CEO背景特征异质性下薪酬与企业绩效关系实证研究
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摘要
企业存在的目的是实现股东权益的最大化,也就是能不断的产生更多的企业绩效。CEO作为企业最重要的人力资源,是企业创新的主体,是企业发展路径的制定和实施者,在很大程度上影响到企业的绩效水平。薪酬是企业激励CEO努力工作提高企业绩效的主要手段,薪酬激励效果的优劣受到个体差异特别是CEO背景特征的影响。基于此,本文从CEO背景特征的角度出发,来分析不同企业间薪酬对企业绩效激励效果的差异。
本文以2011年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证研究了CEO背景特征异质性下薪酬对企业绩效激励效果的差异。本文首先对相关的研究成果进行了评述,并在此基础上根据代理理论、薪酬激励理论、管理权力理论及风险偏好理论等相关理论分析了CEO背景特征的异质性对薪酬和企业绩效关系影响的作用机理,并据此提出研究假设；在选取了相关的变量之后,根据研究假设建立了回归模型；然后运用统计软件进行了模型的实证检验并得出本文的研究结论。
实证研究结果表明：CEO薪酬对企业绩效产生显著的正向影响,的确起到了对企业绩效的激励作用；在考虑了CEO背景特征差异的基础上发现,CEO的性别和年龄差异并不对薪酬和企业绩效的关系产生明显的影响；CEO的学历和任期差异对薪酬和企业绩效的关系产生显著的影响作用,随着CEO学历或任期的提升和增长,会削弱薪酬对企业绩效的激励效果；在区分CEO是否持股后发现,由于CEO学历和任期的异质性所产生的上述作用在CEO未持股时更显著,而CEO持股的情况下该作用不明显；在区分样本的控制权性质后发现,由于CEO学历和任期的异质性所产生的上述作用在国有企业尤为显著,而非国有企业不明显；在区分是否存在CEO董事长两职兼任后发现,由于CEO学历和任期的异质性所产生的上述作用在CEO和董事长兼任时更加显著,而CEO和董事长不兼任的情况下则不明显。最后,根据研究结论,提出相关的对策建议。
The purpose of enterprise existing is to achieve the maximization of shareholders'equity, which can produce the more enterprise performance. As one of the most important enterprise human resources, CEO is the main part of the enterprise innovation, and the maker and practitioner of the enterprise's development path, who affects the enterprise performance level to a great extent. Salary is the principal mean that enterprise incentives CEO to work hard to improve business performance, and the effect of salary incentive is affected by individual differences, especially CEO's background characteristics. Based on this, this article analyzes differences that the different enterprise's salary effects enterprise's incentive performance, from the perspective of CEO's background characteristics.
Based on a-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in2011as samples, This article has done the empirical research on the differences of salary incentive effecting to enterprise performance, under the CEO's background characteristics' heterogeneity, This article firstly reviewed the relevant research results, and on this basis, according to agency theory, salary incentive theory, managerial power theory and risk theory and other related theory, analyzed the mechanism of CEO's background characteristics'heterogeneity on the impact of salary and enterprise performance relationship, and put forward research hypothesis based on it; After selecting the relevant variables, this article established the regression model according to the research hypothesis; Then by using the statistical software, this article carried on the empirical test of model and received research conclusion.
The results of empirical study showed that CEO's salary pays significant positive influence on enterprise performance, which plays an important role on enterprise performance incentive; On the basis of accounting of the differences of the CEO's background characteristics, the article found that CEO's difference of gender and age has no clear influence on the relationship between the salary and corporate performance; The differences of CEO's degree and term have a significant impact on the relationship between compensation and corporate performance, as the CEO's degree or term promotes and grows, it will weaken the effect of salary incentive on corporate performance; The article found that after differentiating whether the CEO shares holding, due to the heterogeneity of CEO's degree and term has the more significant effects,when the CEO is not holding, but in the case of the CEO's shareholding, the effect is not obvious; After distinguish the sample control properties, due to the heterogeneity of CEO's degree and term has the especially significant effect in the state-owned enterprises, but the effect in the non-state-owned enterprises is not obvious; After the distinguish the presence of both part-time between CEO and the chairman, the article found that due to the heterogeneity of CEO's degree and term has more significant function when the CEO and chairman hold a concurrent post, while the CEO and chairman don't hold a concurrent post, it is not obvious. Finally, according to the research conclusion, the article put forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions.
本文以2011年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证研究了CEO背景特征异质性下薪酬对企业绩效激励效果的差异。本文首先对相关的研究成果进行了评述,并在此基础上根据代理理论、薪酬激励理论、管理权力理论及风险偏好理论等相关理论分析了CEO背景特征的异质性对薪酬和企业绩效关系影响的作用机理,并据此提出研究假设；在选取了相关的变量之后,根据研究假设建立了回归模型；然后运用统计软件进行了模型的实证检验并得出本文的研究结论。
实证研究结果表明：CEO薪酬对企业绩效产生显著的正向影响,的确起到了对企业绩效的激励作用；在考虑了CEO背景特征差异的基础上发现,CEO的性别和年龄差异并不对薪酬和企业绩效的关系产生明显的影响；CEO的学历和任期差异对薪酬和企业绩效的关系产生显著的影响作用,随着CEO学历或任期的提升和增长,会削弱薪酬对企业绩效的激励效果；在区分CEO是否持股后发现,由于CEO学历和任期的异质性所产生的上述作用在CEO未持股时更显著,而CEO持股的情况下该作用不明显；在区分样本的控制权性质后发现,由于CEO学历和任期的异质性所产生的上述作用在国有企业尤为显著,而非国有企业不明显；在区分是否存在CEO董事长两职兼任后发现,由于CEO学历和任期的异质性所产生的上述作用在CEO和董事长兼任时更加显著,而CEO和董事长不兼任的情况下则不明显。最后,根据研究结论,提出相关的对策建议。
The purpose of enterprise existing is to achieve the maximization of shareholders'equity, which can produce the more enterprise performance. As one of the most important enterprise human resources, CEO is the main part of the enterprise innovation, and the maker and practitioner of the enterprise's development path, who affects the enterprise performance level to a great extent. Salary is the principal mean that enterprise incentives CEO to work hard to improve business performance, and the effect of salary incentive is affected by individual differences, especially CEO's background characteristics. Based on this, this article analyzes differences that the different enterprise's salary effects enterprise's incentive performance, from the perspective of CEO's background characteristics.
Based on a-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in2011as samples, This article has done the empirical research on the differences of salary incentive effecting to enterprise performance, under the CEO's background characteristics' heterogeneity, This article firstly reviewed the relevant research results, and on this basis, according to agency theory, salary incentive theory, managerial power theory and risk theory and other related theory, analyzed the mechanism of CEO's background characteristics'heterogeneity on the impact of salary and enterprise performance relationship, and put forward research hypothesis based on it; After selecting the relevant variables, this article established the regression model according to the research hypothesis; Then by using the statistical software, this article carried on the empirical test of model and received research conclusion.
The results of empirical study showed that CEO's salary pays significant positive influence on enterprise performance, which plays an important role on enterprise performance incentive; On the basis of accounting of the differences of the CEO's background characteristics, the article found that CEO's difference of gender and age has no clear influence on the relationship between the salary and corporate performance; The differences of CEO's degree and term have a significant impact on the relationship between compensation and corporate performance, as the CEO's degree or term promotes and grows, it will weaken the effect of salary incentive on corporate performance; The article found that after differentiating whether the CEO shares holding, due to the heterogeneity of CEO's degree and term has the more significant effects,when the CEO is not holding, but in the case of the CEO's shareholding, the effect is not obvious; After distinguish the sample control properties, due to the heterogeneity of CEO's degree and term has the especially significant effect in the state-owned enterprises, but the effect in the non-state-owned enterprises is not obvious; After the distinguish the presence of both part-time between CEO and the chairman, the article found that due to the heterogeneity of CEO's degree and term has more significant function when the CEO and chairman hold a concurrent post, while the CEO and chairman don't hold a concurrent post, it is not obvious. Finally, according to the research conclusion, the article put forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions.
引文
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104王营,曹延求.CEO任期、继任来源与管理层激励的动态调整[J].上海经济研究,2012(11)：13-25.
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106 Katz E., Coleman M.. The Influence of Research on Career Development at Academic Colleges of Education in Israel[J]. Journal of Education for Teaching,2002,28,(1):45-61.
107王雄元,何捷.行政垄断、公司规模与CEO权力薪酬[J].会计研究,2012(11)：33-38.
08权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11)：38-40.
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2 Mehran H., Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,(38):163-184.
3 Hall, Brian J., Liebman, Jeffrey, B..Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrates[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113,(3):65-69.
4赵容,企业家薪酬与企业绩效研究[D].中国社会科学院研究生院硕士论文,2002：23-25.
5陈晓红,王小丁,曾江洪.高管薪酬激励方式对中小企业成长性的影响[J].经济问题探索,2007(3)：150-155.
6杨青,高铭.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司业绩[J].金融研究,2009(6)：111-127.
7康怡,贾炜莹.北京上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的实证研究[J].财会月刊,2011(11)：16-18.
8宋清华,曲良波.高管薪酬、风险承担与银行绩效：中国的经验证据[J].国际金融研究,2011(12)：69-79.
9杨水利,姚瑶.国企经营者薪酬兑现与企业绩效的实证研究[J].预测,2011(1)：27-33.
10 Jensen M., Murphy K.J.. Performance pay and Top Management Incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98,(2):225-264.
11 Tosi H., Wemer S., Katz J., Gomez-Mejia L.. How Much Does Performance Matter:A Meta-analysis of Executive Compensation Studies[J]. Journal of Management,2000,26,(2):301-339.
12魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3)：103-115.
13高辉.上市公司CEO薪酬与绩效关系研究[J].北京大学学报,2006：81-86.
14宋增基,杨天赋,王戈阳.上市银行董事会独立性CEO薪酬与绩效[J].山西财经大学学报,2010,32,(10)：88-94.
15刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].2003(3)：35-40.
16吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3)：177-188.
17 Evans M.G, Gilbert E.. Plateaued Managers: Their need Grateifications and Their Effort Performance Expectation[J]. Journal of Management Studies,1984,2,(1):99-108.
18 Katz E., Coleman M.. The Influence of Research on Career Development at Academic Colleges of Education in Israel[J]. Journal of Education for Teaching,2002,28,(1):45-61.
19黄文锋,张建琦.职业经理对民营企业信任关系的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009(2)：75-80.
20 Williams M.L, McDaniel M.A, Nguyen N.T.. A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology,2006,91(2):392-413.
21于海波,李永瑞,郑晓明.员工薪酬满意度及其影响实证研究[J].经济管理,2009(9)：93-99.
22任华亮,邵建平,邱超.薪酬分配外部公平性对不同类别高学历员工的影响研究[J].科技管理研究,2009(5)：357-359.
23万华,梁金成,孔梅英.企业员工人口特征对薪酬满意度影响实证研究[J].技术经济,2010(8)：116-121.
24王炳成.薪酬公平、人格特质与工作满意度关系研究[J].科研管理,2011(3)：91-100.
25周明建,叶文琴.组织对员工的忠诚、员工的工作满意感和组织忠诚感与员工绩效[J].软科学,2006(3)：119-128.
26舒晓兵,孙健敏.家族企业雇员工作满意度对离职意愿和工作绩效的影响：关系身份的调节[J].学海,2011(2)：109-114.
27徐碧琳,李涛.基于网络联盟环境的工作满意度、组织承诺与网络组织效率的关系研究[J].南开管理评论,2011(1)：36-43.
28权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11)：157-160.
29洪峰.管理层权力、治理结构与薪酬业绩敏感度[J].云南财经大学学报,2010(5)：97-104.
30于鸿君.经济学视角下的思维创新[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2007：212-249.
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