我国私募股权投资的融资研究
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摘要
亚当·斯密在《国富论》中注意到中国人勤劳,但并不富有。他认为产生这一现象的原因是由于中国是一个停滞的社会,但斯密对中国社会为什么停滞没有做出更深入的解释,最近我们找到了这个答案。
首先我们肯定这个事实的存在,我们常说十八世纪乾隆盛世是近代中国的鼎盛时期,到处歌舞升平。1766年朝廷的财政收入是4937万两银子,相当于今天的11.4亿美元,然而大清帝国一年的财政收入尚不及今天一个只有6岁的民营公司——无锡尚德公司2007年的收入。
但是从1978年改革开放之后,短短二十几年里GDP增长15倍,连续二十几年GDP以年均超过9%的速度增长。引起这变化的秘密是什么呢?其实过去中国人的勤劳而穷和今天的勤劳而富是一个硬币的两面,都在于两个字:“制度”。
随着改革开放的进一步深入,中国经济日益进入了发展的快车道,每年以近两位数的速度增长,但资本市场的发展并没有跟上经济发展的脚步。资本市场不完善,缺少相应的投融资渠道,导致一方面社会巨额资金被迫滞留在银行系统,以及其他诸如保险公司和养老金等一些大的机构手中,另一方面众多企业却一直陷于资本短缺带来的发展瓶颈之中。
在美国,90%的高新技术企业都是按私募股权投资的早期形式风险投资模式发展起来的。在中国,私募股权基金已经培养了新浪、蒙牛、尚德等一大批知名企业。私募股权市场作为资本市场的重要组成部份,为企业的发展壮大提供了必要的资金和管理支持。
美国成熟的私募股权投资业极大地推动了美国经济的发展,也是世界其他各国发展私募股权投资业借鉴的榜样。而中国私募股权投资业经过二十多年的发展,目前还是处于初级阶段。
私募股权投资有限合伙制度是美国私募股权投资历史上最重要的制度创新,在20世纪80年代发展成为私募股权投资机构主导的组织形式,而养老金投资制度的变革同样极大地推动了私募股权投资有限合伙制度的建立和完善,私募股权投资有限合伙制度的发展又提升了养老金投资的效率。美国私募股权投资业的成功发展,所有这些制度的创新是起了决定性的作用。
那么美国的这些制度创新对于中国私募股权投资业的发展是否适合呢?经过研究发现,目前国内以私募股权投资有限合伙制度与养老金投资之间联系为主题的研究很少。
本文选择私募股权投资的融资为研究主题,围绕私募股权投资的资本供给、有限合伙制度,以及养老金投资制度这个核心内容进行研究。
首先,用实证分析和经济史的研究方法,分析了私募股权投资机构组织形式的制度化演进历程,以及美国私募股权投资发展的各个阶段和特征,指出有限合伙制度是私募股权投资有效的制度创新,并成为美国20世纪80年代后私募股权投资机构的主导组织形式;同时通过分析美国养老金制度的改革,认为这项制度创新极大地促进了私募股权投资有限合伙制度的创立和成熟,从而又进一步推动了美国私募股权投资业的发展;而通过对中国私募股权投资业现状的分析研究,指出中国要推动和发展私募股权投资业也必需进行制度创新。
第二,以比较研究方法,论证了私募股权投资有限合伙制度的效率:SBIC为私募股权投资有限合伙制度的建立奠定了基础,有限合伙制度是私募股权投资市场的必然选择;运用产业组织理论证明效率是组织形式不断演进的动力,有限合伙制度符合私募股权投资业的发展规律,是对传统组织形式的创新超越;运用契约理论证明私募股权有限合伙制度的激励约束机制是最有效的契约机制。
第三,运用组合投资理论及系统分析等方法研究了养老金投资制度,认为有限合伙制度有效解决了养老金以投资者的身份直接投资于企业所带来的委托代理和严重信息不对称的问题。中国养老金要想获得重大发展,如果没有相关制度的扶持配合,是很难做到的。
在本文的最后,提出了相关的研究结论和政策建议:养老金投资于私募股权领域能够促进和完善私募股权投资的有限合伙制度,进而推动私募股权投资业的发展;养老金投资于中国的私募股权市场是中国养老金制度的突破和创新;有限合伙制度将是中国私募股权投资业恰当的选择和制度创新。
In《The Wealth of the Nations》, Adam Smith noticed that Chinese are hardworking, but poor. He thought it was because that China was a stagnant society. But Adam Smith did not give us a deeper explanation for why China stagnated. And recently, we found this answer.
First of all, we affirm this fact. It was said that the eighteen century was the famous "flourishing age of Qianlong" in China's history. In 1766, the finance income of Qing dynasty equals to USD114 000 000 today. The whole year's public revenue of Qing dynasty was less than the income of Shangde Company in 2007. But start from reforming and opening-up in 1978 till now, GDP in China increased 15 times in more than twenty years. What was the secret of this change? In fact, Chinese were industrious but poor in the past and Chinese are hardworking but rich today were just that every coin has two sides. All could attribute to one word: "institution".
Along with the reform and opening-up policies go deeper, China's economy has made a great progress, but the development of capital market is not keep up with the economic progress. Capital market is not perfect, lacking of relevant financing and investing channels, and as a result, on one side, huge amount capital were resorted in the banks, on the other side, a great many enterprises were stagnated because of lacking money.
In America, 90% high-tech corporations were supported by venture capitals. In China, private equity (for short PE) fund has already cultivated many famous companies as Sina, Mengniu, Alibaba and Baidu etc. As an important part of capital market, PE funds provide necessary capitals and management supports for enterprises' development.
Comparing to the highly developed US PE industries, which have set a model for global private equity sector in the world, the Chinese PE industry started only in the 1980s, now still in the primary stage.
The PE limited partnership as the most import institutional innovation in the history of PE development has been the key organizational form in the US since 1980s. The ERISA and pension funds investment in PE industry is impetus to the setup and perfecting PE limited partnership system, and PE limited partnership system strengthens the efficiency of US pension funds investment. The system innovation, esp. PE limited partnership in pension fund investment has been key to the success of American PE industrial development.
We'd better think earnestly about putting American successful experiences of PE industrial system innovation into Chinese application. After studying the related materials, the author noticed that the researches on the innate and natural relationship and co-existence relationship between pension fund investment and the development of private equity limited partnership were limited.
This paper takes fund-raising for PE as main research target, starting analysis from demand and supply of private equity, and constructs a structure of PE capital supply-PELP-pension fund investment system-Chinese application, as analysis model.
Firstly, applying an economic historical analysis tool into the US PE industrial development with different industrial organizational evolution of PE industries as the main line to find sharp stage division and features in each stage, resulting that PELP has been the most important system innovation and current main industrial organizational form in American PE industries since 1980s, and the reforms in US pension system have been great pushes to the establishment of PELP and development of American PE industries. An experimental analysis of Chinese PE industry shows the weaknesses in the industrial organizational form in Chinese current PE area, and concludes that institutional innovation in Chinese PE industries is the only way to develop.
Secondly, after studying the US case with economic theories, the author concludes from three aspects: (1) the system of SBIC has set a base for PELP development, and PELP is the inevitable choice by the PE market evolution; (2) efficiency is the dynamics of PE firm industrial organizational evolution, as an institutional innovation, PELP surpasses the traditional PE industrial organizations, adapts itself to the high development race and high efficiency requirement of PE industry; (3) PELP is the most effective incentive-restrain mechanism ever established in PE industries world-wide.
Thirdly, analyzing the pension funds investment with portfolio theory and systems analysis, the author concludes that PELP effectively resolved principal-agent and information-asymmetric problems in direct investment by pension funds. The ultimate great development of social security fund investment in PE industries in China depends upon the industrial policy innovation.
At last, the author gives concluding remarks and policy advices, that pension funds investment in PE industry can boost and perfect the PELP institution, and further more promote the development of Chinese PE industries. At same time, Chinese pension funds industries will go the same way of which their American counterpart have gone on the past decades and has demonstrated successful, this way is to invest in PE industries.
首先我们肯定这个事实的存在,我们常说十八世纪乾隆盛世是近代中国的鼎盛时期,到处歌舞升平。1766年朝廷的财政收入是4937万两银子,相当于今天的11.4亿美元,然而大清帝国一年的财政收入尚不及今天一个只有6岁的民营公司——无锡尚德公司2007年的收入。
但是从1978年改革开放之后,短短二十几年里GDP增长15倍,连续二十几年GDP以年均超过9%的速度增长。引起这变化的秘密是什么呢?其实过去中国人的勤劳而穷和今天的勤劳而富是一个硬币的两面,都在于两个字:“制度”。
随着改革开放的进一步深入,中国经济日益进入了发展的快车道,每年以近两位数的速度增长,但资本市场的发展并没有跟上经济发展的脚步。资本市场不完善,缺少相应的投融资渠道,导致一方面社会巨额资金被迫滞留在银行系统,以及其他诸如保险公司和养老金等一些大的机构手中,另一方面众多企业却一直陷于资本短缺带来的发展瓶颈之中。
在美国,90%的高新技术企业都是按私募股权投资的早期形式风险投资模式发展起来的。在中国,私募股权基金已经培养了新浪、蒙牛、尚德等一大批知名企业。私募股权市场作为资本市场的重要组成部份,为企业的发展壮大提供了必要的资金和管理支持。
美国成熟的私募股权投资业极大地推动了美国经济的发展,也是世界其他各国发展私募股权投资业借鉴的榜样。而中国私募股权投资业经过二十多年的发展,目前还是处于初级阶段。
私募股权投资有限合伙制度是美国私募股权投资历史上最重要的制度创新,在20世纪80年代发展成为私募股权投资机构主导的组织形式,而养老金投资制度的变革同样极大地推动了私募股权投资有限合伙制度的建立和完善,私募股权投资有限合伙制度的发展又提升了养老金投资的效率。美国私募股权投资业的成功发展,所有这些制度的创新是起了决定性的作用。
那么美国的这些制度创新对于中国私募股权投资业的发展是否适合呢?经过研究发现,目前国内以私募股权投资有限合伙制度与养老金投资之间联系为主题的研究很少。
本文选择私募股权投资的融资为研究主题,围绕私募股权投资的资本供给、有限合伙制度,以及养老金投资制度这个核心内容进行研究。
首先,用实证分析和经济史的研究方法,分析了私募股权投资机构组织形式的制度化演进历程,以及美国私募股权投资发展的各个阶段和特征,指出有限合伙制度是私募股权投资有效的制度创新,并成为美国20世纪80年代后私募股权投资机构的主导组织形式;同时通过分析美国养老金制度的改革,认为这项制度创新极大地促进了私募股权投资有限合伙制度的创立和成熟,从而又进一步推动了美国私募股权投资业的发展;而通过对中国私募股权投资业现状的分析研究,指出中国要推动和发展私募股权投资业也必需进行制度创新。
第二,以比较研究方法,论证了私募股权投资有限合伙制度的效率:SBIC为私募股权投资有限合伙制度的建立奠定了基础,有限合伙制度是私募股权投资市场的必然选择;运用产业组织理论证明效率是组织形式不断演进的动力,有限合伙制度符合私募股权投资业的发展规律,是对传统组织形式的创新超越;运用契约理论证明私募股权有限合伙制度的激励约束机制是最有效的契约机制。
第三,运用组合投资理论及系统分析等方法研究了养老金投资制度,认为有限合伙制度有效解决了养老金以投资者的身份直接投资于企业所带来的委托代理和严重信息不对称的问题。中国养老金要想获得重大发展,如果没有相关制度的扶持配合,是很难做到的。
在本文的最后,提出了相关的研究结论和政策建议:养老金投资于私募股权领域能够促进和完善私募股权投资的有限合伙制度,进而推动私募股权投资业的发展;养老金投资于中国的私募股权市场是中国养老金制度的突破和创新;有限合伙制度将是中国私募股权投资业恰当的选择和制度创新。
In《The Wealth of the Nations》, Adam Smith noticed that Chinese are hardworking, but poor. He thought it was because that China was a stagnant society. But Adam Smith did not give us a deeper explanation for why China stagnated. And recently, we found this answer.
First of all, we affirm this fact. It was said that the eighteen century was the famous "flourishing age of Qianlong" in China's history. In 1766, the finance income of Qing dynasty equals to USD114 000 000 today. The whole year's public revenue of Qing dynasty was less than the income of Shangde Company in 2007. But start from reforming and opening-up in 1978 till now, GDP in China increased 15 times in more than twenty years. What was the secret of this change? In fact, Chinese were industrious but poor in the past and Chinese are hardworking but rich today were just that every coin has two sides. All could attribute to one word: "institution".
Along with the reform and opening-up policies go deeper, China's economy has made a great progress, but the development of capital market is not keep up with the economic progress. Capital market is not perfect, lacking of relevant financing and investing channels, and as a result, on one side, huge amount capital were resorted in the banks, on the other side, a great many enterprises were stagnated because of lacking money.
In America, 90% high-tech corporations were supported by venture capitals. In China, private equity (for short PE) fund has already cultivated many famous companies as Sina, Mengniu, Alibaba and Baidu etc. As an important part of capital market, PE funds provide necessary capitals and management supports for enterprises' development.
Comparing to the highly developed US PE industries, which have set a model for global private equity sector in the world, the Chinese PE industry started only in the 1980s, now still in the primary stage.
The PE limited partnership as the most import institutional innovation in the history of PE development has been the key organizational form in the US since 1980s. The ERISA and pension funds investment in PE industry is impetus to the setup and perfecting PE limited partnership system, and PE limited partnership system strengthens the efficiency of US pension funds investment. The system innovation, esp. PE limited partnership in pension fund investment has been key to the success of American PE industrial development.
We'd better think earnestly about putting American successful experiences of PE industrial system innovation into Chinese application. After studying the related materials, the author noticed that the researches on the innate and natural relationship and co-existence relationship between pension fund investment and the development of private equity limited partnership were limited.
This paper takes fund-raising for PE as main research target, starting analysis from demand and supply of private equity, and constructs a structure of PE capital supply-PELP-pension fund investment system-Chinese application, as analysis model.
Firstly, applying an economic historical analysis tool into the US PE industrial development with different industrial organizational evolution of PE industries as the main line to find sharp stage division and features in each stage, resulting that PELP has been the most important system innovation and current main industrial organizational form in American PE industries since 1980s, and the reforms in US pension system have been great pushes to the establishment of PELP and development of American PE industries. An experimental analysis of Chinese PE industry shows the weaknesses in the industrial organizational form in Chinese current PE area, and concludes that institutional innovation in Chinese PE industries is the only way to develop.
Secondly, after studying the US case with economic theories, the author concludes from three aspects: (1) the system of SBIC has set a base for PELP development, and PELP is the inevitable choice by the PE market evolution; (2) efficiency is the dynamics of PE firm industrial organizational evolution, as an institutional innovation, PELP surpasses the traditional PE industrial organizations, adapts itself to the high development race and high efficiency requirement of PE industry; (3) PELP is the most effective incentive-restrain mechanism ever established in PE industries world-wide.
Thirdly, analyzing the pension funds investment with portfolio theory and systems analysis, the author concludes that PELP effectively resolved principal-agent and information-asymmetric problems in direct investment by pension funds. The ultimate great development of social security fund investment in PE industries in China depends upon the industrial policy innovation.
At last, the author gives concluding remarks and policy advices, that pension funds investment in PE industry can boost and perfect the PELP institution, and further more promote the development of Chinese PE industries. At same time, Chinese pension funds industries will go the same way of which their American counterpart have gone on the past decades and has demonstrated successful, this way is to invest in PE industries.
引文
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