四次《日俄密约》对中国东北及蒙古地区的影响
摘要
20世纪初,日本的大陆政策和俄国的远东政策在中国和朝鲜问题上发生了严重的碰撞,由此引发了日俄战争。1905年俄国战败,在美国的斡旋下于同年9月与日本签订了《朴茨茅斯和约》,被迫将其在中国东北南部地区的利益拱手让予日本,从而形成日俄分据中国东北的格局。
战争的巨大消耗引发了日俄两国的经济危机和社会动荡。不堪重负的日俄两国在美国企图揳入东北的威胁下,以及受英、法、德三国微妙关系的影响,从对抗转向联合。1907——1916年的十年里,日俄陆续签订了四次划分在华势力范围的“密约”。在四次“密约”的保护下,俄国不仅保住了在中国东北北部地区利益,并将势力扩展到整个蒙古地区;日本则获得了中国东北南部及内蒙古的部分地区的“特殊利益”。
四次“密约”的相继签订使日俄同盟日益巩固,并且导致日俄对中国侵略的加深,这就迫使中国政府不断地调整在中国东北及蒙古地区实施的外交政策,从“以夷制夷”到“均势”外交,再到“妥协性”外交。然而,无论怎样调整,终因国力衰微,无法摆脱被人宰割的命运。
"The Russian and Japanese secret treaty" was the mutual compromise and collaboration of Japan and Russia in Northeast China and Mongolia issues. "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" protected the successful implementation of a series treaties that China signed with Japan and Russia about northeastern China and Mongolia. With the signing of four "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan", the Chinese government's foreign policy in northeast China and Mongolia had been compelled to change accordingly.
This paper is divided into four parts.
The first part, comments on the Russo-Japanese War to understand the aggressive nature of these two imperialist countries and further analysis of the actual nature of the treaty.
Japan's mainland policy and the Russian Far East policies were all formed in the 19th century and identified as the basic national policy. The essence and the goal were the same in two policies both were external aggression and expansion and domination in Northeast Asia. Thus in the process of implementing it brought untold suffering to China, North Korea and the whole Asia. Brutal struggle between the two policies was mainstream, but also had compromise and collaboration. 1904--1905 the Russo-Japanese War ended in a Russian defeat, But China and North Korea is the most harm.
"The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" and the Russo-Japanese War were inextricably linked and for the predatory interests in China, "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" was the continuation of the Russo-Japanese War and another way of looting began for china.
The second part,mainly analysis the reasons of the two from war to peace.
Japan and Russia all had the desire of peace. Russia hoped to avoid war before the war. After "1901" , whether Russia withdraw its troops from the northeast of china and took what policy to North Korea it directly affected the development of relations with Japan. At the beginning, Army Secretary Robin Robat beleived that to eased the contradictions only by withdrawing Russian troops. So Russia signed "Settlement Northeast Treaty "in April 1902 with the Chinese government on the withdrawal of Russia from the northeast region of China. But Bezobrazov Minister commented that withdrawal would lead to war. The Japanese Congress would underestimated Russia's strength, in turn, made increasing demands on Russia to speed up the outbreak of war. So Czar took a new defensive approach massed troops in the "Manchukuo".
After the War, Japan and Russia all would like to improve relations between the two countries. Russia was continuation of the pre-war attitude. From the signed of the treaty to the candidates in Japan had all demonstrated their desire to pro-Japanese. The attitude of the Japanese government to improve relations between the two countries was also very positive. Two former prime ministers had expressed their support.
Peace was the only means to resolve the contradiction after Russo-Japanese war. Japan's fiscal deficit triggered the anti-war movement led by socialist pioneers Kotoku Chaplain and Hibiya incident of opposed peace talks. Russia's defeat and the economic crisis led to the 1905 revolution and national self-determination and national liberation movements. Domestic volatile situation in the two governments can not afford to make the new round of fighting.
The delicate relations among Britain, Germany and France impacted on the relations improvement of the two. Before Russo-Japanese War, Britain took Russia as a strong competitor and allianced with Japan against Russia. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's strength greatly reduced, did not threat to the United Kingdom. Contradictions of Germany and Britain became the main contradictions. To fight Germany, the United Kingdom seeked ways to improve relations with Russia with France as the mediator and demanded its allies Japan consistent with it. It was also an important factor in the improvement of relations between Japan and Russia.
The United States was trying to meddle in northeast of China to speed up the joint of Russia and Japan. Before Russo-Japanese war, the United States actively supported Japan in order to break the situation of the Russian unified northeast. After the war Japan's strength grew, the United States would no longer be allowed to meddle in the Northeast, but isolated. Russia's southern region of the Northeast was lost and greatly reduced strength. To protect its northern region in the northeast Russia also strongly resisted the U.S. intervention in this area. Russia and Japan reached a consensus on the issue.
The third part, this chapter are mainly focus on the reasons of the last three "secret treaty" signed, analysis of the "secret treaty" and Russia and Japan plunder northeast of China and Mongolia under the "secret treaty ".
The first " secret treaty " promoted Russia and Japan‘s plundering in northeast China. Japan got the rights of the Northeast Railway, mining and other rights. Russia got Heilongjiang and jilin Provinces’forest logging, mineral exploration and other rights through northeast railway companies. and Russia signed the "provincial railway public boards" with the Chinese government which got the executive power of Harbin, Manchuria, etc. along railway. China implemented restructuring in the northeast region to resist aggression.
The first "secret treaty " could not enable the United States to abandon its ambition to invade Northeast of China. The new president Taft raised money diplomacy hoping to rely on Knox plans to attain the goal of "open door" .The results contributed to the second signing of the "secret treaty ". According to the principle of mutual support in the "secret treaty ", Japan actively cooperated with Russia to revise the treaty campaign.
Outer Mongolia was trying to make Inner Mongolia in its territory, This excited Russian ambitions and Japan had been a worry. In order not to break the balance of power between Russia and Mongolia in the northeast. Japan proposed to sign the third "secret treaty " to differentiate inner Mongolia as the main content. Accordingly, Japan and Russia had extended stretching to Inner Mongolia region. Russia used Mongolian bandits to"independent" for the privilege. Japan had adopted the "contract" and the "Treaty on the South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia,"to comprehensive control Northeast China and Inner Mongolia region.
With the expansion of its sphere of influence in China, Japan's expandtion ambition was no limits. The outbreak of warⅠmade Japan overjoyed.While other powers had no time to the East. Japan made the "21"to subjugate China , but British was against it shaking the "Anglo-Japanese Alliance"."The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" appeared particularly important. Russia's arms at this time was very dependent on Japan.Japan had found it necessary to strengthen the friendly relations with Russia. In July 1916 Russia and Japan signed the fourth "secret treaty" .But good things never last, the outbreak of the Russian October Revolution in 1917, the "secret treaty" automatically was neutralized. Japan had to search for new partners.
The fifth Part,the influence of "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" to China's foreign policy. After the Opium War, the Chinese government had pursued "powers to restrict them" foreign policy. After the first "secret treaty " Japan and Russian entrenched the northeast. In view of the alliance established the Chinese government sought to introduce European capital (primarily the United States) to contain Russia and Japan for "balance of power". It was failure due to the opposition of Russia and Japan. In the subsequent nine years, Japan and Russia had been signed three "secret treaty " and the strength of the two countries increased and expanded its sphere of influence in Mongolia. Not allowed any third country to meddle. The "balance of power" diplomacy had feasibility. The Chinese government took compromising foreign policy .Dealing with autonomy of Outer Mongolia became even more Obviously.
"The Russian and Japanese secret treaty" was the protective umbrella of the Russo-Japanese aggression against China. Japan and Russia infringed upon China's sovereignty using the "secret treaty ". The Chinese government forced continued to adjust its foreign policy. We can see the Russo-Japanese aggression unlimited desires with "Secret treaty ", but also see China's diplomatic helplessness. But we must not only remain in the understanding of China's influence.From the reasons of "secret" signed, the process of signing, the content, it relates to the Northeast Asia, as well as more than half of the world. "The British and French Compact", "Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty," "The French and Japanese Agreement" , "The British and Russian agreement" was all inextricably linked.The international relations of these treaties had continued to build a post-war period. Therefore, it can be said that the "The Russian and Japanese secret treaty" was an important indicator of the pre-warⅠ.
战争的巨大消耗引发了日俄两国的经济危机和社会动荡。不堪重负的日俄两国在美国企图揳入东北的威胁下,以及受英、法、德三国微妙关系的影响,从对抗转向联合。1907——1916年的十年里,日俄陆续签订了四次划分在华势力范围的“密约”。在四次“密约”的保护下,俄国不仅保住了在中国东北北部地区利益,并将势力扩展到整个蒙古地区;日本则获得了中国东北南部及内蒙古的部分地区的“特殊利益”。
四次“密约”的相继签订使日俄同盟日益巩固,并且导致日俄对中国侵略的加深,这就迫使中国政府不断地调整在中国东北及蒙古地区实施的外交政策,从“以夷制夷”到“均势”外交,再到“妥协性”外交。然而,无论怎样调整,终因国力衰微,无法摆脱被人宰割的命运。
"The Russian and Japanese secret treaty" was the mutual compromise and collaboration of Japan and Russia in Northeast China and Mongolia issues. "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" protected the successful implementation of a series treaties that China signed with Japan and Russia about northeastern China and Mongolia. With the signing of four "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan", the Chinese government's foreign policy in northeast China and Mongolia had been compelled to change accordingly.
This paper is divided into four parts.
The first part, comments on the Russo-Japanese War to understand the aggressive nature of these two imperialist countries and further analysis of the actual nature of the treaty.
Japan's mainland policy and the Russian Far East policies were all formed in the 19th century and identified as the basic national policy. The essence and the goal were the same in two policies both were external aggression and expansion and domination in Northeast Asia. Thus in the process of implementing it brought untold suffering to China, North Korea and the whole Asia. Brutal struggle between the two policies was mainstream, but also had compromise and collaboration. 1904--1905 the Russo-Japanese War ended in a Russian defeat, But China and North Korea is the most harm.
"The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" and the Russo-Japanese War were inextricably linked and for the predatory interests in China, "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" was the continuation of the Russo-Japanese War and another way of looting began for china.
The second part,mainly analysis the reasons of the two from war to peace.
Japan and Russia all had the desire of peace. Russia hoped to avoid war before the war. After "1901" , whether Russia withdraw its troops from the northeast of china and took what policy to North Korea it directly affected the development of relations with Japan. At the beginning, Army Secretary Robin Robat beleived that to eased the contradictions only by withdrawing Russian troops. So Russia signed "Settlement Northeast Treaty "in April 1902 with the Chinese government on the withdrawal of Russia from the northeast region of China. But Bezobrazov Minister commented that withdrawal would lead to war. The Japanese Congress would underestimated Russia's strength, in turn, made increasing demands on Russia to speed up the outbreak of war. So Czar took a new defensive approach massed troops in the "Manchukuo".
After the War, Japan and Russia all would like to improve relations between the two countries. Russia was continuation of the pre-war attitude. From the signed of the treaty to the candidates in Japan had all demonstrated their desire to pro-Japanese. The attitude of the Japanese government to improve relations between the two countries was also very positive. Two former prime ministers had expressed their support.
Peace was the only means to resolve the contradiction after Russo-Japanese war. Japan's fiscal deficit triggered the anti-war movement led by socialist pioneers Kotoku Chaplain and Hibiya incident of opposed peace talks. Russia's defeat and the economic crisis led to the 1905 revolution and national self-determination and national liberation movements. Domestic volatile situation in the two governments can not afford to make the new round of fighting.
The delicate relations among Britain, Germany and France impacted on the relations improvement of the two. Before Russo-Japanese War, Britain took Russia as a strong competitor and allianced with Japan against Russia. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's strength greatly reduced, did not threat to the United Kingdom. Contradictions of Germany and Britain became the main contradictions. To fight Germany, the United Kingdom seeked ways to improve relations with Russia with France as the mediator and demanded its allies Japan consistent with it. It was also an important factor in the improvement of relations between Japan and Russia.
The United States was trying to meddle in northeast of China to speed up the joint of Russia and Japan. Before Russo-Japanese war, the United States actively supported Japan in order to break the situation of the Russian unified northeast. After the war Japan's strength grew, the United States would no longer be allowed to meddle in the Northeast, but isolated. Russia's southern region of the Northeast was lost and greatly reduced strength. To protect its northern region in the northeast Russia also strongly resisted the U.S. intervention in this area. Russia and Japan reached a consensus on the issue.
The third part, this chapter are mainly focus on the reasons of the last three "secret treaty" signed, analysis of the "secret treaty" and Russia and Japan plunder northeast of China and Mongolia under the "secret treaty ".
The first " secret treaty " promoted Russia and Japan‘s plundering in northeast China. Japan got the rights of the Northeast Railway, mining and other rights. Russia got Heilongjiang and jilin Provinces’forest logging, mineral exploration and other rights through northeast railway companies. and Russia signed the "provincial railway public boards" with the Chinese government which got the executive power of Harbin, Manchuria, etc. along railway. China implemented restructuring in the northeast region to resist aggression.
The first "secret treaty " could not enable the United States to abandon its ambition to invade Northeast of China. The new president Taft raised money diplomacy hoping to rely on Knox plans to attain the goal of "open door" .The results contributed to the second signing of the "secret treaty ". According to the principle of mutual support in the "secret treaty ", Japan actively cooperated with Russia to revise the treaty campaign.
Outer Mongolia was trying to make Inner Mongolia in its territory, This excited Russian ambitions and Japan had been a worry. In order not to break the balance of power between Russia and Mongolia in the northeast. Japan proposed to sign the third "secret treaty " to differentiate inner Mongolia as the main content. Accordingly, Japan and Russia had extended stretching to Inner Mongolia region. Russia used Mongolian bandits to"independent" for the privilege. Japan had adopted the "contract" and the "Treaty on the South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia,"to comprehensive control Northeast China and Inner Mongolia region.
With the expansion of its sphere of influence in China, Japan's expandtion ambition was no limits. The outbreak of warⅠmade Japan overjoyed.While other powers had no time to the East. Japan made the "21"to subjugate China , but British was against it shaking the "Anglo-Japanese Alliance"."The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" appeared particularly important. Russia's arms at this time was very dependent on Japan.Japan had found it necessary to strengthen the friendly relations with Russia. In July 1916 Russia and Japan signed the fourth "secret treaty" .But good things never last, the outbreak of the Russian October Revolution in 1917, the "secret treaty" automatically was neutralized. Japan had to search for new partners.
The fifth Part,the influence of "The secret treaty of Russian and Japan" to China's foreign policy. After the Opium War, the Chinese government had pursued "powers to restrict them" foreign policy. After the first "secret treaty " Japan and Russian entrenched the northeast. In view of the alliance established the Chinese government sought to introduce European capital (primarily the United States) to contain Russia and Japan for "balance of power". It was failure due to the opposition of Russia and Japan. In the subsequent nine years, Japan and Russia had been signed three "secret treaty " and the strength of the two countries increased and expanded its sphere of influence in Mongolia. Not allowed any third country to meddle. The "balance of power" diplomacy had feasibility. The Chinese government took compromising foreign policy .Dealing with autonomy of Outer Mongolia became even more Obviously.
"The Russian and Japanese secret treaty" was the protective umbrella of the Russo-Japanese aggression against China. Japan and Russia infringed upon China's sovereignty using the "secret treaty ". The Chinese government forced continued to adjust its foreign policy. We can see the Russo-Japanese aggression unlimited desires with "Secret treaty ", but also see China's diplomatic helplessness. But we must not only remain in the understanding of China's influence.From the reasons of "secret" signed, the process of signing, the content, it relates to the Northeast Asia, as well as more than half of the world. "The British and French Compact", "Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty," "The French and Japanese Agreement" , "The British and Russian agreement" was all inextricably linked.The international relations of these treaties had continued to build a post-war period. Therefore, it can be said that the "The Russian and Japanese secret treaty" was an important indicator of the pre-warⅠ.
引文
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