研究型大学创新团队心理契约研究
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摘要
创新型团队是具有创新意识、勇于解决人类面临的重大科学和现实问题、源于共同愿望的学习、研究、应用一体化的研究群体。实践表明,创新团队是获取和整合资源的有效组织形式,是科技创新和科研攻关的重要载体,是优秀杰出人才的创业平台。创新型团队是创新型国家的细胞、是高水平研究型大学的核心机构,是我国建设创新型国家的希望所在。希望通过本文的研究,能够充实和丰富创新团队的理论体系,并在实践上为改善创新团队内部委托代理关系和制定有效的创新团队激励机制从而提高激励效率提供一些理论指导和有益的思路。
本文以团队理论、激励理论、心理契约理论为基础,以研究型大学创新团队为研究对象,综合运用比较分析、数理分析、问卷调查的方法对研究型大学创新团队心理契约的内容、违背与激励机制等问题进行了深入探讨。
本文主要的研究成果如下:
1.界定了研究型大学创新团队的概念,对研究型大学创新团队及其心理契约的特征进行了深入分析,初步探讨并总结了创新团队心理契约的内涵、特征以及体系构建;梳理了团队成员心理契约的演变内容及特点,并强调了关于心理契约违背的研究成果。综述了标准团队激励模型,对心理契约视角下团队激励模型进行了重点考察。
2.开发了研究型大学创新团队心理契约内容调查问卷。通过项目搜集、筛选、探索性因子分析、信度和效度分析最终形成了正式问卷。通过对问卷分析得出:创新团队心理契约更加关注文化、“搭便车”、声誉、生活保障及福利、团队协作、工作环境与氛围等方面,这些对创新团队绩效影响重大。在维度表征上,创新团队心理契约关注维度排序依次为关系维度、团队成员维度与交易维度。这种排序与创新团队特点密切相关。
3.开发并检验了由创新团队对成员违背分问卷及成员对创新团队违背分问卷构成的研究型大学创新团队心理契约违背问卷,其中创新团队对成员心理契约违背分为尊重违背、能力提升违背与工作环境违背三个维度,成员对创新团队心理契约违背分为忠诚违背与奉献违背两个维度。对创新团队心理契约违背的差异分析表明:创新团队对成员心理契约违背在年龄、团队规模上差异显著,成员对创新团队心理契约违背在年龄、规模和团队专业上差异显著。对创新团队对成员与成员对团队心理契约违背各维度之间的关系分析表明:团队对成员心理契约违背中的三个维度与成员对团队心理契约违背中的两个维度之间存在极显著的正相关。创新团队心理契约违背对创新团队的工作绩效等有着明显的负面影响。
4.研究了构成心理契约主要内容的公平关注、声誉关注及职业生涯关注对团队成员的努力程度及协作水平影响,证明了心理契约本身就是一种隐性激励机制。通过问卷调查发现这种心理契约隐性激励的发挥主要是通过公平关注、声誉关注及职业生涯关注产生作用的,并从这三个方面通过数理推导分析了心理契约隐性激励的机理。
5.在分析了研究型大学创新团队对成员心理契约违背及成员对团队心理契约违背的基础上,探讨了研究型大学创新团队凝聚力构建的关键要素和所依赖的路径,并以此为指导提出研究型大学创新团队心理契约违背的防范与重建,且重点分析了研究型大学创新团队心理契约关键因素,即声誉、公平及职业生涯,并提出了管理好这三要素的有效路径。
The innovation team is the cell of innovation-oriented country and the core organization of innovation-oriented university, and it is the hope of our country to construct the innovation-oriented country and the innovation-oriented universities. These are the historical status and the social functions of innovation team. The innovation team is one kind of research groups who stems from the common wishes, integrates the study, the research and the application. It has the innovative conscious, dare to resolve the vital realistic questions that the humanity faced. The theory and the practice indicated that the innovation team is an effective organization to gain and conformity resources. The innovation team is the important carrier to do the scientific innovation and to tackle the key scientific research projects and it is the undertaking platform for outstanding persons. The study of the innovation team has significant research and application implications. Through this article the author hoped that the theoretical system of innovation team can be complement and enhancement, and the effective incentive contract can be droved to improve the interior principal-agent relationships of innovation team in the practice, thus to provide some theoretical instructions and beneficial ideas to enhancement incentive efficiency.
With the group theory, incentive theory, psychological contract theory as study foundation, with innovation teams in research universities as research objects, using comparative analysis, mathematical analysis and questionnaire synthetically, this paper deeply explored the contents and conflicts of psychological contract in innovation teams and the problems of effective incentive.
The main results of this paper were as follows:
(1)This paper defined the concept of innovation teams in innovation-oriented universities, and deeply analyzed the characteristics of both the innovation team and its psychological contract, primarily explored and summarized the contents, characteristics and system buildings of psychological contract of innovation team, reviewed the development, the specialties and the contents of the psychological contract, and emphasized the research results of psychological contract conflicts. The paper also synthesized the incentive models of standard teams and reviewed the team incentive models in the view of psychological contract. The innovation team's psychological contract is statistical analyzed.
(2)This paper developed the questionnaire to measure the psychological contract of innovation teams in innovation-oriented universities. The final questionnaire was formed through items collection, screen, exploratory factor analysis and reliability and validity analyses. The investigation of the questionnaire showed that the innovation teams paid more attention to the culture, "the while vehicle", and prestige, social security and welfare, team cooperation, working conditions and atmosphere in psychology contract, which had significant effect on innovation team achievements. And the order of dimensions of the psychology contract in innovation teams is sorting as follows: the relational dimension, the team member dimension and the transaction dimension. This kind of sorting is closely related to the characteristic of the innovation teams.
(3)This paper designed and tested the questionnaires of the psychological contract conflicts between the innovation teams and the individuals and the conflicts between the individuals and the innovation teams. The psychological contract conflicts of the innovation teams to the individuals is made up of three parts, respect conflicts, ability enhancement conflicts and working environment conflicts, and the psychological contract conflicts of the individuals to the innovation teams is consist of two parts, loyalty conflicts and dedication conflicts. The differences tests results showed that the psychological contract conflicts of the innovation teams to the individuals were remarkable different in gender and the scales of teams, and the psychological contract conflicts of the individuals to the innovation teams also had significant differences in gender, the scales and majors of teams.The relationship between those two different kinds of psychological contract conflicts in innovation teams was also analysed, the result show that they had very significant positive correlations.And the psychological contract conflicts in the innovation teams had negative effect on the efficiency of the teams.
(4) The influences of justice , reputation and career to members' efforts and cooperatrion are studied to demonstrate that psychological contract is a kind of hidden incentive mechanism. Wen can find that the hidden incentive functions of psychological contract are launching through paying attention to justice, reputation and career. The mechanism of psychological contract's hidden incentive is studied from three perspectives of justice, reputation and career.
(5)This paper analyzed the psychological contract conflicts between the innovation teams and the individuals and the similar conflicts between the individuals and the innovation teams, and explored the key factors and the path to make the innovation team work together, then instructed to defend the psychological contract conflicts away from the innovation team and to rebuild the psychological contract. The key factors of psychological contract of innovation teams, such as reputation, fairness and career were emphasized, and the effective path to manager those three factors were pointed out.
本文以团队理论、激励理论、心理契约理论为基础,以研究型大学创新团队为研究对象,综合运用比较分析、数理分析、问卷调查的方法对研究型大学创新团队心理契约的内容、违背与激励机制等问题进行了深入探讨。
本文主要的研究成果如下:
1.界定了研究型大学创新团队的概念,对研究型大学创新团队及其心理契约的特征进行了深入分析,初步探讨并总结了创新团队心理契约的内涵、特征以及体系构建;梳理了团队成员心理契约的演变内容及特点,并强调了关于心理契约违背的研究成果。综述了标准团队激励模型,对心理契约视角下团队激励模型进行了重点考察。
2.开发了研究型大学创新团队心理契约内容调查问卷。通过项目搜集、筛选、探索性因子分析、信度和效度分析最终形成了正式问卷。通过对问卷分析得出:创新团队心理契约更加关注文化、“搭便车”、声誉、生活保障及福利、团队协作、工作环境与氛围等方面,这些对创新团队绩效影响重大。在维度表征上,创新团队心理契约关注维度排序依次为关系维度、团队成员维度与交易维度。这种排序与创新团队特点密切相关。
3.开发并检验了由创新团队对成员违背分问卷及成员对创新团队违背分问卷构成的研究型大学创新团队心理契约违背问卷,其中创新团队对成员心理契约违背分为尊重违背、能力提升违背与工作环境违背三个维度,成员对创新团队心理契约违背分为忠诚违背与奉献违背两个维度。对创新团队心理契约违背的差异分析表明:创新团队对成员心理契约违背在年龄、团队规模上差异显著,成员对创新团队心理契约违背在年龄、规模和团队专业上差异显著。对创新团队对成员与成员对团队心理契约违背各维度之间的关系分析表明:团队对成员心理契约违背中的三个维度与成员对团队心理契约违背中的两个维度之间存在极显著的正相关。创新团队心理契约违背对创新团队的工作绩效等有着明显的负面影响。
4.研究了构成心理契约主要内容的公平关注、声誉关注及职业生涯关注对团队成员的努力程度及协作水平影响,证明了心理契约本身就是一种隐性激励机制。通过问卷调查发现这种心理契约隐性激励的发挥主要是通过公平关注、声誉关注及职业生涯关注产生作用的,并从这三个方面通过数理推导分析了心理契约隐性激励的机理。
5.在分析了研究型大学创新团队对成员心理契约违背及成员对团队心理契约违背的基础上,探讨了研究型大学创新团队凝聚力构建的关键要素和所依赖的路径,并以此为指导提出研究型大学创新团队心理契约违背的防范与重建,且重点分析了研究型大学创新团队心理契约关键因素,即声誉、公平及职业生涯,并提出了管理好这三要素的有效路径。
The innovation team is the cell of innovation-oriented country and the core organization of innovation-oriented university, and it is the hope of our country to construct the innovation-oriented country and the innovation-oriented universities. These are the historical status and the social functions of innovation team. The innovation team is one kind of research groups who stems from the common wishes, integrates the study, the research and the application. It has the innovative conscious, dare to resolve the vital realistic questions that the humanity faced. The theory and the practice indicated that the innovation team is an effective organization to gain and conformity resources. The innovation team is the important carrier to do the scientific innovation and to tackle the key scientific research projects and it is the undertaking platform for outstanding persons. The study of the innovation team has significant research and application implications. Through this article the author hoped that the theoretical system of innovation team can be complement and enhancement, and the effective incentive contract can be droved to improve the interior principal-agent relationships of innovation team in the practice, thus to provide some theoretical instructions and beneficial ideas to enhancement incentive efficiency.
With the group theory, incentive theory, psychological contract theory as study foundation, with innovation teams in research universities as research objects, using comparative analysis, mathematical analysis and questionnaire synthetically, this paper deeply explored the contents and conflicts of psychological contract in innovation teams and the problems of effective incentive.
The main results of this paper were as follows:
(1)This paper defined the concept of innovation teams in innovation-oriented universities, and deeply analyzed the characteristics of both the innovation team and its psychological contract, primarily explored and summarized the contents, characteristics and system buildings of psychological contract of innovation team, reviewed the development, the specialties and the contents of the psychological contract, and emphasized the research results of psychological contract conflicts. The paper also synthesized the incentive models of standard teams and reviewed the team incentive models in the view of psychological contract. The innovation team's psychological contract is statistical analyzed.
(2)This paper developed the questionnaire to measure the psychological contract of innovation teams in innovation-oriented universities. The final questionnaire was formed through items collection, screen, exploratory factor analysis and reliability and validity analyses. The investigation of the questionnaire showed that the innovation teams paid more attention to the culture, "the while vehicle", and prestige, social security and welfare, team cooperation, working conditions and atmosphere in psychology contract, which had significant effect on innovation team achievements. And the order of dimensions of the psychology contract in innovation teams is sorting as follows: the relational dimension, the team member dimension and the transaction dimension. This kind of sorting is closely related to the characteristic of the innovation teams.
(3)This paper designed and tested the questionnaires of the psychological contract conflicts between the innovation teams and the individuals and the conflicts between the individuals and the innovation teams. The psychological contract conflicts of the innovation teams to the individuals is made up of three parts, respect conflicts, ability enhancement conflicts and working environment conflicts, and the psychological contract conflicts of the individuals to the innovation teams is consist of two parts, loyalty conflicts and dedication conflicts. The differences tests results showed that the psychological contract conflicts of the innovation teams to the individuals were remarkable different in gender and the scales of teams, and the psychological contract conflicts of the individuals to the innovation teams also had significant differences in gender, the scales and majors of teams.The relationship between those two different kinds of psychological contract conflicts in innovation teams was also analysed, the result show that they had very significant positive correlations.And the psychological contract conflicts in the innovation teams had negative effect on the efficiency of the teams.
(4) The influences of justice , reputation and career to members' efforts and cooperatrion are studied to demonstrate that psychological contract is a kind of hidden incentive mechanism. Wen can find that the hidden incentive functions of psychological contract are launching through paying attention to justice, reputation and career. The mechanism of psychological contract's hidden incentive is studied from three perspectives of justice, reputation and career.
(5)This paper analyzed the psychological contract conflicts between the innovation teams and the individuals and the similar conflicts between the individuals and the innovation teams, and explored the key factors and the path to make the innovation team work together, then instructed to defend the psychological contract conflicts away from the innovation team and to rebuild the psychological contract. The key factors of psychological contract of innovation teams, such as reputation, fairness and career were emphasized, and the effective path to manager those three factors were pointed out.
引文
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