我国农业上市财务治理效率影响因素研究
摘要
我国农业一直处于贡献的地位,不停地以廉价的劳动力和源源不断的资本保障着工业的发展和工业化进程,这就决定了我国农业产业发展的缓慢,这也是我国农业行业微利的根源所在。但不可否认的是,农业在推动经济发展中的处于基础和先行地位,所发挥的作用是不可替代的。这是本文研究选取农业行业作为研究对象的原因所在,对于农业及农业上市公司问题的关注是有重要价值和深远意义的。
我国农业上市公司自1993年第一家上市以来,经历了十八年的发展历程,尽管在整个证券市场中,农业上市公司的数量、资产规模、发行股票数量所占份额均不足5%,但农业上市公司对我国证券市场和国民经济发展的影响是不容忽视的。2003年-2010年,中央财政不断加大“三农”投入,“十一五”期间中央财政用于“三农”支出达29624亿元,年均增长23.6%；2011年三农投入有望突破9000亿元；2011年1月29日,我国出台了第十三个关于农业的“一号文件”,政府对于农业的重视日益凸显,经过十多年的努力,我国农业上市公司治理结构不断完善,由于种种因素的影响和制约,我国的农业上市公司存在着总体发展相对缓慢、治理效率不高、财务业绩不好、竞争力偏弱、违法违规现象严重以及背农转型等诸多问题,这些问题的存在一定程度上是由财务治理的不健全,财务治理效率低下所引致。如伺提高我国农业上市公司的财务治理效率,从而提升其公司价值?如何提高农业行业的核心竞争力?等诸多问题引起了学者们的关注与思考。
与此同时,随着公司治理研究的兴起,财务治理的研究也引起了诸多学者的关注,以期通过对公司财务治理的研究来解决上市公司治理实践过程中出现的若干复杂的财务难题。进而,深入研究财务治理效率,这一判断现实经济中制度变迁政策调整的目标和成败的标准,是深化公司财务治理问题研究的关键。因此,深入研究我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的影响因素是具有重要的理论价值和实践意义的。
一、论文的主要内容
1.理论分析。从现代企业理论、信息不对称理论和财务学理论的角度,分析与我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素研究相关的理论渊源,建设性地提出财务治理的四个具体目标,并指出其最终目标是提高财务治理效率,从而提升公司价值,提高公司的财务核心竞争力。
2.概念框架。首先对与财务治理相关的概念进行了辨析,并清晰地界定了财务治理的概念；对财务治理效率与公司财务绩效之间的传导机制进行分析,并得出公司的财务治理效率与公司财务绩效之间存在止相关关系的结论。然后分析了我国农业在国民经济中的重要地位,运用制度变迁理论阐述了我国农业上市公司的生成逻辑和发展进程以及我国农业上市公司的财务特性。通过概念框架的搭建,厘清相关概念,为之后的研究做好铺垫。
3.影响机理。从理论上分析影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内外部因素,并深入阐释了内外部影响因素对财务治理效率的影响机理,以便为进一步的实证研究奠定理论基础。
4.实证分析。本文对影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内外部因素选取替代变量,构建模型,采用维度配对法从制造业上市公司中找到配对样本,验证了上述因素对我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的影响,并得到与配对制造业样本不同的结论,凸显农业上市公司特性。
5.政策建议。在我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素概念框架构建、影响机理分析和实证研究的基础上,分别从宏观和微观两方面提出相应政策建议,以期通过宏观环境的完善以及公司层面治理结构的健全,提高农业上市公司财务治理效率,从而提高其财务核心竞争力,使其带动农业经济快速可持续地发展。
二、论文的主要结论
1.财务治理的最终目标是通过财务治理的相关制度安排,对财权进行有效配置,从而提高公司运营效率,保护利益相关者的权益,促使企业目标的实现。本文对于财务治理给了更加清晰地界定,财务治理是置于公司治理之下,而在财务管理之上的一种治理形式,是股东、债权人、董事会、监事会和经理层对财权进行有效配置的一系列制度安排。其中财权应包括财务控制权和财务剩余索取权,而财务控制权又可以细分为财务决策权、财务监督权、财务执行权和财务收益分配权。
2.公司财务治理效率的提高有助于改善公司绩效,提升公司价值。研究发现,财务治理效率与与公司绩效成正相关关系,即,当公司的财务治理效率高时,公司绩效是变好的。对于影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内外部因素,不是直接作用于公司绩效,而是首先影响财务治理效率,进而对公司绩效和公司价值产生影响。
3.我国农业上市公司呈现出与其他行业不同的财务特性。我国农业上市公司经过了十几年的发展历程,通过将农业上市公司与全部上市公司的财务特性相比较发现,我国农业上市公司资产负债率整体偏低；农业上市公司融资结构呈阶段性变化；流动负债比率偏高,负债资金来源单一；权益资金结构中留存收益比例偏低；违法违规现象严重；经营绩效较差,财务竞争力较弱等。这些特性致使农业上市公司的整体运营效率较低,发展相对缓慢。
4.我国农业上市公司中,适当的政府干预、完善的法治环境、良好的市场化水平有助于财务治理效率的提高,而不适当的财税补贴反而会使财务治理效率低下。实证研究结果表明,在影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的外部因素中,财税补贴与财务治理效率存在显著的负相关关系,政府干预程度、法治水平和市场化进程均与财务治理效率呈正相关关系,而采用维度配对法获取的配对样本—制造业上市公司表现出与其不同的特性。政府行为中财政补贴和所得税优惠均无助于财务治理效率的提高,反而产生了明显的消极作用；就政府的干预程度,尽管政府的过度干预往往会导致企业运营效率低下,然而政府介入的效率损失远小于无序导致的效率损失,所以整体而言,政府的适当干预仍然是有效率的。即,政府对农业或农业上市公司适当的干预将有助于农业上市公司财务治理效率的提高；健全和完善的法律制度对财务治理效率有积极的促进作用,但是基于我国的法律制度还不够完善,致使其发挥的作用有限,随着我国证券市场和农业经济相关法律法规的完善,法治水平的不断提高,我国农业上市公司的财务治理效率会不断提高；农业市场化水平高,会对农业上市公司财务治理效率有积极地促进作用。
5.我国农业上市公司中,适度的集中股权、有效的审计委员会和监事会以及增加信息的透明度将有助于提高财务治理效率。实证研究结果表明,在影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内部因素中,股权集中度与财务治理效率呈倒U型关系,资产负债率与财务治理效率呈不显著的负相关性关系,董事会中审计委员会的设置和召开的监事会会议次数与财务治理效率呈不显著的正相关关系,管理层持股与财务治理效率显著止相关,白愿性信息披露指数与财务治理效率存在不显著的负相关关系,白愿性信息披露意愿与财务治理效率存在显著的正相关关系,而运用维度配对法获取的配对样本—制造业上市公司表现出与其不同的特性。可见,农业上市公司中,适度的股权集中将有助于财务治理效率的提高；我国农业上市公司负债融资规模不尽合理,对财务治理效率未起到积极作用；董事会中设置审计委员会和监事会能够起到提高财务治理效率的作用,但基于其发挥的监督作用非常有限,所以作用甚微；通过描述性统计可以看到,我国农业上市公司中管理层持股的平均比例为0.9%,其比例相对较低,但通过让管理层持股的方式可以缓解管理层与股东之间的冲突,使其利益趋于一致,从而达到提高财务治理效率的目的；增加信息的透明度,明确财务信息失真(或舞弊)应承担的法律责任,可以达到保护外部投资人利益,提高财务治理效率和经营绩效的目的。
三、论文的可能创新
1.通过理论回顾与借鉴明确提出财务治理的四个具体目标。即：在财务契约不完备的前提下,实现财权的相机治理,从而实现更高的公司财务治理效率；通过优化企业内部治理结构降低代理成本对企业价值的损害,从而提高公司财务治理效率；通过有效披露财务信息,降低信息不对称对企业价值的损害,从而提高公司财务治理效率；通过财务治理提高对企业对资金的运营效率,从而提高企业业绩,提升公司价值。
2.在前人研究的基础上清晰界定财务治理的概念。即：财务治理是置于公司治理之下,而在财务管理之上的一种治理形式,是股东、债权人、董事会、监事会和经理层对财权进行有效配置的一系列制度安排。其中财权应包括财务控制权和财务剩余索取权,而财务控制权又可以细分为财务决策权、财务监督权、财务执行权和财务收益分配权。
3.搭建了我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素研究的理论分析框架。在搭建的分析框架下,找出影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的因素,并通过相关分析、多元线性回归的方法对影响农业上市公司财务治理效率的内、外部影响因素进行实证分析。
4.采用维度配对法从上市年度、行业、资产规模三个维度找到配对样本—制造业上市公司,对农业与非农业上市公司的财务治理效率影响因素进行对比研究,以凸显我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素分析的特殊性。
四、论文的政策建议
站在国家层面宏观立场上,本文认为(1)应转变政府职能,规范政府行为。分别从财政政策、农业补贴和农村金融政策三个方面提出政策建议来优化治理环境,转变政府职能,规范政府行为：(2)完善法律制度,健全法制保障。修改不合时宜的法律法规,完善各种配套法规制度,建立全方位和多角度的监管体系,从体制和制度上提升市场的运行效率；(3)积极推进农业产业化进程。市场化进程的加快意味着产权的完备、生产及资源配置效率的提高、经济增长速度的加快,而推进农业市场化进程需要政府转变观念,积极运行农业市场机制：同时需要积极培育市场,增加投入并进行制度创新,从而降低交易费用。
而站在企业层面微观立场上,本文建议应培育农业企业市场风险意识：确定合理的资本结构,强化债务的约束功能；优化农业上市公司股权结构；充分利用管理层股权激励机制；强化董事会中审计委员会的职能；有效发挥监事会的作用；规范和完善信息披露制度。
Our agriculture has been in contributional position. So it keeps a steady stream of cheap labor and capital to protect the industrial development and industrialization process. That determines the slow development of our agricultural industry, which is the source of little profit of our agricultural industry. But it is undeniable that the agriculture in promoting economic development in the foundation and first position and the role is irreplaceable. This is the reason of selecting the agriculture, and it is significant value and far-reaching significance for agriculture and listed agricultural companies.
Our listed agricultural companies first listed in 1993 has experienced 18 years, although the number of listed companies, asset size, number of shares outstanding were less than 5% share, but the impact of the listed agricultural companies on the securities market and the national economic development can not be ignored. The government issued a thirteenth on agriculture "Document" at January 29,2011, and the government highlights the growing attention for agriculture. After ten years of efforts, the agriculture continue to improve the governance structure of listed companies. Due to various factors and constraints, the country's overall agricultural listed companies there is relatively slow, inefficient management, poor financial performance, weak competitiveness, and serious illegal agricultural restructuring, and etc.These problems caused inefficiency of the financial management.
At the same time, there are more and more researchs on corporate governance. The research is expected to address the governance practices of listed companies during the emergence of a number of complex financial problems. Furthermore, there are more study of financial management efficiency, which is determined the real economic policy changes in the objectives and success criteria. And it is the key to deepen the study of corporate financial governance. Therefore, the study of financial governance efficiency factor of listed agricultural companies is of great theoretical value and practical significance.
1.Main point in the thesis
(1) Theoretical analysis. The auther use the agricultural economic development theory, institutional change theory, the modern enterprise theory, the asymmetric information theory and the financial theory to analysis the theory of origin. And put forward constructively the four specific objectives. Its ultimate goal is to improve the of financial governance efficiency to enhance corporate value and improve the competitiveness of the company's financial core.
(2) Conceptual framework. We analysis the important position of agriculture in the national economy, expounded the development process of the listed agricultural companies and it's financial characteristics. And we discriminated the concept of financial governance related and clearly defined financial governance. At the same time, we analysised the transmission mechanism between the financial governance efficiency and corporate financial performance. They have a positive relationship. The conceptual framework clarified the concepts and pave the way for the later studies.
(3) Impact mechanism. We analysed the internal and external factors of the financial governance efficiency of listed agricultural companies and explained deeply the affecting mechanism of the internal and external factors of the financial governance efficiency in order to further lay the theoretical foundation for empirical research.
(4) Empirical analysis. We selected variables of affecting financial governance efficiency alternative to internal and external factors, built models, used the dimensions matching method to find the manufacturing paired samples to verify the affecting. We had the different conclusions on manufacturing paired samples to highlight the listed agricultural companies characteristics.
(5) Policy recommendations. Based on the building the conceptual framework, mechanism analysis and empirical research, we put forword the macro and micro policy recommendations. And then, we want to improve financial governance efficiency through perfection of the macroeconomic environment and the company level governance structure. Thereby enhancing the competitiveness of its financial core, to promote sustainable and rapid agricultural economic development.
2.Basic conclusion in the thesis
(1) The ultimate goal of financial governance is that the enterprises allocate effectively the financial power to improve operational efficiency through institutional arrangements related to financial governance. It can protect the interests of stakeholders and promote the enterprise's goal. The financial governance is a governance form between the corporate governance and the financial management. And it is a series of institutional arrangements to allocate effectively the financial power at the shareholders, creditors, board of supervisors and managers. Financial right should include the financial control and the financial residual claims, and financial control can be subdivided into the financial decision-making power, the financial supervision, the financial executive power and the financial income distribution.
(2) The financial governance efficiency is positively correlated with the enterprise performance. That is, the higher the financial governance efficiency, the better the enterprise performance. The interior and external factors don't affect directly the enterprise performance. They will affect firstly the financial governance efficiency, and then impact on the enterprise performance and the enterprise value.
(3)The listed agricultural companies have the different financial characteristics from other industries. The listed agricultural companies debt ratio is low. The listed agricultural companies are a step change in the financing structure. The listed agricultural companies have the high rates of current liabilities and a single source of debt financing.The proportion of retained earnings is low in equity capital structure. Law violations seriously. Poor operating performance and less competitive. These features resulted in the listed agricultural companies less efficient.
(4)Empirical research shows that the financial and tax subsidies is negatively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The government intervention degree, the rule of law and the marketing process are positively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. Otherwise, the Dimensions matching method used to obtain matching samples-manufacturing companies showed their different characteristics. The financial subsidies and tax subsidies were no help to improve the financial governance efficiency. It had a significant negative effect. The appropriate government intervention in listed agricultural companies will contribute to improve the financial governance efficiency. It has a positive role in promoting the efficiency to improve and perfect the legal system. Based on unperfecting of our legal system, its effect is limited. With the relevant laws and regulations improving, the listed agricultural companies will improve the financial governance efficiency. And the higher agricultural market will promote the financial governance efficiency.
(5) Empirical research shows that the centrality of Share and the financial governance efficiency was significantly U-shaped relationship. The percentage of shares held by the executives, firm Size and earning capacity is positively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The agricultural subsidies is negatively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The Audit Committee and the board of supervisors meetings num is positively but not significantly correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The asset-liability ratio is negatively but not significantly related to the financial governance efficiency. Otherwise, the Dimensions matching method used to obtain matching samples-manufacturing companies showed their different characteristics. The moderate concentration of ownership will help to improve the financial governance efficiency. The debt size did not play an active role on the financial governance efficiency. The audit committee and board of supervisors improve the financial governance efficiency, but it had little effect. By descriptive statistics can be seen, The percentage of shares held by the executives average 0.9%, which is relatively low. But it can alleviate the conflict between management and shareholders and improve the financial governance efficiency. The clear distortion of financial information can protect the interests of outside investors, improve the financial governance efficiency.
3.Main innovation in the thesis
(1) The author put forward clearly to the four specific objectives of the financial governance. The first one is to incomplete financial contracts in order to achieve the higher financial governance efficiency. The second one is to reduce agency costs by optimizing the internal governance structure to enhance the financial governance efficiency. The third one is to reduce information asymmetry on the enterprise value of the damage by the effective disclosure of financial information. The fourth one is to improve operational efficiency by the financial governance efficiency.
(2) Based on the previous research, the author support the redefinition of the concept of financial governance. The financial governance is a governance form between the corporate governance and the financial management. And it is a series of institutional arrangements to allocate effectively the financial power at the shareholders, creditors, board of supervisors and managers. Financial right should include the financial control and the financial residual claims, and financial control can be subdivided into the financial decision-making power, the financial supervision, the financial executive power and the financial income distribution.
(3) Building the theoretical framework. Based on the theoretical framework, the author find the factors affecting the financial governance efficiency. We make a inquiry at the factors of financial governance efficiency. And then, we use the indicators of Financial Governance Efficiency and build Model to analyze. After the regression analysis, the correlation between the variables and the regression parameters of the equations is obtained.
(4) This paper use the dimensions matching method to research the factors affecting the financial governance efficiency in the agricultural and non agricultural enterprise. The purpose is to highlight the specificity of the listed agricultural companies.
4.Policy proposals in the thesis
Grounded on the macro-standing position, this paper support that we should change the government functions and regulate the government behavior. And we should improve the legal system and the legal protection. We also should actively promote the process of agricultural industrialization.
Grounded on the micro-standing position, this paper support that we should foster the risk awareness of agricultural enterprises. We should determine a reasonable capital structure and strengthen the debt constraint functions. The listed agricultural companies should optimize the agricultural structure. We also should full use of management equity incentives and strengthen the audit Committee and the board of supervisors. It's importment to standardize and improve the information disclosure system.
我国农业上市公司自1993年第一家上市以来,经历了十八年的发展历程,尽管在整个证券市场中,农业上市公司的数量、资产规模、发行股票数量所占份额均不足5%,但农业上市公司对我国证券市场和国民经济发展的影响是不容忽视的。2003年-2010年,中央财政不断加大“三农”投入,“十一五”期间中央财政用于“三农”支出达29624亿元,年均增长23.6%；2011年三农投入有望突破9000亿元；2011年1月29日,我国出台了第十三个关于农业的“一号文件”,政府对于农业的重视日益凸显,经过十多年的努力,我国农业上市公司治理结构不断完善,由于种种因素的影响和制约,我国的农业上市公司存在着总体发展相对缓慢、治理效率不高、财务业绩不好、竞争力偏弱、违法违规现象严重以及背农转型等诸多问题,这些问题的存在一定程度上是由财务治理的不健全,财务治理效率低下所引致。如伺提高我国农业上市公司的财务治理效率,从而提升其公司价值?如何提高农业行业的核心竞争力?等诸多问题引起了学者们的关注与思考。
与此同时,随着公司治理研究的兴起,财务治理的研究也引起了诸多学者的关注,以期通过对公司财务治理的研究来解决上市公司治理实践过程中出现的若干复杂的财务难题。进而,深入研究财务治理效率,这一判断现实经济中制度变迁政策调整的目标和成败的标准,是深化公司财务治理问题研究的关键。因此,深入研究我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的影响因素是具有重要的理论价值和实践意义的。
一、论文的主要内容
1.理论分析。从现代企业理论、信息不对称理论和财务学理论的角度,分析与我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素研究相关的理论渊源,建设性地提出财务治理的四个具体目标,并指出其最终目标是提高财务治理效率,从而提升公司价值,提高公司的财务核心竞争力。
2.概念框架。首先对与财务治理相关的概念进行了辨析,并清晰地界定了财务治理的概念；对财务治理效率与公司财务绩效之间的传导机制进行分析,并得出公司的财务治理效率与公司财务绩效之间存在止相关关系的结论。然后分析了我国农业在国民经济中的重要地位,运用制度变迁理论阐述了我国农业上市公司的生成逻辑和发展进程以及我国农业上市公司的财务特性。通过概念框架的搭建,厘清相关概念,为之后的研究做好铺垫。
3.影响机理。从理论上分析影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内外部因素,并深入阐释了内外部影响因素对财务治理效率的影响机理,以便为进一步的实证研究奠定理论基础。
4.实证分析。本文对影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内外部因素选取替代变量,构建模型,采用维度配对法从制造业上市公司中找到配对样本,验证了上述因素对我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的影响,并得到与配对制造业样本不同的结论,凸显农业上市公司特性。
5.政策建议。在我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素概念框架构建、影响机理分析和实证研究的基础上,分别从宏观和微观两方面提出相应政策建议,以期通过宏观环境的完善以及公司层面治理结构的健全,提高农业上市公司财务治理效率,从而提高其财务核心竞争力,使其带动农业经济快速可持续地发展。
二、论文的主要结论
1.财务治理的最终目标是通过财务治理的相关制度安排,对财权进行有效配置,从而提高公司运营效率,保护利益相关者的权益,促使企业目标的实现。本文对于财务治理给了更加清晰地界定,财务治理是置于公司治理之下,而在财务管理之上的一种治理形式,是股东、债权人、董事会、监事会和经理层对财权进行有效配置的一系列制度安排。其中财权应包括财务控制权和财务剩余索取权,而财务控制权又可以细分为财务决策权、财务监督权、财务执行权和财务收益分配权。
2.公司财务治理效率的提高有助于改善公司绩效,提升公司价值。研究发现,财务治理效率与与公司绩效成正相关关系,即,当公司的财务治理效率高时,公司绩效是变好的。对于影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内外部因素,不是直接作用于公司绩效,而是首先影响财务治理效率,进而对公司绩效和公司价值产生影响。
3.我国农业上市公司呈现出与其他行业不同的财务特性。我国农业上市公司经过了十几年的发展历程,通过将农业上市公司与全部上市公司的财务特性相比较发现,我国农业上市公司资产负债率整体偏低；农业上市公司融资结构呈阶段性变化；流动负债比率偏高,负债资金来源单一；权益资金结构中留存收益比例偏低；违法违规现象严重；经营绩效较差,财务竞争力较弱等。这些特性致使农业上市公司的整体运营效率较低,发展相对缓慢。
4.我国农业上市公司中,适当的政府干预、完善的法治环境、良好的市场化水平有助于财务治理效率的提高,而不适当的财税补贴反而会使财务治理效率低下。实证研究结果表明,在影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的外部因素中,财税补贴与财务治理效率存在显著的负相关关系,政府干预程度、法治水平和市场化进程均与财务治理效率呈正相关关系,而采用维度配对法获取的配对样本—制造业上市公司表现出与其不同的特性。政府行为中财政补贴和所得税优惠均无助于财务治理效率的提高,反而产生了明显的消极作用；就政府的干预程度,尽管政府的过度干预往往会导致企业运营效率低下,然而政府介入的效率损失远小于无序导致的效率损失,所以整体而言,政府的适当干预仍然是有效率的。即,政府对农业或农业上市公司适当的干预将有助于农业上市公司财务治理效率的提高；健全和完善的法律制度对财务治理效率有积极的促进作用,但是基于我国的法律制度还不够完善,致使其发挥的作用有限,随着我国证券市场和农业经济相关法律法规的完善,法治水平的不断提高,我国农业上市公司的财务治理效率会不断提高；农业市场化水平高,会对农业上市公司财务治理效率有积极地促进作用。
5.我国农业上市公司中,适度的集中股权、有效的审计委员会和监事会以及增加信息的透明度将有助于提高财务治理效率。实证研究结果表明,在影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的内部因素中,股权集中度与财务治理效率呈倒U型关系,资产负债率与财务治理效率呈不显著的负相关性关系,董事会中审计委员会的设置和召开的监事会会议次数与财务治理效率呈不显著的正相关关系,管理层持股与财务治理效率显著止相关,白愿性信息披露指数与财务治理效率存在不显著的负相关关系,白愿性信息披露意愿与财务治理效率存在显著的正相关关系,而运用维度配对法获取的配对样本—制造业上市公司表现出与其不同的特性。可见,农业上市公司中,适度的股权集中将有助于财务治理效率的提高；我国农业上市公司负债融资规模不尽合理,对财务治理效率未起到积极作用；董事会中设置审计委员会和监事会能够起到提高财务治理效率的作用,但基于其发挥的监督作用非常有限,所以作用甚微；通过描述性统计可以看到,我国农业上市公司中管理层持股的平均比例为0.9%,其比例相对较低,但通过让管理层持股的方式可以缓解管理层与股东之间的冲突,使其利益趋于一致,从而达到提高财务治理效率的目的；增加信息的透明度,明确财务信息失真(或舞弊)应承担的法律责任,可以达到保护外部投资人利益,提高财务治理效率和经营绩效的目的。
三、论文的可能创新
1.通过理论回顾与借鉴明确提出财务治理的四个具体目标。即：在财务契约不完备的前提下,实现财权的相机治理,从而实现更高的公司财务治理效率；通过优化企业内部治理结构降低代理成本对企业价值的损害,从而提高公司财务治理效率；通过有效披露财务信息,降低信息不对称对企业价值的损害,从而提高公司财务治理效率；通过财务治理提高对企业对资金的运营效率,从而提高企业业绩,提升公司价值。
2.在前人研究的基础上清晰界定财务治理的概念。即：财务治理是置于公司治理之下,而在财务管理之上的一种治理形式,是股东、债权人、董事会、监事会和经理层对财权进行有效配置的一系列制度安排。其中财权应包括财务控制权和财务剩余索取权,而财务控制权又可以细分为财务决策权、财务监督权、财务执行权和财务收益分配权。
3.搭建了我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素研究的理论分析框架。在搭建的分析框架下,找出影响我国农业上市公司财务治理效率的因素,并通过相关分析、多元线性回归的方法对影响农业上市公司财务治理效率的内、外部影响因素进行实证分析。
4.采用维度配对法从上市年度、行业、资产规模三个维度找到配对样本—制造业上市公司,对农业与非农业上市公司的财务治理效率影响因素进行对比研究,以凸显我国农业上市公司财务治理效率影响因素分析的特殊性。
四、论文的政策建议
站在国家层面宏观立场上,本文认为(1)应转变政府职能,规范政府行为。分别从财政政策、农业补贴和农村金融政策三个方面提出政策建议来优化治理环境,转变政府职能,规范政府行为：(2)完善法律制度,健全法制保障。修改不合时宜的法律法规,完善各种配套法规制度,建立全方位和多角度的监管体系,从体制和制度上提升市场的运行效率；(3)积极推进农业产业化进程。市场化进程的加快意味着产权的完备、生产及资源配置效率的提高、经济增长速度的加快,而推进农业市场化进程需要政府转变观念,积极运行农业市场机制：同时需要积极培育市场,增加投入并进行制度创新,从而降低交易费用。
而站在企业层面微观立场上,本文建议应培育农业企业市场风险意识：确定合理的资本结构,强化债务的约束功能；优化农业上市公司股权结构；充分利用管理层股权激励机制；强化董事会中审计委员会的职能；有效发挥监事会的作用；规范和完善信息披露制度。
Our agriculture has been in contributional position. So it keeps a steady stream of cheap labor and capital to protect the industrial development and industrialization process. That determines the slow development of our agricultural industry, which is the source of little profit of our agricultural industry. But it is undeniable that the agriculture in promoting economic development in the foundation and first position and the role is irreplaceable. This is the reason of selecting the agriculture, and it is significant value and far-reaching significance for agriculture and listed agricultural companies.
Our listed agricultural companies first listed in 1993 has experienced 18 years, although the number of listed companies, asset size, number of shares outstanding were less than 5% share, but the impact of the listed agricultural companies on the securities market and the national economic development can not be ignored. The government issued a thirteenth on agriculture "Document" at January 29,2011, and the government highlights the growing attention for agriculture. After ten years of efforts, the agriculture continue to improve the governance structure of listed companies. Due to various factors and constraints, the country's overall agricultural listed companies there is relatively slow, inefficient management, poor financial performance, weak competitiveness, and serious illegal agricultural restructuring, and etc.These problems caused inefficiency of the financial management.
At the same time, there are more and more researchs on corporate governance. The research is expected to address the governance practices of listed companies during the emergence of a number of complex financial problems. Furthermore, there are more study of financial management efficiency, which is determined the real economic policy changes in the objectives and success criteria. And it is the key to deepen the study of corporate financial governance. Therefore, the study of financial governance efficiency factor of listed agricultural companies is of great theoretical value and practical significance.
1.Main point in the thesis
(1) Theoretical analysis. The auther use the agricultural economic development theory, institutional change theory, the modern enterprise theory, the asymmetric information theory and the financial theory to analysis the theory of origin. And put forward constructively the four specific objectives. Its ultimate goal is to improve the of financial governance efficiency to enhance corporate value and improve the competitiveness of the company's financial core.
(2) Conceptual framework. We analysis the important position of agriculture in the national economy, expounded the development process of the listed agricultural companies and it's financial characteristics. And we discriminated the concept of financial governance related and clearly defined financial governance. At the same time, we analysised the transmission mechanism between the financial governance efficiency and corporate financial performance. They have a positive relationship. The conceptual framework clarified the concepts and pave the way for the later studies.
(3) Impact mechanism. We analysed the internal and external factors of the financial governance efficiency of listed agricultural companies and explained deeply the affecting mechanism of the internal and external factors of the financial governance efficiency in order to further lay the theoretical foundation for empirical research.
(4) Empirical analysis. We selected variables of affecting financial governance efficiency alternative to internal and external factors, built models, used the dimensions matching method to find the manufacturing paired samples to verify the affecting. We had the different conclusions on manufacturing paired samples to highlight the listed agricultural companies characteristics.
(5) Policy recommendations. Based on the building the conceptual framework, mechanism analysis and empirical research, we put forword the macro and micro policy recommendations. And then, we want to improve financial governance efficiency through perfection of the macroeconomic environment and the company level governance structure. Thereby enhancing the competitiveness of its financial core, to promote sustainable and rapid agricultural economic development.
2.Basic conclusion in the thesis
(1) The ultimate goal of financial governance is that the enterprises allocate effectively the financial power to improve operational efficiency through institutional arrangements related to financial governance. It can protect the interests of stakeholders and promote the enterprise's goal. The financial governance is a governance form between the corporate governance and the financial management. And it is a series of institutional arrangements to allocate effectively the financial power at the shareholders, creditors, board of supervisors and managers. Financial right should include the financial control and the financial residual claims, and financial control can be subdivided into the financial decision-making power, the financial supervision, the financial executive power and the financial income distribution.
(2) The financial governance efficiency is positively correlated with the enterprise performance. That is, the higher the financial governance efficiency, the better the enterprise performance. The interior and external factors don't affect directly the enterprise performance. They will affect firstly the financial governance efficiency, and then impact on the enterprise performance and the enterprise value.
(3)The listed agricultural companies have the different financial characteristics from other industries. The listed agricultural companies debt ratio is low. The listed agricultural companies are a step change in the financing structure. The listed agricultural companies have the high rates of current liabilities and a single source of debt financing.The proportion of retained earnings is low in equity capital structure. Law violations seriously. Poor operating performance and less competitive. These features resulted in the listed agricultural companies less efficient.
(4)Empirical research shows that the financial and tax subsidies is negatively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The government intervention degree, the rule of law and the marketing process are positively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. Otherwise, the Dimensions matching method used to obtain matching samples-manufacturing companies showed their different characteristics. The financial subsidies and tax subsidies were no help to improve the financial governance efficiency. It had a significant negative effect. The appropriate government intervention in listed agricultural companies will contribute to improve the financial governance efficiency. It has a positive role in promoting the efficiency to improve and perfect the legal system. Based on unperfecting of our legal system, its effect is limited. With the relevant laws and regulations improving, the listed agricultural companies will improve the financial governance efficiency. And the higher agricultural market will promote the financial governance efficiency.
(5) Empirical research shows that the centrality of Share and the financial governance efficiency was significantly U-shaped relationship. The percentage of shares held by the executives, firm Size and earning capacity is positively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The agricultural subsidies is negatively correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The Audit Committee and the board of supervisors meetings num is positively but not significantly correlated with the financial governance efficiency. The asset-liability ratio is negatively but not significantly related to the financial governance efficiency. Otherwise, the Dimensions matching method used to obtain matching samples-manufacturing companies showed their different characteristics. The moderate concentration of ownership will help to improve the financial governance efficiency. The debt size did not play an active role on the financial governance efficiency. The audit committee and board of supervisors improve the financial governance efficiency, but it had little effect. By descriptive statistics can be seen, The percentage of shares held by the executives average 0.9%, which is relatively low. But it can alleviate the conflict between management and shareholders and improve the financial governance efficiency. The clear distortion of financial information can protect the interests of outside investors, improve the financial governance efficiency.
3.Main innovation in the thesis
(1) The author put forward clearly to the four specific objectives of the financial governance. The first one is to incomplete financial contracts in order to achieve the higher financial governance efficiency. The second one is to reduce agency costs by optimizing the internal governance structure to enhance the financial governance efficiency. The third one is to reduce information asymmetry on the enterprise value of the damage by the effective disclosure of financial information. The fourth one is to improve operational efficiency by the financial governance efficiency.
(2) Based on the previous research, the author support the redefinition of the concept of financial governance. The financial governance is a governance form between the corporate governance and the financial management. And it is a series of institutional arrangements to allocate effectively the financial power at the shareholders, creditors, board of supervisors and managers. Financial right should include the financial control and the financial residual claims, and financial control can be subdivided into the financial decision-making power, the financial supervision, the financial executive power and the financial income distribution.
(3) Building the theoretical framework. Based on the theoretical framework, the author find the factors affecting the financial governance efficiency. We make a inquiry at the factors of financial governance efficiency. And then, we use the indicators of Financial Governance Efficiency and build Model to analyze. After the regression analysis, the correlation between the variables and the regression parameters of the equations is obtained.
(4) This paper use the dimensions matching method to research the factors affecting the financial governance efficiency in the agricultural and non agricultural enterprise. The purpose is to highlight the specificity of the listed agricultural companies.
4.Policy proposals in the thesis
Grounded on the macro-standing position, this paper support that we should change the government functions and regulate the government behavior. And we should improve the legal system and the legal protection. We also should actively promote the process of agricultural industrialization.
Grounded on the micro-standing position, this paper support that we should foster the risk awareness of agricultural enterprises. We should determine a reasonable capital structure and strengthen the debt constraint functions. The listed agricultural companies should optimize the agricultural structure. We also should full use of management equity incentives and strengthen the audit Committee and the board of supervisors. It's importment to standardize and improve the information disclosure system.
引文
①杨淑娥教授的文章大都强调了财务信息质量是财务治理的重要内容,财务治理主要是对财务信息的治理,即如何整合、鉴别、呈报和披露相关的、准确的财务信息,以治理信息的失实、失真和舞弊问题。
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