注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力研究
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摘要
自18世纪英国南海公司舞弊案催生独立审计以来,注册会计师就作为经济警察,成为公司会计舞弊控制的重要防线。公司会计舞弊程度很大程度取决于注册会计师的舞弊识别能力,在一定意义上,注册会计师的会计舞弊识别能力与公司会计舞弊行为的程度呈负相关。而国内外学者对此问题的研究并未达成共识,尤其是对国内情况更是如此,有些方面研究甚至尚存空白。因此系统研究我国注册会计师的会计舞弊识别能力具有重要的理论和实践意义。基于此,本研究借鉴会计学、经济学、管理学、统计学、计量经济学等多种学科知识,理论联系实际,运用规范分析与实证检验相结合,定性与定量分析相结合的方法,系统阐述并界定注册会计师的会计舞弊识别能力及其相关概念,构建会计舞弊识别能力的分析框架,实证检验和分析我国注册会计师专业胜任能力和审计独立性的现状及其影响因素,检验注册会计师是否能识别会计舞弊,并分析影响我国注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力程度的主要原因。在此基础上,从提高注册会计师的专业胜任能力和审计独立性两方面提出相应的政策与建议,同时指出当前政策的重点,以期为政府立法、监管层监管、投资者决策、银行信贷等利益相关者进行相关决策提供理论参考,从而最大限度地提高注册会计师的会计舞弊识别能力,降低上市公司的会计舞弊行为,促进证券市场的健康发展。
本课题在运用契约理论、博弈理论等相关理论构建注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力的分析框架基础上对注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力进行了实证检验,主要内容及结论如下：
1.理论分析方面：
(1)由会计舞弊识别能力概念界定演绎出专业胜任能力和审计独立性是影响注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力的两大基本要素。根据契约论,审计内部契约通过内部各要素的投入形成注册会计师的专业胜任能力,注册会计师会因审计客户的“敲竹杠”行为而减少专用性资产的投入,从而降低其会计舞弊识别能力。审计外部契约通过正式契约形成注册会计师对审计委托人的经济依赖,从而对审计独立性产生制约作用。非正式契约反映的是关于审计者的职业道德和执业能力的制度安排,形成对注册会计师行为的约束。
(2)注册会计师的专业胜任能力可分为注册会计师从业人员胜任能力和会计师事务所整体胜任能力(即行业专长水平的高低)两个层次。前者是后者的前提和基础,后者是前者的保障,二者在互动的过程中,最终是以事务所整体专业胜任能力—行业专长呈现于社会公众面前。除了注册会计师从业人员的素质之外,专用性资产投入、审计市场结构、审计地域性、客户对注册会计师的选择等也是影响我国注册会计师行业专长的重要因素。
(3)审计外部契约制度安排决定了无论是作为弱势利益主体的中小股东还是作为强势利益主体的公司管理当局都是注册会计师的衣食父母,区别在于前者是通过未来收益(声誉)制约审计者的行为,而后者可以通过当前的收益(经济依赖性)胁迫审计者。注册会计师的利益倾向就反映了强势利益主体和弱势利益主体之间的力量对比。市场化程度、监管力量和法制力量则从外部约束市场参与人包括审计者的机会主义行为,从而改变契约各方力量。因此审计独立性水平最终取决于公司管理当局与中小股东、市场力量、监管力量和法制力量之间的力量对比。
2.实证检验方面：
(1)以2002-2008年A股作为研究样本,研究发现我国注册会计师的专业胜任能力(行业专长)总体水平较低,且地区发展不平衡,地区间差距较大,但总体呈逐年上升趋势。从内部影响因素来看,注册会计师从业人员的知识结构为注册会计师的专业胜任能力做出较大贡献,学历作用也日渐显露,但从业经验作用在统计上还不显著。从外部影响因素来看,事务所在特定行业的投入、审计市场结构、客户业务的复杂性、行业竞争程度以及审计地域性都与事务所行业专长正相关。说明这些因素的存在有助于我国事务所行业专长的培育,为我国事务所行业专长培育指出方向和手段。
(2)运用博弈证明注册会计师的审计独立性水平是各方力量较量的结果,并随各方力量对比变化而动态变化。运用A股样本数据对我国注册会计师的审计独立性进行现状分析发现,注册会计师的行业专长与审计独立性呈现背离的异象,原因是事务所为保持其声誉,优质事务所倾向于选择优质客户,同时优质客户也倾向于选择优质事务所。在控制事务所的专业胜任能力之后,实证检验审计独立性影响因素发现,管理当局与中小股东、市场力量、监管力量、法制力量从两个不同方向共同作用于注册会计师的审计独立性,但是市场力量、监管力量、法制力量的作用还有待进一步加强。
(3)运用因子分析法和典型相关分析法对会计舞弊识别能力与会计舞弊之间的关系进行分析和检验,研究发现目前我国注册会计师可以识别上市公司的会计舞弊,但程度较低,原因在于事务所的行业专长水平较低。在注册会计师的会计舞弊识别能力中,审计独立性发挥着较大的作用。专业胜任能力高的事务所对由于财务状况不佳导致的会计舞弊具有较强的识别能力,即不仅能发现而且能以非标准意见进行反映。而在公司治理结构缺陷方面,仅对由于公司行为特征、动态性特征和独立性特征存在缺陷所导致的会计舞弊具有较高的识别能力。
3.政策建议方面：
在实证研究的基础上,提出了提高注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力的政策与建议。一是提高注册会计师的专业胜任能力,包括提高注册会计师的学历层次、丰富其知识结构、增加实务经验、加强后续教育,调整事务所的竞争策略、增加特定行业专用资产的投入、建立寡占型的审计市场结构、适度降低行业的竞争程度、发展大规模事务所、事务所按行业跨区合并等；二是提高注册会计师的审计独立性,包括增强注册会计师的经济独立性、增强中小股东的力量、加快市场化进程、加强监管力度、增强法制力量,加大处罚力度和执行力度等。在提高注册会计师的专业胜任能力与审计独立性之间,当务之急应将重点放在提高其执业水平上。对于由财务状况因素和内部控制因素导致的舞弊行为中,重点在于提高注册师对后者的识别能力上,具体做法：一是关注公司内部控制缺陷、二是加强内控业务学习和培训、二是加强与公司内部审计的交流与联系、四是加强有关内控制度规范建设。
Since the 18th century when South Sea Company fraud gave birth to independent audit, CPA as economic is regarded as an important line of defining against accounting fraud. Accounting fraudulent degree depends largely on the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud. In some manner, it is negative correlation between the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud and the company accounting fraudulent degree. However, domestic and foreign scholars (especially domestic scholars) don't come to an agreement with this study of the problem and some aspects research even remains blank. Therefore studying systematically the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud has important significance in theory and practice. This Research, surrounding the ability of CPA in China identifying accounting fraud, is analyzed by the theory and proof-tested by the demonstration means. Not only using multi-knowledge including accounting, economics, management, statistics, econometrics and so forth but also multi-means such as theory with practice, using normative analysis and empircal test, combining with qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis etc. In this study, the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud and other relevant concepts is elaborated and definited systemly, the analysis framework is structured, the present situation and influence factors of auditors'professional competence and auditors'independence is analyzed and proof-tested. It is proof-tested whether CPA can identify accounting fraud and analyzed what is possible main fact that affects the accounting fraudulent degree, on this basis, we put forward policies and suggestions in auditor professional competence and auditor independence in order to offer reference for government legislation, watchdogs supervision, investors decision-making and banks credit etc, improve the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud, decrease compamy accounting fraudulent activities, and promot securities markets healthy development.
This topic empirically analysed CPAs accounting frauds frauds recognition ability on the basis of constructing the analysis framework with contract theory, game theory and other related theorys, the main content and conclusions are as follows:
1. The theoretic research aspect:
(1)The definition of the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud deduce that auditors' professional competence and auditors'independence are its two fundamental influencing factors. According to contract theory, we find that internal audit contract through internal various resources input come into auditors'professional competence. Audit client would decrease specilized assets investment because of their custumers' "trap" behavior, thereby making the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud weaken. Outside audit contract through formal contracts come into that the audit rely on customs in economy, which can threaten the security of auditors'independence. Informal contracts, which affect institutional arrangement, come into restriction to the audits'behavior.
(2) Auditors'professional competence is composed of two parts as individual auditor and whole accounting offices'ones. The former is the premise and foundation of the latter and the latter is the guarantee of the former, in the both interactive process, auditors' professional competence embodys finally whole accounting offices'professional competence—industry specialization and presents in social public. Except for auditor personal qualities, other important factors including specialized assets investment, audit market structure, audit regionality and the customs'choice to the CPAs also affect auditors'industry specialization.
(3) Autside auditing contracts decide that both minor stakeholders as the weaker and company managers as the stronger are parents of back and belly to CPA. However, the former restrict their activities by auditors'future return (reputation) and the later threaten CPAs by auditors'current benefit (economical dependence). CPA's interested tendencies reflect the balance between the weaker and stronger. And audit surroundings including the degree of marketization, supervision strengths and legal power restrict auditors' opportunistic behavior from the outside. So auditors'independent level is mostly dependent on benefit banlance of between company's authority medium and other powers including minor stakeholder, marker forces, supervision strengths and legal power.
2. The demonstration test aspects:
(1)With 2002-2008 data as research samples, CPA's professional competence (auditor industry specialization) overall level is not only lower, but also is imbalalanced development and exists bigger regional difference,but overall increasing year by yerar. Judging from the internal factors, CPA's knowledge structure makes greater contributions for CPA's professional competence, and CPA's knowledge level also gradually bring into play its'value, but CPA's practical experience value doesn't pass significance test, namely its functionary is very feeble. Judging from exterior influencing factors, auditor industry specialization positively correlates with specific industry investment, audit market structure, the complexity of customer operation, the industry competition extent and audit regionalization, which means that these influencing factors will be propitious to foster auditor industry specialization. At the same time, this finding indicates the means and approaches on improving to become auditor industry specialization.
(2)This thesis proves that auditors'independence which is variable according to the balance of among different interest groups is affected systematically by the pressure exerted by all parties. When analyzing the current situation of auditors'dependence, we find one abnormal phenomenon that auditors'professional competence is deviation from their dependence, which dues to accounting audit office defending their reputation. High quality firms tend to choose the high quality customer, and superior customer also tends to choose the high quality firm. After controlling the accounting office professional competence, auditors'independence level is experientially proved with Chinese data. The research finds that small stockholders, market forces, supervision strength, legal power and listed company managers jointly influence auditor independence from two contrary directions. But the function of market forces, supervision strength and legal power influencing auditor independent doesn't pass significance test.
(3)This research experientially verifies and analyzes correlation between the ability of indentifying accounting frauds and accounting frauds by the means of the factor analysis and canonical correlation analysis, and we find that CPA in China has ability to identify the accounting frauds of listed firm. Because auditor industry specialization level is lower at present, auditor independence makes greater contribution to the ability of identifying accounting frauds. Form the confirmatory research result, the accounting office with the higher level industry specialization can better identify the accounting frauds accused by bad financing. but when there is deficient on the corporation manage structure, CPA only identify the accounting frauds accused by the disfigurement of company behavior characters, company dynamic characters and company independence characters. In the same way, auditor independence takes on the higher lever to the accounting frauds accused by bad financing, viz. CPA cannot only indentify but also report this type accounting frauds.
3. Poiciys and suggestions:
On the base of case study, we proposed policys and suggestions to impriove the ability of CPA identifying accounting frauds.One is to enhance CPAs'professional competence, including improving CPAs'education degree,enriching CPAs'knowledge structure, increasing the practice experience, strengthening the follow-up education, adjusting the firm's competition strategy, increasing the specific industry-specific asset investment, establisming audit market structure, moderately lowering industry competition level, developing large-scale firm, and firming rows to spanned merger etc; Secondly, enhancing auditors'independence, including increasing economic independence, enhancing the minority shareholder's strength, quickening marketization, strengthening supervision, enhancing legal power and increasing penalties and enforcement,ets. Beween CPAs' professional competence and auditors'independence, the urgent will focus on improving auditors'practicing level. Among the accounting frauds caused byfinancial condition factors and internal control factors, the main point is to improve the recognition of fraud acaused by the latter, practice:the fist is to pay attention to the internal control defect, the second is to strengthen internal control business learning and training, the third is to strengthen exchanges and contact with internal audit, the fouth is to strengthen the standardization construction of relevant internal control system.
本课题在运用契约理论、博弈理论等相关理论构建注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力的分析框架基础上对注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力进行了实证检验,主要内容及结论如下：
1.理论分析方面：
(1)由会计舞弊识别能力概念界定演绎出专业胜任能力和审计独立性是影响注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力的两大基本要素。根据契约论,审计内部契约通过内部各要素的投入形成注册会计师的专业胜任能力,注册会计师会因审计客户的“敲竹杠”行为而减少专用性资产的投入,从而降低其会计舞弊识别能力。审计外部契约通过正式契约形成注册会计师对审计委托人的经济依赖,从而对审计独立性产生制约作用。非正式契约反映的是关于审计者的职业道德和执业能力的制度安排,形成对注册会计师行为的约束。
(2)注册会计师的专业胜任能力可分为注册会计师从业人员胜任能力和会计师事务所整体胜任能力(即行业专长水平的高低)两个层次。前者是后者的前提和基础,后者是前者的保障,二者在互动的过程中,最终是以事务所整体专业胜任能力—行业专长呈现于社会公众面前。除了注册会计师从业人员的素质之外,专用性资产投入、审计市场结构、审计地域性、客户对注册会计师的选择等也是影响我国注册会计师行业专长的重要因素。
(3)审计外部契约制度安排决定了无论是作为弱势利益主体的中小股东还是作为强势利益主体的公司管理当局都是注册会计师的衣食父母,区别在于前者是通过未来收益(声誉)制约审计者的行为,而后者可以通过当前的收益(经济依赖性)胁迫审计者。注册会计师的利益倾向就反映了强势利益主体和弱势利益主体之间的力量对比。市场化程度、监管力量和法制力量则从外部约束市场参与人包括审计者的机会主义行为,从而改变契约各方力量。因此审计独立性水平最终取决于公司管理当局与中小股东、市场力量、监管力量和法制力量之间的力量对比。
2.实证检验方面：
(1)以2002-2008年A股作为研究样本,研究发现我国注册会计师的专业胜任能力(行业专长)总体水平较低,且地区发展不平衡,地区间差距较大,但总体呈逐年上升趋势。从内部影响因素来看,注册会计师从业人员的知识结构为注册会计师的专业胜任能力做出较大贡献,学历作用也日渐显露,但从业经验作用在统计上还不显著。从外部影响因素来看,事务所在特定行业的投入、审计市场结构、客户业务的复杂性、行业竞争程度以及审计地域性都与事务所行业专长正相关。说明这些因素的存在有助于我国事务所行业专长的培育,为我国事务所行业专长培育指出方向和手段。
(2)运用博弈证明注册会计师的审计独立性水平是各方力量较量的结果,并随各方力量对比变化而动态变化。运用A股样本数据对我国注册会计师的审计独立性进行现状分析发现,注册会计师的行业专长与审计独立性呈现背离的异象,原因是事务所为保持其声誉,优质事务所倾向于选择优质客户,同时优质客户也倾向于选择优质事务所。在控制事务所的专业胜任能力之后,实证检验审计独立性影响因素发现,管理当局与中小股东、市场力量、监管力量、法制力量从两个不同方向共同作用于注册会计师的审计独立性,但是市场力量、监管力量、法制力量的作用还有待进一步加强。
(3)运用因子分析法和典型相关分析法对会计舞弊识别能力与会计舞弊之间的关系进行分析和检验,研究发现目前我国注册会计师可以识别上市公司的会计舞弊,但程度较低,原因在于事务所的行业专长水平较低。在注册会计师的会计舞弊识别能力中,审计独立性发挥着较大的作用。专业胜任能力高的事务所对由于财务状况不佳导致的会计舞弊具有较强的识别能力,即不仅能发现而且能以非标准意见进行反映。而在公司治理结构缺陷方面,仅对由于公司行为特征、动态性特征和独立性特征存在缺陷所导致的会计舞弊具有较高的识别能力。
3.政策建议方面：
在实证研究的基础上,提出了提高注册会计师会计舞弊识别能力的政策与建议。一是提高注册会计师的专业胜任能力,包括提高注册会计师的学历层次、丰富其知识结构、增加实务经验、加强后续教育,调整事务所的竞争策略、增加特定行业专用资产的投入、建立寡占型的审计市场结构、适度降低行业的竞争程度、发展大规模事务所、事务所按行业跨区合并等；二是提高注册会计师的审计独立性,包括增强注册会计师的经济独立性、增强中小股东的力量、加快市场化进程、加强监管力度、增强法制力量,加大处罚力度和执行力度等。在提高注册会计师的专业胜任能力与审计独立性之间,当务之急应将重点放在提高其执业水平上。对于由财务状况因素和内部控制因素导致的舞弊行为中,重点在于提高注册师对后者的识别能力上,具体做法：一是关注公司内部控制缺陷、二是加强内控业务学习和培训、二是加强与公司内部审计的交流与联系、四是加强有关内控制度规范建设。
Since the 18th century when South Sea Company fraud gave birth to independent audit, CPA as economic is regarded as an important line of defining against accounting fraud. Accounting fraudulent degree depends largely on the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud. In some manner, it is negative correlation between the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud and the company accounting fraudulent degree. However, domestic and foreign scholars (especially domestic scholars) don't come to an agreement with this study of the problem and some aspects research even remains blank. Therefore studying systematically the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud has important significance in theory and practice. This Research, surrounding the ability of CPA in China identifying accounting fraud, is analyzed by the theory and proof-tested by the demonstration means. Not only using multi-knowledge including accounting, economics, management, statistics, econometrics and so forth but also multi-means such as theory with practice, using normative analysis and empircal test, combining with qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis etc. In this study, the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud and other relevant concepts is elaborated and definited systemly, the analysis framework is structured, the present situation and influence factors of auditors'professional competence and auditors'independence is analyzed and proof-tested. It is proof-tested whether CPA can identify accounting fraud and analyzed what is possible main fact that affects the accounting fraudulent degree, on this basis, we put forward policies and suggestions in auditor professional competence and auditor independence in order to offer reference for government legislation, watchdogs supervision, investors decision-making and banks credit etc, improve the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud, decrease compamy accounting fraudulent activities, and promot securities markets healthy development.
This topic empirically analysed CPAs accounting frauds frauds recognition ability on the basis of constructing the analysis framework with contract theory, game theory and other related theorys, the main content and conclusions are as follows:
1. The theoretic research aspect:
(1)The definition of the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud deduce that auditors' professional competence and auditors'independence are its two fundamental influencing factors. According to contract theory, we find that internal audit contract through internal various resources input come into auditors'professional competence. Audit client would decrease specilized assets investment because of their custumers' "trap" behavior, thereby making the ability of CPA identifying accounting fraud weaken. Outside audit contract through formal contracts come into that the audit rely on customs in economy, which can threaten the security of auditors'independence. Informal contracts, which affect institutional arrangement, come into restriction to the audits'behavior.
(2) Auditors'professional competence is composed of two parts as individual auditor and whole accounting offices'ones. The former is the premise and foundation of the latter and the latter is the guarantee of the former, in the both interactive process, auditors' professional competence embodys finally whole accounting offices'professional competence—industry specialization and presents in social public. Except for auditor personal qualities, other important factors including specialized assets investment, audit market structure, audit regionality and the customs'choice to the CPAs also affect auditors'industry specialization.
(3) Autside auditing contracts decide that both minor stakeholders as the weaker and company managers as the stronger are parents of back and belly to CPA. However, the former restrict their activities by auditors'future return (reputation) and the later threaten CPAs by auditors'current benefit (economical dependence). CPA's interested tendencies reflect the balance between the weaker and stronger. And audit surroundings including the degree of marketization, supervision strengths and legal power restrict auditors' opportunistic behavior from the outside. So auditors'independent level is mostly dependent on benefit banlance of between company's authority medium and other powers including minor stakeholder, marker forces, supervision strengths and legal power.
2. The demonstration test aspects:
(1)With 2002-2008 data as research samples, CPA's professional competence (auditor industry specialization) overall level is not only lower, but also is imbalalanced development and exists bigger regional difference,but overall increasing year by yerar. Judging from the internal factors, CPA's knowledge structure makes greater contributions for CPA's professional competence, and CPA's knowledge level also gradually bring into play its'value, but CPA's practical experience value doesn't pass significance test, namely its functionary is very feeble. Judging from exterior influencing factors, auditor industry specialization positively correlates with specific industry investment, audit market structure, the complexity of customer operation, the industry competition extent and audit regionalization, which means that these influencing factors will be propitious to foster auditor industry specialization. At the same time, this finding indicates the means and approaches on improving to become auditor industry specialization.
(2)This thesis proves that auditors'independence which is variable according to the balance of among different interest groups is affected systematically by the pressure exerted by all parties. When analyzing the current situation of auditors'dependence, we find one abnormal phenomenon that auditors'professional competence is deviation from their dependence, which dues to accounting audit office defending their reputation. High quality firms tend to choose the high quality customer, and superior customer also tends to choose the high quality firm. After controlling the accounting office professional competence, auditors'independence level is experientially proved with Chinese data. The research finds that small stockholders, market forces, supervision strength, legal power and listed company managers jointly influence auditor independence from two contrary directions. But the function of market forces, supervision strength and legal power influencing auditor independent doesn't pass significance test.
(3)This research experientially verifies and analyzes correlation between the ability of indentifying accounting frauds and accounting frauds by the means of the factor analysis and canonical correlation analysis, and we find that CPA in China has ability to identify the accounting frauds of listed firm. Because auditor industry specialization level is lower at present, auditor independence makes greater contribution to the ability of identifying accounting frauds. Form the confirmatory research result, the accounting office with the higher level industry specialization can better identify the accounting frauds accused by bad financing. but when there is deficient on the corporation manage structure, CPA only identify the accounting frauds accused by the disfigurement of company behavior characters, company dynamic characters and company independence characters. In the same way, auditor independence takes on the higher lever to the accounting frauds accused by bad financing, viz. CPA cannot only indentify but also report this type accounting frauds.
3. Poiciys and suggestions:
On the base of case study, we proposed policys and suggestions to impriove the ability of CPA identifying accounting frauds.One is to enhance CPAs'professional competence, including improving CPAs'education degree,enriching CPAs'knowledge structure, increasing the practice experience, strengthening the follow-up education, adjusting the firm's competition strategy, increasing the specific industry-specific asset investment, establisming audit market structure, moderately lowering industry competition level, developing large-scale firm, and firming rows to spanned merger etc; Secondly, enhancing auditors'independence, including increasing economic independence, enhancing the minority shareholder's strength, quickening marketization, strengthening supervision, enhancing legal power and increasing penalties and enforcement,ets. Beween CPAs' professional competence and auditors'independence, the urgent will focus on improving auditors'practicing level. Among the accounting frauds caused byfinancial condition factors and internal control factors, the main point is to improve the recognition of fraud acaused by the latter, practice:the fist is to pay attention to the internal control defect, the second is to strengthen internal control business learning and training, the third is to strengthen exchanges and contact with internal audit, the fouth is to strengthen the standardization construction of relevant internal control system.
引文
①转引秦江萍《会计舞弊的市场反应与识别：理论分析与经验研究》,2006,5：26
①转引秦江萍《会计舞弊的市场反应与识别：理论分析与经验研究》,2006,5：26
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