农业水资源有效配置的经济分析
|
摘要
本论文从经济学角度研究农业水资源有效配置之道。中国的治水历史与华夏文明一样源远流长,其中农业水资源的合理配置和有效利用历来是中国治水事务中最为紧要的方面。二十世纪下半叶以来,持续的人口增长和快速的工业化进程,加剧了水资源利用的竞争性和水环境的恶化,使水资源短缺问题日益突出。农业占社会总用水量的70%,提高其水资源配置效率成为中国水资源可持续利用的第一要务。
随着中国向市场经济转型的快速推进,引入市场机制、创新配置手段来优化水资源配置的思路,得到理论界和实践界的广泛认同。水权和水市场自然被视为农业水资源有效配置的关键。问题是,在交易成本普遍存在的现实世界,农业水资源具有自然流动性、生命资源、经济资源和生态资源等多重属性,决定了完全界定产权的成本是非常高的,甚至是不可能的,总有难以界定的权利留在“公共领域”,因而,水权及其交易市场可能并不是唯一的主要问题;相对的,由一定的组织和集体行动协调机制将剩余权利所蕴涵的资源价值内部化为组织租金,可能是以最小化的交易成本实现水资源有效配置的更为现实的办法。本论文从寻求农业水资源配置低效率的根源而起,在回顾和反思相关研究成果基础上,采用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法,运用交易费用理论、产权理论、集体选择理论、福利经济学等理论,构建了以交易成本为中心的农业水资源配置分析框架,展开了对农业水资源有效配置的经济分析。本论文的内容结构安排如下:
第1章导论旨在提出问题和介绍研究思路。本章概述了本论文研究背景,指出当代中国正面临着水资源危机和用水低效率并存的矛盾。在评论和反思相关研究成果的基础上,文章指出对农业水资源配置的组织条件认识的缺乏制约了人们对农业水资源配置低效率根源的理解和突破困境思路的拓展。然后,本章交代了本论文研究思路、假设、方法、内容,以及可能的创新。
第2章构建农业水资源有效配置的理论分析框架。本章以新制度经济学、农业经济学、水利工程学等理论为基础,从交易契约的角度界定了农业水资源的交易特性,并以此为逻辑起点,采用交易成本分析方法,以产权理论、交易成本组织理论、福利经济学等理论为支撑,构建了农业水资源有效配置的理论分析框架,阐释农业水资源交易特性、水权制度、组织结构、组织行为和配置绩效之间的因果互动关系。
第3章研究农业水权制度有效性决定的内在机理。本章在回顾现代产权理论关于产权制度影响资源配置效率的机理基础上,探讨了农业水资源交易特性是如何影响农业水权制度的资源配置效率的;进而,构造了农业水权制度有效性分析模型,论证了农业水权制度有效性决定的内在机理:有效反映水资源交易特性及其相对价值的变化并被良好执行的水权制度才有可能激励配置决策者有效地配置农业水资源。针对中国灌区农业水权制度现状,运用模型解释了农业水权制度非效率的成因。最后,本章提出并论证了构建可交易农业水权制度和扁平化水权结构的设想。
第4章研究农业水资源配置组织的选择理论。本章从农业水资源配置组织的契约性质出发,探讨了配置组织有效边界的决定问题;根据组织治理结构与交易特性相匹配的交易成本最小化效率原则,本章提出农业水资源配置决策的交易成本最小化的组织结构将是相对有效率的,从而可以最大化农业水资源配置的社会福利,据此构建了农业水资源配置组织有效性分析模型,并运用模型分析了现行农业水资源配置组织存在的缺陷及其运行低效率的成因;进而,本章提出构建多元合作治理的农业水资源配置组织结构的思路。
第5章是农业水资源配置机制有效性的比较分析。在比较分析不同配置机制特点的基础上,构造农业水资源配置机制有效性分析模型,论证了任何单一的配置机制都不可能实现农业水资源的有效配置,政府管制的市场配置机制是可能的有效机制;并通过经验实证分析了农业水价的政府决定机制的非效率;提出并论证了构建农业水资源特许经营配置机制有利于农业水资源的有效配置。
第6章是农业水资源配置组织有效运行的机制分析。本章从农民用水户组织发展现状出发,主要采用交易成本理论和集体行动的逻辑理论,解析了农民用水户组织是完善农业水资源配置组织体系、大规模节约交易成本的制度需求。在对灌区农民用水者协会发展困境实证分析基础上,指出组织定位、产权明晰度、制度供给和财政自生能力是制约农民用水户组织生存和发展能力的重要因素。基于此,提出中国农民用水户组织有效发展的对策。
第7章是基于农户的水资源配置行为实证研究。本章根据灌区农户灌溉用水的微观数据,采用计量分析方法,以交易成本和集体行动合约选择为核心,分析了农业水资源配置行为选择的影响因素及其内在机理,实证了现实经济制度条件下,农民联户合作灌溉组织是以最小化的交易成本实现农业水资源配置的有效组织形式。从微观层面揭示了适当的水资源配置组织是农业水资源有效配置的关键。
第8章是本论文的研究结论和政策建议。这一章归纳本研究的重要结论和观点,并对提高中国农业水资源配置的有效性提出具体政策建议,包括构建扁平化的农业水权结构,加快可交易的水权制度建设,构建农业水资源多元合作治理结构,实施农业水资源特许经营配置机制,强化政府在农业水权制度、交易组织建设和农田水利基础工程建设等方面的职能。最后,文章指出有待深入研究的方向。
本研究在借鉴国内外已有研究成果的基础上,以交易成本与合约选择为主线,积极探索了农业水资源有效配置的制度条件和组织基础,为农业水资源配置研究提供了新颖的视角。论文在以下几方面可能有所创新:一是创新性地界定了农业水资源交易特性,构建了农业水资源有效配置的制度分析框架;二是首次实证分析了适当的组织结构是农业水资源有效配置的关键;三是首次综合运用相关理论论证了农业水资源的有效配置机制;四是提出扁平化分权决策的农业水权结构的构建思路。
This dissertation is to expose the intrinsic mechanisms of allocating agriculture water resources effectively from the economic view. The water-control history of China is as long as Chinese civilization, and reasonable disposition of agricultural water resource is always the most critical aspect in general affairs of water control. Since the 1950s, continued increase in population and fast industrialization process have aggravated the environment of water and the competitiveness of water resource, making the shortage of water resource an increasingly noticeable problem. Agriculture is the major industry to use water, so to raise its resource disposition efficiency has become the first business to make Chinese water resource use continuously. Along with China's fast transition to market economy, introducing market mechanism and innovating disposition to optimize water resource to get the extensive identification of theoretical circle and practical circle.
Water rights institution is one of important factors that affect agricultural water resource disposition efficiency by nature. But there are some problems, the complex property of natural mobility, life resource, economic resource and ecological resource that agricultural water resource has. They decide high cost of water resources evaluation and discovery, and always have the right that is hard to make boundary to stay in "public field". Therefore the only realistic method that water resource value realizes fully is through coordinative mechanism of certain organization and collective action and internalizes the resource value within surplus right to organizational rent, with minimum transaction costs which is the only practical way of achieving the optimization of water resource disposition. Obviously, proper disposition organization structure has possibly become the most crucial factor that affects agricultural water resource disposition efficiency. Just thinking deeply for above-mentioned problem, this paper construct the frame of agricultural water resource disposition analysis with the center of transaction costs, spread out economic analysis of agricultural water resource effective disposition seeking the source of inefficient agricultural water resource disposition, based on looking back and reviewing research literature, associating theory analysis with demonstration analysis, using the transaction costs theory, property right theory, collective option theory, welfare economics theory. The structural arrangement of this paper is as follows:
The first chapter aims to put forward problems and introduce research thoughts. This chapter introduces the background of the paper, and points out that at present China faces water resource crisis directly and uses water inefficiently. Based on the comments and review related research literature, this chapter points out that lacking of organization condition knowledge of agricultural water resource disposition restricts people to understand primary low collocation of agricultural water resource and develops to breach scrape thoughts. Then this chapter has explained research thoughts, assumptions, methods and contents, as well as possible innovation.
The second chapter has constructed the theoretical analysis frame of agricultural water resource effective allocation. This chapter has adopted transaction costs analysis method, selected theories such as right theory, transaction costs theory, collectivity choose theory and welfare economics theory, put forward the concept of agricultural water resource trade property, and pointed out that agricultural water resource disposition is that related benefit parts using the trade contract of right to select agricultural water resource behavior on essence, and use it as logic starting point, constructs the theoretical analysis frame of agricultural water resource effective disposition, explains agricultural water resource trade property, water rights system, organization structure and cause and effect connection among organization performance.
The third chapter has studied inner mechanism of agricultural water rights system validity decision. This chapter has looked back the modern theory about inner mechanism of property right that affects resource disposition efficiency, discussed the water rights system restraint condition that affects water resource disposition efficiency and how agricultural water resource trade property affect the resource disposition efficiency of agricultural water rights system. And then, it has constructed agricultural water rights system validity analysis model, expounded and proved the inner mechanism that agricultural water rights system validity deciding: Effectively reflecting water resource trade property and the change of relatively worth and encourage disposition policymakers deploy agricultural water resource efficiently if water rights system is possibly well conducted; According to present situation of agricultural water rights system in district China, using model to explain agricultural water rights system is not the cause of inefficiency. Finally, this chapter has put forward to the suggestion of constructing an agricultural water rights system and flat water rights structure.
The forth chapter has studied the option of agricultural water resource disposition organization theory. This paper has started from the trade nature of agricultural water resource disposition organization, discussed the decision of effective boundary problem of disposition organization. According to the organization administration structure and minimum transaction costs efficiency principle matching trade property, this chapter has put forward in transaction costs generally existent realistic world, the minimum transaction costs of resource disposition decision organization structure will be relatively effective, so it can reach the biggest social welfare of agricultural water resource disposition. Accordingly this paper has constructed agricultural water resource disposition organization validity analysis model, and used this model to analyze the current inefficient cause of defect and operation of agricultural water resource disposition organization form. And then, this chapter has put forward to found the central cooperative administering agricultural water resource disposition organization structure.
The fifth chapter is the agricultural theory analysis and experience investigation of water resource disposition mechanism validity. On the foundation of comparing different disposition mechanism characteristics, it has constructed agricultural water resource disposition mechanism validity analysis model, expounded and proved any unitary disposition mechanism can impossible to realize the effective agricultural water resource disposition, and suggested that the market disposition mechanism of government control is possible and efficient; And through experience demonstration agricultural water price decision mechanism is inefficiency. Therefore this chapter has put forward to found the agricultural water resource operation of special permission based on contract disposition mechanism, mold the agricultural water resource manager of special permission, promote the realization of agricultural water resource effective disposition.
The sixth chapter is the demonstration analysis of agricultural water resource disposition organization condition. This chapter has begun from the present situation of peasant use water household organization, mainly adopted transaction costs theory and collective action theory, parsed peasants' using water household organization which is the perfect agricultural water resource disposition organization system, large-scale economize the system demand of transaction costs. Based on the demonstration analysis of district peasant use water association difficult condition, it has pointed out that organization position, the system supply and finance and clearly ownership levels, institutional supply and finance autogenic ability important factors to restrict using water peasant household organization survival and the developing ability. Based on this, it has suggested that the countermeasure of Chinese peasant organization to develop effectively.
The seventh chapter is the empirical research based on the water resource disposition behavior of peasant household. Based on the microcosmic data of district irrigation water use of peasant household, This chapter has demonstrated influencing factor of agricultural water resource disposition behavior. On the condition of water rights loses, collective action system shortages and organization inefficiency of water supply, the economic rational peasant household can only cooperate in narrow scope to deploy water resource. But peasant household from organization behavior has not yet risen the water efficiency and benefit. So this chapter suggested that, cultivating rural water trade market, raising the collective action of peasant ability, joining the network that realizes scale water conservancy are the inevitable routes of optimizing agricultural water resource disposition behavior.
The eighth chapter has put forward the policy suggestions and the research conclusions of paper. This chapter has concluded the viewpoints and the important view of research. It has suggested that the specific policy to raise the validity of Chinese agricultural water resource allocation, including founding flat agricultural water rights structure, accelerating the water trade right system construction, founding agricultural water resource central cooperation to administer structure, implementing the agricultural water resource operation of special permission. And also it important to reinforce the government's power, such as the basic project, water rights system and trade organization construction of irrigation and water conservancy. Lastly, paper showed the some advices for the future study.
The research explored the system condition and organizational basis for agricultural water resource by referring to the already-made research results. The following aspects are presumably new in history in this article: first, based on defining the trading characteristics of agricultural water resource, it constructed the theoretical analysis framework of effective allocation for agricultural water resource; second, it initially analyzed that appropriate organizational structure is the key to the effective allocation of agricultural water resource; third, it firstly used related theories to prove the mechanism of effective agricultural resource allocation; fourth, it suggested and proved the effectiveness of franchising mechanism of agricultural water resource.
随着中国向市场经济转型的快速推进,引入市场机制、创新配置手段来优化水资源配置的思路,得到理论界和实践界的广泛认同。水权和水市场自然被视为农业水资源有效配置的关键。问题是,在交易成本普遍存在的现实世界,农业水资源具有自然流动性、生命资源、经济资源和生态资源等多重属性,决定了完全界定产权的成本是非常高的,甚至是不可能的,总有难以界定的权利留在“公共领域”,因而,水权及其交易市场可能并不是唯一的主要问题;相对的,由一定的组织和集体行动协调机制将剩余权利所蕴涵的资源价值内部化为组织租金,可能是以最小化的交易成本实现水资源有效配置的更为现实的办法。本论文从寻求农业水资源配置低效率的根源而起,在回顾和反思相关研究成果基础上,采用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法,运用交易费用理论、产权理论、集体选择理论、福利经济学等理论,构建了以交易成本为中心的农业水资源配置分析框架,展开了对农业水资源有效配置的经济分析。本论文的内容结构安排如下:
第1章导论旨在提出问题和介绍研究思路。本章概述了本论文研究背景,指出当代中国正面临着水资源危机和用水低效率并存的矛盾。在评论和反思相关研究成果的基础上,文章指出对农业水资源配置的组织条件认识的缺乏制约了人们对农业水资源配置低效率根源的理解和突破困境思路的拓展。然后,本章交代了本论文研究思路、假设、方法、内容,以及可能的创新。
第2章构建农业水资源有效配置的理论分析框架。本章以新制度经济学、农业经济学、水利工程学等理论为基础,从交易契约的角度界定了农业水资源的交易特性,并以此为逻辑起点,采用交易成本分析方法,以产权理论、交易成本组织理论、福利经济学等理论为支撑,构建了农业水资源有效配置的理论分析框架,阐释农业水资源交易特性、水权制度、组织结构、组织行为和配置绩效之间的因果互动关系。
第3章研究农业水权制度有效性决定的内在机理。本章在回顾现代产权理论关于产权制度影响资源配置效率的机理基础上,探讨了农业水资源交易特性是如何影响农业水权制度的资源配置效率的;进而,构造了农业水权制度有效性分析模型,论证了农业水权制度有效性决定的内在机理:有效反映水资源交易特性及其相对价值的变化并被良好执行的水权制度才有可能激励配置决策者有效地配置农业水资源。针对中国灌区农业水权制度现状,运用模型解释了农业水权制度非效率的成因。最后,本章提出并论证了构建可交易农业水权制度和扁平化水权结构的设想。
第4章研究农业水资源配置组织的选择理论。本章从农业水资源配置组织的契约性质出发,探讨了配置组织有效边界的决定问题;根据组织治理结构与交易特性相匹配的交易成本最小化效率原则,本章提出农业水资源配置决策的交易成本最小化的组织结构将是相对有效率的,从而可以最大化农业水资源配置的社会福利,据此构建了农业水资源配置组织有效性分析模型,并运用模型分析了现行农业水资源配置组织存在的缺陷及其运行低效率的成因;进而,本章提出构建多元合作治理的农业水资源配置组织结构的思路。
第5章是农业水资源配置机制有效性的比较分析。在比较分析不同配置机制特点的基础上,构造农业水资源配置机制有效性分析模型,论证了任何单一的配置机制都不可能实现农业水资源的有效配置,政府管制的市场配置机制是可能的有效机制;并通过经验实证分析了农业水价的政府决定机制的非效率;提出并论证了构建农业水资源特许经营配置机制有利于农业水资源的有效配置。
第6章是农业水资源配置组织有效运行的机制分析。本章从农民用水户组织发展现状出发,主要采用交易成本理论和集体行动的逻辑理论,解析了农民用水户组织是完善农业水资源配置组织体系、大规模节约交易成本的制度需求。在对灌区农民用水者协会发展困境实证分析基础上,指出组织定位、产权明晰度、制度供给和财政自生能力是制约农民用水户组织生存和发展能力的重要因素。基于此,提出中国农民用水户组织有效发展的对策。
第7章是基于农户的水资源配置行为实证研究。本章根据灌区农户灌溉用水的微观数据,采用计量分析方法,以交易成本和集体行动合约选择为核心,分析了农业水资源配置行为选择的影响因素及其内在机理,实证了现实经济制度条件下,农民联户合作灌溉组织是以最小化的交易成本实现农业水资源配置的有效组织形式。从微观层面揭示了适当的水资源配置组织是农业水资源有效配置的关键。
第8章是本论文的研究结论和政策建议。这一章归纳本研究的重要结论和观点,并对提高中国农业水资源配置的有效性提出具体政策建议,包括构建扁平化的农业水权结构,加快可交易的水权制度建设,构建农业水资源多元合作治理结构,实施农业水资源特许经营配置机制,强化政府在农业水权制度、交易组织建设和农田水利基础工程建设等方面的职能。最后,文章指出有待深入研究的方向。
本研究在借鉴国内外已有研究成果的基础上,以交易成本与合约选择为主线,积极探索了农业水资源有效配置的制度条件和组织基础,为农业水资源配置研究提供了新颖的视角。论文在以下几方面可能有所创新:一是创新性地界定了农业水资源交易特性,构建了农业水资源有效配置的制度分析框架;二是首次实证分析了适当的组织结构是农业水资源有效配置的关键;三是首次综合运用相关理论论证了农业水资源的有效配置机制;四是提出扁平化分权决策的农业水权结构的构建思路。
This dissertation is to expose the intrinsic mechanisms of allocating agriculture water resources effectively from the economic view. The water-control history of China is as long as Chinese civilization, and reasonable disposition of agricultural water resource is always the most critical aspect in general affairs of water control. Since the 1950s, continued increase in population and fast industrialization process have aggravated the environment of water and the competitiveness of water resource, making the shortage of water resource an increasingly noticeable problem. Agriculture is the major industry to use water, so to raise its resource disposition efficiency has become the first business to make Chinese water resource use continuously. Along with China's fast transition to market economy, introducing market mechanism and innovating disposition to optimize water resource to get the extensive identification of theoretical circle and practical circle.
Water rights institution is one of important factors that affect agricultural water resource disposition efficiency by nature. But there are some problems, the complex property of natural mobility, life resource, economic resource and ecological resource that agricultural water resource has. They decide high cost of water resources evaluation and discovery, and always have the right that is hard to make boundary to stay in "public field". Therefore the only realistic method that water resource value realizes fully is through coordinative mechanism of certain organization and collective action and internalizes the resource value within surplus right to organizational rent, with minimum transaction costs which is the only practical way of achieving the optimization of water resource disposition. Obviously, proper disposition organization structure has possibly become the most crucial factor that affects agricultural water resource disposition efficiency. Just thinking deeply for above-mentioned problem, this paper construct the frame of agricultural water resource disposition analysis with the center of transaction costs, spread out economic analysis of agricultural water resource effective disposition seeking the source of inefficient agricultural water resource disposition, based on looking back and reviewing research literature, associating theory analysis with demonstration analysis, using the transaction costs theory, property right theory, collective option theory, welfare economics theory. The structural arrangement of this paper is as follows:
The first chapter aims to put forward problems and introduce research thoughts. This chapter introduces the background of the paper, and points out that at present China faces water resource crisis directly and uses water inefficiently. Based on the comments and review related research literature, this chapter points out that lacking of organization condition knowledge of agricultural water resource disposition restricts people to understand primary low collocation of agricultural water resource and develops to breach scrape thoughts. Then this chapter has explained research thoughts, assumptions, methods and contents, as well as possible innovation.
The second chapter has constructed the theoretical analysis frame of agricultural water resource effective allocation. This chapter has adopted transaction costs analysis method, selected theories such as right theory, transaction costs theory, collectivity choose theory and welfare economics theory, put forward the concept of agricultural water resource trade property, and pointed out that agricultural water resource disposition is that related benefit parts using the trade contract of right to select agricultural water resource behavior on essence, and use it as logic starting point, constructs the theoretical analysis frame of agricultural water resource effective disposition, explains agricultural water resource trade property, water rights system, organization structure and cause and effect connection among organization performance.
The third chapter has studied inner mechanism of agricultural water rights system validity decision. This chapter has looked back the modern theory about inner mechanism of property right that affects resource disposition efficiency, discussed the water rights system restraint condition that affects water resource disposition efficiency and how agricultural water resource trade property affect the resource disposition efficiency of agricultural water rights system. And then, it has constructed agricultural water rights system validity analysis model, expounded and proved the inner mechanism that agricultural water rights system validity deciding: Effectively reflecting water resource trade property and the change of relatively worth and encourage disposition policymakers deploy agricultural water resource efficiently if water rights system is possibly well conducted; According to present situation of agricultural water rights system in district China, using model to explain agricultural water rights system is not the cause of inefficiency. Finally, this chapter has put forward to the suggestion of constructing an agricultural water rights system and flat water rights structure.
The forth chapter has studied the option of agricultural water resource disposition organization theory. This paper has started from the trade nature of agricultural water resource disposition organization, discussed the decision of effective boundary problem of disposition organization. According to the organization administration structure and minimum transaction costs efficiency principle matching trade property, this chapter has put forward in transaction costs generally existent realistic world, the minimum transaction costs of resource disposition decision organization structure will be relatively effective, so it can reach the biggest social welfare of agricultural water resource disposition. Accordingly this paper has constructed agricultural water resource disposition organization validity analysis model, and used this model to analyze the current inefficient cause of defect and operation of agricultural water resource disposition organization form. And then, this chapter has put forward to found the central cooperative administering agricultural water resource disposition organization structure.
The fifth chapter is the agricultural theory analysis and experience investigation of water resource disposition mechanism validity. On the foundation of comparing different disposition mechanism characteristics, it has constructed agricultural water resource disposition mechanism validity analysis model, expounded and proved any unitary disposition mechanism can impossible to realize the effective agricultural water resource disposition, and suggested that the market disposition mechanism of government control is possible and efficient; And through experience demonstration agricultural water price decision mechanism is inefficiency. Therefore this chapter has put forward to found the agricultural water resource operation of special permission based on contract disposition mechanism, mold the agricultural water resource manager of special permission, promote the realization of agricultural water resource effective disposition.
The sixth chapter is the demonstration analysis of agricultural water resource disposition organization condition. This chapter has begun from the present situation of peasant use water household organization, mainly adopted transaction costs theory and collective action theory, parsed peasants' using water household organization which is the perfect agricultural water resource disposition organization system, large-scale economize the system demand of transaction costs. Based on the demonstration analysis of district peasant use water association difficult condition, it has pointed out that organization position, the system supply and finance and clearly ownership levels, institutional supply and finance autogenic ability important factors to restrict using water peasant household organization survival and the developing ability. Based on this, it has suggested that the countermeasure of Chinese peasant organization to develop effectively.
The seventh chapter is the empirical research based on the water resource disposition behavior of peasant household. Based on the microcosmic data of district irrigation water use of peasant household, This chapter has demonstrated influencing factor of agricultural water resource disposition behavior. On the condition of water rights loses, collective action system shortages and organization inefficiency of water supply, the economic rational peasant household can only cooperate in narrow scope to deploy water resource. But peasant household from organization behavior has not yet risen the water efficiency and benefit. So this chapter suggested that, cultivating rural water trade market, raising the collective action of peasant ability, joining the network that realizes scale water conservancy are the inevitable routes of optimizing agricultural water resource disposition behavior.
The eighth chapter has put forward the policy suggestions and the research conclusions of paper. This chapter has concluded the viewpoints and the important view of research. It has suggested that the specific policy to raise the validity of Chinese agricultural water resource allocation, including founding flat agricultural water rights structure, accelerating the water trade right system construction, founding agricultural water resource central cooperation to administer structure, implementing the agricultural water resource operation of special permission. And also it important to reinforce the government's power, such as the basic project, water rights system and trade organization construction of irrigation and water conservancy. Lastly, paper showed the some advices for the future study.
The research explored the system condition and organizational basis for agricultural water resource by referring to the already-made research results. The following aspects are presumably new in history in this article: first, based on defining the trading characteristics of agricultural water resource, it constructed the theoretical analysis framework of effective allocation for agricultural water resource; second, it initially analyzed that appropriate organizational structure is the key to the effective allocation of agricultural water resource; third, it firstly used related theories to prove the mechanism of effective agricultural resource allocation; fourth, it suggested and proved the effectiveness of franchising mechanism of agricultural water resource.
引文
1 《管子.水地》.转引自顾浩主编.中国治水史鉴[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2006,231。
2 《管子.度地》.转引自顾浩主编.中国治水史鉴[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2006,6.
3 这是《诗经.小雅.白华》中描述的西周时期关中地区农田灌溉场景,据后人考证,彪池是彪水之源,位于今日秦岭之北、渭水之南的咸阳附近,周围地势南低北高,就势开渠引水,便成为自流灌溉,转引自王红谊、惠富平、王思明:中国西部农业开放史研究[M].北京:中国农业科学技术出版社,2003.p34
6 参见张家炎的相关论述。张家炎.环境、市场与农民选择.刊载于黄宗智主编.中国乡村研究[M]第三辑.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004,4-31
1.埃莉诺.奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海:上海三联书店.2003,156-166
2.埃里克·弗鲁博顿,鲁道夫·芮切特.姜建强、罗长远译.新制度经济学--一个交易费用分析方式.上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店.2006,5
3.常云昆.论水资源管理方式的根本转变.陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,34(4),96-100
4.陈雷,杨广欣,深化小型水利工程产权制度改革加快农村水利事业发展.中国农村水利水电, 1998(6):1-4
5.杜威漩.中国农业水资源管理制度创新研究-理论框架、制度透视与创新构想.[博士学位论文].杭州:浙江大学图书馆,2005
6.傅晨.水权交易的产权经济学分析--基于浙江省东阳和义乌有偿转让用水权的案例分析.中国农村经济,2002(10),25-29
7.顾浩主编.中国治水史鉴.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2006,6,231
8.关良宝,李曦,陈崇德.农业节水激励机制探讨.中国农村水利水电,2002(9),19-21
9.郭善民,王荣.农业水价政策作用的效果分析.农业经济问题.2004(7),41-44
10.郭善民.灌溉管理制度改革问题研究--以皂河灌区为例[博士学位论文].南京:南京农业大学图书馆,2004
11.国家统计局农村社会经济调查司.中国农村统计年鉴.北京:中国统计出版社,1996-2006各年
12.贺骥.水权及其制度建设的现实性初探.中国水利,2002(1),39-40
13.胡继连,周玉玺,西爱琴.我国的小型农田水利产业化发展问题研究一一理论分析、政策取向及现代企业制度建设.当代经济科学,2000,22(3),84-87
14.黄季煜,Scott Rozelle.迈向二十一世纪的中国粮食经济.北京:中国农业出版社,1998年版
15.姜开鹏.从产权制度改革入手创新灌区管理体制和运行机制.中国农村水利水电,2003(3),1-4
16.姜文来.农业水价承载力研究.中国水利,2003(6),41-43
17.李代鑫.中国灌溉管理与用水户参与灌溉管理.中国农村水利水电,2002(5),26-32.
18.理查德·瑞丁格.中国的参与式灌溉管理改革:自主管理灌排区.中国农村水利水电,2002(6),7-9
19.林毅夫.小农与经济理性.农村经济与社会,1988(3),32
20.林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁.载R.科斯A.阿尔钦D.诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁-产权学派与新制度学派译文集.上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994
21.林毅夫.制度、技术与中国农业发展.上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994
22.刘昌明,陈志恺.中国水资源现状评价和供需发展趋势分析.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2001
23.刘宁.对建设人与自然和谐水工程的认识.中国水利,2007(4),13-17
24.刘宁.对中国水工程安全评价和隐患治理的认识.中国水利,2005(22),10
25.罗必良.经济组织的制度逻辑.山西:山西经济出版社,2000,243-244
26.马培衢,刘伟章,2006a.集体行动的逻辑与灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006(12),4-13
27.马晓河,方松海.中国的水资源状况与农业生产.中国农村经济,2006(10),4-12
28.钱正英、张光斗主编.中国可持续发展水资源战略研究综合报告及各专题报告.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2001
29.水利部水利国有资产管理体制改革调研组,水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利,2004(1),14-20
30.水权制度框架研究课题组.水权水市场制度建设.水利发展研究,2004(7),4-8
31.田圃德,张春玲.我国农业用水水价分析.河海大学学报(自然科学版)2003(3),242-246
32.托比.麦克格拉斯.宁夏水权分配和转让的原则与实践.中国水利,2006(21),13-15
33.汪恕诚.建设节水型社会保障经济社会可持续发展--2006年5月6日在中宣部等六部委联合举办的形势报告会上的报告。时事报告,2006(6),9-11
34.汪恕诚.水权和水市场-实现水资源优化配置的经济手段.中国水利.2000(1),6-9
35.汪恕诚.水权转换是水资源优化配置的重要手段.水利规划与设计.2004(3),1-3
36.汪志农,薛建兴,马孝义.陕西关中灌区支斗渠管理体制改革研究.农业工程学报2000(4),64-67
37.王红谊、惠富平、王思明.中国西部农业开放史研究.北京:中国农业科学技术出版社.2003,34
38.王金霞、黄季焜.国外水权交易的经验及对中国的启示.农业技术经济.2002(5),56-62
39.王金霞.地下水灌溉系统产权制度创新、效率及政策-河北省小型水利工程的实证研究.[博士学位论文].北京:中国农业科学院研究生院图书馆,2000
40.王亚华.水权解释.上海:上海人民出版社,上海三联书店.2005,P58.
41.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.段毅才、王伟译,商务印书馆,2002
42.萧代基、刘莹、洪鸣丰.水权交易比率制度的设计与模拟.经济研究.2004(6),69-77
43.肖田兴.论中国水权交易及其制度变迁.管理世界,2004(4),51-58
44.熊向阳.水权的市场属性及水权制度的完善.中国水利.1996(5),30-31
45.许志方,张泽良.各国用水户参与灌溉管理经验述评.中国农村水利水电,2002(6),10-15
46.许志方.农民参与管理和小型水利体制改革.中国农村水利水电,2002(1),8-10
47.张兵,谢玉梅,刘晓玲.大型灌区国有资产管理体制改革探析一江苏省皂河灌区改革个案调查中国农村经济.2004(12):65-69
48.张陆彪,刘静,胡定寰.农民用水户协会的绩效与问题分析.农业经济问题,2003(2),29-33
49.赵连阁.灌区水价提升的经济社会和环境效果--基于辽宁省的分析.中国农村经济.2006(12),37-44
50.郑通汉.制度激励与灌区的可持续运行-从河套灌区水价制度和供水管理制度改革的调查引起的思考,中国水利,2002(1),33-36
51.中国灌溉协会.参与式灌溉管理:国有灌区的管理方式改革,第六届用水户参与灌溉管理国际研讨会,中国水利部和世界银行主办,2002,122-123
52.中国水利部.中国水资源公报(2004年).http://www.cws.net.cn/swsnet/gazette-new.asp.2005-9-21
53.钟焕荣.试论福建省农村小型水利设施产权制度创新.水利发展研究,2003(1),35-38
54.钟玉秀.国外用水户参与灌溉管理的经验和启示.水利发展研究,2002(5),46-48
55.周其仁.研究真实世界的经济学--科斯研究经济学的方法及其在中国实践.张曙光主编.中国制度变迁的案例研究(第二集).北京:中国财经出版社,1996
56.周曙东,张运华.面向可持续发展的灌溉水价选择.农业技术经济.2004(4),39-45
57.Bardhan,P.Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development.World Development.1993,21(4),633-639
58.Easter and Welsch."Implementing Irrigation Projects:Operational andInstitutional Problems."In K.W.Easter(Ed),Irrgation Investment,Technology and Management Strategies for Development. Westview Press, Boston. 1986
59. Easter. "Asia's Irrigation Management in Transition: a Paradigm ShiftFaces High Transaction Costs. " Review of Agricultural Economics, 2000. 22 (2), 370-388
60. Easter. "the Future of Water Market: a Realistic Perspective. "In Easter,Rosegrant, and Dinar(Ed), Markets for Water: Potential and Performance. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 1998
61. Helmi. 2000. Transition of Irrigation system Management in Indonesia:Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainability. A Prepared for a Panel on "Asian Irrigation in Transition"n theConference of International Association for the Study of Common Property Resources BloomingtonCampus of Indiana University, Indiana, USA May30- June 4
62. Kloezen, W. H., C. Garces-Restrepo, and S. H. Johnson III. 1997. Impact assessment of irrigation management transfer in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, Mexico. Research Report. 15
63. Knack S.. Keefer P. Does social capital have an economic payoff? Across-countryinvestigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1997
64. Kumar M. D and Singh. O. P.. 2001. Market instruments for demand management in the face ofscarcity and overuse of water in Gujarat, Western India. Water Policy. 3, 387-403
65. Lele and Patil., 1994. "Farmer Participation in Irrigation: a Case Study of Maharashtra". Horizon India Books. New Delhi.
66. Meinzen-Dick,R. S, Mendoza,M. S.. Saddoulet,L., Abiad-Shields,G.. and Subramanian, A. Sustainable water user associations: Lessons from a literature review. In A. Subramanian, N. V. Jagannathan R. S. Meinzen-Dick (Eds.) ,User organizations for sustainable water services. World Bank Technical Paper. 39. Washington, DC: World Bank. 1997, 7-87
67. Moore,M. , Gollehon,N. , Carey,M. Multicrop production decisions in western irrigated agriculture: the role of water price. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1994, 76. 859-874
68. Ostrom and Gargner. Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons:Self governing Irrigation Systems Can Work. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1993,7 (4). 93-112
69. Ostrom, E., 1992. "The Rudiments of a Thoery of the Origins, Survival and Performance of Common-property Institutions". In Bromley (ed): Making the Commons Work. Institute for Contemporary Studies. San Francisco.
70. Ostrom. EGoverning the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York. Cambridge University Pres. 1990, 156-166
71. Samad, M., and D. Vermillion. 1999. Assessment of participatory management of irrigation schemesin Sri Lanka: Partial reforms, partial benefits. Research Report 34. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute.
72. Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of Man. New York:Wiley
73. Svendsen,M. and Vermillion, D. ,1994. Irrigation Management Transferin the Columbia Basin:Lessons and international Implications. Research Monoh. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IIMI
74. Vermillion, D. L, 1997. Impacts of irrigation management transfer:a Review of the Evidence. Research Report 11. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute
75.Wichelns,1998."Economic Issues Regarging Tertiary Canal ImprovementPrograms:an Example from Egypt" Irrigation and Drainage System.10:131-141
76.Williamson,Oliver E.,1975,Markets and Hierarchies:analysis of antitrust implications.New York,Free Press.162-166
77.Williamson,Oliver E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press.36-47
78.World Bank,1993.Water Resources Management:A World Bank Policy Paper.Washington DC
79.Zilberman,1992."Individual and Institutional Responses to the Drought:theCase of California Agriculture."UC Berkeley,Working Paper
80.Zilberman,1997.Incentives and Economics in Water Resources Management.2nd.Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resources Economics.Toulouse,France.May,14-16
1 转引自王红谊,惠富平,王思明.中国西部农业开放史研究.北京:中国农业科学技术出版社,2003,P265
2 相关分析参见王亚华的有关论述。王亚华.水权解释.上海:上海人民出版社,上海三联书店.2005,P58
3 转引自H.Varain."Intermediate Microeconomics".6th~(ed).Norton&Company,1999,P306-307
4 转引自梁东黎,刘东.微观经济学.南京:南京大学出版社,1993
5 引自尼古拉·阿克塞拉著,郭庆旺,刘茜译.经济政策原理:价值与技术,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002
6 刘肇玮,朱树人,袁宏源:中国水利百科全书-灌溉于排水分册.[M]中国水利水电出版社,2004.171-172
7 山姆.约翰逊.灌溉部门机构改革方案[J].中国农村水利水电.2002(6),P1-6.
8 周玉玺.农田水利基础设施的供给制度选择[J].改革,2005(3).P59
1.德姆赛茨.关于产权的理论.载于科斯、阿尔钦、诺斯等著.财产权利与制度变迁.上海:上海人民出版社,1994,96-113
2.葛颜祥,胡继连.不同水权制度下农户用水行为的比较研究.生产力研究,2003(2),31-33
3.康芒斯.制度经济学.北京:商务印书馆,1997
4.柯武刚、史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策.北京:商务印书馆,2002
5.科斯,哈特.斯蒂格利茨等.契约经济学.李风圣主译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999
6.科斯.社会成本问题.载于科斯、阿尔钦、诺斯等著.财产权利与制度变迁.上海:上海人民出版社,1994
7.梁东黎,刘东.微观经济学.南京:南京大学出版社.1993
8.林洪孝.水资源管理理论与实践.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2003年版
9.林毅夫.制度、技术与中国农业发展.上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年版
10.刘肇玮,朱树人,袁宏源.中国水利百科全书-灌溉于排水分册.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2004,29
11.聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来-兼评威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.管理世界,2004(12),46-53
12.诺斯(D,C North).经济史中的结构与变迁.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1999版
13.诺斯(D,C North).制度、制度变迁与经济绩效(中译本).刘宁英译.上海:上海三联书店,1994,36-49
14.诺斯等.制度变革的经验研究.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,1
15.山姆·约翰逊,马克·斯文特生,弗尔耐多·冈萨雷斯,许志方译.灌溉部门机构改革方案.中国农村水利水电.2002(6):1-6
16.思拉恩·埃格特森.新制度经济学.北京:商务印书馆,1996,10-11
17.斯蒂格利茨.经济学(上册).北京:中国人民出版社,1997,28
18.王红谊,惠富平,王思明.中国西部农业开放史研究.北京:中国农业科学技术出版社.2003,34
19.威廉姆森.市场与等级制(1975).转引自迪屈奇著:交易成本经济学--关于公司的新的经济意义,经济科学出版社.1999,21-31
20.威廉姆森.治理机制.中国社会文献出版社,2001,4.78
21.威廉姆森.资本主义的经济组织(1985).转引自迪屈奇著:交易成本经济学--关于公司的新的经济意义,经济科学出版社.1999,31-51
22.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.段毅才,王伟译.北京:商务印书馆,2002年中文版
23.西蒙.现代决策理论的基石.北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989,8-12
24.肖国兴.论中国水权交易及其制度变迁.管理世界,2004(4),51-58
25.张宇燕.经济发展与制度选择.中国人民大学出版社1992版。
26.张云昌.水市场和水价形成机制浅析.中国水利,2003(6),23-25
27.周玉玺.农田水利基础设施的供给制度选择.改革,2005(3),59
28.Coase,R.H.,1937."The Nature of the Firm ".Economics,4(3),386-405
29.Coase,R.H.,1960."The Problem of Social Cost ".Journal of Law and Economics,vol3(Oct)
30.H.Varain,1999."Intermediate Microeconomics",6th ed,Norton&Company,306-307
31.Williamson,O·E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press,36-47
32.Williarnson,O·E.,1971."The Vertical Integration of Production:Market Failure Convideration",The American EconomicReviecw,61:112-123
1 道格拉斯·C·诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店1997,P 18
2 冯尚友.水资源持续利川与管理导论.北京:科学出版社.2000,189
1.崔建远.私人水权水权与民法理论及物权法典的制定私人水权法学研究,2002,(3),38
2.德姆塞茨.关于产权的理.载盛洪主编:现代制度经济学(上).北京:北京大学出版社,2003
3.段毅才.西方产权理论结构分析.载盛洪主编:现代制度经济学(下).北京:北京大学出版社.2003
4.冯尚友.水资源持续利用与管理导论.北京:科学出版社,2000年版
5.谷树忠著.农业自然资源可持续利用.北京:中国农业出版社,1999,6
6.贺骥.水权及其制度建设的现实性初探.中国水利,2002,1,39-40
7.姜文来.水权及其作用探讨.中国水利,2000,(12),13
8.科斯,阿尔钦,诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁-产权学派与新制度学派译文集.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994
9.卢现祥.西方新制度经济学.中国发展出版社,2003年版
10.马培衢,2006d.产权视角下的灌区水资源配置研究.资源科学,2006(6),33-38
11.诺斯.私人水权经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1999版
12.裴丽萍.水权制度初论.中国法学,2001.(2),91
13.平乔维奇.产权经济学:一种关于比较体制的理论.北京:经济科学出版社,1999年版
14.水利部.中华人民共和国水法.北京:法律出版社,2002,2-6
15.水利国有资产管理体制改革调研组.水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利.2004(1),14-20
16.水权制度框架研究课题组.水权水市场制度建设.水利发展研究.2004(7),4-8
17.王亚华.水权解释.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2005,228
18.张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店.1996
19.张五常.经济解释.北京:商务印书馆,2002年版
20.邹薇.私人水权高级微观经济学.武汉:武汉大学出版,2004.176-190.
21. Barzel, Yoram., 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University Press. 26
22. Bromley. D. W, 1989. Economic Insterests and Institutions.The Conceptual Foundation of Public Policy,New York and Oxford,Basil Blackwell
23. Bromley, D. W, 1992. "Property Rights and Natural Resource Damage Assessments". Ecological Economics, 14,2129
24. Challen. Ray. 2000. Institutions,Transaction Costs Andenvironmental Policy:Insititutional Reform for Waterresources, Edward Elgar Publishing,Inc
25. Coase,R. H, 1937. "the Nature of the Firm", Economics. 4 (3) ,386-405
26. Coase,R. H, 1960. "the Problem of Social Cost". Journal of Law and Economics, vol3 (Oct)
1.[美]埃瑞克.弗鲁博顿、鲁道夫·芮切特.新制度经济学--一个交易费用分析方式,北京:商务印书馆,2005,341-346
2.巴泽尔.产权的经济分析.上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,1997
3.鲍德威,威迪逊.公共部门经济学第二版.中国人民大学出版社,2000,46-76
4.丹尼尔.F.史普博.管制与市场.上海:上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,1999,47-75
5.段毅才.企业性质、治理机制和国有企业改革-企业理论前沿专题.天津:南开大学出版社.2003
6.罗比良.经济组织的制度逻辑.山西:山西经济出版社.2000:343-344
7.罗必良.新制度经济学.太原:山西经济出版社,2005
8.马培衢,刘伟章,2006b.集体行动的逻辑与灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006(12),4-13
9.聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来--兼评威廉姆森:资本主义经济制度.管理世界.2004(12),146-152
10.王金霞,黄季焜,Scott Rozelle.激励机制、农民参与和节水效应:黄河流域灌区水管理制度改革的实证研究.中国软科学,2004(11),8-14
11.周玉玺,周霞,胡继连.灌溉组织制度演进的经济学分析及其模式选择.水利发展研究.2004(3),35
12.Barzel,Yoram,1989.Economic Analysis of Property Rights.Cambridge University Press.26.
13.Clemenz G.Optimal price-cap regulation.The Journal of Industrial Economics,1991.391-407
14.Coase,R.H,1960.the problem of social cost.Journal of law and economics,3,1-44
15.Coward,1980."Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia:Perspectivesfrom the Social Sciences.".Cornell University Press
16.Coward,1986."Direct or Indirect Alternatives for Irrigation Investment and theCreation of Property" In Easter(ed):Irrigation Investment,Technology and Management Strategiesfor Development.Westview Press
17.Hart,Oliver.Firm,Contract and Financial Structure.Oxford University Press.32-56
18.Jehle G.A.,Reny P.J,2003.Advanced Microeconomic Theory.Pearson Education Press.173-185
19.Liu Z B.Wang G S,2000.Study on consumer monopoly.Economical Research Journal,(10).55-6O
20.Rajan,R.G,Zingales,L,1998."Power in a Theory of the Firm".Quarterly Journal of Economics,108,387-432
21. Rajan, R. G , Zingales , L, 2003. Savings Capatilism from the Capitalists. Random House, New York, 66-68
22. Scarf, H., 1973. The Computation of Economic Equilibria. Yale Uninversity Pess, 198-202
23. Tirole,J, 1997. Industrial Organization. Beijing: The Chinese PeopleUniversity Press, 46-56
24. Williamson, Oliver E, 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: analysis of antitrust implications. New York. Free Press, 162-166
25. Williamson, Oliver E, 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, Free Press. 36-39.
26. Williamson, Oliver E, 1991. "Comparative Economics Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives" . Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 269-96
27. Williamson, Oliver E, 2002. "The theory of the firm as governance structure : from choice to contract". Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (3), 171-195
1.陈崇德,胡小梅,王永东.关于两部制水价的思考.水利发展研究,2006(5),41-43
2.道格拉斯.C.诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联书店,1997,18
3.道格拉斯.C.诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效.刘宁英译.上海:上海三联书店.1994,36-49
4.高峰,许建中.我国农业水资源状况与水价理论分析.灌溉排水学报2003(6),27-32
5.科斯.企业、市场与法律.上海:上海三联书店1990年版
6.科斯.企业、市场与法律.盛洪、陈郁等译,上海三联出版社,1990,92
7.马培衢、刘伟章.集体行动逻辑和灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006b(12),4-15
8.穆贤清,黄祖辉,陈崇德,张小蒂.我国农户参与灌溉管理的产权制度保障.经济理论与经济管理,2004(12),61-66
9.沈菊艳.黄宝全,王景雷.浅论农田灌溉高效用水管理机制的现状及改革途径.水利经济,2005(5),32-35
10.水利部.中华人民共和国水法.北京:法律出版社,2002,2-6
11.水利部财务经济司调研组.水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利,2005(22),14-20
12.水利部水利国有资产管理体制改革调研组:水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利,2004(1),14-20
13.唐晓华.产业组织与信息.北京:经济管理出版社,2005
14.温桂芳,刘喜梅.深化水价改革:全面推进与重点深入.财贸经济,2006(4),36-44
15.张吉昌,孙敏.我国水价体系改革的难题与出路.改革,2006(8),112-117
16.张仁田,童利忠,陆小伟,陈守伦.水定价方法对农业用水效率及公平性的影响分析.水利利技与经济,2005(5),257-261
17.郑通汉.当前农业水价改革中的问题、影响与对策.中国水利.2006(16),17-20
18.周其仁.产权与制度变迁-中国改革经验研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2004,85-89
19.周其仁.公有制企业的性质.经济研究,2000(7),12-16
20.邹薇.高级微观经济学.武汉:武汉大学出版,2004.176-190
21.Amhad,Mahmood.2000.Water pricing,and markets in the Near East:policy issues and options.Water Policy(2),229-242
22.Barzel,yoram.1989.Economic Analysis of Property Rights.Cambridge University Press:2,26
23.Berbel,J.,Gomez Limon,J.A.2000.The impact of water pricing policy in Spain:an analysis of three irrigated areas.Agricultural Water Management,(43),121-131
24.JehleG.A.,RenyP.J.Advanced Microeconomic Theory.Pearson Education Press,2003,173,185
25.Scarf,H.The Computation of Economic Equilibria.Yale Uninversity Pess,1973,198-202
26.Whitting D.,2003.Municipal Water Pricing and Tariff:A Reform Agenda for South Asia.Water Policy,(5),61-67
3 李力.用水户参与灌溉管理在全国推开[N].经济日报.2006-7-10。
4 参见许国荣等.栖霞市发展农民水利联合体组织的调查与思考.中国水利.2006(11),P34-36。
11 Lele and Patil,1994."Farmer Participation in Irrigation:a Case Study of Maharashtra".Horizon India Books.New Delhi.
12 Small and Carruthers,1991."Farmer-financed Irrigation:the Economics of Reform".Cambridge University Press,32-36.
1.[泰]布里安.兰多夫.布伦斯,[美]露丝.梅辛蒂克.田克军,刘斌等译.水权协商.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2004,12
2.埃莉诺.奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海:上海三联书店,2003,156-166
3.奥尔森(M.Olson).陈郁,郭宇峰,李崇新译.集体行动的逻辑:公共选择与团体理论.上海:上海三联书店,2006
4.陈军、葛贻华.自主管理灌排区理论与实践.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2003年版
5.韩洪云,赵连阁.灌区资产剩余控制权安排.经济研究,2004(4),117-124
6.湖北省水利厅,湖北省漳河工程管理局.灌区用水者自主管理探索与实践.武汉:湖北辞书出版社.2003,12
7.李代鑫.中国灌溉管理与用水户参与灌溉管理.中国农村水利水电,2002(5),26-32.
8.李力.用水户参与灌溉管理在全国推开.经济日报,2006-07-10
9.马培衢,刘伟章,雷海章.农业水资源配置有效性分析.财经研究,,2006a(5),32-38
10.穆贤清,黄祖辉,陈崇德,张小蒂.我国农户参与灌溉管理的产权制度保障.经济理论与经济管理,2004(12),61-66
11.聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来--兼评威廉姆森资本主义经济制度.管理世界.2004(12),146-152
12.王金霞,黄季焜,Scott Rozelle.激励机制、农民参与和节水效应:黄河流域灌区水管理制度改革的实证研究.中国软科学,2004(11),8-14
13.许国荣.栖霞市发展农民水利联合体组织的调查与思考.中国水利,2006,11,P34-36
14.许志方,张泽良.各国用水户参与灌溉管理经验述评.中国农村水利水电,2001(6),10-15
15.许志刚,王金霞,黄季焜.我国农户参与水资源管理制度改革、激励机制与用水效率.中国农业经济评论,2004(12),415-426
16.杨平富,李赵琴,伍梅.农民用水者协会在漳河灌区的实践与展望.节水灌溉,2006(3),46-48
17.翟浩辉.培育农民用水户协会推进新农村水利建设,www.mwr.gov.cn/bzzs/20060710/69064.asp
18.张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店.1996
19.赵金河,陈崇德.农民用水者协会可持续发展的探索.中国农村水利水电,2005(9).54-55
20.中国灌溉协会.参与式灌溉管理:国有灌区的管理方式改革,第六届用水户参与灌溉管理国际研讨会,中国水利部和世界银行主办,2002:122-123
21.Clemenz G.,1991,Optimal price-cap regulation.The Journal of Industrial Economics,391-407
22.Hardin,Garrett,1968.The Tragedy of the Commons.Science 162:1243-1248
23.International Water Management Institute,2001.Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.Irrigation Management Transfer.Rome:FAO
24.JehleG.A.,RenyP.J,2003.Advanced Microeconomic Theory.Pearson Education Press.173,185
25.Lele and Patil,1994."Farmer Participation in Irrigation:a Case Study of Maharashtra".Horizon India Books.New Delhi
26.Merrey,D.J.,1996.Institutional Design Principles for Account-ability on Large Irrigation Systems.IWMI Research Report,No.8.Colombo.Sri Lanka
27.Ostrom and Gargner,1993."Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons:Self-governing Irrigation Systems Can Work." The Journal of Economic Perspectives.7(4):93-112
28.Ostrom.1992."The Rudiments of a Thoery of the Origins,Survival and Performance of Common-property Institutions".In Bromley(ed):Making the Commons Work.Institute for Contemporary Studies,San Francisco
29.Scarf,H.,1973.The Computation of Economic Equilibria.Yale Uninversity Pess.198-202
30.Tirole,J.,1997.Industrial Organization.Beijing.The Chinese People Press.46-56.
31.Williamson,2002,"The theory of the firm as governance structure:from choice to contract".Journal of Economic Perspectives,16(3),171-195
32.Williamson,Oliver E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press.36-39
33.World Bank,1993.Water Resouse Management:A World Bank Policy Paper.Washington DC
1.埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海:上海三联书店.2003,156-166
2.奥尔森(M.Olson),陈郁、郭宇峰、李崇新译.集体行动的逻辑:公共选择与团体理论,2006
3.奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,段毅才、王伟译.资本主义经济制度.商务印书馆,2002年
4.陈崇德、胡小梅、王永东.关于两部制水价的思考.水利发展研究,2006(5),P41-43
5.谌芸,洪林等.漳河灌区塘堰灌溉作用研究.灌溉排水学报,2005,24(2).48-51
6.韩洪云,赵连阁.灌区资产剩余控制权安排.经济研究,2004(4),117-124
7.贺雪峰、罗兴佐.乡村水利与农地制度创新.管理世界,2003(9),76-88
8.贺雪峰.新农村建设中要防止出现千家万户搞水利的局面.http://www.snzg.cn/showsearch1.asp/2006-3-6
9.罗兴佑.“渠成”为何不能“水到”.中国改革,2006(4),72-76
10.马培衢,刘伟章,雷海章,2006a.农业水资源配置有效性分析.财经研究,2006(5),32-38
11.马培衢,刘伟章,2006b.集体行动的逻辑与灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006(12),4-13
12.马培衢,刘伟章,祁春节.2006c.农户灌溉方式选择行为的实证分析.中国农村经济,2006(12),45-54
13.马晓河,方松海.中国的水资源状况与农业生产.中国农村经济,2006(10),4-12
14.唐忠,李众敏.改革后农田水利建设投入主体缺失的经济学分析.农业经济问题.2005(2),34-42
15.汪和建.自我行动的逻辑—理解“传统主义”与中国单位组织的真实的社会建构.社会,2006(3)
16.张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店.1996.水权协商.中国水利水电出版社,2004,P12
17.赵金河,陈崇德.农民用水者协会可持续发展的探索.中国农村水利水电,2005(9),54-55
18.Basu,Kaushik,2001.The Role of Social Norms and Law in Economics:An Essay On Political Economy,Insoctt and Keates(Eds.),Schools of Thought,Princeton University Press,1-3
19.Becker,G.,1983.A theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August) 1,126-128
20.Clemenz G.,1991.Optimal price-cap regulation.The Journal of Industrial Economics.391-407
21.Garrett Hardin,1968.The tragedy of the commons.Science,(162),1243-1248
22.Hart,Oliver,1995.Firm,Contract and Financial Structure,Oxford University Press
23.International Water Management Institute:Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,Irrigation Management Transfer.Rome,FAO and United Nations,1995
24.Olson,M.,1965.The Logic of Collective Action.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press:156-166
25.Ostrom E.,1990.Governing the Commons:the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,New York:Cambridge University Press
26.Stevens,Joe B.,1993.The Economics of Collective Choice,West view Press,Inc
27.Williamson,Oliver E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press,36-47
28.Williamson,Oliver E.,1991."Comparative Economics Organization:The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives." Administrative Science Quarterly,36,269-96.
29.Williamson,Oliver E.,2002."The theory of the firm as governance structure:from choice to contract".Journal of Economic Perspectives,16(3),171-195.
30.World Bank,1993.Water Resources Management:A World Bank Policy Paper,Washington DC
2 《管子.度地》.转引自顾浩主编.中国治水史鉴[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2006,6.
3 这是《诗经.小雅.白华》中描述的西周时期关中地区农田灌溉场景,据后人考证,彪池是彪水之源,位于今日秦岭之北、渭水之南的咸阳附近,周围地势南低北高,就势开渠引水,便成为自流灌溉,转引自王红谊、惠富平、王思明:中国西部农业开放史研究[M].北京:中国农业科学技术出版社,2003.p34
6 参见张家炎的相关论述。张家炎.环境、市场与农民选择.刊载于黄宗智主编.中国乡村研究[M]第三辑.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004,4-31
1.埃莉诺.奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海:上海三联书店.2003,156-166
2.埃里克·弗鲁博顿,鲁道夫·芮切特.姜建强、罗长远译.新制度经济学--一个交易费用分析方式.上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店.2006,5
3.常云昆.论水资源管理方式的根本转变.陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,34(4),96-100
4.陈雷,杨广欣,深化小型水利工程产权制度改革加快农村水利事业发展.中国农村水利水电, 1998(6):1-4
5.杜威漩.中国农业水资源管理制度创新研究-理论框架、制度透视与创新构想.[博士学位论文].杭州:浙江大学图书馆,2005
6.傅晨.水权交易的产权经济学分析--基于浙江省东阳和义乌有偿转让用水权的案例分析.中国农村经济,2002(10),25-29
7.顾浩主编.中国治水史鉴.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2006,6,231
8.关良宝,李曦,陈崇德.农业节水激励机制探讨.中国农村水利水电,2002(9),19-21
9.郭善民,王荣.农业水价政策作用的效果分析.农业经济问题.2004(7),41-44
10.郭善民.灌溉管理制度改革问题研究--以皂河灌区为例[博士学位论文].南京:南京农业大学图书馆,2004
11.国家统计局农村社会经济调查司.中国农村统计年鉴.北京:中国统计出版社,1996-2006各年
12.贺骥.水权及其制度建设的现实性初探.中国水利,2002(1),39-40
13.胡继连,周玉玺,西爱琴.我国的小型农田水利产业化发展问题研究一一理论分析、政策取向及现代企业制度建设.当代经济科学,2000,22(3),84-87
14.黄季煜,Scott Rozelle.迈向二十一世纪的中国粮食经济.北京:中国农业出版社,1998年版
15.姜开鹏.从产权制度改革入手创新灌区管理体制和运行机制.中国农村水利水电,2003(3),1-4
16.姜文来.农业水价承载力研究.中国水利,2003(6),41-43
17.李代鑫.中国灌溉管理与用水户参与灌溉管理.中国农村水利水电,2002(5),26-32.
18.理查德·瑞丁格.中国的参与式灌溉管理改革:自主管理灌排区.中国农村水利水电,2002(6),7-9
19.林毅夫.小农与经济理性.农村经济与社会,1988(3),32
20.林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁.载R.科斯A.阿尔钦D.诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁-产权学派与新制度学派译文集.上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994
21.林毅夫.制度、技术与中国农业发展.上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994
22.刘昌明,陈志恺.中国水资源现状评价和供需发展趋势分析.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2001
23.刘宁.对建设人与自然和谐水工程的认识.中国水利,2007(4),13-17
24.刘宁.对中国水工程安全评价和隐患治理的认识.中国水利,2005(22),10
25.罗必良.经济组织的制度逻辑.山西:山西经济出版社,2000,243-244
26.马培衢,刘伟章,2006a.集体行动的逻辑与灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006(12),4-13
27.马晓河,方松海.中国的水资源状况与农业生产.中国农村经济,2006(10),4-12
28.钱正英、张光斗主编.中国可持续发展水资源战略研究综合报告及各专题报告.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2001
29.水利部水利国有资产管理体制改革调研组,水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利,2004(1),14-20
30.水权制度框架研究课题组.水权水市场制度建设.水利发展研究,2004(7),4-8
31.田圃德,张春玲.我国农业用水水价分析.河海大学学报(自然科学版)2003(3),242-246
32.托比.麦克格拉斯.宁夏水权分配和转让的原则与实践.中国水利,2006(21),13-15
33.汪恕诚.建设节水型社会保障经济社会可持续发展--2006年5月6日在中宣部等六部委联合举办的形势报告会上的报告。时事报告,2006(6),9-11
34.汪恕诚.水权和水市场-实现水资源优化配置的经济手段.中国水利.2000(1),6-9
35.汪恕诚.水权转换是水资源优化配置的重要手段.水利规划与设计.2004(3),1-3
36.汪志农,薛建兴,马孝义.陕西关中灌区支斗渠管理体制改革研究.农业工程学报2000(4),64-67
37.王红谊、惠富平、王思明.中国西部农业开放史研究.北京:中国农业科学技术出版社.2003,34
38.王金霞、黄季焜.国外水权交易的经验及对中国的启示.农业技术经济.2002(5),56-62
39.王金霞.地下水灌溉系统产权制度创新、效率及政策-河北省小型水利工程的实证研究.[博士学位论文].北京:中国农业科学院研究生院图书馆,2000
40.王亚华.水权解释.上海:上海人民出版社,上海三联书店.2005,P58.
41.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.段毅才、王伟译,商务印书馆,2002
42.萧代基、刘莹、洪鸣丰.水权交易比率制度的设计与模拟.经济研究.2004(6),69-77
43.肖田兴.论中国水权交易及其制度变迁.管理世界,2004(4),51-58
44.熊向阳.水权的市场属性及水权制度的完善.中国水利.1996(5),30-31
45.许志方,张泽良.各国用水户参与灌溉管理经验述评.中国农村水利水电,2002(6),10-15
46.许志方.农民参与管理和小型水利体制改革.中国农村水利水电,2002(1),8-10
47.张兵,谢玉梅,刘晓玲.大型灌区国有资产管理体制改革探析一江苏省皂河灌区改革个案调查中国农村经济.2004(12):65-69
48.张陆彪,刘静,胡定寰.农民用水户协会的绩效与问题分析.农业经济问题,2003(2),29-33
49.赵连阁.灌区水价提升的经济社会和环境效果--基于辽宁省的分析.中国农村经济.2006(12),37-44
50.郑通汉.制度激励与灌区的可持续运行-从河套灌区水价制度和供水管理制度改革的调查引起的思考,中国水利,2002(1),33-36
51.中国灌溉协会.参与式灌溉管理:国有灌区的管理方式改革,第六届用水户参与灌溉管理国际研讨会,中国水利部和世界银行主办,2002,122-123
52.中国水利部.中国水资源公报(2004年).http://www.cws.net.cn/swsnet/gazette-new.asp.2005-9-21
53.钟焕荣.试论福建省农村小型水利设施产权制度创新.水利发展研究,2003(1),35-38
54.钟玉秀.国外用水户参与灌溉管理的经验和启示.水利发展研究,2002(5),46-48
55.周其仁.研究真实世界的经济学--科斯研究经济学的方法及其在中国实践.张曙光主编.中国制度变迁的案例研究(第二集).北京:中国财经出版社,1996
56.周曙东,张运华.面向可持续发展的灌溉水价选择.农业技术经济.2004(4),39-45
57.Bardhan,P.Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development.World Development.1993,21(4),633-639
58.Easter and Welsch."Implementing Irrigation Projects:Operational andInstitutional Problems."In K.W.Easter(Ed),Irrgation Investment,Technology and Management Strategies for Development. Westview Press, Boston. 1986
59. Easter. "Asia's Irrigation Management in Transition: a Paradigm ShiftFaces High Transaction Costs. " Review of Agricultural Economics, 2000. 22 (2), 370-388
60. Easter. "the Future of Water Market: a Realistic Perspective. "In Easter,Rosegrant, and Dinar(Ed), Markets for Water: Potential and Performance. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 1998
61. Helmi. 2000. Transition of Irrigation system Management in Indonesia:Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainability. A Prepared for a Panel on "Asian Irrigation in Transition"n theConference of International Association for the Study of Common Property Resources BloomingtonCampus of Indiana University, Indiana, USA May30- June 4
62. Kloezen, W. H., C. Garces-Restrepo, and S. H. Johnson III. 1997. Impact assessment of irrigation management transfer in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, Mexico. Research Report. 15
63. Knack S.. Keefer P. Does social capital have an economic payoff? Across-countryinvestigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1997
64. Kumar M. D and Singh. O. P.. 2001. Market instruments for demand management in the face ofscarcity and overuse of water in Gujarat, Western India. Water Policy. 3, 387-403
65. Lele and Patil., 1994. "Farmer Participation in Irrigation: a Case Study of Maharashtra". Horizon India Books. New Delhi.
66. Meinzen-Dick,R. S, Mendoza,M. S.. Saddoulet,L., Abiad-Shields,G.. and Subramanian, A. Sustainable water user associations: Lessons from a literature review. In A. Subramanian, N. V. Jagannathan R. S. Meinzen-Dick (Eds.) ,User organizations for sustainable water services. World Bank Technical Paper. 39. Washington, DC: World Bank. 1997, 7-87
67. Moore,M. , Gollehon,N. , Carey,M. Multicrop production decisions in western irrigated agriculture: the role of water price. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1994, 76. 859-874
68. Ostrom and Gargner. Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons:Self governing Irrigation Systems Can Work. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1993,7 (4). 93-112
69. Ostrom, E., 1992. "The Rudiments of a Thoery of the Origins, Survival and Performance of Common-property Institutions". In Bromley (ed): Making the Commons Work. Institute for Contemporary Studies. San Francisco.
70. Ostrom. EGoverning the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York. Cambridge University Pres. 1990, 156-166
71. Samad, M., and D. Vermillion. 1999. Assessment of participatory management of irrigation schemesin Sri Lanka: Partial reforms, partial benefits. Research Report 34. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute.
72. Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of Man. New York:Wiley
73. Svendsen,M. and Vermillion, D. ,1994. Irrigation Management Transferin the Columbia Basin:Lessons and international Implications. Research Monoh. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IIMI
74. Vermillion, D. L, 1997. Impacts of irrigation management transfer:a Review of the Evidence. Research Report 11. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute
75.Wichelns,1998."Economic Issues Regarging Tertiary Canal ImprovementPrograms:an Example from Egypt" Irrigation and Drainage System.10:131-141
76.Williamson,Oliver E.,1975,Markets and Hierarchies:analysis of antitrust implications.New York,Free Press.162-166
77.Williamson,Oliver E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press.36-47
78.World Bank,1993.Water Resources Management:A World Bank Policy Paper.Washington DC
79.Zilberman,1992."Individual and Institutional Responses to the Drought:theCase of California Agriculture."UC Berkeley,Working Paper
80.Zilberman,1997.Incentives and Economics in Water Resources Management.2nd.Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resources Economics.Toulouse,France.May,14-16
1 转引自王红谊,惠富平,王思明.中国西部农业开放史研究.北京:中国农业科学技术出版社,2003,P265
2 相关分析参见王亚华的有关论述。王亚华.水权解释.上海:上海人民出版社,上海三联书店.2005,P58
3 转引自H.Varain."Intermediate Microeconomics".6th~(ed).Norton&Company,1999,P306-307
4 转引自梁东黎,刘东.微观经济学.南京:南京大学出版社,1993
5 引自尼古拉·阿克塞拉著,郭庆旺,刘茜译.经济政策原理:价值与技术,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002
6 刘肇玮,朱树人,袁宏源:中国水利百科全书-灌溉于排水分册.[M]中国水利水电出版社,2004.171-172
7 山姆.约翰逊.灌溉部门机构改革方案[J].中国农村水利水电.2002(6),P1-6.
8 周玉玺.农田水利基础设施的供给制度选择[J].改革,2005(3).P59
1.德姆赛茨.关于产权的理论.载于科斯、阿尔钦、诺斯等著.财产权利与制度变迁.上海:上海人民出版社,1994,96-113
2.葛颜祥,胡继连.不同水权制度下农户用水行为的比较研究.生产力研究,2003(2),31-33
3.康芒斯.制度经济学.北京:商务印书馆,1997
4.柯武刚、史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策.北京:商务印书馆,2002
5.科斯,哈特.斯蒂格利茨等.契约经济学.李风圣主译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999
6.科斯.社会成本问题.载于科斯、阿尔钦、诺斯等著.财产权利与制度变迁.上海:上海人民出版社,1994
7.梁东黎,刘东.微观经济学.南京:南京大学出版社.1993
8.林洪孝.水资源管理理论与实践.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2003年版
9.林毅夫.制度、技术与中国农业发展.上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年版
10.刘肇玮,朱树人,袁宏源.中国水利百科全书-灌溉于排水分册.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2004,29
11.聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来-兼评威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.管理世界,2004(12),46-53
12.诺斯(D,C North).经济史中的结构与变迁.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1999版
13.诺斯(D,C North).制度、制度变迁与经济绩效(中译本).刘宁英译.上海:上海三联书店,1994,36-49
14.诺斯等.制度变革的经验研究.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,1
15.山姆·约翰逊,马克·斯文特生,弗尔耐多·冈萨雷斯,许志方译.灌溉部门机构改革方案.中国农村水利水电.2002(6):1-6
16.思拉恩·埃格特森.新制度经济学.北京:商务印书馆,1996,10-11
17.斯蒂格利茨.经济学(上册).北京:中国人民出版社,1997,28
18.王红谊,惠富平,王思明.中国西部农业开放史研究.北京:中国农业科学技术出版社.2003,34
19.威廉姆森.市场与等级制(1975).转引自迪屈奇著:交易成本经济学--关于公司的新的经济意义,经济科学出版社.1999,21-31
20.威廉姆森.治理机制.中国社会文献出版社,2001,4.78
21.威廉姆森.资本主义的经济组织(1985).转引自迪屈奇著:交易成本经济学--关于公司的新的经济意义,经济科学出版社.1999,31-51
22.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.段毅才,王伟译.北京:商务印书馆,2002年中文版
23.西蒙.现代决策理论的基石.北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989,8-12
24.肖国兴.论中国水权交易及其制度变迁.管理世界,2004(4),51-58
25.张宇燕.经济发展与制度选择.中国人民大学出版社1992版。
26.张云昌.水市场和水价形成机制浅析.中国水利,2003(6),23-25
27.周玉玺.农田水利基础设施的供给制度选择.改革,2005(3),59
28.Coase,R.H.,1937."The Nature of the Firm ".Economics,4(3),386-405
29.Coase,R.H.,1960."The Problem of Social Cost ".Journal of Law and Economics,vol3(Oct)
30.H.Varain,1999."Intermediate Microeconomics",6th ed,Norton&Company,306-307
31.Williamson,O·E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press,36-47
32.Williarnson,O·E.,1971."The Vertical Integration of Production:Market Failure Convideration",The American EconomicReviecw,61:112-123
1 道格拉斯·C·诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店1997,P 18
2 冯尚友.水资源持续利川与管理导论.北京:科学出版社.2000,189
1.崔建远.私人水权水权与民法理论及物权法典的制定私人水权法学研究,2002,(3),38
2.德姆塞茨.关于产权的理.载盛洪主编:现代制度经济学(上).北京:北京大学出版社,2003
3.段毅才.西方产权理论结构分析.载盛洪主编:现代制度经济学(下).北京:北京大学出版社.2003
4.冯尚友.水资源持续利用与管理导论.北京:科学出版社,2000年版
5.谷树忠著.农业自然资源可持续利用.北京:中国农业出版社,1999,6
6.贺骥.水权及其制度建设的现实性初探.中国水利,2002,1,39-40
7.姜文来.水权及其作用探讨.中国水利,2000,(12),13
8.科斯,阿尔钦,诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁-产权学派与新制度学派译文集.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994
9.卢现祥.西方新制度经济学.中国发展出版社,2003年版
10.马培衢,2006d.产权视角下的灌区水资源配置研究.资源科学,2006(6),33-38
11.诺斯.私人水权经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1999版
12.裴丽萍.水权制度初论.中国法学,2001.(2),91
13.平乔维奇.产权经济学:一种关于比较体制的理论.北京:经济科学出版社,1999年版
14.水利部.中华人民共和国水法.北京:法律出版社,2002,2-6
15.水利国有资产管理体制改革调研组.水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利.2004(1),14-20
16.水权制度框架研究课题组.水权水市场制度建设.水利发展研究.2004(7),4-8
17.王亚华.水权解释.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2005,228
18.张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店.1996
19.张五常.经济解释.北京:商务印书馆,2002年版
20.邹薇.私人水权高级微观经济学.武汉:武汉大学出版,2004.176-190.
21. Barzel, Yoram., 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University Press. 26
22. Bromley. D. W, 1989. Economic Insterests and Institutions.The Conceptual Foundation of Public Policy,New York and Oxford,Basil Blackwell
23. Bromley, D. W, 1992. "Property Rights and Natural Resource Damage Assessments". Ecological Economics, 14,2129
24. Challen. Ray. 2000. Institutions,Transaction Costs Andenvironmental Policy:Insititutional Reform for Waterresources, Edward Elgar Publishing,Inc
25. Coase,R. H, 1937. "the Nature of the Firm", Economics. 4 (3) ,386-405
26. Coase,R. H, 1960. "the Problem of Social Cost". Journal of Law and Economics, vol3 (Oct)
1.[美]埃瑞克.弗鲁博顿、鲁道夫·芮切特.新制度经济学--一个交易费用分析方式,北京:商务印书馆,2005,341-346
2.巴泽尔.产权的经济分析.上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,1997
3.鲍德威,威迪逊.公共部门经济学第二版.中国人民大学出版社,2000,46-76
4.丹尼尔.F.史普博.管制与市场.上海:上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,1999,47-75
5.段毅才.企业性质、治理机制和国有企业改革-企业理论前沿专题.天津:南开大学出版社.2003
6.罗比良.经济组织的制度逻辑.山西:山西经济出版社.2000:343-344
7.罗必良.新制度经济学.太原:山西经济出版社,2005
8.马培衢,刘伟章,2006b.集体行动的逻辑与灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006(12),4-13
9.聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来--兼评威廉姆森:资本主义经济制度.管理世界.2004(12),146-152
10.王金霞,黄季焜,Scott Rozelle.激励机制、农民参与和节水效应:黄河流域灌区水管理制度改革的实证研究.中国软科学,2004(11),8-14
11.周玉玺,周霞,胡继连.灌溉组织制度演进的经济学分析及其模式选择.水利发展研究.2004(3),35
12.Barzel,Yoram,1989.Economic Analysis of Property Rights.Cambridge University Press.26.
13.Clemenz G.Optimal price-cap regulation.The Journal of Industrial Economics,1991.391-407
14.Coase,R.H,1960.the problem of social cost.Journal of law and economics,3,1-44
15.Coward,1980."Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia:Perspectivesfrom the Social Sciences.".Cornell University Press
16.Coward,1986."Direct or Indirect Alternatives for Irrigation Investment and theCreation of Property" In Easter(ed):Irrigation Investment,Technology and Management Strategiesfor Development.Westview Press
17.Hart,Oliver.Firm,Contract and Financial Structure.Oxford University Press.32-56
18.Jehle G.A.,Reny P.J,2003.Advanced Microeconomic Theory.Pearson Education Press.173-185
19.Liu Z B.Wang G S,2000.Study on consumer monopoly.Economical Research Journal,(10).55-6O
20.Rajan,R.G,Zingales,L,1998."Power in a Theory of the Firm".Quarterly Journal of Economics,108,387-432
21. Rajan, R. G , Zingales , L, 2003. Savings Capatilism from the Capitalists. Random House, New York, 66-68
22. Scarf, H., 1973. The Computation of Economic Equilibria. Yale Uninversity Pess, 198-202
23. Tirole,J, 1997. Industrial Organization. Beijing: The Chinese PeopleUniversity Press, 46-56
24. Williamson, Oliver E, 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: analysis of antitrust implications. New York. Free Press, 162-166
25. Williamson, Oliver E, 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, Free Press. 36-39.
26. Williamson, Oliver E, 1991. "Comparative Economics Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives" . Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 269-96
27. Williamson, Oliver E, 2002. "The theory of the firm as governance structure : from choice to contract". Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (3), 171-195
1.陈崇德,胡小梅,王永东.关于两部制水价的思考.水利发展研究,2006(5),41-43
2.道格拉斯.C.诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联书店,1997,18
3.道格拉斯.C.诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效.刘宁英译.上海:上海三联书店.1994,36-49
4.高峰,许建中.我国农业水资源状况与水价理论分析.灌溉排水学报2003(6),27-32
5.科斯.企业、市场与法律.上海:上海三联书店1990年版
6.科斯.企业、市场与法律.盛洪、陈郁等译,上海三联出版社,1990,92
7.马培衢、刘伟章.集体行动逻辑和灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006b(12),4-15
8.穆贤清,黄祖辉,陈崇德,张小蒂.我国农户参与灌溉管理的产权制度保障.经济理论与经济管理,2004(12),61-66
9.沈菊艳.黄宝全,王景雷.浅论农田灌溉高效用水管理机制的现状及改革途径.水利经济,2005(5),32-35
10.水利部.中华人民共和国水法.北京:法律出版社,2002,2-6
11.水利部财务经济司调研组.水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利,2005(22),14-20
12.水利部水利国有资产管理体制改革调研组:水利国有资产管理体制运行机制改革调研报告.中国水利,2004(1),14-20
13.唐晓华.产业组织与信息.北京:经济管理出版社,2005
14.温桂芳,刘喜梅.深化水价改革:全面推进与重点深入.财贸经济,2006(4),36-44
15.张吉昌,孙敏.我国水价体系改革的难题与出路.改革,2006(8),112-117
16.张仁田,童利忠,陆小伟,陈守伦.水定价方法对农业用水效率及公平性的影响分析.水利利技与经济,2005(5),257-261
17.郑通汉.当前农业水价改革中的问题、影响与对策.中国水利.2006(16),17-20
18.周其仁.产权与制度变迁-中国改革经验研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2004,85-89
19.周其仁.公有制企业的性质.经济研究,2000(7),12-16
20.邹薇.高级微观经济学.武汉:武汉大学出版,2004.176-190
21.Amhad,Mahmood.2000.Water pricing,and markets in the Near East:policy issues and options.Water Policy(2),229-242
22.Barzel,yoram.1989.Economic Analysis of Property Rights.Cambridge University Press:2,26
23.Berbel,J.,Gomez Limon,J.A.2000.The impact of water pricing policy in Spain:an analysis of three irrigated areas.Agricultural Water Management,(43),121-131
24.JehleG.A.,RenyP.J.Advanced Microeconomic Theory.Pearson Education Press,2003,173,185
25.Scarf,H.The Computation of Economic Equilibria.Yale Uninversity Pess,1973,198-202
26.Whitting D.,2003.Municipal Water Pricing and Tariff:A Reform Agenda for South Asia.Water Policy,(5),61-67
3 李力.用水户参与灌溉管理在全国推开[N].经济日报.2006-7-10。
4 参见许国荣等.栖霞市发展农民水利联合体组织的调查与思考.中国水利.2006(11),P34-36。
11 Lele and Patil,1994."Farmer Participation in Irrigation:a Case Study of Maharashtra".Horizon India Books.New Delhi.
12 Small and Carruthers,1991."Farmer-financed Irrigation:the Economics of Reform".Cambridge University Press,32-36.
1.[泰]布里安.兰多夫.布伦斯,[美]露丝.梅辛蒂克.田克军,刘斌等译.水权协商.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2004,12
2.埃莉诺.奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海:上海三联书店,2003,156-166
3.奥尔森(M.Olson).陈郁,郭宇峰,李崇新译.集体行动的逻辑:公共选择与团体理论.上海:上海三联书店,2006
4.陈军、葛贻华.自主管理灌排区理论与实践.北京:中国水利水电出版社,2003年版
5.韩洪云,赵连阁.灌区资产剩余控制权安排.经济研究,2004(4),117-124
6.湖北省水利厅,湖北省漳河工程管理局.灌区用水者自主管理探索与实践.武汉:湖北辞书出版社.2003,12
7.李代鑫.中国灌溉管理与用水户参与灌溉管理.中国农村水利水电,2002(5),26-32.
8.李力.用水户参与灌溉管理在全国推开.经济日报,2006-07-10
9.马培衢,刘伟章,雷海章.农业水资源配置有效性分析.财经研究,,2006a(5),32-38
10.穆贤清,黄祖辉,陈崇德,张小蒂.我国农户参与灌溉管理的产权制度保障.经济理论与经济管理,2004(12),61-66
11.聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来--兼评威廉姆森资本主义经济制度.管理世界.2004(12),146-152
12.王金霞,黄季焜,Scott Rozelle.激励机制、农民参与和节水效应:黄河流域灌区水管理制度改革的实证研究.中国软科学,2004(11),8-14
13.许国荣.栖霞市发展农民水利联合体组织的调查与思考.中国水利,2006,11,P34-36
14.许志方,张泽良.各国用水户参与灌溉管理经验述评.中国农村水利水电,2001(6),10-15
15.许志刚,王金霞,黄季焜.我国农户参与水资源管理制度改革、激励机制与用水效率.中国农业经济评论,2004(12),415-426
16.杨平富,李赵琴,伍梅.农民用水者协会在漳河灌区的实践与展望.节水灌溉,2006(3),46-48
17.翟浩辉.培育农民用水户协会推进新农村水利建设,www.mwr.gov.cn/bzzs/20060710/69064.asp
18.张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店.1996
19.赵金河,陈崇德.农民用水者协会可持续发展的探索.中国农村水利水电,2005(9).54-55
20.中国灌溉协会.参与式灌溉管理:国有灌区的管理方式改革,第六届用水户参与灌溉管理国际研讨会,中国水利部和世界银行主办,2002:122-123
21.Clemenz G.,1991,Optimal price-cap regulation.The Journal of Industrial Economics,391-407
22.Hardin,Garrett,1968.The Tragedy of the Commons.Science 162:1243-1248
23.International Water Management Institute,2001.Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.Irrigation Management Transfer.Rome:FAO
24.JehleG.A.,RenyP.J,2003.Advanced Microeconomic Theory.Pearson Education Press.173,185
25.Lele and Patil,1994."Farmer Participation in Irrigation:a Case Study of Maharashtra".Horizon India Books.New Delhi
26.Merrey,D.J.,1996.Institutional Design Principles for Account-ability on Large Irrigation Systems.IWMI Research Report,No.8.Colombo.Sri Lanka
27.Ostrom and Gargner,1993."Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons:Self-governing Irrigation Systems Can Work." The Journal of Economic Perspectives.7(4):93-112
28.Ostrom.1992."The Rudiments of a Thoery of the Origins,Survival and Performance of Common-property Institutions".In Bromley(ed):Making the Commons Work.Institute for Contemporary Studies,San Francisco
29.Scarf,H.,1973.The Computation of Economic Equilibria.Yale Uninversity Pess.198-202
30.Tirole,J.,1997.Industrial Organization.Beijing.The Chinese People Press.46-56.
31.Williamson,2002,"The theory of the firm as governance structure:from choice to contract".Journal of Economic Perspectives,16(3),171-195
32.Williamson,Oliver E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press.36-39
33.World Bank,1993.Water Resouse Management:A World Bank Policy Paper.Washington DC
1.埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海:上海三联书店.2003,156-166
2.奥尔森(M.Olson),陈郁、郭宇峰、李崇新译.集体行动的逻辑:公共选择与团体理论,2006
3.奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,段毅才、王伟译.资本主义经济制度.商务印书馆,2002年
4.陈崇德、胡小梅、王永东.关于两部制水价的思考.水利发展研究,2006(5),P41-43
5.谌芸,洪林等.漳河灌区塘堰灌溉作用研究.灌溉排水学报,2005,24(2).48-51
6.韩洪云,赵连阁.灌区资产剩余控制权安排.经济研究,2004(4),117-124
7.贺雪峰、罗兴佐.乡村水利与农地制度创新.管理世界,2003(9),76-88
8.贺雪峰.新农村建设中要防止出现千家万户搞水利的局面.http://www.snzg.cn/showsearch1.asp/2006-3-6
9.罗兴佑.“渠成”为何不能“水到”.中国改革,2006(4),72-76
10.马培衢,刘伟章,雷海章,2006a.农业水资源配置有效性分析.财经研究,2006(5),32-38
11.马培衢,刘伟章,2006b.集体行动的逻辑与灌区农户灌溉行为分析.财经研究,2006(12),4-13
12.马培衢,刘伟章,祁春节.2006c.农户灌溉方式选择行为的实证分析.中国农村经济,2006(12),45-54
13.马晓河,方松海.中国的水资源状况与农业生产.中国农村经济,2006(10),4-12
14.唐忠,李众敏.改革后农田水利建设投入主体缺失的经济学分析.农业经济问题.2005(2),34-42
15.汪和建.自我行动的逻辑—理解“传统主义”与中国单位组织的真实的社会建构.社会,2006(3)
16.张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店.1996.水权协商.中国水利水电出版社,2004,P12
17.赵金河,陈崇德.农民用水者协会可持续发展的探索.中国农村水利水电,2005(9),54-55
18.Basu,Kaushik,2001.The Role of Social Norms and Law in Economics:An Essay On Political Economy,Insoctt and Keates(Eds.),Schools of Thought,Princeton University Press,1-3
19.Becker,G.,1983.A theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August) 1,126-128
20.Clemenz G.,1991.Optimal price-cap regulation.The Journal of Industrial Economics.391-407
21.Garrett Hardin,1968.The tragedy of the commons.Science,(162),1243-1248
22.Hart,Oliver,1995.Firm,Contract and Financial Structure,Oxford University Press
23.International Water Management Institute:Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,Irrigation Management Transfer.Rome,FAO and United Nations,1995
24.Olson,M.,1965.The Logic of Collective Action.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press:156-166
25.Ostrom E.,1990.Governing the Commons:the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,New York:Cambridge University Press
26.Stevens,Joe B.,1993.The Economics of Collective Choice,West view Press,Inc
27.Williamson,Oliver E.,1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.New York,Free Press,36-47
28.Williamson,Oliver E.,1991."Comparative Economics Organization:The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives." Administrative Science Quarterly,36,269-96.
29.Williamson,Oliver E.,2002."The theory of the firm as governance structure:from choice to contract".Journal of Economic Perspectives,16(3),171-195.
30.World Bank,1993.Water Resources Management:A World Bank Policy Paper,Washington DC