度。实施经济资本管理的投资银行,通过以经济增加值(Economic Value Added,简写为EVA)和风险调整后资本收益率(Risk Adjusted Return on Capital,简写为RAROC)作为业绩评价和考核激励的核心指标,有助于解决追求利润与控制风险之间的矛盾,将风险与收益结合起来,使绩效考评实现从数量到质量的转变,有利于在内部建立良好的激励机制。
In the face of the complex and volatile external environment, the increasingly fierce industry competition, sound and effective internal control ensure the enterprise development and achieve business objectives. In2013, Guangda Securities event, Nanjing Securities、Mingsheng Securitie、Pingan Securities、 Lianghe Securities
have been punished for the sponsor business. Once again proving, perfecting internal control, strengthening the importance of risk management of investment bank is very important, once again proving, The impact on the market caused by the failure control of investment bank internal.
From the end of the comprehensive management to the present, for the past6years, It is necessary to concern the the development of internal control in our country's investment banking. At the same time, in2013, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (referred to as the COSO Commission) issued a new 《internal control integrated framework"(2013)》, the internal control theory and practice take the forward, Is the new development of internal control suitable for the investment bank of our country? What we can learn from? what a stage of is the internal control of investment banks in China?
In the Guangda Securities event and other events, combining the development of internal control theory and practice at home and abroad, makes a summary on the progress of the internal control of China's investment bank, as a sort of existing problems, and puts forward the corresponding solutions, and puts forward a new idea for the development of the next step is meaningful.
On this train of thoughts, the first chapter introduces the research background、literature review.
The second chapter briefly reviews on the development of internal control.analyzes several core concepts, such as the corporate governance, risk management, compliance management, supervision. On this basis, found that the scope of internal control in the expanding, content systematic, formed a close contact with the external environment, its development impetus come from the change of the social economic environment and business stakeholders demand. Note the different enterprises with different risk preferences, different internal and external environment, the difference can be reflected in its.
The third chapter analyzes the development of China's investment bank.found that because the defects of China's investment banks early, defects of the system, system deficiencies, lack of supervision, resulting in the early failure of internal control of China's investment bank, the risk of problems is existed. Therefore, from point of the industry competition, risk management, external supervision,put forward that it is necessary to our investment bank to take the internal control construction. In order to win in the competition, at the same time, take the investment bank as the financial institutions, their business is taking risk, managing risk, and profiting from it. So the internal control is the guarantee of achieving the business objectives, manage the risk, investment banks have inherent impulse to takd the high risk business, therefore, effective supervision and from the external drive the internal control is necessary. Then summarizes the before and after the comprehensive treatment, investment bank internal control evolution and characteristics. Combines with Guangda event, analyzes the investment bank of our country control problem of the present stage.
By other's faults, wise men correct their own. The fourth chapter internal control to USA independent investment banks were analyzed. Different from other literature, this chapter analyzes the characteristic of American independent investment banks, from the point of the change of development mode, external environment, On this basis, analyzes the characteristics of independent investment bank internal control. The formation of internal control of independent investment bank, the performance of internal control is caused by the defects and problems of the objective of internal control, internal control environment, control measures of the performance of internal control.
Finally, thinking the enlightenment of the internal control experience of America independent investment bank. Thinking the construction of China's investment bank internal control is to grasp the function of China's investment bank.
Designing rationally the principal-agent mechanism of investment banks, establish of internal governance structure to form the effective restriction mechanism, establish a rational incentive mechanism, internal control and organization system is corresponding rationally, pay attention to the implementation of internal control.
The fifth chapter and the sixth chapter provide some suggestions to our investment bank on internal control construction. The fifth chapter firstly orientates our investment bank on internal control:the core of management for investment banking is the correspondence to risk and revenue. The premise of comprehensive risk management should be a good internal control effective operation. So the fifth chapter puts forward the overall internal control framework of China's investment bank, providing detailed analysis and construction for each of the elements. The sixth chapter provides suggestion on the internal control mechanism and internal control system which can embody the characteristics of the internal control of investment banks in China.
The creative points for this paper show below:
1. It gives the definition of connotation on internal control and the development path to China's investment bank at the present stage. The internal control theory and practice has experienced five stages.
Internal control has developed to the stage of comprehensive risk management, but according to the current situation of the investment banks in China:the scale is generally small, and business is mainly on brokerage business, which is relatively simple and homogenization. After analysis and comparison of the Ministry of Finance and other five ministries in2008issued "basic norms of internal control", China Securities Regulatory Commission in2003revised "securities company internal control guidelines", the COSO Committee issued "internal control integrated framework"(Internal Control-Integrated Framework) report (COSO report)1994edition,2013edition,2004COSO Committee issued "enterprise risk management framework"(Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework, referred to as ERM report), it deems that China's investment bank internal control is still in the stage of internal control. And the definition of internal control in "securities company internal control guidelines" issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) still is applicable to the current China's investment bank. The development path of the internal control of investment bank in China is to construct the internal control system, and then on this basis, play safe, improve our risk management level.
2. The formed operating characteristics on the changing mode of development in American investment bank fully affect the internal control. This is the characteristics of the internal control in independent investment banks of USA, and this is also the cause of failure in the subprime mortgage crisis.
The transformation of mode on America. investment banks reflects the separation of commercial banking, fusion, separation, and mixing. After Mixed operation, America set up nearly500financial holding companies. Many large commercial banks have changed into a financial holding company. In2008, before the financial crisis, Wall Street only left the five largest investment bank (Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman, Bell Sten) as the representative of the few independent investment banks. They compete as the representative of the financial holding company and the financial group.
Competition has forced the independent investment banks from main "seller" to main "buyer", from the partnership system into a shareholding system,
in order to solve the principal-agent problem, the equity incentive is introduced, which are caused by the pursuit of business characteristics of high income high risk, internal control is forgot, internal control is replaced by short term of company interests and the interests of the people. At the last, independent investment banks disappear.
3. Internal control in China investment bank reflects the different development paths compared with USA independent investment bank. China's investment banks, is weak in internal control. The internal control is more of an internal compliance management. So from the start, the internal controls are not perfect and not standard, but this defective and lack of standardization is more from internally generated.
4. From the Sino-US investment bank experience, Conclusion can be got:(1) the internal control is the most important to the overall design, especially the rationality of organization structure. Whether it can form the effective restriction mechanism is the key to effective internal control.(2) the internal control should reflect the characteristics of the enterprise. Good internal control can be conducive to the formation of investment bank reputation.
5. It is suggested that economic capital as the core of the performance appraisal system should be introduced to investment bank. The implementation of economic capital management and investment banking, according to economic value added (Economic Value Added, abbreviated as EVA) return on capital and risk adjusted (Risk Adjusted Return on Capital, abbreviated as RAROC) as the core indicators of performance evaluation and incentive, is helps to solve the contradiction between the pursuit of profit and risk control. It combines with risk and return together, and makes the performance evaluation to realize the transformation from quantity to quality. It is benefit to the establishment of a good incentive mechanism in the internal.
从综合治理结束到现在,已有6年时间,我国投资银行内部控制的发展情况值得关注。同时,2013年,美国反欺诈财务报告全国委员会的发起委员会(Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission,简称COSO委员会)发布了新的《内部控制—整体框架(2013)》,将内部控制的理论与实践又向前推进了一步,内部控制的新发展对我国投资银行来说是否适用?有哪些我们可以借鉴?我国投资银行的内部控制目前处于一个什么阶段?在光大事件、保荐事件发生后,结合国内外内部控制理论及实践的发展,对我国投资银行内部控制的新进展作一总结,对存在的问题作一梳理,并提出相应的解决方法,对下一步的发展提出新的思路是有意义的。
围绕这样的研究思路,本文第一章介绍了研究背景、相关文献综述。
第二章首先对内部控制的发展进行了简要回顾,对4个核心概念,即公司治理、风险管理、合规管理、外部监管与内部控制的关系进行了辨析,明确其关系。在此基础上,发现内部控制的范围在不断扩大、内容系统化和体系化,与外部环境形成了紧密的联系,其发展动力来自社会经济环境的变化及企业利益相关者的需求。说明不同的企业由于有不同的风险偏好,不同的内外部环境,这种差异可体现在其内部控制上。因此,在对我国投资银行内部控制制度进行了分析后,对我国投资银行内部控制所处的阶段及性质作了分析判断,对我国投资银行内部控制的内涵进行了界定。
第三章先分析了我国投资银行的发展历程,发现由于我国投资银行产生初期就存在体制缺陷、制度缺失、监管缺失,导致我国投资银行业早期内部控制失效,风险丛生。因此,从行业竞争、风险管理、外部监管角度分析了我国投资银行进行内部控制建设的动因或必要性。为了在竞争中胜出,同时,投资银行作为金融机构,其经营本质是承担风险、管理风险,并从中获利,所以内部控制是其进行风险管理、实现经营目标的保证,投资银行有从事高风险业务的内在冲动,因此,有效的监管并从外部推动其内部控制是必要的。接下来梳理总结了综合治理前后,投资银行内部控制的发展演变和特点。并结合光大事件,分析了现阶段我国投资银行内部控制存在的问题。
他山之石,可以攻玉。第四章对美国独立投行的内部控制进行了分析。与其他文献不同,本章是先从美国独立投行的发展模式、外部环境的变化对独立投行造成的影响出发,分析了独立投行经营特征,并在此基础上,分析了独立投行内部控制的特点。认为独立投行内部控制的形成及内部控制在次贷危机中的表现实际上是其发展模式所形成的内控目标、内控环境、控制措施中所存在的缺陷与问题造成的。最后,思考了美国独立投行内部控制的经验对我国投行的启示。认为我国投行内部控制的建设要正确把握投资银行的功能定位,合理设计安排投行的委托代理机制,建立合理的内部治理结构以形成有效的制衡机制,建立合理的激励机制,内部控制与组织体系合理化对应、注重内部控制的执行。
第五章、第六章对我国投资银行内部控制建设提出了建议。第五章先对我国投资银行内部控制进行了定位,基于投资银行的管理核心是风险收益对应,其全面风险管理的前提应该是有良好的运行有效的内部控制。所以,第五章提出我国投资银行内部控制的整体框架,对内部控制的每一要素进行了详细的分析和构建,第六章则从内部控制机制、内部控制制度中能体现我国投资银行内部控制特色的方面提出了建议。
本文的创新点有：
1.对现阶段我国投资银行内部控制的内涵及发展路径进行了界定。内部控制的理论与实践经历了五个阶段,五个阶段分别是：以查错防弊为主的内部牵制阶段；划分为内部会计控制和内部管理控制两类的控制制度阶段；包含控制环境、会计制度和控制程序三要素的控制结构阶段；包含一个定义、三个目标、五个要素的内部控制整体框架阶段；包含一个定义、四个目标,八个要素的全面风险管理阶段。
内部控制已发展至全面风险管理阶段,但根据我国投资银行的现状：规模普遍较小,业务以经纪业务为主,比较单一、同质化,分析比较了财政部等五部委2008年发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》,我国证监会2003年修订的《证券公司内部控制指引》,COSO委员发布的《内部控制—整体框架》(Internal Control-Integrated Framework)报告(以下简称COSO报告)1994年版和2013年版,2004年COSO委员会发布的《企业风险管理—总体框架》(Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework,简称ERM报告),认为我国投资银行内部控制仍处于内部控制阶段,证监会《证券公司内部控制指引》中关于内部控制的定义仍适用于当前我国投资银行,我国投资银行内部控制的发展路径：是先建设好内部控制体系,再在此基础上,稳打稳扎提升自己的风险管理水平。
2.美国投资银行发展模式的变迁形成的经营特征充分影响其内部控制特征,这是美国独立投资银行内部控制的特点,也是导致其内部控制在次贷危机中失效的原因。
美国投资银行发展模式的变迁体现了与商业银行分离、融合、再分离、到再融合的过程。再融合后,美国成立了近500家金融控股公司,许多大型商业银行都变更为金融控股公司,2008年金融危机前,华尔街仅剩下以五大投行(高盛、摩根士丹利、美林、雷曼、贝尔斯登)为代表的不多的独立投行。它们与以金融控股公司为代表的金融集团展开竞争。竞争迫使独立投行从以“卖方”为主,转向以“买方”为主,由合伙制变为股份制,为了解决委托代理问题而引入了股权激励,这些都造成了其追求高风险高收益的经营特征,将内部控制抛在脑后,内部控制让位于短期利益、公司内部人的利益,最后独立投行消失。所以其风险的演变过程是：经营模式→业务表现、经营风格→内部控制失效→风险累积→风险爆发。
3.我国投资银行内部控制体现了与美国独立投行不同的发展路径。我国投资银行内部控制薄弱,内部控制更多是一种内部合规性管理,所以内部控制从一开始就是不健全不规范的,而且这种不健全不规范更多是从内部产生的。我国投行成立之初,业务前景很好,人们对投资有很大的热情,但初期我国投行内部控制缺失严重,内部人对利益的无限追求,导致其无视制度规范,从而发生了一系列重大违规事件,使我国投行面临较大的风险,不得不由政府出面进行综合治理。综合治理后,我国投行基本上开展了内部控制建设,而不仅仅是合规性建设。因此,我国投行的内部控制在综合治理后应该定性为重建。其发展路径为：内部合规管理→内部控制失效→风险累积→综合治理→重新构建。
4.从中美投行的经验得出结论：(1)内部控制最重要的是：在对投资银行进行功能定位的基础上进行整体设计,尤其是组织架构的合理性,能否形成有效的制衡机制,是内控是否有效的关键。中美投行内部控制失效的表现都是内控让位于公司对利润的无限追求,说明公司内部没有力量对这种不利提出反对,制衡机制失去作用。其次才是制度的制定,否则任何制度都是苍白的。(2)内部控制要体现出企业的特点,形成特色。良好的内部控制可以有助于形成投行的声誉的形成。
5.建议投资银行引入以经济资本管理为核心的绩效考核制度。实施经济资本管理的投资银行,通过以经济增加值(Economic Value Added,简写为EVA)和风险调整后资本收益率(Risk Adjusted Return on Capital,简写为RAROC)作为业绩评价和考核激励的核心指标,有助于解决追求利润与控制风险之间的矛盾,将风险与收益结合起来,使绩效考评实现从数量到质量的转变,有利于在内部建立良好的激励机制。
In the face of the complex and volatile external environment, the increasingly fierce industry competition, sound and effective internal control ensure the enterprise development and achieve business objectives. In2013, Guangda Securities event, Nanjing Securities、Mingsheng Securitie、Pingan Securities、 Lianghe Securities
have been punished for the sponsor business. Once again proving, perfecting internal control, strengthening the importance of risk management of investment bank is very important, once again proving, The impact on the market caused by the failure control of investment bank internal.
From the end of the comprehensive management to the present, for the past6years, It is necessary to concern the the development of internal control in our country's investment banking. At the same time, in2013, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (referred to as the COSO Commission) issued a new 《internal control integrated framework"(2013)》, the internal control theory and practice take the forward, Is the new development of internal control suitable for the investment bank of our country? What we can learn from? what a stage of is the internal control of investment banks in China?
In the Guangda Securities event and other events, combining the development of internal control theory and practice at home and abroad, makes a summary on the progress of the internal control of China's investment bank, as a sort of existing problems, and puts forward the corresponding solutions, and puts forward a new idea for the development of the next step is meaningful.
On this train of thoughts, the first chapter introduces the research background、literature review.
The second chapter briefly reviews on the development of internal control.analyzes several core concepts, such as the corporate governance, risk management, compliance management, supervision. On this basis, found that the scope of internal control in the expanding, content systematic, formed a close contact with the external environment, its development impetus come from the change of the social economic environment and business stakeholders demand. Note the different enterprises with different risk preferences, different internal and external environment, the difference can be reflected in its.
The third chapter analyzes the development of China's investment bank.found that because the defects of China's investment banks early, defects of the system, system deficiencies, lack of supervision, resulting in the early failure of internal control of China's investment bank, the risk of problems is existed. Therefore, from point of the industry competition, risk management, external supervision,put forward that it is necessary to our investment bank to take the internal control construction. In order to win in the competition, at the same time, take the investment bank as the financial institutions, their business is taking risk, managing risk, and profiting from it. So the internal control is the guarantee of achieving the business objectives, manage the risk, investment banks have inherent impulse to takd the high risk business, therefore, effective supervision and from the external drive the internal control is necessary. Then summarizes the before and after the comprehensive treatment, investment bank internal control evolution and characteristics. Combines with Guangda event, analyzes the investment bank of our country control problem of the present stage.
By other's faults, wise men correct their own. The fourth chapter internal control to USA independent investment banks were analyzed. Different from other literature, this chapter analyzes the characteristic of American independent investment banks, from the point of the change of development mode, external environment, On this basis, analyzes the characteristics of independent investment bank internal control. The formation of internal control of independent investment bank, the performance of internal control is caused by the defects and problems of the objective of internal control, internal control environment, control measures of the performance of internal control.
Finally, thinking the enlightenment of the internal control experience of America independent investment bank. Thinking the construction of China's investment bank internal control is to grasp the function of China's investment bank.
Designing rationally the principal-agent mechanism of investment banks, establish of internal governance structure to form the effective restriction mechanism, establish a rational incentive mechanism, internal control and organization system is corresponding rationally, pay attention to the implementation of internal control.
The fifth chapter and the sixth chapter provide some suggestions to our investment bank on internal control construction. The fifth chapter firstly orientates our investment bank on internal control:the core of management for investment banking is the correspondence to risk and revenue. The premise of comprehensive risk management should be a good internal control effective operation. So the fifth chapter puts forward the overall internal control framework of China's investment bank, providing detailed analysis and construction for each of the elements. The sixth chapter provides suggestion on the internal control mechanism and internal control system which can embody the characteristics of the internal control of investment banks in China.
The creative points for this paper show below:
1. It gives the definition of connotation on internal control and the development path to China's investment bank at the present stage. The internal control theory and practice has experienced five stages.
Internal control has developed to the stage of comprehensive risk management, but according to the current situation of the investment banks in China:the scale is generally small, and business is mainly on brokerage business, which is relatively simple and homogenization. After analysis and comparison of the Ministry of Finance and other five ministries in2008issued "basic norms of internal control", China Securities Regulatory Commission in2003revised "securities company internal control guidelines", the COSO Committee issued "internal control integrated framework"(Internal Control-Integrated Framework) report (COSO report)1994edition,2013edition,2004COSO Committee issued "enterprise risk management framework"(Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework, referred to as ERM report), it deems that China's investment bank internal control is still in the stage of internal control. And the definition of internal control in "securities company internal control guidelines" issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) still is applicable to the current China's investment bank. The development path of the internal control of investment bank in China is to construct the internal control system, and then on this basis, play safe, improve our risk management level.
2. The formed operating characteristics on the changing mode of development in American investment bank fully affect the internal control. This is the characteristics of the internal control in independent investment banks of USA, and this is also the cause of failure in the subprime mortgage crisis.
The transformation of mode on America. investment banks reflects the separation of commercial banking, fusion, separation, and mixing. After Mixed operation, America set up nearly500financial holding companies. Many large commercial banks have changed into a financial holding company. In2008, before the financial crisis, Wall Street only left the five largest investment bank (Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman, Bell Sten) as the representative of the few independent investment banks. They compete as the representative of the financial holding company and the financial group.
Competition has forced the independent investment banks from main "seller" to main "buyer", from the partnership system into a shareholding system,
in order to solve the principal-agent problem, the equity incentive is introduced, which are caused by the pursuit of business characteristics of high income high risk, internal control is forgot, internal control is replaced by short term of company interests and the interests of the people. At the last, independent investment banks disappear.
3. Internal control in China investment bank reflects the different development paths compared with USA independent investment bank. China's investment banks, is weak in internal control. The internal control is more of an internal compliance management. So from the start, the internal controls are not perfect and not standard, but this defective and lack of standardization is more from internally generated.
4. From the Sino-US investment bank experience, Conclusion can be got:(1) the internal control is the most important to the overall design, especially the rationality of organization structure. Whether it can form the effective restriction mechanism is the key to effective internal control.(2) the internal control should reflect the characteristics of the enterprise. Good internal control can be conducive to the formation of investment bank reputation.
5. It is suggested that economic capital as the core of the performance appraisal system should be introduced to investment bank. The implementation of economic capital management and investment banking, according to economic value added (Economic Value Added, abbreviated as EVA) return on capital and risk adjusted (Risk Adjusted Return on Capital, abbreviated as RAROC) as the core indicators of performance evaluation and incentive, is helps to solve the contradiction between the pursuit of profit and risk control. It combines with risk and return together, and makes the performance evaluation to realize the transformation from quantity to quality. It is benefit to the establishment of a good incentive mechanism in the internal.
引文
4 [美]K.弗莱德·斯考森,《公司治理与证券交易委员会》,方红星译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006
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28 本节内容已公开发表。陈野华、黎洁,证券公司绩效考核刍议,光明日报,2012年5月25日。
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58.张宜霞,2007：企业内部控制的范围、性质与概念体系[J],会计研究, 第7期.
59.池国华,2011：企业内部控制应“形似实至”,财务与会计(理财版),第5期.
60.蔡真,袁增霆,2009：投资银行与全能型银行在金融危机中的殊途—风险管理角度的解读,中国金融,第1期.
61.吴晓灵、唐欣语,2009：对未来国际金融改革的建议,国际金融研究,第5期.
62.熊鹏、方先明、王飞,2006：美国投资银行制度风险管理的经验与启示,国际金融研究,第2期.
63.陈云贤,2001：风险收益论：投资银行的管理轴心,证券市场导报,4月号.
5 [英]吉尔·所罗门、阿瑞斯·所罗门,《公司治理与问责制》,李维安等译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006
6 张翌轩,COSO内部控制与风险管理框架的实践—访COSO主席拉瑞·瑞丁伯格博士,中国内部审计,2008年第1期
7 程新生,公司治理、内部控制、组织结构互动关系研究,会计研究,2004年第4期
8 张宜霞,企业内部控制的范围、性质与概念体系[J],会计研究,2007年第7期
9 王晓玲,基于风险管理的内部控制制度建设,北京,电子工业出版社,54页
(?) 池国华,企业内部控制应“形似实至”,财务与会计(理则版),2011年第5期
14 吴清、张洪水、周小全、夏晨,美国投资银行经营失败案例研究,北京：中国财政经济出版社,35贝
15 蔡真,袁增霆,投资银行与全能型银行在金融危机中的殊途—风险管理角度的解读,中国金融,2009年第1期
16 吴晓灵、唐欣语,对未来国际金融改革的建议,国际金融研究,2009年第5期
17 孙国茂,制度、模式与中国投资银行发展,中国金融出版社,216页
8 2008-2012年,证监会处罚的证券公司和其人员,其违规行为发生在2008年前。
19 陈云贤,何荣天,潘峰,投资银行风险收益对应运营论—雷曼兄弟经营失败案例分析,中国金融出版社,2012年,173页
20 熊鹏,方先明,王飞,美国投资银行制度风险管理的经验与启示,国际金融研究.2006年第2期
21 陈云贤,何荣天,潘峰,投资银行风险收益对应运营论—雷曼兄弟经营失败案例分析,中国金融出版社,2012年,173页
22 陈共炎,证券公司治理机制与对策,中国财政经济出版社,109页
24 吴清、张洪水、周小全、夏晨,美国投资银行经营失败案例研究,中国财政经济出版社,234页
25 陈云贤,风险收益论：投资银行的管理轴心,证券市场导报,2001年4月号
26 张俊民,内部控制理论与实务,东北财经大学出版社,31页。
27 陈云贤,投资银行风险收益对应运营论—雷曼兄弟经营失败案例分析,中国金融出版社,236页
28 本节内容已公开发表。陈野华、黎洁,证券公司绩效考核刍议,光明日报,2012年5月25日。
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56.张翌轩,2008：COSO内部控制与风险管理框架的实践—访COSO主席拉瑞·瑞丁伯格博士,中国内部审计,第1期.
57.程新生,2004：公司治理、内部控制、组织结构互动关系研究,会计研究,第4期.
58.张宜霞,2007：企业内部控制的范围、性质与概念体系[J],会计研究, 第7期.
59.池国华,2011：企业内部控制应“形似实至”,财务与会计(理财版),第5期.
60.蔡真,袁增霆,2009：投资银行与全能型银行在金融危机中的殊途—风险管理角度的解读,中国金融,第1期.
61.吴晓灵、唐欣语,2009：对未来国际金融改革的建议,国际金融研究,第5期.
62.熊鹏、方先明、王飞,2006：美国投资银行制度风险管理的经验与启示,国际金融研究,第2期.
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