基于演化博弈的发电企业二氧化碳排放市场交易机制研究
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摘要
2010年我国已经成为世界第一温室气体(二氧化碳)排放国。发电企业(特别是煤电)已成为温室效应最大的排放源。低碳约束已经成为制约我国未来经济发展空间的重要因素。通过排放权交易控制、减缓以至改善我国主要工业集中排放源——发电企业(特别是煤电)的二氧化碳排放,是实现我国电能生产——控制温室气体排放目标相协调和经济社会可持续发展的有效手段。本文尝试在演化博弈论的基础上,借鉴欧洲二氧化碳排放期权交易市场的经验,研究发电企业二氧化碳排放市场的交易机制。
首先,本文介绍了研究背景及研究意义,把发电企业作为本文的研究对象,优先在电力行业开展研究二氧化碳排放市场交易机制的研究,具有非常好的示范作用和较高的效率。同时,综述了国内外当前针对二氧化碳排放交易市场的研究现状,并简要阐述了本文的主要内容、研究框架和创新之处。
其次,对我国发电企业二氧化碳排放的现状进行分析,指出发电企业二氧化碳排放的特点及其影响;同时,对二氧化碳排放权市场现状进行分析,介绍了二氧化碳排放权交易市场的产生的背景和国际二氧化碳排放权交易市场的现状,进而指出我国建立发电企业二氧化碳排放权交易市场的必要性;随后,对本文研究起到支撑作用的相关理论:本文最根本的理论基础是环境容量资源的价值理论、产权理论及配置理论;期权市场理论是本文二氧化碳排放权市场的设计的实践应用;演化博弈理论则是本文分析政府、发电企业、公众之间在二氧化碳排放权定价过程中相互作用的工具。
最后,本文在建立发电企业二氧化碳排放权交易期权市场的基础上,以演化博弈理论为基础构建政府、发电企业及公众在二氧化碳排放权期权市场中的博弈模型,并对模型的运算结果进行分析,得出如果减少发电企业的二氧化碳排放量是政府的最大目标且取得该目标不是以企业利润作为代价,均衡点(0,1)是最优选择,政府和发电企业、公众以最经济的方法实现这一目标的结论。并针对结论,对我国政府促进发电企业减少二氧化碳排放提出政策建议。
本文研究的主要意义在于基于动态复杂系统的视角,应用演化博弈理论构建了政府,公众、发电企业三方参与的二氧化碳排放期权交易市场,来研究我国发电企业二氧化碳排放市场的交易机制,是一种研究思路和方法的创新。一个健全、有效的二氧化碳排放权交易机制,不仅有利于有效激励发电企业减少二氧化碳排放,改善环境质量,而且从经济的角度来看,当把环境因素考虑进来之后,二氧化碳排放权就成了新的稀缺资源,把这种资源投入到市场交易,有利于资源整体配置效率的提高。
In the 2010, China has become No.1 emitter of greenhouse gas(Carbon Dioxide) in the world. Power plants (especially coal) has become the largest emission source of the greenhouse effect. Carbon constraints have become an important factor which will restrict the space for China’s future economic development. Through emissions trading to control, retard and improve the focus of China’s major industrial emission sources-power plants(especially coal),which is the effective way our country realize the goal of energy production-control of greenhouse gas emission object coordination and the economic and social sustainable development. In this article, based on the evolutionary game theory, we research the trading Mechanism of Carbon Dioxide Emission market by drawing on the experience of European options trading market of carbon dioxide emission.
First, the article describes the research background and research significance, taking the power plants as the object and giving priority to researching the trading Mechanism of Carbon Dioxide Emission market in the power industry,which has a very good example and high efficiency. At the same time, we review the currently domestic and international research status of carbon dioxide emission trading market and explain the main contents of this article, research frameworks and innovations briefly.
Second, the article analyzes the current carbon dioxide emission situation of power plants in China and points out the characteristics and impacts of power plants’carbon dioxide emission; meanwhile, the article analyzes the situation of the carbon dioxide emission rights market, introducing the background of carbon dioxide emissions trading market and the international carbon emissions trading market situation, then, pointing out the necessity to establish the power plants’carbon dioxide emissions trading market.Subsequently, we introduce the supporting theory for studying in this article. The most fundamental theoretical basis of this article is the value theory, property rights theory and configuration rights of the Environmental Capacity Resources; options market theory is the practical application of the carbon dioxide emission rights market; evolution game is the tool to analysis the interaction among the power plants, the public and government.
Finally, on the basis of establishing the carbon dioxide emissions trading options market of power plants, the article builds the game model among the power plants, the public and government based on evolutionary game in the carbon dioxide emissions bonds market and analyzes the result of model, obtaining if the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by power plants is the largest target of the government and the target is not realized at the cost of power plants’profits, the equilibrium point (0,1) is the optimum choice. Then the power plants, the public and government will achieve the goal with the most economical methods. And we propose the political recommendations to help power plants reduce the carbon dioxide emission.
The main significance of the article which applies the evolutionary game theory constructing the government, public, power generation companies three options in the carbon dioxide emissions trading market, to study the market trading mechanism of carbon dioxide emission market of power plants in China from the perspective of dynamic complex system, is an innovative research idea and method. A sound and effective trading mechanism of carbon dioxide emission should not only help power plants to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, improve environmental quality, but also is beneficial to the overall resource allocation efficiency when put a new scare resource ------carbon dioxide emission into market. From the economic perspective, the carbon dioxide emission can become a new scare resource when environmental factors are taken into account.
首先,本文介绍了研究背景及研究意义,把发电企业作为本文的研究对象,优先在电力行业开展研究二氧化碳排放市场交易机制的研究,具有非常好的示范作用和较高的效率。同时,综述了国内外当前针对二氧化碳排放交易市场的研究现状,并简要阐述了本文的主要内容、研究框架和创新之处。
其次,对我国发电企业二氧化碳排放的现状进行分析,指出发电企业二氧化碳排放的特点及其影响;同时,对二氧化碳排放权市场现状进行分析,介绍了二氧化碳排放权交易市场的产生的背景和国际二氧化碳排放权交易市场的现状,进而指出我国建立发电企业二氧化碳排放权交易市场的必要性;随后,对本文研究起到支撑作用的相关理论:本文最根本的理论基础是环境容量资源的价值理论、产权理论及配置理论;期权市场理论是本文二氧化碳排放权市场的设计的实践应用;演化博弈理论则是本文分析政府、发电企业、公众之间在二氧化碳排放权定价过程中相互作用的工具。
最后,本文在建立发电企业二氧化碳排放权交易期权市场的基础上,以演化博弈理论为基础构建政府、发电企业及公众在二氧化碳排放权期权市场中的博弈模型,并对模型的运算结果进行分析,得出如果减少发电企业的二氧化碳排放量是政府的最大目标且取得该目标不是以企业利润作为代价,均衡点(0,1)是最优选择,政府和发电企业、公众以最经济的方法实现这一目标的结论。并针对结论,对我国政府促进发电企业减少二氧化碳排放提出政策建议。
本文研究的主要意义在于基于动态复杂系统的视角,应用演化博弈理论构建了政府,公众、发电企业三方参与的二氧化碳排放期权交易市场,来研究我国发电企业二氧化碳排放市场的交易机制,是一种研究思路和方法的创新。一个健全、有效的二氧化碳排放权交易机制,不仅有利于有效激励发电企业减少二氧化碳排放,改善环境质量,而且从经济的角度来看,当把环境因素考虑进来之后,二氧化碳排放权就成了新的稀缺资源,把这种资源投入到市场交易,有利于资源整体配置效率的提高。
In the 2010, China has become No.1 emitter of greenhouse gas(Carbon Dioxide) in the world. Power plants (especially coal) has become the largest emission source of the greenhouse effect. Carbon constraints have become an important factor which will restrict the space for China’s future economic development. Through emissions trading to control, retard and improve the focus of China’s major industrial emission sources-power plants(especially coal),which is the effective way our country realize the goal of energy production-control of greenhouse gas emission object coordination and the economic and social sustainable development. In this article, based on the evolutionary game theory, we research the trading Mechanism of Carbon Dioxide Emission market by drawing on the experience of European options trading market of carbon dioxide emission.
First, the article describes the research background and research significance, taking the power plants as the object and giving priority to researching the trading Mechanism of Carbon Dioxide Emission market in the power industry,which has a very good example and high efficiency. At the same time, we review the currently domestic and international research status of carbon dioxide emission trading market and explain the main contents of this article, research frameworks and innovations briefly.
Second, the article analyzes the current carbon dioxide emission situation of power plants in China and points out the characteristics and impacts of power plants’carbon dioxide emission; meanwhile, the article analyzes the situation of the carbon dioxide emission rights market, introducing the background of carbon dioxide emissions trading market and the international carbon emissions trading market situation, then, pointing out the necessity to establish the power plants’carbon dioxide emissions trading market.Subsequently, we introduce the supporting theory for studying in this article. The most fundamental theoretical basis of this article is the value theory, property rights theory and configuration rights of the Environmental Capacity Resources; options market theory is the practical application of the carbon dioxide emission rights market; evolution game is the tool to analysis the interaction among the power plants, the public and government.
Finally, on the basis of establishing the carbon dioxide emissions trading options market of power plants, the article builds the game model among the power plants, the public and government based on evolutionary game in the carbon dioxide emissions bonds market and analyzes the result of model, obtaining if the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by power plants is the largest target of the government and the target is not realized at the cost of power plants’profits, the equilibrium point (0,1) is the optimum choice. Then the power plants, the public and government will achieve the goal with the most economical methods. And we propose the political recommendations to help power plants reduce the carbon dioxide emission.
The main significance of the article which applies the evolutionary game theory constructing the government, public, power generation companies three options in the carbon dioxide emissions trading market, to study the market trading mechanism of carbon dioxide emission market of power plants in China from the perspective of dynamic complex system, is an innovative research idea and method. A sound and effective trading mechanism of carbon dioxide emission should not only help power plants to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, improve environmental quality, but also is beneficial to the overall resource allocation efficiency when put a new scare resource ------carbon dioxide emission into market. From the economic perspective, the carbon dioxide emission can become a new scare resource when environmental factors are taken into account.
引文
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[2]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果[J].管理世界,2008,7:11-12.
[3] IPCC(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).Climate Change 2007:Mitigation of Climate Change [M].United Kingdom;Cambridge University press,2007:303.
[4]李寿德,王家祺.初始排污权不同分配下的交易对市场结构的影响研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(交通科学与工程版),2004,2:40-43.
[5]陈德湖.排污权交易理论及其研究综述[J].外国经济与管理,2004,5:45-49.
[6]张永宏等.排污权交易理论及其发展研究综述[J].辽宁工学院学报.2007.2:19-21.
[7]李寿德,黄桐城.交易成本条件下初始排污权免费分配的决策机制[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,8:318-321.
[8]赵海霞.不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择[J].生态经济,2004,6:51-53.
[9]赵文会.初始排污权分配理论研究综述[J].工业技术经济,2008,8:111-113.
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