自然垄断产业的组织演化与规制调整
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摘要
电信、电力、铁路、民航运输、自来水和燃气供应等行业,投资大、回报周期长,资产专用性强,沉淀成本大。通常这些产业还具有网络经济性的共同特征,在网络建成并投入使用后,生产企业的固定成本很高而边际成本极低,规模经济性十分明显,这样的产业常被称为自然垄断产业。为了防止垄断企业制定高于边际成本的价格从而导致生产的低效率和社会福利损失,对其进行政府舰制符合经济效率的原则。然而理论研究和实践经验都表明,产业组织自然垄断的性质本身不是固定的,而是不断演化的,当产业自然垄断的性质已经弱化为具备竞争产业的特征时,经济性规制的放松或退出也就成为可能。
传统的自然垄断产业通常由一系列具有垂直关系的业务部门组成,产业组织自然垄断的性质演化往往不是整体性的,而是体现在垂直产业链的某些业务部门上。因此通过分析产业组织演化的规律,明确这些业务的垄断与竞争性质,并实施相应的分类管制政策就显得很有意义。
民航运输业从整体上看是传统的自然垄断行业,但是从其垂直产业链的不同业务类型看,各业务的技术经济特征并不相同。本文将民航运输业分为机场服务业务、客货运输业务、空中交通管制业务、航空保障业务、航空延伸业务、航空器维修与培训等六个不同业务。对民航运输业的不同业务类型,应该考虑分业务类型实施不同的规制措施。
本文第一章阐述了论文的选题背景和意义,在分析已有文献研究成果的基础上,提出了本文的研究目标、思路和方法；第二章从产业组织理论关于市场结构演化的思想,演化经济学关于产业演化的相关理论,自然垄断理论本身的演化,需求和技术进步等影响自然垄断产业边界变化的实际因素等多个角度闸述自然垄断产业组织形态演进的理论依据：,目的存于考证本论文研究命题的科学性；第三章主要闸述自然垄断和政府规制的关系,政府规制是自然垄断治理的各种可选方法中使用最广泛和最成熟的,但是却不存在完美的规制定价方法,引入激励机制可以在一定程度上消除传统规制的负效应。但是如果自然垄断产业或者其某些业务的技术经济属性已经演化,那么相应的规制措施应该被放松或调整；第四章通过规模经济等方面的实证分析,说明了航空公司客货业务具有一定自然垄断性,但是航空运输需求不断扩大、航空公司业技术进步以及替代竞争等因素,使得其自然垄断程度在弱化,与此相对应的是规制必须放松,并利用1986-2011年的中国航空公司业时间序列数据,检验了我国航空公司业放松规制的市场绩效；第五章阐述了机场的区域自然垄断性,总结了各国机场规制的内容和方法,通过一个理论模型分析了机场规制的福利效应,并在比较研究各国机场规制经验基础上,提出了我国机场价格上限规制的初步方案：第六章研究了民航运输业自然垄断和行政垄断的结合的复杂关系,利用层次分析法,通过建立评价指标体系,估算了民航运输业的行政垄断程度,并计算了2002年以来民航运输业由于行政垄断带来的福利净损失、总成本的增加和福利转移,据此提出了我国民航运输业行政垄断规制的思路;第七章提出了先重组后分类规制的基本策略,总结了五种重组方式的优缺点,分析了重组过程中存在的问题和可以采取的对策,并从价格规制和进入规制两个方面分别提出了民航运输业各业务类型的规制改革思路。
本文的研究思路和分析框架,不仅适用于民航运输业,对其它自然垄断行业的改革与发展同样具有参考价值。
Telecommunications, electricity, railways, air transport, water and gas supply industries have a huge investment, long payback period, asset specificity, and big sunk costs. Typically, these industries also have the common characteristics of the network economy. When the network is built and put into use, enterprises have high fixed costs and low marginal costs of production. The economies of scale are so obvious that these industries are often called as natural monopoly industries. In order to prevent monopolies developing a price higher than the marginal cost, which may result in low efficiency of the production and loss of social welfare, government regulation is in line with the principles of economic efficiency. However, theoretical research and practical experience have shown that the natural monopoly nature of industrial organization itself is not fixed, but evolving. When the nature of natural monopoly of the industry has been weakening into a competitive industry, economic regulation became possible to relax or exit.
Traditional natural monopoly industries usually consists of a series of business units with vertical relationship. The evolution of natural monopoly of the industrial organization is often not holistic, but is reflected in certain business units of the vertical chain. Therefore, it is very meaningful to carry out differentiated regulatory policy by analyzing the evolution law of industrial organization and determining the nature of the business.
Air transport industry as a whole is traditional natural monopoly industry, but the different types of business on its vertical industry chain has different technical and economic characteristics. This paper divide air transport industry into six different types of business,including airport service, passenger and freight transportation services, air t'affic management, support services, extensional services, aircraft maintenance and training services. Differentiated regulatory policy should be carry out on the different types of business of air transport industry.
The first chapter presented background and significance of the paper, and then on the base of analyzing existing research, the research goals, ideas and methods were proposed. The second chapter has elaborated the theoretical basis on the evolution of natural monopoly industry from four point of view, that is, the idea of industrial organization theory about the evolution of the market structure, related theories of evolutionary economics on industry evolution, evolution of the theory of natural monopoly itself, actual factors of demand and technological progress affecting the change of natural monopoly industry boundaries. All these aimed at the scientific research of the thesis theme; The third chapter is mainly on the relationship between natural monopoly and government regulation. Government regulation is the broadest used and most mature way among the optional method of natural monopoly governance, unfortunately there is no perfect regulatory price. The introduction of incentives into regulatory policy may eliminate the negative effects of traditional regulation to a certain the extent. But appropriate regulatory measures should be relaxed or adjusted if the technical and economic attributes of natural monopoly industry itself or some of its business has evolved.
The fourth chapter explained why airline passenger and cargo business is to some extend a natural monopoly by empirical analysis on economies of scale and other aspects of the airline business. With the expanding demand for air transportation, technological progress in airline industry and alternative competition between transport industries, the degree of natural monopoly of airline industry has being weaken, which required the regulation must be relaxed. Based on the time series data1986-2011in airline industry, this paper tested the market performance of deregulation in airline industry in China. The fifth chapter stressed the regional natural monopoly of airport, summarize the content and method of airport regulation in other countries, and analyze the welfare effects of airport regulation by a theoretical model. In this chapter, price cap regulation were proposed in china by a comparative study on airport regulation on the basis of experience of other countries; The seventh chapter proposed a basic strategy of "first restructuring second differentiated regulation", and then summarized the advantages and disadvantages of five models of restructuring. Further more, this paper analyzed the existing problems in the process of restructuring and countermeasures should be taken. In the end, differentiated regulatory policies on all types of business of the air transport industry were proposed from the two aspects of price regulation and entry regulation.
The idea and analytical framework of this research is not only valuable for the air transport industry but also valuable for the reform and development of other natural monopoly industries.
传统的自然垄断产业通常由一系列具有垂直关系的业务部门组成,产业组织自然垄断的性质演化往往不是整体性的,而是体现在垂直产业链的某些业务部门上。因此通过分析产业组织演化的规律,明确这些业务的垄断与竞争性质,并实施相应的分类管制政策就显得很有意义。
民航运输业从整体上看是传统的自然垄断行业,但是从其垂直产业链的不同业务类型看,各业务的技术经济特征并不相同。本文将民航运输业分为机场服务业务、客货运输业务、空中交通管制业务、航空保障业务、航空延伸业务、航空器维修与培训等六个不同业务。对民航运输业的不同业务类型,应该考虑分业务类型实施不同的规制措施。
本文第一章阐述了论文的选题背景和意义,在分析已有文献研究成果的基础上,提出了本文的研究目标、思路和方法；第二章从产业组织理论关于市场结构演化的思想,演化经济学关于产业演化的相关理论,自然垄断理论本身的演化,需求和技术进步等影响自然垄断产业边界变化的实际因素等多个角度闸述自然垄断产业组织形态演进的理论依据：,目的存于考证本论文研究命题的科学性；第三章主要闸述自然垄断和政府规制的关系,政府规制是自然垄断治理的各种可选方法中使用最广泛和最成熟的,但是却不存在完美的规制定价方法,引入激励机制可以在一定程度上消除传统规制的负效应。但是如果自然垄断产业或者其某些业务的技术经济属性已经演化,那么相应的规制措施应该被放松或调整；第四章通过规模经济等方面的实证分析,说明了航空公司客货业务具有一定自然垄断性,但是航空运输需求不断扩大、航空公司业技术进步以及替代竞争等因素,使得其自然垄断程度在弱化,与此相对应的是规制必须放松,并利用1986-2011年的中国航空公司业时间序列数据,检验了我国航空公司业放松规制的市场绩效；第五章阐述了机场的区域自然垄断性,总结了各国机场规制的内容和方法,通过一个理论模型分析了机场规制的福利效应,并在比较研究各国机场规制经验基础上,提出了我国机场价格上限规制的初步方案：第六章研究了民航运输业自然垄断和行政垄断的结合的复杂关系,利用层次分析法,通过建立评价指标体系,估算了民航运输业的行政垄断程度,并计算了2002年以来民航运输业由于行政垄断带来的福利净损失、总成本的增加和福利转移,据此提出了我国民航运输业行政垄断规制的思路;第七章提出了先重组后分类规制的基本策略,总结了五种重组方式的优缺点,分析了重组过程中存在的问题和可以采取的对策,并从价格规制和进入规制两个方面分别提出了民航运输业各业务类型的规制改革思路。
本文的研究思路和分析框架,不仅适用于民航运输业,对其它自然垄断行业的改革与发展同样具有参考价值。
Telecommunications, electricity, railways, air transport, water and gas supply industries have a huge investment, long payback period, asset specificity, and big sunk costs. Typically, these industries also have the common characteristics of the network economy. When the network is built and put into use, enterprises have high fixed costs and low marginal costs of production. The economies of scale are so obvious that these industries are often called as natural monopoly industries. In order to prevent monopolies developing a price higher than the marginal cost, which may result in low efficiency of the production and loss of social welfare, government regulation is in line with the principles of economic efficiency. However, theoretical research and practical experience have shown that the natural monopoly nature of industrial organization itself is not fixed, but evolving. When the nature of natural monopoly of the industry has been weakening into a competitive industry, economic regulation became possible to relax or exit.
Traditional natural monopoly industries usually consists of a series of business units with vertical relationship. The evolution of natural monopoly of the industrial organization is often not holistic, but is reflected in certain business units of the vertical chain. Therefore, it is very meaningful to carry out differentiated regulatory policy by analyzing the evolution law of industrial organization and determining the nature of the business.
Air transport industry as a whole is traditional natural monopoly industry, but the different types of business on its vertical industry chain has different technical and economic characteristics. This paper divide air transport industry into six different types of business,including airport service, passenger and freight transportation services, air t'affic management, support services, extensional services, aircraft maintenance and training services. Differentiated regulatory policy should be carry out on the different types of business of air transport industry.
The first chapter presented background and significance of the paper, and then on the base of analyzing existing research, the research goals, ideas and methods were proposed. The second chapter has elaborated the theoretical basis on the evolution of natural monopoly industry from four point of view, that is, the idea of industrial organization theory about the evolution of the market structure, related theories of evolutionary economics on industry evolution, evolution of the theory of natural monopoly itself, actual factors of demand and technological progress affecting the change of natural monopoly industry boundaries. All these aimed at the scientific research of the thesis theme; The third chapter is mainly on the relationship between natural monopoly and government regulation. Government regulation is the broadest used and most mature way among the optional method of natural monopoly governance, unfortunately there is no perfect regulatory price. The introduction of incentives into regulatory policy may eliminate the negative effects of traditional regulation to a certain the extent. But appropriate regulatory measures should be relaxed or adjusted if the technical and economic attributes of natural monopoly industry itself or some of its business has evolved.
The fourth chapter explained why airline passenger and cargo business is to some extend a natural monopoly by empirical analysis on economies of scale and other aspects of the airline business. With the expanding demand for air transportation, technological progress in airline industry and alternative competition between transport industries, the degree of natural monopoly of airline industry has being weaken, which required the regulation must be relaxed. Based on the time series data1986-2011in airline industry, this paper tested the market performance of deregulation in airline industry in China. The fifth chapter stressed the regional natural monopoly of airport, summarize the content and method of airport regulation in other countries, and analyze the welfare effects of airport regulation by a theoretical model. In this chapter, price cap regulation were proposed in china by a comparative study on airport regulation on the basis of experience of other countries; The seventh chapter proposed a basic strategy of "first restructuring second differentiated regulation", and then summarized the advantages and disadvantages of five models of restructuring. Further more, this paper analyzed the existing problems in the process of restructuring and countermeasures should be taken. In the end, differentiated regulatory policies on all types of business of the air transport industry were proposed from the two aspects of price regulation and entry regulation.
The idea and analytical framework of this research is not only valuable for the air transport industry but also valuable for the reform and development of other natural monopoly industries.
引文
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1 数据来源：杨波.美国航空运输市场二十年发展历程的启示,http://news.carnoc.com/list/184/ 184010.html
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1 第一财经日报.刘亚军究竟为何选择不归路?http://www.s1979.com/news/china/201006/284693628.shtml
1 数据来源：杨波.美国航空运输市场二十年发展历程的启示,http://news.carnoc.com/list/184/ 184010.html
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2 数据来源：《关于调整民航进近指挥费和航路费有关问题的通知》,民航发[2012]59号,表中T为最大起飞全重。
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1 《关于建立民航国内航线旅客运输燃油附加与航空煤油价格联动机制有关问题的通知》,发改价格[2009]2879号。
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