我国碳税效应、最优税率和配置机制研究
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摘要
碳税作为目前公认的解决人类社会发展高碳困境最有效的手段已经在欧洲许多国家推广并取得了良好的成效。除了能够降低碳排放外,碳税还有助于促进环境税制改革和应对国际贸易中的“绿色壁垒”,这些优点使得许多国家正积极筹措制定自己的碳税政策。我国作为负责任的大国,对国际社会作出了大幅度降低碳排放的承诺。为了实现这一承诺,碳税已经被我国政府明确确定为“十二五”期间需要开征的税种。在此背景下,对我国碳税相关问题的前瞻性研究成为了目前制定碳税政策的迫切需要。与现有研究主要强调产业差异的做法不同,本文认为我国碳税政策制定需要考虑区域差异,并从区域差异角度对碳税效应、最优税率和配套机制等方面进行研究。
碳税在欧洲的实践经验表明,碳税对能源消费、经济增长和收入分配的影响是政府制定碳税政策时应该考虑的关键因素。基于欧洲各国均为小国的实际情况,欧洲的碳税政策主要围绕这些关键因素在产业间进行了差异化处理。也正是受此影响,目前国内外的碳税研究主要集中在对产业差异方面的关注。然而,我国是一个大国,区域间的经济发展模式存在很大差异。本文通过运用面板数据模型、分位数回归模型和对应分析等方法研究发现,碳税对我国不同区域能源消费、经济增长和收入分配存在较大的系统性差异。这就要求我国的碳税政策不但需要考虑产业间差异,还需要重视区域间差异。
基于上述对我国碳税政策效应区域差异实证研究的结果,本文遵循目前西方学者在经济增长框架下分析环境税最优税率的新思路,建立了一个多部门的动态优化模型,并结合中国的数据对适合不同区域的最优碳税税率进行了估算。
由于区域差异化的税收政策可能诱发多层级政府间产生策略行为的风险,区域化碳税政策的有效实施必须依赖于其它一系列配套机制。本文从环境联邦主义理论出发,在指出了现有环境联邦主义理论与我国实际脱节的基础上,结合中国式财政分权的特征分别构建了完全信息动态博弈模型和多任务委托代理模型进行分析,对我国有效实施区域差异化碳税政策需要采取的配套机制改革提出建议,包括中央政府在环境保护方面的法律法规上进行统一引导、树立正确舆论导向;加强群众话语权；完善信息反馈机制；转变干部考核评价体系等。
Accepted as the most effective measure to high carbon dilemma, carbon taxation have been implemented and gotten good results in Europe. In addition to decreasing carbon emission, carbon taxation is conductive to environmental taxation reform and "green trade barrier". These advantages make many counties preparing to formulate carbon taxation. As a responsible big country, China promises to decrease carbon emission remarkably. To fulfill this commitment, carbon taxation will be implemented during the "125" period. Therefore, researches of carbon taxation are in sore need. Different from current studys, we stress on regional differences, and analyse policy effects, optimal tax rate and related mechanisms.
Through summarizing the Eureop experiences, this article states that the influences of carbon taxation to energy consumption, economic growth and income distribution are the key factors for governments to implement carbon taxation. Because the Eureopean countries are small, Eureopean carbon taxation just reflect industry differences of these influences and until now, researches of carbon taxation always pay attention to industry differences. However, China is a large country. Economic development modes have series reginal variation. Based on panel data, quantile regression model and correspondence analysis, this article finds remarkable differences of carbon taxation effects among different regions. Therefore, China's carbon taxation should regard reginal differences in addition to industry differences.
On account of the empirical analysis above, this article estabilishes a multi-sectors dynamic optimization model to explore and compute the reginal optimal carbon taxation in China.
Because reginal different taxation could induce multi-governments to play strategic behaviors, the effiency of reginal different carbon taxation depends on a series of conresponding meachanisms. This article starts from the environmental federalism theory, points out the shortages of the environmental federalism, develops dynamic games of complete information model and multi-task principal-agent model basing on Chinese style decentralization, and proposes suggestions for the effiency of regional different carbon taxation.
碳税在欧洲的实践经验表明,碳税对能源消费、经济增长和收入分配的影响是政府制定碳税政策时应该考虑的关键因素。基于欧洲各国均为小国的实际情况,欧洲的碳税政策主要围绕这些关键因素在产业间进行了差异化处理。也正是受此影响,目前国内外的碳税研究主要集中在对产业差异方面的关注。然而,我国是一个大国,区域间的经济发展模式存在很大差异。本文通过运用面板数据模型、分位数回归模型和对应分析等方法研究发现,碳税对我国不同区域能源消费、经济增长和收入分配存在较大的系统性差异。这就要求我国的碳税政策不但需要考虑产业间差异,还需要重视区域间差异。
基于上述对我国碳税政策效应区域差异实证研究的结果,本文遵循目前西方学者在经济增长框架下分析环境税最优税率的新思路,建立了一个多部门的动态优化模型,并结合中国的数据对适合不同区域的最优碳税税率进行了估算。
由于区域差异化的税收政策可能诱发多层级政府间产生策略行为的风险,区域化碳税政策的有效实施必须依赖于其它一系列配套机制。本文从环境联邦主义理论出发,在指出了现有环境联邦主义理论与我国实际脱节的基础上,结合中国式财政分权的特征分别构建了完全信息动态博弈模型和多任务委托代理模型进行分析,对我国有效实施区域差异化碳税政策需要采取的配套机制改革提出建议,包括中央政府在环境保护方面的法律法规上进行统一引导、树立正确舆论导向;加强群众话语权；完善信息反馈机制；转变干部考核评价体系等。
Accepted as the most effective measure to high carbon dilemma, carbon taxation have been implemented and gotten good results in Europe. In addition to decreasing carbon emission, carbon taxation is conductive to environmental taxation reform and "green trade barrier". These advantages make many counties preparing to formulate carbon taxation. As a responsible big country, China promises to decrease carbon emission remarkably. To fulfill this commitment, carbon taxation will be implemented during the "125" period. Therefore, researches of carbon taxation are in sore need. Different from current studys, we stress on regional differences, and analyse policy effects, optimal tax rate and related mechanisms.
Through summarizing the Eureop experiences, this article states that the influences of carbon taxation to energy consumption, economic growth and income distribution are the key factors for governments to implement carbon taxation. Because the Eureopean countries are small, Eureopean carbon taxation just reflect industry differences of these influences and until now, researches of carbon taxation always pay attention to industry differences. However, China is a large country. Economic development modes have series reginal variation. Based on panel data, quantile regression model and correspondence analysis, this article finds remarkable differences of carbon taxation effects among different regions. Therefore, China's carbon taxation should regard reginal differences in addition to industry differences.
On account of the empirical analysis above, this article estabilishes a multi-sectors dynamic optimization model to explore and compute the reginal optimal carbon taxation in China.
Because reginal different taxation could induce multi-governments to play strategic behaviors, the effiency of reginal different carbon taxation depends on a series of conresponding meachanisms. This article starts from the environmental federalism theory, points out the shortages of the environmental federalism, develops dynamic games of complete information model and multi-task principal-agent model basing on Chinese style decentralization, and proposes suggestions for the effiency of regional different carbon taxation.
引文
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