中国电力行业规制改革研究
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摘要
当今世界很多国家都在经历着电力行业规制放松或重建规制的实验,改革的动因可能源于技术、需求、经济约束或执政理念的变化。拆分垂直垄断的电力企业、发电侧和售电侧引入竞争,对具有自然垄断性质的输配电进行政府规制,以及引入独立的监管机构,这几乎是全球电力行业改革的标准套路；中国2002年出台的电力体制改革方案(5号文)对于规制改革的设计也是如出一辙。之后,改革并没有按预想的进程推进,某些环节甚至出现倒退。为了找寻中国电力行业规制改革滞后的原因,探求一条适合本国电力发展的道路,本文基于西方规制理论和经验研究,从经济学、法学、行政管理等多学科视角,对中国电力行业规制历史、规制框架和规制内容进行了分析和思考。
研究发现,我国电力行业一直以来都是“先改革,后立法”,规制改革缺乏相应的法律依据和规范。单纯依靠行政力量不利于改革的推进,容易引发腐败和寻租问题。改革涉及利益关系的调整,没有专门法对规制机构、职能和程序等的授权,在面对既得利益集团阻扰时,监管机构束手无策,而电监会颁布的电改法规,由于没有上位法的立法授权条款,缺乏足够权威性。从电力行业规制机构来看,存在规制职能错位,规制职能配置不当,多头管制等问题。规制职能的分散并非出于权力制衡的考虑,而是计划经济条件下生产式管理的继承物。同时,电力规制机构权力纵向配置不当,地方保护主义和市场分割现象突出。监管方式一般应与政治组织形式相适应。我国地方官员评价体系和分税制的财政制度安排,给予了地方干预市场的激励。目前分权型的电力监管绩效低,容易导致规制合谋。对电力行业经济性规制的研究发现,电力市场准入监管实务中存在所有制歧视,政企不分、政监不分,法律缺位等问题。未来市场准入条件或逐步转向规划、环保和资质审查,变“不确定的政府行为+确定的市场”为“确定的规则+竞争性的市场”。电价规制则一直延续政府定价模式,既充当着宏观调控的工具,又是利益集团讨价还价的产物,两者都主要依靠行政命令和法规来发挥作用。没有科学定价方式,电价不能反映能源稀缺,弥补环境成本,调节供给和需求。规制改革的目标一般是在发电和售电引入竞争,由市场力量决定价格；而在输配电价则由政府规制。目前发电部门有一定程度的竞争,但输配售尚未解耦。近几年5大发电和国家电网的过度投资行为,其风险防范机制就是政府定价,一旦国有电力企业面临经营困难或金融风险,可以通过游说政治家涨电价来弥补。
综上,电力行业规制改革取得进展需要相应的配套改革的支撑,否则,制度和政治程序的障碍会减缓改革的实际进程。电力产业规制应该考虑政府和市场的边界,中央和地方集权和分权,国家和企业的关系等深层次问题,将规制改革与构建完善的法律体系、简化行政、引入竞争以及国有产权制度改革等等问题结合在一起,寻找一条符合我国发展道路的规制体系。
De-regulation and re-regulation have been taking place in electric power industry in many countries around the world. The reasons which brought to the reforms might arise from the changes of technologies, demand, economic constraints or political ideologies. The text-book restructuring model is to split the vertical monopoly, introduce competition to generation and retail sector, regulate transmission and distribution which bear the natural monopoly characteristics and build up an independent regulator. China's electric power industry restructuring plan (No.5) is of no big difference. But the deregulation practice did not follow the documental design and lag far behind the proposed plan. In oder to find out the causalities and explore a right path for the development of China's electric power industry, this dissertation based its research on the theoretical and empirical regulation studies, analyzes the regulatory history, framework and content from the multidisciplinary perspective of economics, law, administrative management.
The author finds out that, China's electric power industry always takes the path: reform first and legislation second. The deregulation reform has not corresponding legal ground. To rely mostly on administrative power is not propitious for pushing forward the regulation reform. It is always accompanied by corruption and rent seeking. The regulation reform adjusts the interest among different groups. Without the legal authorization concerning the regulatory institution, function and process, the regulatory body will be at wit's end when confronting the pullback of the interest groups. State Electric Regulation Commission has issued some regulations concerning regulatory reform, while these documents do not have adequate constraints over the stakeholders because there is no commission from the upper law. From the study on the regulatory bodies, there exists widely that the allocation of regulatory function and institution design are not in accordance with each other. The decentralization of the regulatory functions is not made out of consideration for balancing the power but an inheritance for traditional plant supervision from central planning era. Moreover, the allocation between central and local government concerning regulatory function is not optimized as well. Regional protectionism and market segmentation become a prominent problem. The regulatory mode is generally in accordance with political system. The institution arrangement about the assessment criteria for local officer and revenue-sharing system motivate local government to intervene in markets. Currently the decentralized regulatory practice is of low efficiency and has the tendency to cause cahoots. From the study on the economic regulation of electric power industry, there exists discrimination concerning the market access towards private investors. There is no clear line among the function of enterprises, government and independent regulator. The market access criteria shall change gradually to planning, environmental protection and qualification audit. Electricy prices have been set by the government and used as a tool for macro-control. The price adjustment turns out to be the bargain between different interest groups. Without scientific pricing methodology, the electricity price can not response to the scarcity of energy, compensate the external costs, and balance the demand and supply. The generating sector has some extent of competition while transmission and distribution are still not splitted. The over investment behaviour in the recent 5 years of state owned electric companies shows the deficiency of the pricing system.
Generally, the regulation reform of the electric power industry shall be accompanied by reforms in other areas. Otherwise, the impediment from institution and political process will slow down the progress. The reform in electric power industry shall be combined with establishment of relative laws, simplification of administrative process, introduction of competition and property right reform of state owned companies.
研究发现,我国电力行业一直以来都是“先改革,后立法”,规制改革缺乏相应的法律依据和规范。单纯依靠行政力量不利于改革的推进,容易引发腐败和寻租问题。改革涉及利益关系的调整,没有专门法对规制机构、职能和程序等的授权,在面对既得利益集团阻扰时,监管机构束手无策,而电监会颁布的电改法规,由于没有上位法的立法授权条款,缺乏足够权威性。从电力行业规制机构来看,存在规制职能错位,规制职能配置不当,多头管制等问题。规制职能的分散并非出于权力制衡的考虑,而是计划经济条件下生产式管理的继承物。同时,电力规制机构权力纵向配置不当,地方保护主义和市场分割现象突出。监管方式一般应与政治组织形式相适应。我国地方官员评价体系和分税制的财政制度安排,给予了地方干预市场的激励。目前分权型的电力监管绩效低,容易导致规制合谋。对电力行业经济性规制的研究发现,电力市场准入监管实务中存在所有制歧视,政企不分、政监不分,法律缺位等问题。未来市场准入条件或逐步转向规划、环保和资质审查,变“不确定的政府行为+确定的市场”为“确定的规则+竞争性的市场”。电价规制则一直延续政府定价模式,既充当着宏观调控的工具,又是利益集团讨价还价的产物,两者都主要依靠行政命令和法规来发挥作用。没有科学定价方式,电价不能反映能源稀缺,弥补环境成本,调节供给和需求。规制改革的目标一般是在发电和售电引入竞争,由市场力量决定价格；而在输配电价则由政府规制。目前发电部门有一定程度的竞争,但输配售尚未解耦。近几年5大发电和国家电网的过度投资行为,其风险防范机制就是政府定价,一旦国有电力企业面临经营困难或金融风险,可以通过游说政治家涨电价来弥补。
综上,电力行业规制改革取得进展需要相应的配套改革的支撑,否则,制度和政治程序的障碍会减缓改革的实际进程。电力产业规制应该考虑政府和市场的边界,中央和地方集权和分权,国家和企业的关系等深层次问题,将规制改革与构建完善的法律体系、简化行政、引入竞争以及国有产权制度改革等等问题结合在一起,寻找一条符合我国发展道路的规制体系。
De-regulation and re-regulation have been taking place in electric power industry in many countries around the world. The reasons which brought to the reforms might arise from the changes of technologies, demand, economic constraints or political ideologies. The text-book restructuring model is to split the vertical monopoly, introduce competition to generation and retail sector, regulate transmission and distribution which bear the natural monopoly characteristics and build up an independent regulator. China's electric power industry restructuring plan (No.5) is of no big difference. But the deregulation practice did not follow the documental design and lag far behind the proposed plan. In oder to find out the causalities and explore a right path for the development of China's electric power industry, this dissertation based its research on the theoretical and empirical regulation studies, analyzes the regulatory history, framework and content from the multidisciplinary perspective of economics, law, administrative management.
The author finds out that, China's electric power industry always takes the path: reform first and legislation second. The deregulation reform has not corresponding legal ground. To rely mostly on administrative power is not propitious for pushing forward the regulation reform. It is always accompanied by corruption and rent seeking. The regulation reform adjusts the interest among different groups. Without the legal authorization concerning the regulatory institution, function and process, the regulatory body will be at wit's end when confronting the pullback of the interest groups. State Electric Regulation Commission has issued some regulations concerning regulatory reform, while these documents do not have adequate constraints over the stakeholders because there is no commission from the upper law. From the study on the regulatory bodies, there exists widely that the allocation of regulatory function and institution design are not in accordance with each other. The decentralization of the regulatory functions is not made out of consideration for balancing the power but an inheritance for traditional plant supervision from central planning era. Moreover, the allocation between central and local government concerning regulatory function is not optimized as well. Regional protectionism and market segmentation become a prominent problem. The regulatory mode is generally in accordance with political system. The institution arrangement about the assessment criteria for local officer and revenue-sharing system motivate local government to intervene in markets. Currently the decentralized regulatory practice is of low efficiency and has the tendency to cause cahoots. From the study on the economic regulation of electric power industry, there exists discrimination concerning the market access towards private investors. There is no clear line among the function of enterprises, government and independent regulator. The market access criteria shall change gradually to planning, environmental protection and qualification audit. Electricy prices have been set by the government and used as a tool for macro-control. The price adjustment turns out to be the bargain between different interest groups. Without scientific pricing methodology, the electricity price can not response to the scarcity of energy, compensate the external costs, and balance the demand and supply. The generating sector has some extent of competition while transmission and distribution are still not splitted. The over investment behaviour in the recent 5 years of state owned electric companies shows the deficiency of the pricing system.
Generally, the regulation reform of the electric power industry shall be accompanied by reforms in other areas. Otherwise, the impediment from institution and political process will slow down the progress. The reform in electric power industry shall be combined with establishment of relative laws, simplification of administrative process, introduction of competition and property right reform of state owned companies.
引文
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