食品安全的经济理论研究
|
摘要
对食品安全问题进行研究的现实意义不仅仅局限于该问题本身在我国现阶段的重要性和紧迫性,而且在更为广泛的意义下,也是为了解答如何有效保障民生、提高社会管理水平和国家软实力这一重大课题的一种具体尝试。从经济学角度考察与食品安全利益相关的参与者的经济行为,将有助于合理分析各项政策措施的效率,为政策的制定和相关制度的设计提供可靠的理论支持。就这方面的研究现状而言,对于食品安全问题的经济学分析在微观基础层面还有待深入和拓展。特别地,着眼于我国的现实情况,从企业的经济行为出发,构建清晰的微观理论框架来分析国内食品安全方面的诸多问题,就具有重大的理论意义。
从经济学理论对于产品质量的分类来看,食品安全在较大程度上具有信任品的特征,但与汽车维修、医疗等“专家服务型信任品”相比又存在一些具体的差异。本文详细阐述了“食品安全型信任品”的概念,并采取了一个多期交易框架对其进行模型化。其中,我们强调了食品安全缺陷即使在产品被购买使用一段时间后也未必能够被消费者获悉的特征。以这种刻画方式为起点,我们针对国内食品安全的几类典型现象,构建相应的理论模型进行解释,并对一些政策因素的影响进行了分析。
第一,为什么国内某些食品的质量安全水平良莠难辨?到底是高质量企业没有能力采取必要的营销手段(如定价、广告等)向消费者显示其品质,还是没有动力这么做、而宁愿与低质量者混杂于市场中?外部的经济环境如民众收入水平、收入分布结构以及舆论普遍讨论的监管水平、消费者信心等因素如何影响高质量企业的信号显示动机?我们发现,如果大多数消费者的收入偏低,高质量企业将无法通过产品定价与广告等耗散性支出成功显示其产品质量。此时,检测水平的提高或者消费者信心的提升并不能改观产品质量的显示效果,而提高这些消费者的收入是改善现状的首要任务。在此前提下,大幅提高质量检测水平或者大幅提升消费者信心,将有助于高质量者自愿做出信号显示的努力、并且总是在交易的初期阶段采取高价面向高端客户的营销手段。不过,这两者的温和提升却未必有效。因此,对于“增强外部监管”与“重塑消费者信心”的舆论呼吁,应该根据实际情况准确分析。
第二,为什么国内以乳品为代表的食品企业倾向于追逐市场份额而忽视产品质量,同时消费者在面对不同的品牌时通常更加青睐市场份额较大者?质量检测水平等监管力度的提升能否改善这一状况?我们发现,只要产品市场容量较大,同时在质量控制上投资过低的企业无法大量提供高质量产品,那么企业即使有实力充分投资,也未必有足够的动力这样做,并且总是热衷于采取低价大销量的营销策略,产品质量也因此良莠不齐。质量检测水平的提升并不会从根本上改变企业在质量投资上的不足以及对大销量的“迷恋”,但是能够增加企业充分投资的可能性,从而在平均意义上提高产品的质量水平。此外,竞争压力或市场结构的改变未必能够从根本上改变厂商追逐大销量且忽视质量控制的现状。
第三,近年来国内食品行业遭受严重的行业信任危机：一旦一家企业被曝光存在质量问题,其它没有出事的企业也会受到消费者的质疑。如何解释这一现象?外部监管如何影响行业信任危机的化解效果?我们发现,民众对于政府单方面监管水平的低信任、社会中间组织在食品安全治理中的缺位以及媒体在调查覆盖面上的不完全,是行业信任危机产生的重要原因。在此背景下,如果行业的道德败坏程度较严重,那么追逐利润的机会主义者在面对低质量的竞争对手时就会采取“近墨者黑”的策略,同样提供低质量产品。同时,在行业内某家企业因质量缺陷出事后,消费者对于幸存企业的产品质量也持怀疑态度。相对于质量检测水平的提升而言,监管覆盖面的扩大对于促使机会主义者提供高质量产品具有明确的、根本性的作用：在单方面提升检测水平生效甚微的情形中,扩大监管覆盖面却有可能化解行业信任危机；更重要的是,在监管完全覆盖全行业的前提下,再辅之以检测水平的提升,行业信任问题将能够明确得到改善。此时,只要检测水平充分高,唯利是图的机会主义者就愿意表现得和“道德者”一样,坚持提供高质量产品。
以上结果启发我们从监管覆盖面和质量检测水平两个维度对当前国内食品安全的现状进行考察。结果发现,我国的食品安全治理存在检测水平较低、监管覆盖面不足的缺陷。因此,从提高监管能力、增强监管动力的角度出发,我们的建议是：将食品安全问题作为一个试点领域和突破口,从立法、组织形态创新、政企关系等多方面入手,发挥各利益相关者的积极性和能力特长,构建一个政府、社会中间组织与市场参与者三方面合理分工并且良性互动的多主体合作的治理模式,是我国食品安全治理的未来方向。
This paper aims to construct a frame based on economic theory for explaining the interesting phenomena in China's food safety area. We first introduce the concept of'credence goods of food-safety type', and distinguish it from the traditional 'experience goods'and'credence goods of expert-service type'.
Based on this concept, we construct a multi-period purchase frame to model the economic behaviors of food firms and consumers. In this frame, the quality (safety) defect in products can only be revealed imperfectly after the first period by the external inspection agencies. Using this method, we provide an explanation for several phenomena in China's food safety area.
First, by taking into account the probability that the quality defect will be exposed, we construct a signaling model for the credence goods of food-safety type and obtain the conditions for both the separating equilibria and the possibly co-existing pooling equilibria. Our results suggest that the high quality producer will be encouraged to signal its type if the income of certain consumer group is increased or the regulation is strengthened significantly provided that the income of such group is high enough. When the ratio of the high-income consumer group is small, the high quality producer will be encouraged to signal its type if the consumers'confidence in quality is improved significantly provided that the income of the low income group is high enough. Separation will not necessarily take place when the regulation and consumers'confidence are just moderately improved. Therefore, the public voice of 'strengthen the regulation and recover the consumers'confidence'should be treated prudently.
Second, from a technological and informational perspective, we give an explanation for the ignorance of quality control and the inclination for the big sales in food industries, especially in the dairy industry. We show that the competition pressure is not the crucial reason. If the market is large enough and the capacity of high quality goods under low investment is relatively small, firms are not willing to make enough investment in the quality control and are inclined to set low price for big sales, which would be viewed by consumers as an imperfect signal of high investment. To strengthen the supervising will not change the'insufficient investment and big sales'status, but will increase the probability of high investment and therefore improve the quality on average.
Third, by using a two-period model with both adverse selection and moral hazard, we give an explanation for'the crisis of trust' in the domain food industry. We show that lack of trust in the government and the incompleteness in the inspection coverage of media are the cause of this crisis. If the ratio of immoral firms is high, those chasing profits, who would have provide safe goods without the asymmetric information, will imitate their bad competitors'behavior and produce unsafe goods. Meanwhile, consumers will not trust the survivors in the crisis. It is more important to expand the inspection coverage that to improve the testing technology for solving the crisis of trust.
Based on the analysis above, we examine the inspection coverage and testing level in China's current governing system of food safety. We show that in the current system the two indexes are both low. This implies that it is important to reconstruct our food-safety governing system to realize a wide coverage and high trust inspection with all parts relevant participating.
从经济学理论对于产品质量的分类来看,食品安全在较大程度上具有信任品的特征,但与汽车维修、医疗等“专家服务型信任品”相比又存在一些具体的差异。本文详细阐述了“食品安全型信任品”的概念,并采取了一个多期交易框架对其进行模型化。其中,我们强调了食品安全缺陷即使在产品被购买使用一段时间后也未必能够被消费者获悉的特征。以这种刻画方式为起点,我们针对国内食品安全的几类典型现象,构建相应的理论模型进行解释,并对一些政策因素的影响进行了分析。
第一,为什么国内某些食品的质量安全水平良莠难辨?到底是高质量企业没有能力采取必要的营销手段(如定价、广告等)向消费者显示其品质,还是没有动力这么做、而宁愿与低质量者混杂于市场中?外部的经济环境如民众收入水平、收入分布结构以及舆论普遍讨论的监管水平、消费者信心等因素如何影响高质量企业的信号显示动机?我们发现,如果大多数消费者的收入偏低,高质量企业将无法通过产品定价与广告等耗散性支出成功显示其产品质量。此时,检测水平的提高或者消费者信心的提升并不能改观产品质量的显示效果,而提高这些消费者的收入是改善现状的首要任务。在此前提下,大幅提高质量检测水平或者大幅提升消费者信心,将有助于高质量者自愿做出信号显示的努力、并且总是在交易的初期阶段采取高价面向高端客户的营销手段。不过,这两者的温和提升却未必有效。因此,对于“增强外部监管”与“重塑消费者信心”的舆论呼吁,应该根据实际情况准确分析。
第二,为什么国内以乳品为代表的食品企业倾向于追逐市场份额而忽视产品质量,同时消费者在面对不同的品牌时通常更加青睐市场份额较大者?质量检测水平等监管力度的提升能否改善这一状况?我们发现,只要产品市场容量较大,同时在质量控制上投资过低的企业无法大量提供高质量产品,那么企业即使有实力充分投资,也未必有足够的动力这样做,并且总是热衷于采取低价大销量的营销策略,产品质量也因此良莠不齐。质量检测水平的提升并不会从根本上改变企业在质量投资上的不足以及对大销量的“迷恋”,但是能够增加企业充分投资的可能性,从而在平均意义上提高产品的质量水平。此外,竞争压力或市场结构的改变未必能够从根本上改变厂商追逐大销量且忽视质量控制的现状。
第三,近年来国内食品行业遭受严重的行业信任危机：一旦一家企业被曝光存在质量问题,其它没有出事的企业也会受到消费者的质疑。如何解释这一现象?外部监管如何影响行业信任危机的化解效果?我们发现,民众对于政府单方面监管水平的低信任、社会中间组织在食品安全治理中的缺位以及媒体在调查覆盖面上的不完全,是行业信任危机产生的重要原因。在此背景下,如果行业的道德败坏程度较严重,那么追逐利润的机会主义者在面对低质量的竞争对手时就会采取“近墨者黑”的策略,同样提供低质量产品。同时,在行业内某家企业因质量缺陷出事后,消费者对于幸存企业的产品质量也持怀疑态度。相对于质量检测水平的提升而言,监管覆盖面的扩大对于促使机会主义者提供高质量产品具有明确的、根本性的作用：在单方面提升检测水平生效甚微的情形中,扩大监管覆盖面却有可能化解行业信任危机；更重要的是,在监管完全覆盖全行业的前提下,再辅之以检测水平的提升,行业信任问题将能够明确得到改善。此时,只要检测水平充分高,唯利是图的机会主义者就愿意表现得和“道德者”一样,坚持提供高质量产品。
以上结果启发我们从监管覆盖面和质量检测水平两个维度对当前国内食品安全的现状进行考察。结果发现,我国的食品安全治理存在检测水平较低、监管覆盖面不足的缺陷。因此,从提高监管能力、增强监管动力的角度出发,我们的建议是：将食品安全问题作为一个试点领域和突破口,从立法、组织形态创新、政企关系等多方面入手,发挥各利益相关者的积极性和能力特长,构建一个政府、社会中间组织与市场参与者三方面合理分工并且良性互动的多主体合作的治理模式,是我国食品安全治理的未来方向。
This paper aims to construct a frame based on economic theory for explaining the interesting phenomena in China's food safety area. We first introduce the concept of'credence goods of food-safety type', and distinguish it from the traditional 'experience goods'and'credence goods of expert-service type'.
Based on this concept, we construct a multi-period purchase frame to model the economic behaviors of food firms and consumers. In this frame, the quality (safety) defect in products can only be revealed imperfectly after the first period by the external inspection agencies. Using this method, we provide an explanation for several phenomena in China's food safety area.
First, by taking into account the probability that the quality defect will be exposed, we construct a signaling model for the credence goods of food-safety type and obtain the conditions for both the separating equilibria and the possibly co-existing pooling equilibria. Our results suggest that the high quality producer will be encouraged to signal its type if the income of certain consumer group is increased or the regulation is strengthened significantly provided that the income of such group is high enough. When the ratio of the high-income consumer group is small, the high quality producer will be encouraged to signal its type if the consumers'confidence in quality is improved significantly provided that the income of the low income group is high enough. Separation will not necessarily take place when the regulation and consumers'confidence are just moderately improved. Therefore, the public voice of 'strengthen the regulation and recover the consumers'confidence'should be treated prudently.
Second, from a technological and informational perspective, we give an explanation for the ignorance of quality control and the inclination for the big sales in food industries, especially in the dairy industry. We show that the competition pressure is not the crucial reason. If the market is large enough and the capacity of high quality goods under low investment is relatively small, firms are not willing to make enough investment in the quality control and are inclined to set low price for big sales, which would be viewed by consumers as an imperfect signal of high investment. To strengthen the supervising will not change the'insufficient investment and big sales'status, but will increase the probability of high investment and therefore improve the quality on average.
Third, by using a two-period model with both adverse selection and moral hazard, we give an explanation for'the crisis of trust' in the domain food industry. We show that lack of trust in the government and the incompleteness in the inspection coverage of media are the cause of this crisis. If the ratio of immoral firms is high, those chasing profits, who would have provide safe goods without the asymmetric information, will imitate their bad competitors'behavior and produce unsafe goods. Meanwhile, consumers will not trust the survivors in the crisis. It is more important to expand the inspection coverage that to improve the testing technology for solving the crisis of trust.
Based on the analysis above, we examine the inspection coverage and testing level in China's current governing system of food safety. We show that in the current system the two indexes are both low. This implies that it is important to reconstruct our food-safety governing system to realize a wide coverage and high trust inspection with all parts relevant participating.
引文
[1]曹婧,孙绍荣.惩罚性赔偿制度的博弈模型分析——以食品安全问题为例[J].经济体制改革,2010,(4)：164-166.
[2]陈华宁.欧盟、日本农产品质量安全立法及启示[J].世界农业,2007,(9)：11-14.
[3]陈锡进.中国政府食品质量安全管理的分析框架及其治理体系[J].南京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2011,(1)：29-36.
[4]陈志高.浅析违反我国食品安全法的刑事责任追究[J].法制与经济,2011,(2)：21-22.
[5]崔卓兰,宋慧宇.论我国食品安全监管方式的多元化[J].华南师范大学学报(社会科学版),2010,(3)：17-22.
[6]戴迎春.猪肉供应链垂直协作关系研究——以江苏省为例[D].南京农业大学硕士论文,2003.
[7]傅烨,郑绍濂.企业的质量、价格决策与政府干预[J].系统工程理论方法与应用,1999,(4)：43-49.
[8]高晓鸥,宋敏,刘丽军.基于质量声誉模型的乳品质量安全问题分析[J].中国畜牧杂志,2010,(10)：30-34.
[9]恭顺龙,白丽,王向阳,刘战礼.合作监管视角下的我国食品安全监管策略研究[J].消费经济,2010,(2)：79-82.
[10]郭云辉.基于政府管制视角的食品质量安全问题——以“三鹿奶粉”事件为例[J].调研世界,2009,(1)：37-39.
[11]韩俊,罗丹.食品安全监管体制的国际现状. 《中国食品安全报告》[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2007.
[12]何立华,杨淑华.食品安全问题的成因及其解决：基于政府与市场失灵的角度[J].山东经济,2011,(2)：40-45.
[13]何坪华,凌远云,周德翼.食品价值链及其对食品企业质量安全信用行为的影响[J].农业经济问题,2009,(1)：48-52.
[14]洪群联.食品安全问题的原因审视与安全保障体系的构建[J].中国流通经济,2011,(9)：67-71.
[15]胡颖廉.食品安全监管的框架分析与细节观察[J].改革,2011,(10)：147-154.
[16]蒋抒博.我国食品安全管制体系存在的问题及对策[J].经济纵横,2008,(11)：30-33.
[17]李昌玉.对我国食品安全监管体制的思考[J].长江大学学报,2010,(2)：55-59.
[18]李长健,张锋.我国食品安全多元规制模式发展研究[J].河北法学,2007,(10)：104-108.
[19]李长健,张锋.一种社会性监管模式——中国食品安全监管模式的理性回归[J].重庆社会科学,2006,(3)：117-120.
[20]李红,何坪华,刘华楠.美国政府食品安全息披露机制与经验启示[J].世界农业,2006,(4)：4-7。
[21]李红.中美食品安全信息披露对比及启示[J].世界农业,2009,(3)：1-3.
[22]李凯年,逯德山.欧美等发达国家加强食品安全管理做法及启示[J].世界农业,2006,(10)：18-20.
[23]李丽,胡伟.食品安全及其治理文献综述[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2011,(2)：26-28.
[24]李先国.发达国家食品安全监管体系及其启示[J].财贸经济,2011,(7)：91-96.
[25]李想,石磊.质量的产能约束、信息不对称与大销量倾向：以食品安全为例[J].南开经济研究,2011,(2)：42-67.
[26]李想.信任品质量的一个信号显示模型[J].世界经济文汇,2011,(1)：87-108.
[27]李艳波,刘松先.信息不对称下政府主管部门与食品企业的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2006,(14)：197-200.
[28]刘成果.中国奶业年鉴(2009)[R].北京：中国农业出版社,2009.
[29]刘呈庆,孙曰瑶,龙文军,白杨.竞争、管理与规制：乳制品企业三聚氰胺污染影响因素的实证分析[J].管理世界,2009,(12)：67-78.
[30]刘东,贾愚.食品质量安全供应链规制研究：以乳品为例[J].商业研究,2010,(2)：100-106.
[31]刘华楠,宋春祥.食品安全信用缺失原因的系统分析与治理模式[J].经济与管理研究,2006,(7)：73-76.
[32]刘江.制度逆反效应：基于中国能源、环境、食品安全与福利[J].经济体制改革,2011,(6)：170-173.
[33]刘录民.我国食品安全监管体系研究[D].西北农林科技大学博士学位论文,2009.
[34]刘鹏.中国食品安全监管——基于体制变迁与绩效评估的实证研究[J].公共管理学报,2010,(7)：63-78.
[35]刘为军,潘家荣,丁文峰.关于食品安全认识、成因及对策问题的研究综述[J].中国农村观察,2007,(5)：73-80.
[36]刘小峰,陈国华,盛昭瀚.不同供需关系下的食品安全与政府监管策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,(4)：143-150.
[37]刘亚平(a).中国式“监管国家”的问题与反思：以食品安全为例[J].政治学研究,2011,(2)：69-79.
[38]刘亚平(b).中国食品安全的监管痼疾及其纠治——对毒奶粉卷土重来的剖析[J].经济社会体制比较,2011,(3)：84-93.
[39]刘志彪.信息不对称、政府管制与企业的质量战略[J].学海,2000,(5)：64-67.
[40]吕玉花.食品生产纵向投资激励和食品安全问题[J].中国流通经济,2009,(8)：36-39.
[41]吕志轩.关于食品安全问题的研究综述：一个经济学的视角[J].德州学院学报,2009,(1)：73-80.
[42]梅新育.祸起超女营销模式[N].上海证券报,2010-10-25,(4).
[43]秦利.基于制度安排的中国食品安全治理研究[D].东北林业大学博士学位论文,2010.
[44]沈宏亮.中国规制政府的崛起：一个供给主导型制度变迁过程[J].经济学家,2011,(4)：32-39.
[45]谭颖珊.企业食品安全自我规制机制探讨——基于实证的分析[J].学术论坛,2007,(7)：90-95.
[46]王彩霞.政府监管失灵、公众预期调整与低信任陷阱——基于乳品行业质量监管的实证分析[J].宏观经济研究,2011,(2)：31-51.
[47]王虎,李长健.主流范式的危机：我国食品安全治理模式的反思与重整[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(4)：132-140.
[48]王建英,王亚楠,王子文.关于食品安全问题的研究综述[J].吉林农业科学,2009,(5)：59-64.
[49]王威,尚杰.乳制品安全事故：“信任品”的信任危机[J].社会科学家,2009,(4)：48-51.
[50]王艳林.食品安全法概论[M].北京：中国计量出版社,2005.
[51]王耀忠.食品安全监管的横向和纵向配置——食品安全监管的国际比较与启示[J].中国工业经济,2005,(12)：64-70.
[52]王耀忠.外部诱因和制度变迁：食品安全监管的制度解释[J].上海经济研究,2006,(7)：62-72.
[53]王中亮.食品安全监管体制的国际比较及其启示[J].上海经济研究,2007,(12)：19-25.
[54]王中亮.我国食品安全管理的问题与对策[J].经济纵横,2007,(11)：14-17.
[55]卫龙宝,卢光明.农业专业合作组织对农产品质量控制的作用分析——以浙江省部分农业专业合作组织为例[J].中国农村经济,2004,(2)：23-30.
[56]魏益民,刘为军.澳大利亚、新西兰食品召回体系及其借鉴[J].中国食物与营养,2005,(4)：12-16.
[57]吴修立,李树超.农产品质量安全问题中的信息不对称及其对策研究[J].当代经济管理,2008,(4)：31-33.
[58]肖志兴,胡艳芳.中国食品安全监管的激励机制[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2009,(1)：35-39.
[59]修文彦,任爱胜,冯忠泽,郝利.美日欧农产品市场准入制度对中国的启示[J].农业经济问题,2007,(增刊)：55-58.
[60]徐成德.食品安全博弈分析：信任危机的产生与消除[J].中国食物与营养,2009,(6)：19-21.
[61]薛庆根.美国食品安全体系及对我国的启示[J].经济纵横,2006,(2)：21-24.
[62]颜海娜,聂勇浩.制度选择的逻辑——我国食品安全监管体制的演变[J].公共管理学报,2009,(3)：12-25.
[63]颜海娜.我国食品安全监管体制改革——基于整体政府理论的分析[J].学术研究,2010,(5)：43-52.
[64]杨合岭,王彩霞.食品安全事故频发的成因及对策[J].统计与决策,2010,(4)：74-77.
[65]杨万江,李剑锋.城镇居民购买安全农产品的选择行为研究[J].中国食物与营养, 2005,(10)：12-15.
[66]杨在军.农村日常消费品假冒伪劣市场成因及其治理[J].调研世界,2007,(1)：23-25.
[67]叶成利,蒙向东.农产品(食品)供应链风险管理文献综述[J].农业经济问题,2007,(增刊)：200-205.
[68]尹振东,聂辉华,桂林.垂直管理与属地管理的选择：政企关系的视角[J].世界经济文汇,2011,(6)：1-10.
[69]袁文艺.食品安全管制的模式转型与政策取向[J].财经问题研究,2011,(7)：26-31.
[70]岳中刚.信息不对称、食品安全与监管制度设计[J].河北经贸大学学报,2006,(3)：36-39.
[71]臧立新.我国食品安全监管问题及对策研究[D].吉林大学博士学位论文,2010.
[72]张琥.集体信誉的理论分析——组织内部逆向选择问题[J].经济研究,2008,(2)：124-133.
[73]张蕾.关于食品质量安全经济学领域研究的文献综述[J].世界农业,2007,(11)：28-30.
[74]张利庠.产业组织、产业链整合与产业可持续发展——基于我国饲料产业“千百十调研工程”与个案企业的分析[J].管理世界,2007,(4)：78-87.
[75]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[76]张晓勇,李刚,张莉.中国消费者对食品安全的关切——对天津消费者的调查与分析[J].中国农村观察,2004,(1)：14-21.
[77]张云华,孔祥智,罗丹.安全食品供给的契约分析[J].农业经济问题,2004,(8)：80-86.
[78]张云华,马九杰,孔祥智.农户采用无公害和绿色农药行为的影响因素分析——对山西、陕西和山东巧县(市)的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2004,(1)：15-21.
[79]赵亚翔,高素英.农产品市场“柠檬”问题的解决——一个基于食品质量安全视角的文献综述[J].中国农学通报,2010,(10)：70-76.
[80]钟真,孔祥智.产业组织模式对农产品质量安全的影响：来自奶业的例证[J].管理世界,2012,(1)：79-92.
[81]周洁红.消费者对蔬菜安全的态度、认知和购买行为分析——基于浙江省城市和 城镇消费者的调查统计[J].中国农村经济,2004,(11)：44-52.
[82]周小梅.我国食品安全管制的供求分析[J].农业经济问题,2010,(9)：98-104.
[83]周应恒,霍丽玥,彭晓佳.食品安全：消费者态度、购买意愿及信息的影响——对南京市超市消费者的调查分析[J].中国农村经济,2004,(11)：53-59.
[84]周应恒,彭晓佳.江苏省城市消费者对食品安全支付意愿的实证研究——以低残留青菜为例[J].经济学(季刊),2006,(3)：1319-1342.
[85]周应恒,卓佳,谢美婧.农户交易模式与农产品质量安全标准选择——一个基于交易费用经济学视角的分析框架的介绍[J].山西农业大学学报(社会科学报),2010,(1)：44-47.
[86]周应恒,卓佳.消费者食品安全风险认知研究——基于三聚氰胺事件下南京消费者的调查[J].农业技术经济,2010,(2)：89-96.
[87]Anderson E. and K. Philipsen,1998. "The Evolution of Credence Goods in Customer Markets:Exchanging'Pigs in Pokes"[J], DRUID Working Paper,1-19.
[88]Antle J.,1999(a), "Benefits and Costs of Food Safety Regulation"[J], Food Policy,24, 605-623.
[89]Antle J.,1999(b), "The New Economics of Agriculture"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,81(5),993-1010.
[90]Antle J.,2001, "Economic Analysis of Food Safety" [M], in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 1, Eds. by Gardner B. and G. Rausser,1084-1136.
[91]Arrow K., et. al.,1996, "Is there a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation?"[J], Science,272(4),221-222.
[92]Bagwell K. and M. Riordan,1991, "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality"[J], American Economic Review,81(1),224-239.
[93]Bagwell K.,1992, "Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,1(1),151-174.
[94]Bagwell K.,2007, "The Economic Analysis of Advertising" [M], in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, Eds. by Armstrong M. and R. Porter,1701-1844.
[95]Balmaceda F.,2009, "Uncertainty, Pay for Performance, and Asymmetric Information"[J], Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization,25(2),400-441.
[96]Banerjee A.,1992, "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior"[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,107(3),797-817.
[97]Barzel Y.,1970, "Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition"[J], Journal of Political Economy,78(5),1142-1149.
[98]Becker G.,1991, "A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Prices"[J], Journal of Political Economy,99(5),1109-1116.
[99]Beggs A. and P. Klemperer,1992, "Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs"[J], Econometrica,60(3),651-666.
[100]Bikhchandani S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch,1992,"A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades"[J], Journal of Political Economy,100(5), 992-1026.
[101]Bocker A.,2002, "Consumer Response to a Food Safety Incident"[J], European Review of Agricultural Economics,29(1),29-50.
[102]Caminal R. and X. Vives,1996, "Why Market Shares Matter:An Information-Based Theory"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,27(2),221-239.
[103]Caminal R. and X. Vives,1999, "Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,8(1),95-131.
[104]Cho I. and D. Kreps,1987, "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria"[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,102(2),179-221.
[105]Coestier B., E. Gozlan, and S. Marette,2005, "On Food Companies Liability for Obesity"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,7(1),1-14.
[106]Crespi J. and S. Marette,2001, "How Should Food Safety Certification Be Financed?"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,83(4),852-861.
[107]Darby M. and E. Kami,1973, "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud"[J], Journal of Law and Economics,16(1),67-88.
[108]Daughety A. and J. Reinganum,2008, "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signalling"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,39(1),163-183.
[109]Dulleck U. and R. Kerschbamer,2003, "Price Discrimination via the Choice of Distribution Channels"[R], Working Paper 0312, Department of Economics, University of Vienna, 1-34.
[110]Dulleck U. and R. Kerschbamer,2006, "On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists:The Economics of Credence Goods"[J], Journal of Economic Literature,44(3),5-42.
[111]Dulleck U. and R. Kerschbamer,2009, "Experts vs. Discounters:Consumer Free-Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,27(1),15-23.
[112]Ekanem E., M. Mafuyai-Ekanem, F. Tegegne and S. Singh,2008, "Trust in Food Safety Information Sources:Examining Differences in Respondents' Opinions from a Three-State Survey"[J], Journal of Food Distribution Research,39(1),51-56.
[113]Ellison G. and J. Fudenberg,1993, "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning"[J], Journal of Political Economy,101(4),612-643.
[114]Emons W.,1997, "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,28(1),107-119.
[115]Emons W.,2001, "Credence Goods Monopolists"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,19(3),375-389.
[116]Ennis H.,2008, "Search, Money, and Inflation under Private Information"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,138(1),101-131.
[117]Feddersen T. and T. Gilligan,2001, "Saints and Markets:Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,10(1),149-171.
[118]Fishman M. and K. Hagerty,2003, "Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers"[J], Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization, 19(1),45-63.
[119]Fleckinger P.,2007, "Collective Reputation and Markets Structure"[R], Working Paper, 1-35.
[120]Fluet C. and P. Garella,2002, "Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,20(7),907-930.
[121]Fong Y.,2005, "When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target" [J], Rand Journal of Economics,36(1),113-130.
[122]Gabszewicz J. and J. Thisse,1979, "Price Competition, Quality and Income Disparities"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,20(3),340-359.
[123]Gale H. and D. Hu,2012, "Food Safety Pressures Push Integration in China's Agricultural Sector"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,94(2),483-488.
[124]Gersbach H.,2004, "The Money-Burning Refinement:With an Application to a Political Signalling Game"[J], International Journal of Game Theory,33(1),67-87.
[125]Gibbons R.,1992, Game Theory for Applied Economist [M]. Published by Princeton University Press.
[126]Gomes A.,2000, "Going Public without Governance:Managerial Reputation Effects"[J], Journal of Finance,55(2),615-646.
[127]Hahn S.,2004, "The Advertising of Credence Goods as a Signal of Product Quality"[J], the Manchester School,72(1),50-59.
[128]Henson S. and J. Caswell,1999, "Food Safety Regulation:An Overview of Contemporary Issues"[J], Food Policy,24,589-603.
[129]Henson S. and N. Hooker,2001, "Private Sector Management of Food Safety:Public Regulation and the Role of Private Controls"[J], International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, (4),7-17.
[130]Hertzendorf M. and P. Overgaard,2001, "Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,10(4), 621-662.
[131]Hertzendorf M.,1993, "I'm Not a High-Quality Firm-But I Play One on TV"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,24(2),236-247.
[132]Horstmann I. and G. Macdonald,1994, "When is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,3(3),561-584.
[133]Hsieh Y., H. Chiu, and M. Chiang,2005, "Maintaining a Committed Online Customer: A Study across Search-Experience-Credence Products"[J], Journal of Retailing,81(1),75-82.
[134]Inderst R.,2001, "Incentive Schemes as a Signaling Device"[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,44(4),455-465.
[135]Judd K. and M. Riordan,1994, "Price and Quality in A New Product Monopoly"[J], Review of Economic Studies,61(4),773-789.
[136]Katz M. and C. Shapiro,1986, "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities"[J], Journal of Political Economy,94(4),822-841.
[137]Kaya A.,2010, "When Does It Pay to Get Informed?"[J], International Economic Review,51(2),533-551.
[138]Kihlstrom R. and M. Riordan,1984, "Advertising as a Signal"[J], Journal of Political Economy,92(3),427-450.
[139]Klein B. and K. Leffler,1981, "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance", Journal of Political Economy,89(4),615-641.
[140]Klein N. and G. Brester,1997, "Economic Impacts of the Zero Tolerance Directive on the Cost Structure of Beef Packing Companies"[R], Discussion paper in 1997 Western Agricultural Economics Association Meetings,1-15.
[141]Klemperer P.,1987, "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,18(1),138-150.
[142]Kreps D. and R. Wilson,1982, "Reputation and Imperfect Information"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,27,253-279.
[143]Kreps D., and J. Scheinkman,1983, "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes"[J], Bell Journal of Economics,14(2),326-337.
[144]Latvala T. and J. Kola,2000, "Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Information about Food Safety and Quality:Case Beef'[J], Working Paper, IAMA World Food and Agribusiness Congress,1-6.
[145]Latvala T. and J. Kola,2003, "Impact of Information on the Demand for Credence Characteristics"[J], International Food and Agribusiness Management Review,5(2),1-12.
[146]Lawson L., J. Jenson and M. Lund,2007, "The Costs of Food Safety:a Methodological Review"[R], Working Paper,1-67.
[147]Leppamaki M. and M. Mustonen,2009, "Skill Signalling with Product Market Externality"[J], Economic Journal,119(7),1130-1142.
[148]Levine J.,2009, "The Dynamics of Collective Reputation"[R], SIEPR Discussion Paper,1-18.
[149]Linnemer L.,2002, "Price and Advertising as Signals of Quality when some Consumers are Informed"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,20(7),931-947.
[150]Linnemer L.,2008, "Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases"[J], CESIFO Working Paper 2310,1-19.
[151]Lobb A.,2005, "Consumer Trust, Risk and Food Safety:A Review"[J], Food Economics in Acta Agriculturae Scand Section C, (2),3-12.
[152]Lutz N.,1989, "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard", Rand Journal of Economics,20(2),239-255.
[153]MacDonald J. and S. Crutchfield,1996,'"Modeling the Costs of Food Safety Regulation"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,78(5),1285-1290.
[154]Mahenc P. and V. Meunier,2003, "Forward Market and Signals of Quality"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,34(3),478-494.
[155]Mahenc P.,2004, "Influence of Informed Buyers in Markets Susceptible to the Lemons Problem"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,86(3),649-659.
[156]Mailath G., M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and A. Postlewaite,1993, "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,60(2),241-276.
[157]Marette S., J. Bureau, and E. Gozlan,2000, "Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information"[J], Australian Economic Papers,39(4),426-441.
[158]Marette S., J. Crespi and A. Schiavina,1999, "The Role of Common Labeling in a Context of Asymmetric Information"[J], European Review of Agricultural Economics,26(1), 167-178.
[159]Masters W. and D. Sanogo,2002, "Welfare Gains from Quality Certification of Infant Foods:Results from a Market Experiment in Mali"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(4),974-989.
[160]McCluskey J.,2000, "A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods:An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy"[J]. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review,29(2),1-9.
[161]Mcquade T., S. Salant and J. Winfree,2008, "Quality Standard Effects on Goods with Collective Reputation and Multiple Components"[R], Working Paper,1-27.
[162]Melkonyan T. and S. Schubert,2009, "Food Safety Regulations under Ambiguity"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,91 (5),1389-1396.
[163]Mezzetti C. and T. Tsoulouhas,2000, "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract with a Privately Informed Principal"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(4),667-689.
[164]Milgrom P. and J. Roberts,1982, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,27,280-213.
[165]Milgrom P. and J. Roberts,1986, "Prices and Advertising Signals of Product Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,94(4),796-821.
[166]Mojduszka E. and J. Caswell,2000, "A Test of Nutritional Quality Signaling in Food Markets Prior to Implementation of Mandatory Labeling"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,82(2),298-309.
[167]Mojduszka E. and J. Caswell,2000, "A Test of Nutritional Quality Signaling in Food Markets Prior to Implementation of Mandatory Labeling"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,82(2),298-309.
[168]Moraga-Gonzalez J.,2000, "Quality Uncertainty and Informative Advertising"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,18(4),615-640.
[169]Nelson P.,1970, "Information and Consumer Behavior"[J], Journal of Political Economy,78(2),311-329.
[170]Nelson P.,1974, "Advertising as Information"[J], Journal of Political Economy,82(4), 729-754.
[171]Noldeke G. and L. Samuelson,1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,73(1),118-156.
[172]Ortega D., H. Wang, N. Olynk, L. Wu and J. Bai,2012, "Chinese Consumers'Demand for Food Safety Attributes:A Push for Government and Industry Regulation"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,94(2),489-495.
[173]Orzach R., P. Overgaard, and Y. Tauman,2002, "Modest Advertising Signals Strength"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,33(2),340-358.
[174]Papademas P. and T. Bintis,2006, "Food Safety Management Systems (FSMS) in the Dairy Industry"[J], International Journal of Dairy Technology,63(4),489-503.
[175]Peltzman S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation"[J], Journal of Law and Economics,19,211-240.
[176]Perri T.,2002, "Signaling versus Contingent Contracts with Costly Turnover"[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,48(4),365-374.
[177]Perrin K.,1997, "Quality Biased Technical Change:Meat Irradiation"[R], Working Paper,1-23.
[178]Pesendorfer W. and A. Wolinsky,2003, "Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice"[J], Review of Economic Studies,70(2),417-437.
[179]Pitchik C. and A. Schotter,1987, "Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission"[J], American Economic Review,77(5),1032-1036.
[180]Pitchik C. and A. Schotter,1993, "Information Transmission in Regulated Markets"[J], Canadian Journal of Economics,26(4),815-829.
[181]Ragna M. and M. Mazzocchi,2008, "Measuring the Impacts of Food Safety Regulations:A Methodological Review"[R], Discussion Paper in 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists,1-9.
[182]Riley J.,2001, "Silver Signals:Twenty Five Years of Screening and Signaling"[J], Journal of Economic Literature,39(2),432-478.
[183]Roe B. and I. Sheldon,2007, "Credence Good Labeling:The Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,89(4),1020-1033.
[184]Rouviere E. and S. Soubeyran,2008, "Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard"[R], Working Paper,1-15.
[185]Saak, A.,2011, "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation"[R], RFPRI Discussion Paper,1-14.
[186]Schmalensee R.,1978, "A Model of Advertising and Product Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,86(3),485-503.
[187]Shieh S.,1996, "Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,5(3),361-377.
[188]Smallwood, D. and J. Conlisk,1979, "Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers Are Imperfectly Informed"[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,93(1),1-23.
[189]Stigler J.,1971, "The Theory of Economic Regulation"[J], Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,2,3-21.
[190]Taylor C.,1995, "The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures"[J], Journal of Political Economy,103(1),53-74.
[191]Taylor C.,1999, "Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality"[J], Review of Economic Studies,66(3),555-578.
[192]Tirole J.,1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization [M]. Published by MIT Press.
[193]Tirole J.,1996, "A Theory of Collective Reputations"[J], Review of Economic Studies, 63(1),1-22.
[194]Valeeva N., M. Meuwissen and R. Huirne,2004, "Economics of Food Safety in Chains: a Review of General Principles"[J], Netherland Journal of Agricultural Studies,51(4),369-390.
[195]van Ravenswaay E. and J. Hoehn,1996, "The Theoretical Benefits of Food Safety Policies:A Total Economic Value Framework"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78(5),1291-1296.
[196]Vany A. and N. Frey,1981, "Stochastic Equilibrium and Capacity Utilization"[J], American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,71(2),53-57.
[197]Vany A. and T. Saving,1977, "Product Quality, Uncertainty, and Regulation:The Trucking Industry"[J], American Economic Review,67(4),583-594.
[198]Vany A. and T. Saving,1983, "The Economics of Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,91(6),979-1000.
[199]Vany A.,1976, "Uncertainty, Waiting Time, and Capacity Utilization:A Stochastic Theory of Product Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,84(3),523-542.
[200]Vettas N.,1997, "On the Informational Role of Quantities:Durable Goods and Consumer's Word-of-Mouth Communication"[J], International Economic Review,38(4),915-944.
[201]Vettas N.,1998, "Demand and Supply in New Markets:Diffusion with Bilateral Learning"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,29(1),215-233.
[202]Vettas N.,2000, "Investment Dynamics in Markets with Endogenous Demand"[J], Journal of Industrial Economics,48(2),189-203.
[203]Wilok A., M. Pun, J. Knanona and M. Aung,2004, "Consumer Attitudes, Knowledge and Behaviour:A Review of Food Safety Issues"[J], Trends in Food Science & Technology,15, 56-66.
[204]Winfree J. and J. McCluskey,2005, "Collective Reputation and Quality", American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87(1),206-213.
[205]Wolinsky A.,1983, "Prices as Signals of Product Quality"[J], Review of Economic Studies,50(4),647-658.
[206]Wolinsky A.,1993, "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts'Services"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,24(3),380-398.
[207]Yehezkel Y.,2008, "Signaling Quality in an Oligopoly when Some Consumers are Informed"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,17(4),937-972.
[208]Zhao H.,2000, "Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model"[J], Marketing Science,19(4),390-396.
[2]陈华宁.欧盟、日本农产品质量安全立法及启示[J].世界农业,2007,(9)：11-14.
[3]陈锡进.中国政府食品质量安全管理的分析框架及其治理体系[J].南京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2011,(1)：29-36.
[4]陈志高.浅析违反我国食品安全法的刑事责任追究[J].法制与经济,2011,(2)：21-22.
[5]崔卓兰,宋慧宇.论我国食品安全监管方式的多元化[J].华南师范大学学报(社会科学版),2010,(3)：17-22.
[6]戴迎春.猪肉供应链垂直协作关系研究——以江苏省为例[D].南京农业大学硕士论文,2003.
[7]傅烨,郑绍濂.企业的质量、价格决策与政府干预[J].系统工程理论方法与应用,1999,(4)：43-49.
[8]高晓鸥,宋敏,刘丽军.基于质量声誉模型的乳品质量安全问题分析[J].中国畜牧杂志,2010,(10)：30-34.
[9]恭顺龙,白丽,王向阳,刘战礼.合作监管视角下的我国食品安全监管策略研究[J].消费经济,2010,(2)：79-82.
[10]郭云辉.基于政府管制视角的食品质量安全问题——以“三鹿奶粉”事件为例[J].调研世界,2009,(1)：37-39.
[11]韩俊,罗丹.食品安全监管体制的国际现状. 《中国食品安全报告》[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2007.
[12]何立华,杨淑华.食品安全问题的成因及其解决：基于政府与市场失灵的角度[J].山东经济,2011,(2)：40-45.
[13]何坪华,凌远云,周德翼.食品价值链及其对食品企业质量安全信用行为的影响[J].农业经济问题,2009,(1)：48-52.
[14]洪群联.食品安全问题的原因审视与安全保障体系的构建[J].中国流通经济,2011,(9)：67-71.
[15]胡颖廉.食品安全监管的框架分析与细节观察[J].改革,2011,(10)：147-154.
[16]蒋抒博.我国食品安全管制体系存在的问题及对策[J].经济纵横,2008,(11)：30-33.
[17]李昌玉.对我国食品安全监管体制的思考[J].长江大学学报,2010,(2)：55-59.
[18]李长健,张锋.我国食品安全多元规制模式发展研究[J].河北法学,2007,(10)：104-108.
[19]李长健,张锋.一种社会性监管模式——中国食品安全监管模式的理性回归[J].重庆社会科学,2006,(3)：117-120.
[20]李红,何坪华,刘华楠.美国政府食品安全息披露机制与经验启示[J].世界农业,2006,(4)：4-7。
[21]李红.中美食品安全信息披露对比及启示[J].世界农业,2009,(3)：1-3.
[22]李凯年,逯德山.欧美等发达国家加强食品安全管理做法及启示[J].世界农业,2006,(10)：18-20.
[23]李丽,胡伟.食品安全及其治理文献综述[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2011,(2)：26-28.
[24]李先国.发达国家食品安全监管体系及其启示[J].财贸经济,2011,(7)：91-96.
[25]李想,石磊.质量的产能约束、信息不对称与大销量倾向：以食品安全为例[J].南开经济研究,2011,(2)：42-67.
[26]李想.信任品质量的一个信号显示模型[J].世界经济文汇,2011,(1)：87-108.
[27]李艳波,刘松先.信息不对称下政府主管部门与食品企业的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2006,(14)：197-200.
[28]刘成果.中国奶业年鉴(2009)[R].北京：中国农业出版社,2009.
[29]刘呈庆,孙曰瑶,龙文军,白杨.竞争、管理与规制：乳制品企业三聚氰胺污染影响因素的实证分析[J].管理世界,2009,(12)：67-78.
[30]刘东,贾愚.食品质量安全供应链规制研究：以乳品为例[J].商业研究,2010,(2)：100-106.
[31]刘华楠,宋春祥.食品安全信用缺失原因的系统分析与治理模式[J].经济与管理研究,2006,(7)：73-76.
[32]刘江.制度逆反效应：基于中国能源、环境、食品安全与福利[J].经济体制改革,2011,(6)：170-173.
[33]刘录民.我国食品安全监管体系研究[D].西北农林科技大学博士学位论文,2009.
[34]刘鹏.中国食品安全监管——基于体制变迁与绩效评估的实证研究[J].公共管理学报,2010,(7)：63-78.
[35]刘为军,潘家荣,丁文峰.关于食品安全认识、成因及对策问题的研究综述[J].中国农村观察,2007,(5)：73-80.
[36]刘小峰,陈国华,盛昭瀚.不同供需关系下的食品安全与政府监管策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,(4)：143-150.
[37]刘亚平(a).中国式“监管国家”的问题与反思：以食品安全为例[J].政治学研究,2011,(2)：69-79.
[38]刘亚平(b).中国食品安全的监管痼疾及其纠治——对毒奶粉卷土重来的剖析[J].经济社会体制比较,2011,(3)：84-93.
[39]刘志彪.信息不对称、政府管制与企业的质量战略[J].学海,2000,(5)：64-67.
[40]吕玉花.食品生产纵向投资激励和食品安全问题[J].中国流通经济,2009,(8)：36-39.
[41]吕志轩.关于食品安全问题的研究综述：一个经济学的视角[J].德州学院学报,2009,(1)：73-80.
[42]梅新育.祸起超女营销模式[N].上海证券报,2010-10-25,(4).
[43]秦利.基于制度安排的中国食品安全治理研究[D].东北林业大学博士学位论文,2010.
[44]沈宏亮.中国规制政府的崛起：一个供给主导型制度变迁过程[J].经济学家,2011,(4)：32-39.
[45]谭颖珊.企业食品安全自我规制机制探讨——基于实证的分析[J].学术论坛,2007,(7)：90-95.
[46]王彩霞.政府监管失灵、公众预期调整与低信任陷阱——基于乳品行业质量监管的实证分析[J].宏观经济研究,2011,(2)：31-51.
[47]王虎,李长健.主流范式的危机：我国食品安全治理模式的反思与重整[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(4)：132-140.
[48]王建英,王亚楠,王子文.关于食品安全问题的研究综述[J].吉林农业科学,2009,(5)：59-64.
[49]王威,尚杰.乳制品安全事故：“信任品”的信任危机[J].社会科学家,2009,(4)：48-51.
[50]王艳林.食品安全法概论[M].北京：中国计量出版社,2005.
[51]王耀忠.食品安全监管的横向和纵向配置——食品安全监管的国际比较与启示[J].中国工业经济,2005,(12)：64-70.
[52]王耀忠.外部诱因和制度变迁：食品安全监管的制度解释[J].上海经济研究,2006,(7)：62-72.
[53]王中亮.食品安全监管体制的国际比较及其启示[J].上海经济研究,2007,(12)：19-25.
[54]王中亮.我国食品安全管理的问题与对策[J].经济纵横,2007,(11)：14-17.
[55]卫龙宝,卢光明.农业专业合作组织对农产品质量控制的作用分析——以浙江省部分农业专业合作组织为例[J].中国农村经济,2004,(2)：23-30.
[56]魏益民,刘为军.澳大利亚、新西兰食品召回体系及其借鉴[J].中国食物与营养,2005,(4)：12-16.
[57]吴修立,李树超.农产品质量安全问题中的信息不对称及其对策研究[J].当代经济管理,2008,(4)：31-33.
[58]肖志兴,胡艳芳.中国食品安全监管的激励机制[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2009,(1)：35-39.
[59]修文彦,任爱胜,冯忠泽,郝利.美日欧农产品市场准入制度对中国的启示[J].农业经济问题,2007,(增刊)：55-58.
[60]徐成德.食品安全博弈分析：信任危机的产生与消除[J].中国食物与营养,2009,(6)：19-21.
[61]薛庆根.美国食品安全体系及对我国的启示[J].经济纵横,2006,(2)：21-24.
[62]颜海娜,聂勇浩.制度选择的逻辑——我国食品安全监管体制的演变[J].公共管理学报,2009,(3)：12-25.
[63]颜海娜.我国食品安全监管体制改革——基于整体政府理论的分析[J].学术研究,2010,(5)：43-52.
[64]杨合岭,王彩霞.食品安全事故频发的成因及对策[J].统计与决策,2010,(4)：74-77.
[65]杨万江,李剑锋.城镇居民购买安全农产品的选择行为研究[J].中国食物与营养, 2005,(10)：12-15.
[66]杨在军.农村日常消费品假冒伪劣市场成因及其治理[J].调研世界,2007,(1)：23-25.
[67]叶成利,蒙向东.农产品(食品)供应链风险管理文献综述[J].农业经济问题,2007,(增刊)：200-205.
[68]尹振东,聂辉华,桂林.垂直管理与属地管理的选择：政企关系的视角[J].世界经济文汇,2011,(6)：1-10.
[69]袁文艺.食品安全管制的模式转型与政策取向[J].财经问题研究,2011,(7)：26-31.
[70]岳中刚.信息不对称、食品安全与监管制度设计[J].河北经贸大学学报,2006,(3)：36-39.
[71]臧立新.我国食品安全监管问题及对策研究[D].吉林大学博士学位论文,2010.
[72]张琥.集体信誉的理论分析——组织内部逆向选择问题[J].经济研究,2008,(2)：124-133.
[73]张蕾.关于食品质量安全经济学领域研究的文献综述[J].世界农业,2007,(11)：28-30.
[74]张利庠.产业组织、产业链整合与产业可持续发展——基于我国饲料产业“千百十调研工程”与个案企业的分析[J].管理世界,2007,(4)：78-87.
[75]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[76]张晓勇,李刚,张莉.中国消费者对食品安全的关切——对天津消费者的调查与分析[J].中国农村观察,2004,(1)：14-21.
[77]张云华,孔祥智,罗丹.安全食品供给的契约分析[J].农业经济问题,2004,(8)：80-86.
[78]张云华,马九杰,孔祥智.农户采用无公害和绿色农药行为的影响因素分析——对山西、陕西和山东巧县(市)的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2004,(1)：15-21.
[79]赵亚翔,高素英.农产品市场“柠檬”问题的解决——一个基于食品质量安全视角的文献综述[J].中国农学通报,2010,(10)：70-76.
[80]钟真,孔祥智.产业组织模式对农产品质量安全的影响：来自奶业的例证[J].管理世界,2012,(1)：79-92.
[81]周洁红.消费者对蔬菜安全的态度、认知和购买行为分析——基于浙江省城市和 城镇消费者的调查统计[J].中国农村经济,2004,(11)：44-52.
[82]周小梅.我国食品安全管制的供求分析[J].农业经济问题,2010,(9)：98-104.
[83]周应恒,霍丽玥,彭晓佳.食品安全：消费者态度、购买意愿及信息的影响——对南京市超市消费者的调查分析[J].中国农村经济,2004,(11)：53-59.
[84]周应恒,彭晓佳.江苏省城市消费者对食品安全支付意愿的实证研究——以低残留青菜为例[J].经济学(季刊),2006,(3)：1319-1342.
[85]周应恒,卓佳,谢美婧.农户交易模式与农产品质量安全标准选择——一个基于交易费用经济学视角的分析框架的介绍[J].山西农业大学学报(社会科学报),2010,(1)：44-47.
[86]周应恒,卓佳.消费者食品安全风险认知研究——基于三聚氰胺事件下南京消费者的调查[J].农业技术经济,2010,(2)：89-96.
[87]Anderson E. and K. Philipsen,1998. "The Evolution of Credence Goods in Customer Markets:Exchanging'Pigs in Pokes"[J], DRUID Working Paper,1-19.
[88]Antle J.,1999(a), "Benefits and Costs of Food Safety Regulation"[J], Food Policy,24, 605-623.
[89]Antle J.,1999(b), "The New Economics of Agriculture"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,81(5),993-1010.
[90]Antle J.,2001, "Economic Analysis of Food Safety" [M], in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 1, Eds. by Gardner B. and G. Rausser,1084-1136.
[91]Arrow K., et. al.,1996, "Is there a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation?"[J], Science,272(4),221-222.
[92]Bagwell K. and M. Riordan,1991, "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality"[J], American Economic Review,81(1),224-239.
[93]Bagwell K.,1992, "Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,1(1),151-174.
[94]Bagwell K.,2007, "The Economic Analysis of Advertising" [M], in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, Eds. by Armstrong M. and R. Porter,1701-1844.
[95]Balmaceda F.,2009, "Uncertainty, Pay for Performance, and Asymmetric Information"[J], Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization,25(2),400-441.
[96]Banerjee A.,1992, "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior"[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,107(3),797-817.
[97]Barzel Y.,1970, "Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition"[J], Journal of Political Economy,78(5),1142-1149.
[98]Becker G.,1991, "A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Prices"[J], Journal of Political Economy,99(5),1109-1116.
[99]Beggs A. and P. Klemperer,1992, "Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs"[J], Econometrica,60(3),651-666.
[100]Bikhchandani S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch,1992,"A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades"[J], Journal of Political Economy,100(5), 992-1026.
[101]Bocker A.,2002, "Consumer Response to a Food Safety Incident"[J], European Review of Agricultural Economics,29(1),29-50.
[102]Caminal R. and X. Vives,1996, "Why Market Shares Matter:An Information-Based Theory"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,27(2),221-239.
[103]Caminal R. and X. Vives,1999, "Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,8(1),95-131.
[104]Cho I. and D. Kreps,1987, "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria"[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,102(2),179-221.
[105]Coestier B., E. Gozlan, and S. Marette,2005, "On Food Companies Liability for Obesity"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,7(1),1-14.
[106]Crespi J. and S. Marette,2001, "How Should Food Safety Certification Be Financed?"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,83(4),852-861.
[107]Darby M. and E. Kami,1973, "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud"[J], Journal of Law and Economics,16(1),67-88.
[108]Daughety A. and J. Reinganum,2008, "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signalling"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,39(1),163-183.
[109]Dulleck U. and R. Kerschbamer,2003, "Price Discrimination via the Choice of Distribution Channels"[R], Working Paper 0312, Department of Economics, University of Vienna, 1-34.
[110]Dulleck U. and R. Kerschbamer,2006, "On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists:The Economics of Credence Goods"[J], Journal of Economic Literature,44(3),5-42.
[111]Dulleck U. and R. Kerschbamer,2009, "Experts vs. Discounters:Consumer Free-Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,27(1),15-23.
[112]Ekanem E., M. Mafuyai-Ekanem, F. Tegegne and S. Singh,2008, "Trust in Food Safety Information Sources:Examining Differences in Respondents' Opinions from a Three-State Survey"[J], Journal of Food Distribution Research,39(1),51-56.
[113]Ellison G. and J. Fudenberg,1993, "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning"[J], Journal of Political Economy,101(4),612-643.
[114]Emons W.,1997, "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,28(1),107-119.
[115]Emons W.,2001, "Credence Goods Monopolists"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,19(3),375-389.
[116]Ennis H.,2008, "Search, Money, and Inflation under Private Information"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,138(1),101-131.
[117]Feddersen T. and T. Gilligan,2001, "Saints and Markets:Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,10(1),149-171.
[118]Fishman M. and K. Hagerty,2003, "Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers"[J], Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization, 19(1),45-63.
[119]Fleckinger P.,2007, "Collective Reputation and Markets Structure"[R], Working Paper, 1-35.
[120]Fluet C. and P. Garella,2002, "Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,20(7),907-930.
[121]Fong Y.,2005, "When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target" [J], Rand Journal of Economics,36(1),113-130.
[122]Gabszewicz J. and J. Thisse,1979, "Price Competition, Quality and Income Disparities"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,20(3),340-359.
[123]Gale H. and D. Hu,2012, "Food Safety Pressures Push Integration in China's Agricultural Sector"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,94(2),483-488.
[124]Gersbach H.,2004, "The Money-Burning Refinement:With an Application to a Political Signalling Game"[J], International Journal of Game Theory,33(1),67-87.
[125]Gibbons R.,1992, Game Theory for Applied Economist [M]. Published by Princeton University Press.
[126]Gomes A.,2000, "Going Public without Governance:Managerial Reputation Effects"[J], Journal of Finance,55(2),615-646.
[127]Hahn S.,2004, "The Advertising of Credence Goods as a Signal of Product Quality"[J], the Manchester School,72(1),50-59.
[128]Henson S. and J. Caswell,1999, "Food Safety Regulation:An Overview of Contemporary Issues"[J], Food Policy,24,589-603.
[129]Henson S. and N. Hooker,2001, "Private Sector Management of Food Safety:Public Regulation and the Role of Private Controls"[J], International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, (4),7-17.
[130]Hertzendorf M. and P. Overgaard,2001, "Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,10(4), 621-662.
[131]Hertzendorf M.,1993, "I'm Not a High-Quality Firm-But I Play One on TV"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,24(2),236-247.
[132]Horstmann I. and G. Macdonald,1994, "When is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,3(3),561-584.
[133]Hsieh Y., H. Chiu, and M. Chiang,2005, "Maintaining a Committed Online Customer: A Study across Search-Experience-Credence Products"[J], Journal of Retailing,81(1),75-82.
[134]Inderst R.,2001, "Incentive Schemes as a Signaling Device"[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,44(4),455-465.
[135]Judd K. and M. Riordan,1994, "Price and Quality in A New Product Monopoly"[J], Review of Economic Studies,61(4),773-789.
[136]Katz M. and C. Shapiro,1986, "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities"[J], Journal of Political Economy,94(4),822-841.
[137]Kaya A.,2010, "When Does It Pay to Get Informed?"[J], International Economic Review,51(2),533-551.
[138]Kihlstrom R. and M. Riordan,1984, "Advertising as a Signal"[J], Journal of Political Economy,92(3),427-450.
[139]Klein B. and K. Leffler,1981, "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance", Journal of Political Economy,89(4),615-641.
[140]Klein N. and G. Brester,1997, "Economic Impacts of the Zero Tolerance Directive on the Cost Structure of Beef Packing Companies"[R], Discussion paper in 1997 Western Agricultural Economics Association Meetings,1-15.
[141]Klemperer P.,1987, "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,18(1),138-150.
[142]Kreps D. and R. Wilson,1982, "Reputation and Imperfect Information"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,27,253-279.
[143]Kreps D., and J. Scheinkman,1983, "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes"[J], Bell Journal of Economics,14(2),326-337.
[144]Latvala T. and J. Kola,2000, "Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Information about Food Safety and Quality:Case Beef'[J], Working Paper, IAMA World Food and Agribusiness Congress,1-6.
[145]Latvala T. and J. Kola,2003, "Impact of Information on the Demand for Credence Characteristics"[J], International Food and Agribusiness Management Review,5(2),1-12.
[146]Lawson L., J. Jenson and M. Lund,2007, "The Costs of Food Safety:a Methodological Review"[R], Working Paper,1-67.
[147]Leppamaki M. and M. Mustonen,2009, "Skill Signalling with Product Market Externality"[J], Economic Journal,119(7),1130-1142.
[148]Levine J.,2009, "The Dynamics of Collective Reputation"[R], SIEPR Discussion Paper,1-18.
[149]Linnemer L.,2002, "Price and Advertising as Signals of Quality when some Consumers are Informed"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,20(7),931-947.
[150]Linnemer L.,2008, "Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases"[J], CESIFO Working Paper 2310,1-19.
[151]Lobb A.,2005, "Consumer Trust, Risk and Food Safety:A Review"[J], Food Economics in Acta Agriculturae Scand Section C, (2),3-12.
[152]Lutz N.,1989, "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard", Rand Journal of Economics,20(2),239-255.
[153]MacDonald J. and S. Crutchfield,1996,'"Modeling the Costs of Food Safety Regulation"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,78(5),1285-1290.
[154]Mahenc P. and V. Meunier,2003, "Forward Market and Signals of Quality"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,34(3),478-494.
[155]Mahenc P.,2004, "Influence of Informed Buyers in Markets Susceptible to the Lemons Problem"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,86(3),649-659.
[156]Mailath G., M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and A. Postlewaite,1993, "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,60(2),241-276.
[157]Marette S., J. Bureau, and E. Gozlan,2000, "Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information"[J], Australian Economic Papers,39(4),426-441.
[158]Marette S., J. Crespi and A. Schiavina,1999, "The Role of Common Labeling in a Context of Asymmetric Information"[J], European Review of Agricultural Economics,26(1), 167-178.
[159]Masters W. and D. Sanogo,2002, "Welfare Gains from Quality Certification of Infant Foods:Results from a Market Experiment in Mali"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(4),974-989.
[160]McCluskey J.,2000, "A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods:An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy"[J]. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review,29(2),1-9.
[161]Mcquade T., S. Salant and J. Winfree,2008, "Quality Standard Effects on Goods with Collective Reputation and Multiple Components"[R], Working Paper,1-27.
[162]Melkonyan T. and S. Schubert,2009, "Food Safety Regulations under Ambiguity"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,91 (5),1389-1396.
[163]Mezzetti C. and T. Tsoulouhas,2000, "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract with a Privately Informed Principal"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(4),667-689.
[164]Milgrom P. and J. Roberts,1982, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,27,280-213.
[165]Milgrom P. and J. Roberts,1986, "Prices and Advertising Signals of Product Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,94(4),796-821.
[166]Mojduszka E. and J. Caswell,2000, "A Test of Nutritional Quality Signaling in Food Markets Prior to Implementation of Mandatory Labeling"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,82(2),298-309.
[167]Mojduszka E. and J. Caswell,2000, "A Test of Nutritional Quality Signaling in Food Markets Prior to Implementation of Mandatory Labeling"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,82(2),298-309.
[168]Moraga-Gonzalez J.,2000, "Quality Uncertainty and Informative Advertising"[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization,18(4),615-640.
[169]Nelson P.,1970, "Information and Consumer Behavior"[J], Journal of Political Economy,78(2),311-329.
[170]Nelson P.,1974, "Advertising as Information"[J], Journal of Political Economy,82(4), 729-754.
[171]Noldeke G. and L. Samuelson,1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets"[J], Journal of Economic Theory,73(1),118-156.
[172]Ortega D., H. Wang, N. Olynk, L. Wu and J. Bai,2012, "Chinese Consumers'Demand for Food Safety Attributes:A Push for Government and Industry Regulation"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,94(2),489-495.
[173]Orzach R., P. Overgaard, and Y. Tauman,2002, "Modest Advertising Signals Strength"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,33(2),340-358.
[174]Papademas P. and T. Bintis,2006, "Food Safety Management Systems (FSMS) in the Dairy Industry"[J], International Journal of Dairy Technology,63(4),489-503.
[175]Peltzman S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation"[J], Journal of Law and Economics,19,211-240.
[176]Perri T.,2002, "Signaling versus Contingent Contracts with Costly Turnover"[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,48(4),365-374.
[177]Perrin K.,1997, "Quality Biased Technical Change:Meat Irradiation"[R], Working Paper,1-23.
[178]Pesendorfer W. and A. Wolinsky,2003, "Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice"[J], Review of Economic Studies,70(2),417-437.
[179]Pitchik C. and A. Schotter,1987, "Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission"[J], American Economic Review,77(5),1032-1036.
[180]Pitchik C. and A. Schotter,1993, "Information Transmission in Regulated Markets"[J], Canadian Journal of Economics,26(4),815-829.
[181]Ragna M. and M. Mazzocchi,2008, "Measuring the Impacts of Food Safety Regulations:A Methodological Review"[R], Discussion Paper in 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists,1-9.
[182]Riley J.,2001, "Silver Signals:Twenty Five Years of Screening and Signaling"[J], Journal of Economic Literature,39(2),432-478.
[183]Roe B. and I. Sheldon,2007, "Credence Good Labeling:The Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,89(4),1020-1033.
[184]Rouviere E. and S. Soubeyran,2008, "Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard"[R], Working Paper,1-15.
[185]Saak, A.,2011, "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation"[R], RFPRI Discussion Paper,1-14.
[186]Schmalensee R.,1978, "A Model of Advertising and Product Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,86(3),485-503.
[187]Shieh S.,1996, "Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,5(3),361-377.
[188]Smallwood, D. and J. Conlisk,1979, "Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers Are Imperfectly Informed"[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,93(1),1-23.
[189]Stigler J.,1971, "The Theory of Economic Regulation"[J], Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,2,3-21.
[190]Taylor C.,1995, "The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures"[J], Journal of Political Economy,103(1),53-74.
[191]Taylor C.,1999, "Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality"[J], Review of Economic Studies,66(3),555-578.
[192]Tirole J.,1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization [M]. Published by MIT Press.
[193]Tirole J.,1996, "A Theory of Collective Reputations"[J], Review of Economic Studies, 63(1),1-22.
[194]Valeeva N., M. Meuwissen and R. Huirne,2004, "Economics of Food Safety in Chains: a Review of General Principles"[J], Netherland Journal of Agricultural Studies,51(4),369-390.
[195]van Ravenswaay E. and J. Hoehn,1996, "The Theoretical Benefits of Food Safety Policies:A Total Economic Value Framework"[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78(5),1291-1296.
[196]Vany A. and N. Frey,1981, "Stochastic Equilibrium and Capacity Utilization"[J], American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,71(2),53-57.
[197]Vany A. and T. Saving,1977, "Product Quality, Uncertainty, and Regulation:The Trucking Industry"[J], American Economic Review,67(4),583-594.
[198]Vany A. and T. Saving,1983, "The Economics of Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,91(6),979-1000.
[199]Vany A.,1976, "Uncertainty, Waiting Time, and Capacity Utilization:A Stochastic Theory of Product Quality"[J], Journal of Political Economy,84(3),523-542.
[200]Vettas N.,1997, "On the Informational Role of Quantities:Durable Goods and Consumer's Word-of-Mouth Communication"[J], International Economic Review,38(4),915-944.
[201]Vettas N.,1998, "Demand and Supply in New Markets:Diffusion with Bilateral Learning"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,29(1),215-233.
[202]Vettas N.,2000, "Investment Dynamics in Markets with Endogenous Demand"[J], Journal of Industrial Economics,48(2),189-203.
[203]Wilok A., M. Pun, J. Knanona and M. Aung,2004, "Consumer Attitudes, Knowledge and Behaviour:A Review of Food Safety Issues"[J], Trends in Food Science & Technology,15, 56-66.
[204]Winfree J. and J. McCluskey,2005, "Collective Reputation and Quality", American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87(1),206-213.
[205]Wolinsky A.,1983, "Prices as Signals of Product Quality"[J], Review of Economic Studies,50(4),647-658.
[206]Wolinsky A.,1993, "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts'Services"[J], Rand Journal of Economics,24(3),380-398.
[207]Yehezkel Y.,2008, "Signaling Quality in an Oligopoly when Some Consumers are Informed"[J], Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,17(4),937-972.
[208]Zhao H.,2000, "Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model"[J], Marketing Science,19(4),390-396.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |