医患纠纷处理模式博弈研究
|
摘要
目的:通过对武汉市3年医疗事故技术鉴定案例的了解与分析,揭示目前医患纠纷处理模式的特点,同时结合目前我国医患纠纷处理立法情况与司法导向现状,力求通过引入博弈理论的观点和模型构建对医患纠纷中的现象进行分析,提出当前情况下医患双方在纠纷处理中选择策略时所需要注意的问题,并进一步对缓解医患纠纷的制度建设提出建议。
方法:本研究主要采用文献研究、理论与实证研究相结合的方式;运用文献分析、知情人访谈等定性研究方法,结合实证资料量化处理,并运用统计分析方法对指标分析比较并分析相关因素,同时根据博弈理论构建初步的医患纠纷博弈模型,寻求医患纠纷现象的合理解释。研究资料主要来源于武汉市医学会和国内外有关医患纠纷与博弈相关理论书籍及文献。
分析结果:
1、医疗事故技术鉴定每年受理的案例数量基本保持平稳,主要委托进行鉴定的机构是卫生行政部门(53.4%)与法院(45.7%),三级医疗机构是医疗事故鉴定中医方的主要构成部分(67.8%)。患方的年龄构成除不足5岁的婴幼儿比例偏高(9.2%)外,基本符合人群正态分布的特征。医疗事故的等级与医方承担的责任呈现负相关关系。
2、2004～2006年的医疗事故认定率逐年的升高,分别为25%、36%、44%。
经过分析发现医疗事故技术鉴定结果中医疗事故认定率上,三级医疗机构明显低于非三级医疗机构(χ2=23.841,P<0.001);
法院委托的鉴定案例其事故认定率要明显低于由卫生行政部门委托的案例(χ2=6.257,P=0.012),卫生行政部门委托鉴定的案例其医疗事故认定率逐年提高(χ2=13.076,P=0.001),分别为2004年26%,2005年41%,2006年58%,而法院委托的案例,其医疗事故认定率无明显变化(χ2=0.676,P=0.713)。
3、时间指标分析指出,由法院委托的鉴定案例其患方“就诊——受理”平均时间要长于非法院委托的案例;而出现死亡结果的鉴定案例其患方“就诊——受理”平均时间要短于非死亡结果的鉴定案例;
对于法院委托的鉴定案例来看,医疗事故中的患方“就诊——受理”平均时间间隔要短于非医疗事故;
对于患方死亡的鉴定案例来看,医疗事故中的患方“就诊——死亡”平均时间间隔要短于非医疗事故;
4、结合博弈理论,医患纠纷符合不完全信息条件下的动态博弈过程,最终根据信号博弈模型构建医患纠纷博弈模型的初步框架。
患方在博弈模型中不能确且的知晓医方是否有责任,只对此有一个信念,然后患方通过观察医方对待医患纠纷的态度,患方修正自身的信念,并选择处理医患纠纷方式的策略。
主要结论
1、根据医疗事故认定率的分析以及近年来我国医患纠纷处理法律规范和司法导向的分析,发现医疗事故技术鉴定可能对医方存在一定的偏移和保护,这一现象在2005年后是得到国家法律和司法部门一定程度上的默许和认可的。这一现象体现了司法部门运用国家规定的法律法规寻求促进医疗行业和技术发展与保护患方利益这一对矛盾间的平衡所作出的努力。
2、医患纠纷产生的主要因素可能来源于患方对损伤性后果的直观感受,这一感受同时决定了患方认为医方在诊疗过程中因过错存在责任的信念强度,以及患方所将会采取的策略选择。越是严重的损伤性诊疗后果,导致患方对医方存在责任的信念越是强烈,同时也使患方采取的策略更倾向于尽快的验证自身信念的正确性。
建议
1、根据国家的宏观导向,希望医患纠纷尽量在医疗事故的范畴内进行解决,在这一背景下医方和患方在具体的纠纷博弈需要更多的理性来选择策略,引导和谐社会中医患纠纷的尽快合理的解决。
卫生行政部门可以作为促进双方理性的调解角色,而不仅仅是力求在行政调解中尽快令医患双方达成协议。
2、在短时期内,法院作为最有权威和体现公正性的第三方机构,在医患纠纷博弈中作为最后的策略,需要在医患纠纷的处理中体现更多的价值。
司法部门对于医患纠纷案件的审理上可以充分利用司法调解等手段,同时在一定程度上探索简化医患纠纷民事案件的审理程序,提高审理效率。
3、长远来看,我国应该重视医疗机构医疗责任的分散机制的设计和建设,逐步建立健全以医疗责任险为代表的医疗机构医疗责任的分散机制。
Object: Analysis the Wuhan medical accident checkup cases, find out the character of the medical dispute resolution, and combine with legislation of China medical dispute actuality. We want to analyze the phenomenons of the medical dispute by Game Theory,and give the recommendation for both sides’strategy choosing. Finially find out how to reduce the medical dispute.
Methods: This research mainly adopts literature and theory study, and demonstration investigation. It uses qualitative research approach, such as document analysis, expert consultation, etc and quantitative research approach, such as demonstration investigation. It also uses statistical analysis methods to analyze and compare about the statistical indexes and the analysis of the relevant factors. At the same time, we build the primary former of medical dispute by Game Theory, find out explanation of phenomenons of the medical dispute. The study data mainly come from Wuhan Medcine academy, and the literature mainly come from medical dispute and Game Theory book at home and aboard.
Analysis:
1. The count of medical accident checkup cases every year is calm. The cases mainly come from the health administration (53.4%) and court (45.7%). The hospital in the cases mainly build by third level hospital (67.8%). The patient’s age structure nearly accord with normal distributing,except the count of baby whose age smaller than 5 years has a high proportion (9.2%). The leve of the medcial accident have a negative correlativity with the duty of hospital.
2. 2004~2005 the medical accident rate of checkup case hoist by years, 2004-25%,2005-36%,2006-44%.
Third level hospital’s medical accident rate obvisly lower than non-third level hospital (χ2=23.841,P<0.001);
Medical accident rate of the court case obvisly lower than health administration case (χ2=6.257,P=0.012). Medical accident rate of the health administration case hoist by years(χ2=13.076,P=0.001),2004-26%,2005-41%,2006-58%. At the same time medical accident rate of the court case has no obviously change (χ2=0.676,P=0.713). 3. Time index analysis find out that the mean“treat to commission”time of court case longer than non-court case (health administration case); the mean“treat to commission”time of dead case shorter than non-dead case.
In the court case, the mean“treat to commission”time of medical accident case shorter than non-accident case.
In the dead case, the mean“treat to dead”time of medical accident case shorter than non-accident case.
4. Combining with Game Theory, the medcial dispute fit the dynamic Game of incomplete information, and the primary medcial dispute former came from the signaling Game former.
The patient can not know whether hospital has duty in beginning of the Game, but have a faith , patient can amend the faith by observe the hospital’s attitude to medical dispute, and then patient choose the strategy of resolution.
Results:
1. By analysis of medcial accident rate of checkup case and china medical dispute law, we find out that medical accident checkup has nepotism to hospital, and from 2005,the nepotism has recognized by the low and court. This phenomenon is the balance of the conflict between health vocation development and protecrion patient’s behalf.
2.Medical dispute caused by the responsibility of patient for the treat hurt outcome, the responesibiliy decide the degree of faith that hospital has duty for the treat hurt outcome, and then patient will choose the strategy. The more serious outcome ,the high degree faith and the patient will be more inclined to choose the strategy which will check the faith.
Suggestions:
1. Following the national macroscopical guide, the medical dispute should resolute in the ground of medical accident. Hospital and patient in the dispute game should choose strategy more nous, guide the dispute resoluted more effective in the harmonious society.
2. In the near future, court to be the third side is the most authority and equity. To be the final strategy ,court can show more value in medical dispute resolution.
3. In long-range future, national design and build for decentralization of hospital’s duty mechanism should be the most important resolution of medcial dispute. The example of the mechanism is medical duty care system, the system should be work up.
方法:本研究主要采用文献研究、理论与实证研究相结合的方式;运用文献分析、知情人访谈等定性研究方法,结合实证资料量化处理,并运用统计分析方法对指标分析比较并分析相关因素,同时根据博弈理论构建初步的医患纠纷博弈模型,寻求医患纠纷现象的合理解释。研究资料主要来源于武汉市医学会和国内外有关医患纠纷与博弈相关理论书籍及文献。
分析结果:
1、医疗事故技术鉴定每年受理的案例数量基本保持平稳,主要委托进行鉴定的机构是卫生行政部门(53.4%)与法院(45.7%),三级医疗机构是医疗事故鉴定中医方的主要构成部分(67.8%)。患方的年龄构成除不足5岁的婴幼儿比例偏高(9.2%)外,基本符合人群正态分布的特征。医疗事故的等级与医方承担的责任呈现负相关关系。
2、2004～2006年的医疗事故认定率逐年的升高,分别为25%、36%、44%。
经过分析发现医疗事故技术鉴定结果中医疗事故认定率上,三级医疗机构明显低于非三级医疗机构(χ2=23.841,P<0.001);
法院委托的鉴定案例其事故认定率要明显低于由卫生行政部门委托的案例(χ2=6.257,P=0.012),卫生行政部门委托鉴定的案例其医疗事故认定率逐年提高(χ2=13.076,P=0.001),分别为2004年26%,2005年41%,2006年58%,而法院委托的案例,其医疗事故认定率无明显变化(χ2=0.676,P=0.713)。
3、时间指标分析指出,由法院委托的鉴定案例其患方“就诊——受理”平均时间要长于非法院委托的案例;而出现死亡结果的鉴定案例其患方“就诊——受理”平均时间要短于非死亡结果的鉴定案例;
对于法院委托的鉴定案例来看,医疗事故中的患方“就诊——受理”平均时间间隔要短于非医疗事故;
对于患方死亡的鉴定案例来看,医疗事故中的患方“就诊——死亡”平均时间间隔要短于非医疗事故;
4、结合博弈理论,医患纠纷符合不完全信息条件下的动态博弈过程,最终根据信号博弈模型构建医患纠纷博弈模型的初步框架。
患方在博弈模型中不能确且的知晓医方是否有责任,只对此有一个信念,然后患方通过观察医方对待医患纠纷的态度,患方修正自身的信念,并选择处理医患纠纷方式的策略。
主要结论
1、根据医疗事故认定率的分析以及近年来我国医患纠纷处理法律规范和司法导向的分析,发现医疗事故技术鉴定可能对医方存在一定的偏移和保护,这一现象在2005年后是得到国家法律和司法部门一定程度上的默许和认可的。这一现象体现了司法部门运用国家规定的法律法规寻求促进医疗行业和技术发展与保护患方利益这一对矛盾间的平衡所作出的努力。
2、医患纠纷产生的主要因素可能来源于患方对损伤性后果的直观感受,这一感受同时决定了患方认为医方在诊疗过程中因过错存在责任的信念强度,以及患方所将会采取的策略选择。越是严重的损伤性诊疗后果,导致患方对医方存在责任的信念越是强烈,同时也使患方采取的策略更倾向于尽快的验证自身信念的正确性。
建议
1、根据国家的宏观导向,希望医患纠纷尽量在医疗事故的范畴内进行解决,在这一背景下医方和患方在具体的纠纷博弈需要更多的理性来选择策略,引导和谐社会中医患纠纷的尽快合理的解决。
卫生行政部门可以作为促进双方理性的调解角色,而不仅仅是力求在行政调解中尽快令医患双方达成协议。
2、在短时期内,法院作为最有权威和体现公正性的第三方机构,在医患纠纷博弈中作为最后的策略,需要在医患纠纷的处理中体现更多的价值。
司法部门对于医患纠纷案件的审理上可以充分利用司法调解等手段,同时在一定程度上探索简化医患纠纷民事案件的审理程序,提高审理效率。
3、长远来看,我国应该重视医疗机构医疗责任的分散机制的设计和建设,逐步建立健全以医疗责任险为代表的医疗机构医疗责任的分散机制。
Object: Analysis the Wuhan medical accident checkup cases, find out the character of the medical dispute resolution, and combine with legislation of China medical dispute actuality. We want to analyze the phenomenons of the medical dispute by Game Theory,and give the recommendation for both sides’strategy choosing. Finially find out how to reduce the medical dispute.
Methods: This research mainly adopts literature and theory study, and demonstration investigation. It uses qualitative research approach, such as document analysis, expert consultation, etc and quantitative research approach, such as demonstration investigation. It also uses statistical analysis methods to analyze and compare about the statistical indexes and the analysis of the relevant factors. At the same time, we build the primary former of medical dispute by Game Theory, find out explanation of phenomenons of the medical dispute. The study data mainly come from Wuhan Medcine academy, and the literature mainly come from medical dispute and Game Theory book at home and aboard.
Analysis:
1. The count of medical accident checkup cases every year is calm. The cases mainly come from the health administration (53.4%) and court (45.7%). The hospital in the cases mainly build by third level hospital (67.8%). The patient’s age structure nearly accord with normal distributing,except the count of baby whose age smaller than 5 years has a high proportion (9.2%). The leve of the medcial accident have a negative correlativity with the duty of hospital.
2. 2004~2005 the medical accident rate of checkup case hoist by years, 2004-25%,2005-36%,2006-44%.
Third level hospital’s medical accident rate obvisly lower than non-third level hospital (χ2=23.841,P<0.001);
Medical accident rate of the court case obvisly lower than health administration case (χ2=6.257,P=0.012). Medical accident rate of the health administration case hoist by years(χ2=13.076,P=0.001),2004-26%,2005-41%,2006-58%. At the same time medical accident rate of the court case has no obviously change (χ2=0.676,P=0.713). 3. Time index analysis find out that the mean“treat to commission”time of court case longer than non-court case (health administration case); the mean“treat to commission”time of dead case shorter than non-dead case.
In the court case, the mean“treat to commission”time of medical accident case shorter than non-accident case.
In the dead case, the mean“treat to dead”time of medical accident case shorter than non-accident case.
4. Combining with Game Theory, the medcial dispute fit the dynamic Game of incomplete information, and the primary medcial dispute former came from the signaling Game former.
The patient can not know whether hospital has duty in beginning of the Game, but have a faith , patient can amend the faith by observe the hospital’s attitude to medical dispute, and then patient choose the strategy of resolution.
Results:
1. By analysis of medcial accident rate of checkup case and china medical dispute law, we find out that medical accident checkup has nepotism to hospital, and from 2005,the nepotism has recognized by the low and court. This phenomenon is the balance of the conflict between health vocation development and protecrion patient’s behalf.
2.Medical dispute caused by the responsibility of patient for the treat hurt outcome, the responesibiliy decide the degree of faith that hospital has duty for the treat hurt outcome, and then patient will choose the strategy. The more serious outcome ,the high degree faith and the patient will be more inclined to choose the strategy which will check the faith.
Suggestions:
1. Following the national macroscopical guide, the medical dispute should resolute in the ground of medical accident. Hospital and patient in the dispute game should choose strategy more nous, guide the dispute resoluted more effective in the harmonious society.
2. In the near future, court to be the third side is the most authority and equity. To be the final strategy ,court can show more value in medical dispute resolution.
3. In long-range future, national design and build for decentralization of hospital’s duty mechanism should be the most important resolution of medcial dispute. The example of the mechanism is medical duty care system, the system should be work up.
引文
[1]刘俊荣著.医患冲突的沟通与解决.广东高等教育出版社,2004,P173
[2] Harold TK. Minimizing medical litigation. J Med Pract Manage. 2006 Mar-Apr;21(5):257-61.
[3]施锡铨(2002),博弈论。上海财经大学出版社。
[4]赖微微等,关注民生-博弈试析医患不对称痼疾,经济理论研究,2006
[5]弓宪文等,信息不对称下的医患关系博弈分析,重庆大学学报,2004年4月
[6]王勇等,再论医患关系博弈模型,重庆大学学报,2006年6月
[7]耿嘉川,中国医疗体制下多方博弈与组织政策分析,山东大学2006届硕士论文
[8]顾东辉,医患博弈中的行为模式研究,中国人民解放军军医进修学院2006届硕士论文
[9]高宁宁,政府与居民基于消费倾向的博弈分析,上海师范大学2006届硕士论文
[10]戴维.国外的医患纠纷处理.国际医药卫生导报,2002,5
[11] Dowd S,The Mystery of Altruism and Transcultural Nursing.Health Care Manag (Frederick). 2007 January/March;26(1):64-67
[12]《医疗事故技术鉴定暂行办法》2002年7月31日
[13]《医疗事故处理条例》2002年4月4日
[14] Spence,A.M.,1974,Market Signaling,Harvard University Press.
[15]吉本斯,博弈论基础,第一版
[16]张维迎(1996),博弈论与信息经济学。上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,
[17] [美]朱?弗登博格,[法]让?梯若尔(2003),博弈论。中国人民大学出版社
[18] Harsanyi.J. 1967-68. Game with incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Management Science 14:159-182。320-334,486-502.
[19]《北京高院关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案件若干问题的意见》2005年7月13日
[20]《广东省高级人民法院关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案件若干问题指导意见》2007年12月25日
[21]关于参照《医疗事故处理条例》审理医疗纠纷民事案件的通知,最高人民法院, 2003年1月6日
[22]《关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》,最高人民法院,2003年12月26日
[23]杨勤法,我国目前医疗纠纷的赔偿现状及完善,辽东学院学报,Vol8 SumNo.47,2006年第2期。
[24]《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》,2001年
[25]医疗纠纷应当区别不同类型分别适用法律,最高人民法院答记者问,2005年06月06日
[26]朱晓卓,试论医患纠纷案件处理中的司法鉴定,中国卫生事业管理,2006年第12期,总222期
[27]张维迎,信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析,经济研究,2002年第十期
[28]医患纠纷:伪市场哈改革的恶果,中国经济时评,2006年第7期,总第340期
[29]张伟,私了:是“有效机制”还是“无赖行径”,中国经济周刊,2006年第7期,总第340期
[30]姚澜,医疗事故鉴定体制中影响司法公正的缺陷分析,中国司法鉴定,2004年6月5日
[31]纪建文,关系视角下中国的医患契约与医患纠纷,法学论坛,vol21 No.6,2006年11月5日
[32] Spence, A.M.,1973,”Job Market Signailing”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:355-374
[33] Milgrom, P .and J. Roberts,1982,”limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis”, Econometrica 40: 433-459
[34] Rubinstein, A .,1982,”Perfcet Equilibrium in a Bargain Model”, Econometrica 50:97-109
[35]王农,规范医疗行为正确适用法律处理医疗事故处理案件,中国医院, 2005, 9
[36]宋世明,苏州“动刀”医患纠纷顽疾.江苏法制报,2007年2月6日
[37]徐和平,医患纠纷案件的法律适用及鉴定问题,中国卫生法制,2005,6
[38]罗向明,建立强制医疗责任保险适应医疗体制改革,医院领导决策参考,2006年第01期
[39]李松,医疗责任保险在国外,法律在医,第八卷第12期,总第63期
[40]丁邦宁,引入商业保险机制有利于解决医疗纠纷,保险研究,2005年第4期
[41]汪挺,江苏:医疗责任险推行困难重重,医院领导决策参考,2005年第6期
[42] Luce, R. and H. Raiffa, 1957,Games and Decisions,Wiley
[43] Staih, I., 1972, Bargaining Theory, Stockholm School of Economics.
[44] McMillan,J.,1986,Game Theory in International Economics, Harwood Academic Publisher.
[45] Harsanyi,J.,1973,”Games with Randomly Distributed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points”, International Journal of Game Theory 2:1-23.
[1]刘俊荣著.医患冲突的沟通与解决.广东高等教育出版社,2004,P173
[2] 2006年9月9日“新浪网”,广东省上半年发生200起医疗暴力事件
[3] 2006年11月08日新华网,新华视点:谁在为医患矛盾推波助澜
[4]宋世明.苏州“动刀”医患纠纷顽疾.江苏法制报.2007年2月6日
[5] Harold TK. Minimizing medical litigation. J Med Pract Manage. 2006 Mar-Apr;21(5):257-61.
[6]施锡铨(2002),博弈论。上海财经大学出版社。
[7]万里涛.浅议医患纠纷的非诉讼解决方式.中国卫生监督,2005,12
[8]刘革新.医患双方协商解决医患纠纷具有法律效力.医院管理论坛,2005,9
[9]邵永生.仲裁解决医患纠纷的可行性与效益性探讨.中国卫生事业管理,2000,12
[10]任其盛.从医患纠纷的处理机制的现状看法院作为司法机关社会职能的实现.科技与法律,2004,3
[11]丁宇.在改革和发展中解决医患纠纷问题.红旗文稿,2006,3
[12]王农.规范医疗行为正确适用法律处理医疗事故处理案件.中国医院,2005,9
[13]徐和平.医患纠纷案件的法律适用及鉴定问题.中国卫生法制,2005,6
[14]赖微微等,关注民生-博弈试析医患不对称痼疾,经济理论研究,2006
[15]弓宪文等,信息不对称下的医患关系博弈分析,重庆大学学报,2004年4月
[16]王勇等,再论医患关系博弈模型,重庆大学学报,2006年6月
[17]耿嘉川,中国医疗体制下多方博弈与组织政策分析,山东大学2006届硕士论文
[18]顾东辉,医患博弈中的行为模式研究,中国人民解放军军医进修学院2006届硕士论文
[19]高宁宁,政府与居民基于消费倾向的博弈分析,上海师范大学2006届硕士论文
[20]戴维.国外的医患纠纷处理.国际医药卫生导报,2002,5
[21]Ferris LE.A challenge and an opportunity for medical regulators--considering the public's interests in cases using ADR to resolve disputes about physicians' practices: a Canadian analysis.Med Law.2002;21(1):11-42.
[22]Dauer EA. Alternatives to litigation for health care conflicts and claims: alternative dispute resolution in medicine.Med Law.2002;21 (1):11-42
[23] Scheppokat KD. Learning from the experiences of an arbitration unit for medical liability questions. Ther Umsch. 2005 Mar;62(3):185-9
[24] Dowd S,The Mystery of Altruism and Transcultural Nursing.Health Care Manag (Frederick). 2007 January/March;26(1):64-67
[25]吉本斯,博弈论基础,第一版
[26]张维迎(1996),博弈论与信息经济学。上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,
[27] [美]朱?弗登博格,[法]让?梯若尔(2003),博弈论。中国人民大学出版社
[28]陈学彬(1999),宏观金融博弈分析。上海财经大学出版社。
[29]KENNETHJOSEPHARROW.Uncertaint yand the Welfare Economics of MedicalCare [J] .AmericanEconomicReview1963,53:942-973.
[30]ROBETG.EVANS.Supplier Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications .The Economics of Health and MedicalCare [M] . NewYork: HealsteadPress , 1974:162-173.
[31]DAVIDDRANOVE.Demand Inducement and the Physician-Patient Relationship [J]. EconomicInquiry.1988(2):281-298.
[32]MARTINS.FELDSTEIN.The Rising Price of Physicians. Services[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics.1970(52):121-133.
[33] Carroll, Christopher. How Does Future income Affect Current consumption? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,l994(February).
[34]Dardanoni,Valentino,Precautionary Savings under Income Uncertainty:A Cross-Sectional Analysi、[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, 23.
[35] Skinner, Jonathan. Risky Tncome, Life Cycle Consumption, and Precautionary [J]. Jorunal of Monetary Economics,1998,22(September)。
[36] Browing, Martin;Crossley, Thomas F. The Life-Cycle Model of Consumptionand Saving[J]. Jorunal of Economics Perspectives,2001,Vol. 15 (3).
[37]Caballero,R.J. .Consumption Puzzles and Precautionary Saving[J7.Jorunal of Monetary Economics,1990,25.
[38] Kraay, Aart. Household Saving in China[J].World Bank Economic Review, 2000, Vol. 14, No. 3, September.
[2] Harold TK. Minimizing medical litigation. J Med Pract Manage. 2006 Mar-Apr;21(5):257-61.
[3]施锡铨(2002),博弈论。上海财经大学出版社。
[4]赖微微等,关注民生-博弈试析医患不对称痼疾,经济理论研究,2006
[5]弓宪文等,信息不对称下的医患关系博弈分析,重庆大学学报,2004年4月
[6]王勇等,再论医患关系博弈模型,重庆大学学报,2006年6月
[7]耿嘉川,中国医疗体制下多方博弈与组织政策分析,山东大学2006届硕士论文
[8]顾东辉,医患博弈中的行为模式研究,中国人民解放军军医进修学院2006届硕士论文
[9]高宁宁,政府与居民基于消费倾向的博弈分析,上海师范大学2006届硕士论文
[10]戴维.国外的医患纠纷处理.国际医药卫生导报,2002,5
[11] Dowd S,The Mystery of Altruism and Transcultural Nursing.Health Care Manag (Frederick). 2007 January/March;26(1):64-67
[12]《医疗事故技术鉴定暂行办法》2002年7月31日
[13]《医疗事故处理条例》2002年4月4日
[14] Spence,A.M.,1974,Market Signaling,Harvard University Press.
[15]吉本斯,博弈论基础,第一版
[16]张维迎(1996),博弈论与信息经济学。上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,
[17] [美]朱?弗登博格,[法]让?梯若尔(2003),博弈论。中国人民大学出版社
[18] Harsanyi.J. 1967-68. Game with incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Management Science 14:159-182。320-334,486-502.
[19]《北京高院关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案件若干问题的意见》2005年7月13日
[20]《广东省高级人民法院关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案件若干问题指导意见》2007年12月25日
[21]关于参照《医疗事故处理条例》审理医疗纠纷民事案件的通知,最高人民法院, 2003年1月6日
[22]《关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》,最高人民法院,2003年12月26日
[23]杨勤法,我国目前医疗纠纷的赔偿现状及完善,辽东学院学报,Vol8 SumNo.47,2006年第2期。
[24]《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》,2001年
[25]医疗纠纷应当区别不同类型分别适用法律,最高人民法院答记者问,2005年06月06日
[26]朱晓卓,试论医患纠纷案件处理中的司法鉴定,中国卫生事业管理,2006年第12期,总222期
[27]张维迎,信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析,经济研究,2002年第十期
[28]医患纠纷:伪市场哈改革的恶果,中国经济时评,2006年第7期,总第340期
[29]张伟,私了:是“有效机制”还是“无赖行径”,中国经济周刊,2006年第7期,总第340期
[30]姚澜,医疗事故鉴定体制中影响司法公正的缺陷分析,中国司法鉴定,2004年6月5日
[31]纪建文,关系视角下中国的医患契约与医患纠纷,法学论坛,vol21 No.6,2006年11月5日
[32] Spence, A.M.,1973,”Job Market Signailing”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:355-374
[33] Milgrom, P .and J. Roberts,1982,”limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis”, Econometrica 40: 433-459
[34] Rubinstein, A .,1982,”Perfcet Equilibrium in a Bargain Model”, Econometrica 50:97-109
[35]王农,规范医疗行为正确适用法律处理医疗事故处理案件,中国医院, 2005, 9
[36]宋世明,苏州“动刀”医患纠纷顽疾.江苏法制报,2007年2月6日
[37]徐和平,医患纠纷案件的法律适用及鉴定问题,中国卫生法制,2005,6
[38]罗向明,建立强制医疗责任保险适应医疗体制改革,医院领导决策参考,2006年第01期
[39]李松,医疗责任保险在国外,法律在医,第八卷第12期,总第63期
[40]丁邦宁,引入商业保险机制有利于解决医疗纠纷,保险研究,2005年第4期
[41]汪挺,江苏:医疗责任险推行困难重重,医院领导决策参考,2005年第6期
[42] Luce, R. and H. Raiffa, 1957,Games and Decisions,Wiley
[43] Staih, I., 1972, Bargaining Theory, Stockholm School of Economics.
[44] McMillan,J.,1986,Game Theory in International Economics, Harwood Academic Publisher.
[45] Harsanyi,J.,1973,”Games with Randomly Distributed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points”, International Journal of Game Theory 2:1-23.
[1]刘俊荣著.医患冲突的沟通与解决.广东高等教育出版社,2004,P173
[2] 2006年9月9日“新浪网”,广东省上半年发生200起医疗暴力事件
[3] 2006年11月08日新华网,新华视点:谁在为医患矛盾推波助澜
[4]宋世明.苏州“动刀”医患纠纷顽疾.江苏法制报.2007年2月6日
[5] Harold TK. Minimizing medical litigation. J Med Pract Manage. 2006 Mar-Apr;21(5):257-61.
[6]施锡铨(2002),博弈论。上海财经大学出版社。
[7]万里涛.浅议医患纠纷的非诉讼解决方式.中国卫生监督,2005,12
[8]刘革新.医患双方协商解决医患纠纷具有法律效力.医院管理论坛,2005,9
[9]邵永生.仲裁解决医患纠纷的可行性与效益性探讨.中国卫生事业管理,2000,12
[10]任其盛.从医患纠纷的处理机制的现状看法院作为司法机关社会职能的实现.科技与法律,2004,3
[11]丁宇.在改革和发展中解决医患纠纷问题.红旗文稿,2006,3
[12]王农.规范医疗行为正确适用法律处理医疗事故处理案件.中国医院,2005,9
[13]徐和平.医患纠纷案件的法律适用及鉴定问题.中国卫生法制,2005,6
[14]赖微微等,关注民生-博弈试析医患不对称痼疾,经济理论研究,2006
[15]弓宪文等,信息不对称下的医患关系博弈分析,重庆大学学报,2004年4月
[16]王勇等,再论医患关系博弈模型,重庆大学学报,2006年6月
[17]耿嘉川,中国医疗体制下多方博弈与组织政策分析,山东大学2006届硕士论文
[18]顾东辉,医患博弈中的行为模式研究,中国人民解放军军医进修学院2006届硕士论文
[19]高宁宁,政府与居民基于消费倾向的博弈分析,上海师范大学2006届硕士论文
[20]戴维.国外的医患纠纷处理.国际医药卫生导报,2002,5
[21]Ferris LE.A challenge and an opportunity for medical regulators--considering the public's interests in cases using ADR to resolve disputes about physicians' practices: a Canadian analysis.Med Law.2002;21(1):11-42.
[22]Dauer EA. Alternatives to litigation for health care conflicts and claims: alternative dispute resolution in medicine.Med Law.2002;21 (1):11-42
[23] Scheppokat KD. Learning from the experiences of an arbitration unit for medical liability questions. Ther Umsch. 2005 Mar;62(3):185-9
[24] Dowd S,The Mystery of Altruism and Transcultural Nursing.Health Care Manag (Frederick). 2007 January/March;26(1):64-67
[25]吉本斯,博弈论基础,第一版
[26]张维迎(1996),博弈论与信息经济学。上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,
[27] [美]朱?弗登博格,[法]让?梯若尔(2003),博弈论。中国人民大学出版社
[28]陈学彬(1999),宏观金融博弈分析。上海财经大学出版社。
[29]KENNETHJOSEPHARROW.Uncertaint yand the Welfare Economics of MedicalCare [J] .AmericanEconomicReview1963,53:942-973.
[30]ROBETG.EVANS.Supplier Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications .The Economics of Health and MedicalCare [M] . NewYork: HealsteadPress , 1974:162-173.
[31]DAVIDDRANOVE.Demand Inducement and the Physician-Patient Relationship [J]. EconomicInquiry.1988(2):281-298.
[32]MARTINS.FELDSTEIN.The Rising Price of Physicians. Services[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics.1970(52):121-133.
[33] Carroll, Christopher. How Does Future income Affect Current consumption? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,l994(February).
[34]Dardanoni,Valentino,Precautionary Savings under Income Uncertainty:A Cross-Sectional Analysi、[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, 23.
[35] Skinner, Jonathan. Risky Tncome, Life Cycle Consumption, and Precautionary [J]. Jorunal of Monetary Economics,1998,22(September)。
[36] Browing, Martin;Crossley, Thomas F. The Life-Cycle Model of Consumptionand Saving[J]. Jorunal of Economics Perspectives,2001,Vol. 15 (3).
[37]Caballero,R.J. .Consumption Puzzles and Precautionary Saving[J7.Jorunal of Monetary Economics,1990,25.
[38] Kraay, Aart. Household Saving in China[J].World Bank Economic Review, 2000, Vol. 14, No. 3, September.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |