控制权配置视角下上市公司股权激励效应的研究
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摘要
公司控制权理论是现代企业治理理论的一个重要组成部分,其核心是决定公司资源配置的权力。公司控制权是一个制度设计问题,包括权力机关设置、权力产生基础、权力分解与配置等方面的制度安排。由于公司所有权与经营权的相对分离态势,公司内外不同利益主体的目标函数、利益实现方式、参与治理程度等均不同。通过对公司控制权的分析,可以理清这些与企业有直接契约关系利益相关者之间的相互作用机制。
随着我国证监会《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》的出台,经营者股权激励的相关措施陆续成形,股权激励在我国日益正规化和制度化。但由于制度和历史原因,我国上市公司仍存在着公司治理结构效能低下,股东大会权力弱化,监事会形同虚设等问题。股东大会、董事会和管理层相互制衡的公司治理模式和控制体系理论正在日益完善,但现实中在企业里并不拥有充分剩余索取权的经理层往往拥有充分控制权,在缺乏有效的约束机制时,作为理性经济人的经理可能会利用控制权来满足自己的私人利益。股东大会、董事会及经理层之间控制权配置对公司股权激励偏好的行为选择以及股权激励的实施效应都会产生不同的影响。本文从控制权配置视角对股权激励的偏好行为以及股权激励效应进行研究。
本文在借鉴国内外文献的基础上,将两权分离所产生的控制权配置状态划分为股东、董事会、经理层三个层面,并将各层面的控制权统一起来构建控制权配置综合模型,从理论上分析控制权配置对股权激励偏好及股权激励效应的影响机理；建立logit回归模型实证检验控制权配置对股权激励偏好的影响,并通过随机前沿分析法构建股权激励短期效应和长期效应模型,实证检验控制权配置对股权激励短期市场效应和长期业绩效应的影响；最后通过理论分析和实证检验得到股权激励效应最优的控制权配置模式。
本文主要内容包括以下几个方面：
第一章为绪论。主要阐述了研究背景和意义,对论文的相关重要概念进行界定,并对研究思路、结构安排和研究方法进行了说明,最后总结了本文预期可能的创新点。
第二章为文献综述。本章通过对控制权配置、股权激励等相关研究成果的梳理和总结,为以后章节的分析提供研究基础。通过对相关文献的总结发现,现有文献多从大股东控制权角度研究控制权配置对股权激励的影响,而从控制权配置整体视角系统研究股权激励的成果并不多,现有研究的深度和广度也存在明显的不足。股权激励效应的研究指标多选择超额收益率和净资产收益率,研究方法上还有待深入挖掘,特别是计量模型的应用。这些发现为后续的研究提供了重要的切入点。
第三章为理论分析。本章将控制权配置划分为股东、董事会及经理层三个层面,并综合这三个维度建立了控制权配置的综合模型；结合我国的实际阐述了股权激励效应的主要表现和应用约束,并从理论上分析了不同的控制权配置模式对股权激励偏好及股权激励效应的影响。企业经理人的目标函数及效用函数与股东不完全一致,导致经理人在追求效用最大化的过程中造成资源配置效率下降和股东利益受损,而股权激励有利于股东与经理人利益的一致与整合,从而提高企业资源配置效率和优化治理结构。股权激励效应的发挥不仅依赖外部竞争性市场,更受到内部治理机制的制约,而作为内部治理结构核心的控制权配置成为影响股权激励效应发挥的重要制约因素。从董事会层面控制权配置入手,分析不同控制权配置模型下股权激励效应的差异；大股东控制的董事会中,随着大股东控制权的减弱,股东监督动力降低,股权激励偏好增强,权利制衡使得股权激励效应提升；经理层控制的董事会中,经理层权利过大容易引发内部人利用股权激励寻租,故股权激励偏好较强,而股权激励效应较弱；独立或制衡的董事会中,随着大股东持股比例下降,权利制衡推动“三权分控”局面稳定性增强,股权激励效应提高。
第四章为控制权配置对股权激励偏好的影响。本章以2006年至2012年深市上市公司为样本,采用logit模型,实证检验控制权配置对股权激励偏好的影响,并采用单因素方差分析法比较不同控制权配置模式下股权激励偏好的差异。实证结果显示,大股东特征、董事会结构及总经理状态均可对股权激励偏好产生显著影响,其中大股东持股比例低于30%且总经理由大股东委派的控制权配置模式,股权激励的偏好最强。研究发现,大股东控制权较大时,其监督动力和对经营者职位的威胁够大,导致企业的股权激励偏好较低；经理层控制权比较大时,经理层容易利用信息优势,借助股权激励进行寻租,导致企业股权激励偏好偏高；大股东持股比例较低且总经理由大股东委派的独立或制衡的董事会中,更容易出现大股东与经理层合谋,利用股权激励谋取私利,故企业的股权激励偏好最强。
第五章为控制权配置对股权激励短期效应的影响。本章以2006年1月1日至2012年12月31日深市公布股权激励计划草案的上市公司为研究样本,采用事件研究法实证检验股权激励短期市场反应；并利用随机前沿面分析方法构建股权激励短期市场效应模型和因素分析模型,研究控制权配置对股权激励短期市场效应的影响；采用单因素方差分析法检验不同控制权配置模式下短期效率的差异。实证结果显示：市场能够识别企业公布的股权激励信息,并产生积极的市场反应,但是由于存在内幕交易现象,往往使得股权激励消息提前泄露,导致市场反应提前；大股东特征能对股权激励短期市场效应具有显著的影响,而董事会结构和总经理状态对股权激励短期市场效应不存在显著影响,股东、董事会及经理权利相互制衡的控制权配置综合模式下的股权激励短期效应最优。研究表明,大股东控制权较大时,容易出现大股东与管理层的冲突,二者之间的紧张关系使得股权激励效应降低；董事会结构和总经理的任命方式不会对股权激励效应产生显著影响；权利相互制衡的控制权配置综合模式,挤压了各主体单独寻租的能力和空间,此时的股权激励效应最优。
第六章为控制权配置对股权激励长期效应的影响。本章以经行业和年度调整后的净资产收益率为长期产出,利用随机前沿面分析方法构建股权激励长期业绩效应模型和因素分析模型,实证检验控制权配置对股权激励长期业绩效应的影响,并采用单因素方差分析法检验不同控制权配置模式下长期效率的差异。实证结果显示：大股东特征与总经理状态对股权激励长期效应存在显著影响,董事会结构对股权激励长期效应不存在显著影响。研究发现,总经理状态虽然在短期内不会对股权激励效应产生显著影响,但从长期看由于总经理状态涉及到控股股东的实际控制权以及与总经理的合谋动机对股权激励的长期效应具有显著的影响。
第七章为结论与展望。对主要研究结论进行总结,提出若干启示和建议,并分析现有研究的不足之处,提出未来的研究展望。
本文的创新点主要集中在以下四个方面：
(1)从公司控制权配置入手研究股权激励的效应,研究视角比较新。本文从股东、董事会、经理三个层面研究控制权配置特征,并结合三个维度提出了控制权配置综合模型,研究了控制权配置对股权激励偏好及股权激励效应的影响,认为股权激励与公司控制权配置模式应该相匹配,若控制权配置不当,股权激励不但不能起到激励效果,反而会成为寻租工具。
(2)采用随机前沿面分析方法中BC(1995)模型构建股权激励效应模型和因素分析模型,研究方法比较新。国内外有关股权激励效应的文献多数直接以超额收益率和净资产收益率作为股权激励短期和长期效应,本文考虑股权激励的投入和产出,采用随机前沿面分析方法计算股权激励的短期市场效应和长期业绩效应,并建立因素分析模型研究控制权配置对股权激励效应的影响。
(3)采用“控制权配置→偏好行为→行为效应”的模式进行研究,研究思路比较新。以往文献多数直接研究股权激励对公司绩效的相关关系,本文采用了“控制权配置—偏好行为—行为效应”的模式,先论证控制权配置对公司股权激励偏好行为的影响,然后再探讨其对效应的影响,使得研究结论更加具体、更具有逻辑性和说服力。
(4)研究结论显示,我国当前股权激励效应发挥的关键是构建“股东大会—董事会—经理层”的控制权配置模式。研究发现,在董事会独立程度强,权利相互制衡有效的情况下,股权激励效应最优。因此,应通过协议转让、配售等方式逐步形成股权结构的制衡状态；建立有效的薪酬与考核委员会强化董事会的监督和制衡作用；建立有效的职业经理人市场,提供经理人的竞争和选择机制等手段优化控制权配置模式,提高股权激励效应。
As an important part of the main content of the modern corporate governance theory, the key of the corporate control right theory is the power determining the company resources allocation. It is a question of system design including authority department structure, power base, power decomposition and power allocation and so on. Because of the relative separation of ownership and management in the company, many internal and external stakeholders have different objective functions, interest achievement means and governance participate levels in the enterprise. Through the analysis of corporate control rights, we can make the interaction mechanism clear among the stakeholders having direct contractual relationships with the enterprise.
As China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Equity Incentive Management of Listed Companies (Trial)", the operator equity incentive measures have gradually formed, and the equity incentive in our increasingly is becoming formalized and institutionalized. But because of institutional and historical reasons, there are many problems such as corporate governance structure inefficiency, the general meeting of shareholders' power weakening, board of supervisors performing practically no function and so on in China. The theories on the corporate governance model and control system are becoming more perfect, which depends on the balance of general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors and management, but managers have full control rights in the modern enterprise. As a rational economic man, the manager may meet their own private interest by dominion over property to others, in the absence of effective constraint mechanism. Allocation of control rights between the shareholders meeting, board of directors and managers affects the company's equity incentive preference and the effect of equity incentive. This article studied the equity incentive preference and the effect of equity incentive from the perspective of control rights allocation.
Based on the all references, this paper divided the control rights allocation into three aspects including the shareholders meeting, board of directors and managers, and built the comprehensive control right allocation model through unifying the control rights. The paper analyzed the effect mechanism of control rights allocation on the equity incentive, and analyzed the impacts of control rights allocation on equity incentive preference by establishing the logit regression model, and analyzed the control rights allocation impact on the equity incentive by building the effect model of the equity incentive on the short-term and the long-term through the stochastic frontier model. The paper got the control rights allocation model on the optimal effect of equity incentive.
The paper includes the following aspects:
The first chapter is the introduction. This part described the research background, meaning, and defined the relevant concepts, and explained the main contents, the logical thinking and research methods, and summarized the expected innovation.
The second chapter is a literature review. This chapter provided a theoretical basis for the analysis of future research chapters through collating and summarizing the relevant literature and research on the control right allocation, equity incentive and so on. Through the study on the control right allocation and equity incentive, we found that there were few direct literatures on the impacts of control right allocation on the equity incentive, the depth and breadth of existing research were obviously deficient. The relevance references study the effect of equity incentive used CAR and ROE, so the method has yet to be excavated, especially the application of econometric models.
The third chapter is the theoretical analysis. As the theoretical study of the paper, this chapter explained the mechanism and application constraints of equity incentive in China. The objective function and utility function of business managers were not completely consistent with the shareholders', which made the managers ignore resources allocation signals from the capital markets in pursuit of maximizing the effectiveness. The equity incentive could integrate the interests between shareholders and managers, and improve resource allocation efficiency and optimize the governance structures; the equity incentive effect laid on the competitive market externally and internal governance mechanisms internally, and as the internal control right allocation, the governance structure played binding effect on the equity incentive effect. By establishing comprehensive model on control right allocation, the paper analyzed its impact on the equity incentive effect. In the board of directors in control of the major shareholders, with the control weakening of major shareholders, shareholder supervise impetus decreased, equity incentives appetite increased, and the equity incentive effect enhanced because of the right checks and balances; In the board of directors in control of the managers, because managers rights is too large and it is easily lead to internal people use equity incentive rent-seeking, so there is a strong preference for equity incentives, and equity incentive effect was weak; in the independent or balance board, with the proportion decline of large shareholders,"three rights separate control" situation is more stable because of right checks and balances, and equity incentive effect increased.
The fourth chapter is the impact of control right allocation on equity incentive preference. Choosing2006-2012Shenzhen listed companies as samples, this chapter, using the logit model, empirical researched the impact of control right allocation on the equity incentive preference and lateral compare the preference differences of equity incentive under different control right allocation mode. The empirical results show that the shareholding proportion of the large shareholders and major shareholders controlling proportion in the board were negatively correlated to the equity incentives preference, and director proportion in control of the managers and manager proportion appointed directly or indirectly by the major shareholders were positively correlated to the equity incentives preference, and the impact of mode27on the equity incentive preference was the strongest. The results showed that while the large shareholder with more control rights, supervision and job threats, the equity incentive preference was lower; while the managers with relatively larger control rights, it was easy for managers using information superiority to do rent-seeking, and so the equity incentives preference is stronger.
The fifth chapter is the short-term influence of control right allocation on equity incentive effect. Choosing the listed company in Shenzhen announcing draft equity incentive plan from January1,2006to December31,2012as the study sample, this chapter built equity incentive effect of short-term market models and factor analysis model using SFA means, and empirically researched the short-term influence of control right allocation on equity incentive effect, and tested the differences in short-term efficiency in different control right allocation mode using single-factor analysis of variance. The empirical results show:there was a significant negative correlation coefficient between the shareholders characteristics and equity incentive short-term market effect, and board structure and general state did not exist significantly effect on the equity incentive short-term market effect, and short-term effect of incentive options was optimal in the right balance allocation integrated model among the shareholders, the board directors and managers. The results show the larger control right of shareholders lead to conflicts between large shareholders and management, and the tensions between the two made equity incentive effect lower; board structure and the appointing way of general managers did not have a significant effect on the equity incentive influence. The integrated model of control right allocation in balance squeezed the rent-seeking ability and space of each individual subject, and the equity incentive effect is the most optimal at this time.
The sixth chapter is the long-term effect of control right allocation on equity incentive effect. Taking ROE by industry and year adjusted for the long-term output, this chapter built equity incentive effect of short-term market models and factor analysis model using SFA means, and empirically researched the long-term impact of control right allocation on equity incentive effect, and tested the differences in long-term efficiency in different control right allocation mode using single-factor analysis of variance. The empirical results show:different from the short-term effect, the board in control of large shareholders has a negative impact on the long-term effect of equity incentives.
The results show that the board in control of large shareholders did not have a significant impact on the equity incentive effect in the short term, but in the long term duo to the conflicts between shareholders and managers because of the control of large shareholders on the board, lead to the prominent influence on long-term equity incentive performance.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and outlook. This part summarized the main conclusions, and made a number of revelations, and analyzed the shortcomings of the study, and proposed the future research directions.
The innovation of this paper focused on the following aspects:
Firstly, the paper studied the equity incentive effect from the aspect of the control right allocation, and proposed the control right allocation integrated model; equity incentive and control right allocation mode should match, and equity incentive would not play the incentive effect, but become rent-seeking tools if the control rights were configured incorrectly.
Secondly, taking into the inputs and outputs of equity incentive, this paper calculated the short-term market effect and long-term performance effect of incentive stock options incentives using the SFA means of the stochastic frontier model, and researched the influence of control right allocation on the equity incentive effect through the factor analysis model.
Thirdly, this paper built the model of "control right allocation-preference behavior-effect ", firstly demonstrating the impacts of control right allocation on the preference behavior of the equity incentive, and then investigating the impact on its effect. The means made the conclusions more logical and convincing.
Fourthly, the conclusion shows that equity incentive play incentive effect, by building "the shareholders meeting, board of directors, and managers" control allocation mode. The study found that equity incentive can play the best effect, if the independence of the board of directors is strong, and right is effective checks and balances. Therefore, enterprises need to optimize the control allocation mode, improve the equity incentive effect, by negotiating transfer, rationing, establishing an effective remuneration and appraisal committee and establishing an effective professional manager market.
随着我国证监会《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》的出台,经营者股权激励的相关措施陆续成形,股权激励在我国日益正规化和制度化。但由于制度和历史原因,我国上市公司仍存在着公司治理结构效能低下,股东大会权力弱化,监事会形同虚设等问题。股东大会、董事会和管理层相互制衡的公司治理模式和控制体系理论正在日益完善,但现实中在企业里并不拥有充分剩余索取权的经理层往往拥有充分控制权,在缺乏有效的约束机制时,作为理性经济人的经理可能会利用控制权来满足自己的私人利益。股东大会、董事会及经理层之间控制权配置对公司股权激励偏好的行为选择以及股权激励的实施效应都会产生不同的影响。本文从控制权配置视角对股权激励的偏好行为以及股权激励效应进行研究。
本文在借鉴国内外文献的基础上,将两权分离所产生的控制权配置状态划分为股东、董事会、经理层三个层面,并将各层面的控制权统一起来构建控制权配置综合模型,从理论上分析控制权配置对股权激励偏好及股权激励效应的影响机理；建立logit回归模型实证检验控制权配置对股权激励偏好的影响,并通过随机前沿分析法构建股权激励短期效应和长期效应模型,实证检验控制权配置对股权激励短期市场效应和长期业绩效应的影响；最后通过理论分析和实证检验得到股权激励效应最优的控制权配置模式。
本文主要内容包括以下几个方面：
第一章为绪论。主要阐述了研究背景和意义,对论文的相关重要概念进行界定,并对研究思路、结构安排和研究方法进行了说明,最后总结了本文预期可能的创新点。
第二章为文献综述。本章通过对控制权配置、股权激励等相关研究成果的梳理和总结,为以后章节的分析提供研究基础。通过对相关文献的总结发现,现有文献多从大股东控制权角度研究控制权配置对股权激励的影响,而从控制权配置整体视角系统研究股权激励的成果并不多,现有研究的深度和广度也存在明显的不足。股权激励效应的研究指标多选择超额收益率和净资产收益率,研究方法上还有待深入挖掘,特别是计量模型的应用。这些发现为后续的研究提供了重要的切入点。
第三章为理论分析。本章将控制权配置划分为股东、董事会及经理层三个层面,并综合这三个维度建立了控制权配置的综合模型；结合我国的实际阐述了股权激励效应的主要表现和应用约束,并从理论上分析了不同的控制权配置模式对股权激励偏好及股权激励效应的影响。企业经理人的目标函数及效用函数与股东不完全一致,导致经理人在追求效用最大化的过程中造成资源配置效率下降和股东利益受损,而股权激励有利于股东与经理人利益的一致与整合,从而提高企业资源配置效率和优化治理结构。股权激励效应的发挥不仅依赖外部竞争性市场,更受到内部治理机制的制约,而作为内部治理结构核心的控制权配置成为影响股权激励效应发挥的重要制约因素。从董事会层面控制权配置入手,分析不同控制权配置模型下股权激励效应的差异；大股东控制的董事会中,随着大股东控制权的减弱,股东监督动力降低,股权激励偏好增强,权利制衡使得股权激励效应提升；经理层控制的董事会中,经理层权利过大容易引发内部人利用股权激励寻租,故股权激励偏好较强,而股权激励效应较弱；独立或制衡的董事会中,随着大股东持股比例下降,权利制衡推动“三权分控”局面稳定性增强,股权激励效应提高。
第四章为控制权配置对股权激励偏好的影响。本章以2006年至2012年深市上市公司为样本,采用logit模型,实证检验控制权配置对股权激励偏好的影响,并采用单因素方差分析法比较不同控制权配置模式下股权激励偏好的差异。实证结果显示,大股东特征、董事会结构及总经理状态均可对股权激励偏好产生显著影响,其中大股东持股比例低于30%且总经理由大股东委派的控制权配置模式,股权激励的偏好最强。研究发现,大股东控制权较大时,其监督动力和对经营者职位的威胁够大,导致企业的股权激励偏好较低；经理层控制权比较大时,经理层容易利用信息优势,借助股权激励进行寻租,导致企业股权激励偏好偏高；大股东持股比例较低且总经理由大股东委派的独立或制衡的董事会中,更容易出现大股东与经理层合谋,利用股权激励谋取私利,故企业的股权激励偏好最强。
第五章为控制权配置对股权激励短期效应的影响。本章以2006年1月1日至2012年12月31日深市公布股权激励计划草案的上市公司为研究样本,采用事件研究法实证检验股权激励短期市场反应；并利用随机前沿面分析方法构建股权激励短期市场效应模型和因素分析模型,研究控制权配置对股权激励短期市场效应的影响；采用单因素方差分析法检验不同控制权配置模式下短期效率的差异。实证结果显示：市场能够识别企业公布的股权激励信息,并产生积极的市场反应,但是由于存在内幕交易现象,往往使得股权激励消息提前泄露,导致市场反应提前；大股东特征能对股权激励短期市场效应具有显著的影响,而董事会结构和总经理状态对股权激励短期市场效应不存在显著影响,股东、董事会及经理权利相互制衡的控制权配置综合模式下的股权激励短期效应最优。研究表明,大股东控制权较大时,容易出现大股东与管理层的冲突,二者之间的紧张关系使得股权激励效应降低；董事会结构和总经理的任命方式不会对股权激励效应产生显著影响；权利相互制衡的控制权配置综合模式,挤压了各主体单独寻租的能力和空间,此时的股权激励效应最优。
第六章为控制权配置对股权激励长期效应的影响。本章以经行业和年度调整后的净资产收益率为长期产出,利用随机前沿面分析方法构建股权激励长期业绩效应模型和因素分析模型,实证检验控制权配置对股权激励长期业绩效应的影响,并采用单因素方差分析法检验不同控制权配置模式下长期效率的差异。实证结果显示：大股东特征与总经理状态对股权激励长期效应存在显著影响,董事会结构对股权激励长期效应不存在显著影响。研究发现,总经理状态虽然在短期内不会对股权激励效应产生显著影响,但从长期看由于总经理状态涉及到控股股东的实际控制权以及与总经理的合谋动机对股权激励的长期效应具有显著的影响。
第七章为结论与展望。对主要研究结论进行总结,提出若干启示和建议,并分析现有研究的不足之处,提出未来的研究展望。
本文的创新点主要集中在以下四个方面：
(1)从公司控制权配置入手研究股权激励的效应,研究视角比较新。本文从股东、董事会、经理三个层面研究控制权配置特征,并结合三个维度提出了控制权配置综合模型,研究了控制权配置对股权激励偏好及股权激励效应的影响,认为股权激励与公司控制权配置模式应该相匹配,若控制权配置不当,股权激励不但不能起到激励效果,反而会成为寻租工具。
(2)采用随机前沿面分析方法中BC(1995)模型构建股权激励效应模型和因素分析模型,研究方法比较新。国内外有关股权激励效应的文献多数直接以超额收益率和净资产收益率作为股权激励短期和长期效应,本文考虑股权激励的投入和产出,采用随机前沿面分析方法计算股权激励的短期市场效应和长期业绩效应,并建立因素分析模型研究控制权配置对股权激励效应的影响。
(3)采用“控制权配置→偏好行为→行为效应”的模式进行研究,研究思路比较新。以往文献多数直接研究股权激励对公司绩效的相关关系,本文采用了“控制权配置—偏好行为—行为效应”的模式,先论证控制权配置对公司股权激励偏好行为的影响,然后再探讨其对效应的影响,使得研究结论更加具体、更具有逻辑性和说服力。
(4)研究结论显示,我国当前股权激励效应发挥的关键是构建“股东大会—董事会—经理层”的控制权配置模式。研究发现,在董事会独立程度强,权利相互制衡有效的情况下,股权激励效应最优。因此,应通过协议转让、配售等方式逐步形成股权结构的制衡状态；建立有效的薪酬与考核委员会强化董事会的监督和制衡作用；建立有效的职业经理人市场,提供经理人的竞争和选择机制等手段优化控制权配置模式,提高股权激励效应。
As an important part of the main content of the modern corporate governance theory, the key of the corporate control right theory is the power determining the company resources allocation. It is a question of system design including authority department structure, power base, power decomposition and power allocation and so on. Because of the relative separation of ownership and management in the company, many internal and external stakeholders have different objective functions, interest achievement means and governance participate levels in the enterprise. Through the analysis of corporate control rights, we can make the interaction mechanism clear among the stakeholders having direct contractual relationships with the enterprise.
As China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Equity Incentive Management of Listed Companies (Trial)", the operator equity incentive measures have gradually formed, and the equity incentive in our increasingly is becoming formalized and institutionalized. But because of institutional and historical reasons, there are many problems such as corporate governance structure inefficiency, the general meeting of shareholders' power weakening, board of supervisors performing practically no function and so on in China. The theories on the corporate governance model and control system are becoming more perfect, which depends on the balance of general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors and management, but managers have full control rights in the modern enterprise. As a rational economic man, the manager may meet their own private interest by dominion over property to others, in the absence of effective constraint mechanism. Allocation of control rights between the shareholders meeting, board of directors and managers affects the company's equity incentive preference and the effect of equity incentive. This article studied the equity incentive preference and the effect of equity incentive from the perspective of control rights allocation.
Based on the all references, this paper divided the control rights allocation into three aspects including the shareholders meeting, board of directors and managers, and built the comprehensive control right allocation model through unifying the control rights. The paper analyzed the effect mechanism of control rights allocation on the equity incentive, and analyzed the impacts of control rights allocation on equity incentive preference by establishing the logit regression model, and analyzed the control rights allocation impact on the equity incentive by building the effect model of the equity incentive on the short-term and the long-term through the stochastic frontier model. The paper got the control rights allocation model on the optimal effect of equity incentive.
The paper includes the following aspects:
The first chapter is the introduction. This part described the research background, meaning, and defined the relevant concepts, and explained the main contents, the logical thinking and research methods, and summarized the expected innovation.
The second chapter is a literature review. This chapter provided a theoretical basis for the analysis of future research chapters through collating and summarizing the relevant literature and research on the control right allocation, equity incentive and so on. Through the study on the control right allocation and equity incentive, we found that there were few direct literatures on the impacts of control right allocation on the equity incentive, the depth and breadth of existing research were obviously deficient. The relevance references study the effect of equity incentive used CAR and ROE, so the method has yet to be excavated, especially the application of econometric models.
The third chapter is the theoretical analysis. As the theoretical study of the paper, this chapter explained the mechanism and application constraints of equity incentive in China. The objective function and utility function of business managers were not completely consistent with the shareholders', which made the managers ignore resources allocation signals from the capital markets in pursuit of maximizing the effectiveness. The equity incentive could integrate the interests between shareholders and managers, and improve resource allocation efficiency and optimize the governance structures; the equity incentive effect laid on the competitive market externally and internal governance mechanisms internally, and as the internal control right allocation, the governance structure played binding effect on the equity incentive effect. By establishing comprehensive model on control right allocation, the paper analyzed its impact on the equity incentive effect. In the board of directors in control of the major shareholders, with the control weakening of major shareholders, shareholder supervise impetus decreased, equity incentives appetite increased, and the equity incentive effect enhanced because of the right checks and balances; In the board of directors in control of the managers, because managers rights is too large and it is easily lead to internal people use equity incentive rent-seeking, so there is a strong preference for equity incentives, and equity incentive effect was weak; in the independent or balance board, with the proportion decline of large shareholders,"three rights separate control" situation is more stable because of right checks and balances, and equity incentive effect increased.
The fourth chapter is the impact of control right allocation on equity incentive preference. Choosing2006-2012Shenzhen listed companies as samples, this chapter, using the logit model, empirical researched the impact of control right allocation on the equity incentive preference and lateral compare the preference differences of equity incentive under different control right allocation mode. The empirical results show that the shareholding proportion of the large shareholders and major shareholders controlling proportion in the board were negatively correlated to the equity incentives preference, and director proportion in control of the managers and manager proportion appointed directly or indirectly by the major shareholders were positively correlated to the equity incentives preference, and the impact of mode27on the equity incentive preference was the strongest. The results showed that while the large shareholder with more control rights, supervision and job threats, the equity incentive preference was lower; while the managers with relatively larger control rights, it was easy for managers using information superiority to do rent-seeking, and so the equity incentives preference is stronger.
The fifth chapter is the short-term influence of control right allocation on equity incentive effect. Choosing the listed company in Shenzhen announcing draft equity incentive plan from January1,2006to December31,2012as the study sample, this chapter built equity incentive effect of short-term market models and factor analysis model using SFA means, and empirically researched the short-term influence of control right allocation on equity incentive effect, and tested the differences in short-term efficiency in different control right allocation mode using single-factor analysis of variance. The empirical results show:there was a significant negative correlation coefficient between the shareholders characteristics and equity incentive short-term market effect, and board structure and general state did not exist significantly effect on the equity incentive short-term market effect, and short-term effect of incentive options was optimal in the right balance allocation integrated model among the shareholders, the board directors and managers. The results show the larger control right of shareholders lead to conflicts between large shareholders and management, and the tensions between the two made equity incentive effect lower; board structure and the appointing way of general managers did not have a significant effect on the equity incentive influence. The integrated model of control right allocation in balance squeezed the rent-seeking ability and space of each individual subject, and the equity incentive effect is the most optimal at this time.
The sixth chapter is the long-term effect of control right allocation on equity incentive effect. Taking ROE by industry and year adjusted for the long-term output, this chapter built equity incentive effect of short-term market models and factor analysis model using SFA means, and empirically researched the long-term impact of control right allocation on equity incentive effect, and tested the differences in long-term efficiency in different control right allocation mode using single-factor analysis of variance. The empirical results show:different from the short-term effect, the board in control of large shareholders has a negative impact on the long-term effect of equity incentives.
The results show that the board in control of large shareholders did not have a significant impact on the equity incentive effect in the short term, but in the long term duo to the conflicts between shareholders and managers because of the control of large shareholders on the board, lead to the prominent influence on long-term equity incentive performance.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and outlook. This part summarized the main conclusions, and made a number of revelations, and analyzed the shortcomings of the study, and proposed the future research directions.
The innovation of this paper focused on the following aspects:
Firstly, the paper studied the equity incentive effect from the aspect of the control right allocation, and proposed the control right allocation integrated model; equity incentive and control right allocation mode should match, and equity incentive would not play the incentive effect, but become rent-seeking tools if the control rights were configured incorrectly.
Secondly, taking into the inputs and outputs of equity incentive, this paper calculated the short-term market effect and long-term performance effect of incentive stock options incentives using the SFA means of the stochastic frontier model, and researched the influence of control right allocation on the equity incentive effect through the factor analysis model.
Thirdly, this paper built the model of "control right allocation-preference behavior-effect ", firstly demonstrating the impacts of control right allocation on the preference behavior of the equity incentive, and then investigating the impact on its effect. The means made the conclusions more logical and convincing.
Fourthly, the conclusion shows that equity incentive play incentive effect, by building "the shareholders meeting, board of directors, and managers" control allocation mode. The study found that equity incentive can play the best effect, if the independence of the board of directors is strong, and right is effective checks and balances. Therefore, enterprises need to optimize the control allocation mode, improve the equity incentive effect, by negotiating transfer, rationing, establishing an effective remuneration and appraisal committee and establishing an effective professional manager market.
引文
1 《中华人民共和国公司法》和《中华人民共和国证券法》于2005年10月27日,由中华人民共和国第十届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议修订通过,自2006年1月1日开始施行。
2 三一重工、清华同方、紫江企业为试点企业进行股权分置改革。
3 该数据由笔者根据上海证券交易所网站和深圳证券交易所网站发布的股权激励计划草案数据统计所得。
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10 又称股份多数决,指在符合法定人数或表决权数的股东大会上,决议以出席股东大会股东表决权的多数通过才能生效。
11 《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百条,召开临时股东大会的第三种情形。
12 《中华人民共和国证券法》第四章上市公司的收购第八十八条。
13 《中华人民共和国》第一百零三条。
14 《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百零三条。
《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百一十一条,董事会作出决议,必须经全体董事的过半数通过。
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21 模式28(DDcMb)：第一大股东持股比例∈(10%,30%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由董事会选举
25 模式26(CDcMb)：第一大股东持股比例∈(30%,50%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由董事会选举
26 模式25(CDcMa)：第一大股东持股比例E(30%,50%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由大股东直接或间接委派
27 模式27(DDcMa)：第一大股东持股比例∈(10%,30%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由大股东直接或间接委派
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3 该数据由笔者根据上海证券交易所网站和深圳证券交易所网站发布的股权激励计划草案数据统计所得。
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10 又称股份多数决,指在符合法定人数或表决权数的股东大会上,决议以出席股东大会股东表决权的多数通过才能生效。
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14 《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百零三条。
《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百一十一条,董事会作出决议,必须经全体董事的过半数通过。
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25 模式26(CDcMb)：第一大股东持股比例∈(30%,50%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由董事会选举
26 模式25(CDcMa)：第一大股东持股比例E(30%,50%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由大股东直接或间接委派
27 模式27(DDcMa)：第一大股东持股比例∈(10%,30%],董事会结构为独立或制衡的董事会,总经理由大股东直接或间接委派
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