纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应研究
|
摘要
自20世纪90年代以来,由于半导体、生物科技、计算机软件和通讯等产业中的片断化和重叠专利(fragmented and overlapping patent rights)的愈加膨胀,加剧了“专利丛林”问题,而构建专利联盟可以有效地解决“专利丛林”问题。随着“专利丛林”问题的日益严峻,许多发达国家政府积极按照专利联盟的模式发展高新技术产业。在遭遇了DVD3C和DVD6C两大纵向结构专利联盟的猛烈进攻以后,我国也清晰的认识到纵向结构专利联盟在产业发展中所起到的巨大作用；同时也意识到纵向结构专利联盟开始威胁到由未拥有核心知识产权的专业化生产商构成的我国制造业的健康发展。因此,对纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应进行研究,顺应了全球高科技产业发展的趋势,也符合我国的现实国情。本文以最广泛和最具普遍意义的纵向结构专利联盟为研究对象,分析了纵向结构专利联盟的构建动因问题；在传统产品的市场和创新市场研究了纵向结构的竞争效应问题；最后在网络效应条件下研究了纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。研究工作主要体现在以下几点：
(1)首先探讨专利联盟的构建动因问题。“专利丛林”是由障碍性专利和互补性专利构成的,“专利丛林”问题的加剧必将导致在产品商业化进程中专利持有者彼此间侵权诉讼风险的增加,而借由独立授权方式所实现的专利共享在避免侵权诉讼风险增加的同时转而会导致敲竹杠问题、专利许可费叠加问题以及巨大交易成本问题的相继产生。专利联盟在解决“专利丛林”问题时具有显著的优越性,其构建使得以上这些问题迎刃而解。专利联盟的构建动因可以归结为”穿越‘专利丛林’”；同时,在专利联盟授权条件下纵向一体化企业的利润回报高于独立授权的这一状况,也给出了纵向结构专利联盟构建的经济动因,毕竟,追求利润最大化是企业的终极目标。
(2)在传统产品市场通过计算纵向结构专利联盟的市场绩效以及纵向结构专利联盟对专业化生产商的影响探讨了纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。从企业层面来说,专利联盟是企业进行专利交易的最优方式。从社会层面来说,政府应认真审核积极引导专利联盟的构建,避免专利联盟降低消费者福利。在纵向结构专利联盟的条件下,专业化生产商也被排除最终产品市场之外。纵向结构专利联盟具有市场垄断性,纵向结构专利联盟导致了寡头垄断市场结构的形成。
(3)在创新市场从纵向结构专利联盟对创新影响的角度探讨纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。通过引入专利联盟成员的实质性专利产出函数静态地研究纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励效应,在专利许可费收入按数量比例规则分配的条件下,纵向结构专利联盟鼓励其成员进行研究与开发,对创新有激励效应；在纵向结构专利联盟缔结返授条款的条件下动态地研究纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励效应。虽然纵向结构专利联盟中的创新者失去了获得产品差异化方面的竞争优势的机会,但是同创新活动联系在一起的市场的增长也会推动专利联盟成员进行创新,不过随着市场的发展这种创新的动力逐渐下降。
(4)在网络效应的条件下探讨了纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。在最终产品差异化和同质化条件下,消费者需求随着网络效应的增强而逐渐提高,网络效应改善了社会福利效应。专利联盟成员的利润随着网络效应的增强而逐渐增加,获取网络效应所带来的好处也是组建专利联盟的动因。在网络效应和产品同质化的条件下,专业化生产商不会被纵向结构专利联盟排除市场之外,这说明网络效应抑制了纵向结构专利联盟的垄断性。
From1990s, in semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, and telecommunication fragmented and overlapping patent rights aggravate patent thicket problem, building patent pools could solve the patent thicket problem effectively. With the patent thicket problem more and more worsen, a lot of developed countries advance high-technology industry actively using the patent pools model. After encountered overwhelming attack from DVD3C and DVD6C patent pools, our country cognized clearly the role playing by patent pools based on vertical structure in the development of industry and the threat on our manufacture that is consisted of special manufacturer without core intellectual property from patent pools based on vertical structure. The study of the competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure conforms to the trend of the development of the world high-technology industry and corresponds to the conditions of our country. This paper take the significant and widespread patent pools based on vertical structure as studying object, analyzed the building motive of patent pools based on vertical structure, studied the competitive effects problem in traditional goods market and innovation market, and studied the competitive effects problem under the condition of the network effects. Main contributions are as fellows:
(1) The building motive of patent pools was studied at first. Patent thickets are consisted of blocking patent and complementary patents; with the Patent thickets aggravating the risk of infringement litigation between the patent holders in the process of commercialization of the goods is increasing. The authorized independently model between each other model making the patents sharing and avoiding infringement litigation could result in hold-up problem, royalty stacking problem and huge transaction cost, while patent pools could avoid these problems, therefore patent pools are superior in solving the patent thickets, the motive of building the patent pools may be attribute to crossing the patent thickets. Furthermore the profit of vertical integrated company on the condition of the patent pools is more than using the authorized independently model between each other, this is the economic motive of building the patent pools; after all pursuing the maximizing the profit is the ultimate target.
(2) The competitive effects problem of patent pools based on vertical structure was studied in the traditional goods market by calculating the market performance of the patent pools based on vertical structure and by analyzing how patent pools based on vertical structure influence on the special manufacturers. Standing the point of the company the patent pool is the most effective patent authorized model; And from the society the government should pilot the construction of patent pool, avoid reducing the social welfare by building the patent pools. And the special manufacturers are precluded from the final goods markets under the patent pools based on vertical structure. Therefore the patent pools based on vertical structure are monopolistic; the patent pools based on vertical structure could engender oligarch monopoly market structure.
(3) The competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied in the innovation market by analyzing how patent pools based on vertical structure influence on the innovation. First, the competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied statically by introducing the essential patent output function of the members of a patent pool based on vertical structure. In conclusion, on the condition of dividing the royalty income according to the numeric proportional rules, the patent pool based on vertical structure encourages its members to engage research and development; it has incentive effect to innovation. Second, the competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied dynamically under the condition of patent pools establishing grant backs clause. On the condition of the grant backs clause, the innovator of patent pools based on vertical structure could not get the competitive advantage against its rivals by innovating, but its innovation activity could be motivated by increase of the market in correspondence with innovating, but the incentive will decrease with the market development.
(4) The competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied under the condition of the network effects. On the condition of product differentiation and homogenization the demand of consumer is increasing when the network effects is increasing, network effects promote the social welfare;the profit of the member of patent pools is increasing when the network effects is increasing, it indicated that gaining the profit from the network effects was one of the motives of the company building the patent pool; the special manufacturers are not precluded from the final goods markets under the condition of the network effectsand product homogenization, it indicate that the network effects constrain the monopoly of the patent pools based on the vertical structure.
(1)首先探讨专利联盟的构建动因问题。“专利丛林”是由障碍性专利和互补性专利构成的,“专利丛林”问题的加剧必将导致在产品商业化进程中专利持有者彼此间侵权诉讼风险的增加,而借由独立授权方式所实现的专利共享在避免侵权诉讼风险增加的同时转而会导致敲竹杠问题、专利许可费叠加问题以及巨大交易成本问题的相继产生。专利联盟在解决“专利丛林”问题时具有显著的优越性,其构建使得以上这些问题迎刃而解。专利联盟的构建动因可以归结为”穿越‘专利丛林’”；同时,在专利联盟授权条件下纵向一体化企业的利润回报高于独立授权的这一状况,也给出了纵向结构专利联盟构建的经济动因,毕竟,追求利润最大化是企业的终极目标。
(2)在传统产品市场通过计算纵向结构专利联盟的市场绩效以及纵向结构专利联盟对专业化生产商的影响探讨了纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。从企业层面来说,专利联盟是企业进行专利交易的最优方式。从社会层面来说,政府应认真审核积极引导专利联盟的构建,避免专利联盟降低消费者福利。在纵向结构专利联盟的条件下,专业化生产商也被排除最终产品市场之外。纵向结构专利联盟具有市场垄断性,纵向结构专利联盟导致了寡头垄断市场结构的形成。
(3)在创新市场从纵向结构专利联盟对创新影响的角度探讨纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。通过引入专利联盟成员的实质性专利产出函数静态地研究纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励效应,在专利许可费收入按数量比例规则分配的条件下,纵向结构专利联盟鼓励其成员进行研究与开发,对创新有激励效应；在纵向结构专利联盟缔结返授条款的条件下动态地研究纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励效应。虽然纵向结构专利联盟中的创新者失去了获得产品差异化方面的竞争优势的机会,但是同创新活动联系在一起的市场的增长也会推动专利联盟成员进行创新,不过随着市场的发展这种创新的动力逐渐下降。
(4)在网络效应的条件下探讨了纵向结构专利联盟的竞争效应问题。在最终产品差异化和同质化条件下,消费者需求随着网络效应的增强而逐渐提高,网络效应改善了社会福利效应。专利联盟成员的利润随着网络效应的增强而逐渐增加,获取网络效应所带来的好处也是组建专利联盟的动因。在网络效应和产品同质化的条件下,专业化生产商不会被纵向结构专利联盟排除市场之外,这说明网络效应抑制了纵向结构专利联盟的垄断性。
From1990s, in semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, and telecommunication fragmented and overlapping patent rights aggravate patent thicket problem, building patent pools could solve the patent thicket problem effectively. With the patent thicket problem more and more worsen, a lot of developed countries advance high-technology industry actively using the patent pools model. After encountered overwhelming attack from DVD3C and DVD6C patent pools, our country cognized clearly the role playing by patent pools based on vertical structure in the development of industry and the threat on our manufacture that is consisted of special manufacturer without core intellectual property from patent pools based on vertical structure. The study of the competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure conforms to the trend of the development of the world high-technology industry and corresponds to the conditions of our country. This paper take the significant and widespread patent pools based on vertical structure as studying object, analyzed the building motive of patent pools based on vertical structure, studied the competitive effects problem in traditional goods market and innovation market, and studied the competitive effects problem under the condition of the network effects. Main contributions are as fellows:
(1) The building motive of patent pools was studied at first. Patent thickets are consisted of blocking patent and complementary patents; with the Patent thickets aggravating the risk of infringement litigation between the patent holders in the process of commercialization of the goods is increasing. The authorized independently model between each other model making the patents sharing and avoiding infringement litigation could result in hold-up problem, royalty stacking problem and huge transaction cost, while patent pools could avoid these problems, therefore patent pools are superior in solving the patent thickets, the motive of building the patent pools may be attribute to crossing the patent thickets. Furthermore the profit of vertical integrated company on the condition of the patent pools is more than using the authorized independently model between each other, this is the economic motive of building the patent pools; after all pursuing the maximizing the profit is the ultimate target.
(2) The competitive effects problem of patent pools based on vertical structure was studied in the traditional goods market by calculating the market performance of the patent pools based on vertical structure and by analyzing how patent pools based on vertical structure influence on the special manufacturers. Standing the point of the company the patent pool is the most effective patent authorized model; And from the society the government should pilot the construction of patent pool, avoid reducing the social welfare by building the patent pools. And the special manufacturers are precluded from the final goods markets under the patent pools based on vertical structure. Therefore the patent pools based on vertical structure are monopolistic; the patent pools based on vertical structure could engender oligarch monopoly market structure.
(3) The competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied in the innovation market by analyzing how patent pools based on vertical structure influence on the innovation. First, the competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied statically by introducing the essential patent output function of the members of a patent pool based on vertical structure. In conclusion, on the condition of dividing the royalty income according to the numeric proportional rules, the patent pool based on vertical structure encourages its members to engage research and development; it has incentive effect to innovation. Second, the competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied dynamically under the condition of patent pools establishing grant backs clause. On the condition of the grant backs clause, the innovator of patent pools based on vertical structure could not get the competitive advantage against its rivals by innovating, but its innovation activity could be motivated by increase of the market in correspondence with innovating, but the incentive will decrease with the market development.
(4) The competitive effects problem of the patent pools based on vertical structure was studied under the condition of the network effects. On the condition of product differentiation and homogenization the demand of consumer is increasing when the network effects is increasing, network effects promote the social welfare;the profit of the member of patent pools is increasing when the network effects is increasing, it indicated that gaining the profit from the network effects was one of the motives of the company building the patent pool; the special manufacturers are not precluded from the final goods markets under the condition of the network effectsand product homogenization, it indicate that the network effects constrain the monopoly of the patent pools based on the vertical structure.
引文
[1]SUNG-HWAN KIM. Vertical Structure and Patent Pools [J].Review of Industrial Organization, 2004, (25):231-250.
[2]Michael A. Heller, Rebecca S. Eisenberg. Can Patents Deter Innovations? [J].The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research, Science,1998, (280):698-701.
[3]Heller M A. The Tragedy of Anti-commons [J].Harvard Law Review,1998, (111):621-688.
[4]Carl Shapiro. Navigating the Patent Thicket:Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting[J].NBER Innovation Policy & the Economy,2001,1(1):119-151.
[5]Richard Ekenger.The Rationale for Patent Pools and Their Effect on Competition[D].2003,http: //www. Jur.Lu.Se/Internet/Biblioteket/Examensarbeten.
[6]林晓DVD6C专利权行使质疑[EB/OL].1999, http://www.law-lib.com/LW/lw_view.asp? no =2148.
[7]TD专利联盟.联盟简介[DB/OL].2000,http://www.tdscdma-alliance.org/aboutus/jianjie.asp.
[8]中国移动创新,3G元年中国移动TD-SCDMA发展的最佳注脚[EB/OL].2010,http://www.tdsc dma-alliance.org/view.asp?id=735.
[9]国家知识产权局规划发展司.2009年国内专利中请和授权呈现五大特点[J].专利统计简报,2010,(2)：2.
[10]Anne Layne-Farnar, Josh Lerner. To join or not to join:examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules [EB/OL].2008,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945189.
[11]David Serafino. Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures [EB/OL].2007,http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf.
[12]Department Of Justice, Federal Trade Commission. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 1995 [EB/OL].1995, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf.
[13]The Bluetooth Special Interest Group. About the Bluetooth SIG [EB/OL].1998,http://w ww.bluetooth.com/English/SIG/Pages/default.aspx.
[14]Giuseppe Colangelo. Avoiding the tragedy of the anticommons:collective rights organiz ations, patent pools and the role of antitrust [EB/OL].2004, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa pers.cfm?abstract_id=523122.
[15]Stephen R. Munzer. Commons, anticommons and community in Biotechnological assets [EB/OL].2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334822.
[16]Gavin Clarkson. Patent Informatics for Patent Thicket Detection:A Network Analytic Approach for Measuring the Density of Patent Space [EB/OL].2007,http://w4.stern.nyu.e du/emplibrary/ACFNpuvR7.pdf.
[17]Gavin D. George. What is hiding in the busshes? EBay's effect on holdout behavior in patent thicket [EB/OL].2007,http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/george.pdf.
[18]Mark A. Lemley,Carl Shapiro.Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking[J] Texas Law Review, 2007,(85):1991-2049.
[19]James Bessen. Patent Thickets:Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies [EB/OL]. http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf.
[20]Ralph SiebertGeorg, von Graevenitz. Does Licensing Resolve Hold Up in the Patent Thicket?[EB/OL].2008, http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2104/3/SvG0108N_DBlatt.pdf.
[21]Iain M. Cockburn, Megan MacGarvie. patents, thickets, and the financing of early-stage firms:evidence from the software industry[EB/OL].2007,http://www.nber.org/papers/w1644.
[22]James Bessen.Patent Thickets:Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies [EB/OL]. 2004,http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf
[23]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利及其特性[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ zsjz/zhzs/200804/t20080418_383770.html
[24]世界知识产权组织.关于知识产权[EB/OL].2003, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.zh
[25]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利基本概念[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ zsjz/cj wt/200804/t20080402_367771.html
[26]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利权的客体是什么?[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ sipo2008/zsjz/cjwt/200804/t20080402_367770.html.
[27]中华人民共和国知识产权局.什么是发明专利?[DB/OL].2008, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2 008/zsjz/cjwt/200804/t20080402_367771.html.
[28]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利权有哪些主要特征?[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov. cn/sipo2008/zsjz/cjwt/200804/t20080402_367769.html.
[29]Steven C. Carlson. Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma [J].Yale Journal on Regulation.1999, 16(2):359-399.
[30]Robert P. Merges. Contracting into Liability Rules:Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations [J].California Law Review,1996,84(5):1293-1393.
[31]Robert P.Merges. Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions:The Case of Patent Pools. [EB/OL].1999,http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges.
[32]Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole. Efficient Patent Pools[J]. American Economic Review,2004,94 (3): 691-711.
[33]Vianney Dequiedt, Bruno Versaevel. Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D[ EB/OL].2007,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988303.
[34]李玉剑、宣国良.专利联盟：战略联盟研究的新领域[J].中国工业经济2004(2)：48-54.
[35]李玉剑.专利联盟：战略联盟研究的新领域[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006.
[36]Department Of Justice, Federal Trade Commission. Antitrust enforcement and the Intelle ctual Property:promoting innovation and competition [EB/OL].2007, http://www.ftc.gov/ reports/innovation/P040101 PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt074.pdf.
[37]卡尔.夏皮罗,哈尔.瓦里安.信息规则：网络经济的策略指导[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000：152-199.
[38]朱幼为.微观经济理论基本原理与扩展[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2008.
[39]朱志泰.马歇尔经济学原理[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[40]朱泱,张胜纪,吴良键.福利经济学[M].北京：商务印书馆,2006.
[41]Ronald H. Coase. The Problem of Social Cost[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1960, 16(3):1-44.
[42]Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization [J].The American Economic Review,1972,62:777-795.
[43]Steven N. S. Cheung.The Fable of the Bees:An Economic Investigation[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1973,16(1):11-33.
[44]STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG.The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas [J].THE American Economic Review,1974, (62):384-391.
[45]Vernon Henderson.Externalities and Industrial Development [J].Journal of urban economics 1997, (42):449-470.
[46]Manjira Datta,Leonard J. Mirman. Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1999,(37):233-255.
[47]Jeffrey Rohlfs. A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1974,5(1):16-37.
[48]Michael L. Katz, Carl Shapiro. Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities [J].The journal of political economy,1986,94(4):822-841.
[49]Michael L. Katz, Carl Shapiro. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility [J]. American Economic Review,2001,75 (3):424-440.
[50]Joseph Farrell, Garth Saloner. Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1985,16(1):70-83.
[51]Nicholas Economides. Network externalities, complementarities, and invitations to enter [J].European Journal of Political Economy1996, (12):211-233.
[52]Matthew T. Clements.Direct and indirect network effects:are they equivalent? [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2004,(22):633-645.
[53]Jeffrey Church, Neil Gandal,David Krause.Indirect network effects and adoption externalities[J].Review of Network Economics,2008,7(3):337-358.
[54]Jeffrey Chuich, Neil Gandal. Network effects, software provision and standardization [J].The journal on industrial economics,1992,51(1):85-103.
[55]G.M. Peter Swann. The functional form of network effects [J]. Information Economics and Policy,2002,(14):417-429.
[56]Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro-product introduction with network externality[J].The journal of industrial economics,1992,40(1):55-83.
[57]Robin Mason. Network externalities and the Coase conjecture [J].European Economic Review, 2000(44):1981-1992.
[58]Stephen P. Kinga, Ryan Lampe. Network externalities, price discrimination and profitable piracy [J]. Information Economics and Policy,2003 (15):271-290.
[59]Luca Lambertini and Raimondello Orsini.Network Externality and the Coordination Problem[J] Journal of economics,2004,82 (2):123-136.
[60]Matthew F. Mitchell,Andrzej Skrzypacz. Network externalities and long-run market shares [J].Economic Theory (2006) 29:621-648.
[61]Bing Jing.Network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly [J].Economics Letters, 2007,(95):7-13
[62]Jose Ignacio, Lopez Sanchez, Jose Luis Arroyo-Barriguete, Domingo Ribeiro. Development of a technological competition model in the presence of network effects from the modified law of Metcalfe [J].Service Business,2008(2):83-98.
[63]Oz Shy Technology revolutions in the presence of network externalities[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1996, (14):785-800.
[64]Gilbert R.J. Patent Pools:100 Years of Law and Econmic Solitude [EB/OL].2002,http:/ /www.innovationlaw.org/Assets/old/gilbert_1022019.doc.
[65]Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas, Jean Tirole. The Structure and Performance of Patent Pools: Empirical Evidence [EB/OL].2003,http://idei.fr/doc/conf/sic/papers_2003/tirole2.pdf.
[66]Steffen Brenner. Stable patent pools [EB/OL].2004,http://www.epip.eu/papers/20050310/E pip%205%20Papers_Presenations/Session%208%20Brenner_Paper.pdf.
[67]Atsushi Kato. Patent pool enhances market competition [J].International Review of Law and Economics,2004, (24):255-268.
[68]Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas, Jean Tirole. The design of patent pools:the determinants of licensing rules [J]. RAND Journal of Economics,2007,38(3):610-625.
[69]Steffen Brenner. Optimal formation rules for patent pools [J]. Economic Theory,2009,3(40): 373-388.
[70]James Kulbaski. Comments on Patent Pools and Standards for Federal Trade Commission Hearings Regarding Competition & Intellectual Property [EB/OL].2002, http://www.cptech.org/cm/patentpool.html.
[71]Ryan lampe, Petra Moser.Do patent pools encourage innovation? Evidence from 19th-century sewing machine industry [EB/OL].2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1308997.
[72]David S. Taylor. The sinking of the United States electronics industry within Japanese patent pools [M].Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.1992, (26):181-212.
[73]Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole, Marcin Strojwas.Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors:Evidence from Patent Pools [EB/OL].2003, http://time.dufe.edu.cn/jingjiwe ncong/waiwenziliao/tirole009.pdf.
[74]Aoki Reiko and Sadao Nagaoka.The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools[J].The Economic Review,2005,55(4), pp.346-356.
[75]李玉剑,宣国良.专利联盟与专利使用效率的提高[J].科学学研究,2005,23(4)：513-516.
[76]刘林青,谭力文,赵浩兴.专利丛林、专利组合和专利联盟——从专利战略到专利群战略[J].研究与发展管理,2006,18(4)：83-89.
[77]任声策,宣国良.专利联盟中的组织学习与技术能力提升—以NOKIA为例[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006,(9)：96-102.
[78]张文莉.专利联盟许可行为的博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2007,16(4)：153-156.
[79]陈欣.国外企业利用专利联盟运作技术标准的实践及其启示[J].科研管理,2007,28(4)：23-29.
[80]杜晓君.专利池：高新技术产业发展和竞争的主导范式[J],经济理论与经济管理,2007,(10)：32-36.
[81]朱振中,吴宗杰.专利联盟的竞争分析[J].科学学研究,2008,25(1)：110-116.
[82]任声策.专利联盟中企业的专利战略：基于联盟要件的考察[J].研究与发展管理,2008,20(3)：95-99.
[83]任声策,尤建新.专利联盟成员的专利许可投入决策研究[J].科研管理2009,30(2)：77-83.
[84]徐明华,陈锦其.专利联盟理论及其对我国企业专利战略的启示[J].科研管理,2009,30(4)：162-167.
[85]Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole.Public Policy toward Patent Pools [J]. Innovation Policy and the Economy,2007, (8):157-186.
[86]Richard J. Gilbert. Antitrust for Patent pools:A Century of Policy Evolution [EB/OL].2002, http://www. law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.
[87]工业和信息产业部TD-SCDMA专利联盟简介[EB/OL].1999, http://www.miit.gov.cn/nll 293472/n11293877/n12163738/n12163787/12180772.html
[88]工业和信息产业部.什么是3G[EB/OL].2004,http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n 12163738/n12163802/12164933.html20090311.
[89]工业和信息产业部TD-SCDMA标准的提出[EB/OL].2000, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1129 3472/n11293877/n12163738/n12163802/12164917.html20090311
[90]工业和信息产业部.什么是TD-SCDMA [EB/OL].2009, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472 /n11293877/n12163738/n12163802/12164925.html.
[91]中国电子报社TD-SCDMA(?)产业十年发展历程[M].北京：电子工业出版社,2008.
[92]国家知识产权局规划发展司.2009年国内发明专利逆势上扬创新能力建设取得新进展[J].专利统计简报,2009,(1)：1-6.
[93]国家知识产权局规划发展司.我国PCT的技术领域分布特点[J].专利统计简报,2010,(7)：1-5.
[94]杜晓君,梅开.基三于纵向结构的专利联盟效应分析[J].预测,2009,28(2)：37-41.
[95]To promote innovation:the proper balance of competition and patent law and policy [EB/OL].2003,http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
[96]梅开,杜晓君,杨昆明.单一市场结构下专利联盟的市场绩效分析[J].科学学于科学技术管理,2009,(8)：41-44.
[97]斯蒂芬.马丁.高级产业经济学[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[98]F. M. Scherer, David Ross. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance [M].Chicago press,1970.
[99]George J. Stigler.The Organization of Industry[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1968.
[100]Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Roller.Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2005 (23):829-848.
[101]Fornell Claes, Robinson William.Industrial Organization and Consumer Satisfaction Dissatisfaction [J].The Journal of consumer research,1983,9(3):403-412.
[102]Harold Demsetz.Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1973,16(1):1-9.
[103]任剑新.单一市场结构下横向联盟的市场绩效与规制[J].中国工业经济,2004,(2)：42-47.
[104]Oliver E.Williamson.Economies as an Antitrust Defense:The Welfare Tradeoffs [J]. The American Economic Review,1968,58(1):18-36.
[105]Carl Shapiro, Willig Robert. On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures [J] Journal of Economic Perspectives,1990,4(3):113-130.
[106]Carl Shapiro. Antitrust limits to patent settlements [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003,34(2):391-411.
[107]查尔斯.I.琼斯.经济增长导论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.
[108]熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1991.
[109]Kenneth J. Arrow. Economic Welfare and the Allocationon Resources for Invention [EB/OL]. 1962,http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P1856.pdf.
[110]Harold Demsetz. Information and Efficiency:Another Viewpoint [J]Journal of Law and Economics,1969,(12),1-22.
[111]Morton 1. Kamien. Market structure and innovation [EB/OL].http://ideas.repec.org/cgi-b in/get_doc.pl?urn=RePEc%3Anwu%3Acmsems%3A256&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kellog g.northwestern.edu%2Fresearch%2Fmath%2Fpapers%2F256.pdf.
[112]Morton I. Kamien.and Schwartz, Nancy L. Market Structure, Elasticity of Demand and Incentive to Invent [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1970,(13):241-252.
[113]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Timing of Innovations under Rivalry[J].Econometrica, 1972,40(1)43-60.
[114]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Market Structure and Innovation:A Survey [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1975,13(1),1-37.
[115]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. On the Degree of Rivalry for Maximum Innovative Activity [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,(90):245-260.
[116]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Self financing of an R&D Project0[J].American Economic Review,1978,(68):252-261.
[117]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Potential Rivalry, Monopoly Profits and the Pace of Inventive Activity[J].Review of Economic Studies,1978,(45),547-557.
[118]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy.Market Structure and Innovation [M].Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982.
[119]Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information[EB/OL].
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/holdup.pdf.
[120]James Bessen, Eric Maskin. Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation[EB/OL].1999, http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/econpaper25.pdf.
[121]杜晓君,梅开纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励作用分析[J].科研管理,2010(1)：64-68.
[122]张伟,张华祝,倪晓宁,张倩伟,王宝来.经济数学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[123]中华人民共和国科学技术部.科学研究与试验发展经费[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sts.org.c n/sjkl/kjtjdt/data2008/2008-1.htm.
[124]薛定宇,陈阳泉.高等应用数学问题的MATLAB求解[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2008.
[125]Reiko Aoki, Aaron Schiff. Promoting access to intellectual property:patent pools, copyright collectives, and clearinghouses [J]. R&D Management,2008,38(2):189-204.
[126]Jay Pil Choi. Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation [EB/OL].2003,http://ssrn.com/abstract=466062.
[127]Corinne Langinier. Patent Pool Formation and Scope of Patents [EB/OL]. 2007,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155762.
[128]Michael Bednarek, Markus Ineichen.Patent Pools as an Alternative to Patent Wars in Emergent Sectors[J]Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal,2004,16(7):1-5.
[129]Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation. [EB/OL].2003,http://ssrn.com/abstract=380880.
[130]Jeanne Clark, Joe Piccolo, Brian Stanton, Karin Tyson.Patent pools:a solution to the problem of access in biotechnology patents? [EB/OL].2004,http://www.uspto.gov/web/off ices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf
[131]Esther van Zimmeren.from one-stop to one-stop-shop:patent pools and clearinghouse mechanisms as pragmatic solutions for patent thickets and non-cooperative patent holde rs in genetic diagnostics? [EB/OL].2006,http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/p apers2/van%20Zimmeren.pdf.
[132]梅开,杜晓君,杨昆明,冯国滨.网络效应与专利联盟[J].科学学研究,2010,28(2)：211-214.
[133]刘振刚.技术创新、技术标准与经济发展[M].北京：中国标准出版社,2005.
[134]Jefrey L. Funk, David T. Methe. Market and Committee based Mechanisms in the Creation and Difusion of Global Industry Standards:the Case of Mobile Communication[J]. Research Policy,2001,30(4):589-610.
[135]Farrell J.,Saloner G.Coordination Through Committees and Markets[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1988,19(2):235-252.
[136]Nicholas Economides, Charles Himmelberg.Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications [EB/OL].1994, http://www.google.com/books.
[137]Nicholas Economides, Brian Viard. Pricing of Complements and Network Effects [EB/OL].2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=407280.
[138]夏大慰,熊红星.网络效应、消费偏好与标准竞争[J].中国工业经济2005,(5):43-49.
[139]段文奇,陈忠.网络效应新产品成功的关键：产品质量还是安装基础?[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,(7)：144-148.
[140]朱.弗登博格,让.梯若尔.博弈论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[141]Li Hui Lin, Na Lin Kulatilaka,network effects and licencing with fixed fee,royalty,hybrid contract [J].Journal of Management Information Systems,2006,23(2):91-118.
[142]Alberto Cavaliere. Price Competition and Consumer Externalities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Information Disparities[J].Journal of Economics,2005,86 (1):29-64.
[143]何青,王利芬Maple教程[M].北京：科学出版社,2006.
[144]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[145]迈克尔.波特.竞争优势[M].北京：华夏出版社,2006.
[146]International Telecommunication Union. IMT-Advanced (4G) Mobile wireless broadband on the anvil New ITU radio interface standards to revolutionize mobile communication [EB/OL].2009-10-21,http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2009/48.html.
[2]Michael A. Heller, Rebecca S. Eisenberg. Can Patents Deter Innovations? [J].The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research, Science,1998, (280):698-701.
[3]Heller M A. The Tragedy of Anti-commons [J].Harvard Law Review,1998, (111):621-688.
[4]Carl Shapiro. Navigating the Patent Thicket:Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting[J].NBER Innovation Policy & the Economy,2001,1(1):119-151.
[5]Richard Ekenger.The Rationale for Patent Pools and Their Effect on Competition[D].2003,http: //www. Jur.Lu.Se/Internet/Biblioteket/Examensarbeten.
[6]林晓DVD6C专利权行使质疑[EB/OL].1999, http://www.law-lib.com/LW/lw_view.asp? no =2148.
[7]TD专利联盟.联盟简介[DB/OL].2000,http://www.tdscdma-alliance.org/aboutus/jianjie.asp.
[8]中国移动创新,3G元年中国移动TD-SCDMA发展的最佳注脚[EB/OL].2010,http://www.tdsc dma-alliance.org/view.asp?id=735.
[9]国家知识产权局规划发展司.2009年国内专利中请和授权呈现五大特点[J].专利统计简报,2010,(2)：2.
[10]Anne Layne-Farnar, Josh Lerner. To join or not to join:examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules [EB/OL].2008,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945189.
[11]David Serafino. Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures [EB/OL].2007,http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf.
[12]Department Of Justice, Federal Trade Commission. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 1995 [EB/OL].1995, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf.
[13]The Bluetooth Special Interest Group. About the Bluetooth SIG [EB/OL].1998,http://w ww.bluetooth.com/English/SIG/Pages/default.aspx.
[14]Giuseppe Colangelo. Avoiding the tragedy of the anticommons:collective rights organiz ations, patent pools and the role of antitrust [EB/OL].2004, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa pers.cfm?abstract_id=523122.
[15]Stephen R. Munzer. Commons, anticommons and community in Biotechnological assets [EB/OL].2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334822.
[16]Gavin Clarkson. Patent Informatics for Patent Thicket Detection:A Network Analytic Approach for Measuring the Density of Patent Space [EB/OL].2007,http://w4.stern.nyu.e du/emplibrary/ACFNpuvR7.pdf.
[17]Gavin D. George. What is hiding in the busshes? EBay's effect on holdout behavior in patent thicket [EB/OL].2007,http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/george.pdf.
[18]Mark A. Lemley,Carl Shapiro.Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking[J] Texas Law Review, 2007,(85):1991-2049.
[19]James Bessen. Patent Thickets:Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies [EB/OL]. http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf.
[20]Ralph SiebertGeorg, von Graevenitz. Does Licensing Resolve Hold Up in the Patent Thicket?[EB/OL].2008, http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2104/3/SvG0108N_DBlatt.pdf.
[21]Iain M. Cockburn, Megan MacGarvie. patents, thickets, and the financing of early-stage firms:evidence from the software industry[EB/OL].2007,http://www.nber.org/papers/w1644.
[22]James Bessen.Patent Thickets:Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies [EB/OL]. 2004,http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf
[23]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利及其特性[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ zsjz/zhzs/200804/t20080418_383770.html
[24]世界知识产权组织.关于知识产权[EB/OL].2003, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.zh
[25]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利基本概念[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ zsjz/cj wt/200804/t20080402_367771.html
[26]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利权的客体是什么?[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ sipo2008/zsjz/cjwt/200804/t20080402_367770.html.
[27]中华人民共和国知识产权局.什么是发明专利?[DB/OL].2008, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2 008/zsjz/cjwt/200804/t20080402_367771.html.
[28]中华人民共和国知识产权局.专利权有哪些主要特征?[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sipo.gov. cn/sipo2008/zsjz/cjwt/200804/t20080402_367769.html.
[29]Steven C. Carlson. Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma [J].Yale Journal on Regulation.1999, 16(2):359-399.
[30]Robert P. Merges. Contracting into Liability Rules:Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations [J].California Law Review,1996,84(5):1293-1393.
[31]Robert P.Merges. Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions:The Case of Patent Pools. [EB/OL].1999,http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges.
[32]Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole. Efficient Patent Pools[J]. American Economic Review,2004,94 (3): 691-711.
[33]Vianney Dequiedt, Bruno Versaevel. Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D[ EB/OL].2007,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988303.
[34]李玉剑、宣国良.专利联盟：战略联盟研究的新领域[J].中国工业经济2004(2)：48-54.
[35]李玉剑.专利联盟：战略联盟研究的新领域[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006.
[36]Department Of Justice, Federal Trade Commission. Antitrust enforcement and the Intelle ctual Property:promoting innovation and competition [EB/OL].2007, http://www.ftc.gov/ reports/innovation/P040101 PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt074.pdf.
[37]卡尔.夏皮罗,哈尔.瓦里安.信息规则：网络经济的策略指导[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000：152-199.
[38]朱幼为.微观经济理论基本原理与扩展[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2008.
[39]朱志泰.马歇尔经济学原理[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[40]朱泱,张胜纪,吴良键.福利经济学[M].北京：商务印书馆,2006.
[41]Ronald H. Coase. The Problem of Social Cost[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1960, 16(3):1-44.
[42]Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization [J].The American Economic Review,1972,62:777-795.
[43]Steven N. S. Cheung.The Fable of the Bees:An Economic Investigation[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1973,16(1):11-33.
[44]STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG.The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas [J].THE American Economic Review,1974, (62):384-391.
[45]Vernon Henderson.Externalities and Industrial Development [J].Journal of urban economics 1997, (42):449-470.
[46]Manjira Datta,Leonard J. Mirman. Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1999,(37):233-255.
[47]Jeffrey Rohlfs. A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1974,5(1):16-37.
[48]Michael L. Katz, Carl Shapiro. Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities [J].The journal of political economy,1986,94(4):822-841.
[49]Michael L. Katz, Carl Shapiro. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility [J]. American Economic Review,2001,75 (3):424-440.
[50]Joseph Farrell, Garth Saloner. Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1985,16(1):70-83.
[51]Nicholas Economides. Network externalities, complementarities, and invitations to enter [J].European Journal of Political Economy1996, (12):211-233.
[52]Matthew T. Clements.Direct and indirect network effects:are they equivalent? [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2004,(22):633-645.
[53]Jeffrey Church, Neil Gandal,David Krause.Indirect network effects and adoption externalities[J].Review of Network Economics,2008,7(3):337-358.
[54]Jeffrey Chuich, Neil Gandal. Network effects, software provision and standardization [J].The journal on industrial economics,1992,51(1):85-103.
[55]G.M. Peter Swann. The functional form of network effects [J]. Information Economics and Policy,2002,(14):417-429.
[56]Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro-product introduction with network externality[J].The journal of industrial economics,1992,40(1):55-83.
[57]Robin Mason. Network externalities and the Coase conjecture [J].European Economic Review, 2000(44):1981-1992.
[58]Stephen P. Kinga, Ryan Lampe. Network externalities, price discrimination and profitable piracy [J]. Information Economics and Policy,2003 (15):271-290.
[59]Luca Lambertini and Raimondello Orsini.Network Externality and the Coordination Problem[J] Journal of economics,2004,82 (2):123-136.
[60]Matthew F. Mitchell,Andrzej Skrzypacz. Network externalities and long-run market shares [J].Economic Theory (2006) 29:621-648.
[61]Bing Jing.Network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly [J].Economics Letters, 2007,(95):7-13
[62]Jose Ignacio, Lopez Sanchez, Jose Luis Arroyo-Barriguete, Domingo Ribeiro. Development of a technological competition model in the presence of network effects from the modified law of Metcalfe [J].Service Business,2008(2):83-98.
[63]Oz Shy Technology revolutions in the presence of network externalities[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1996, (14):785-800.
[64]Gilbert R.J. Patent Pools:100 Years of Law and Econmic Solitude [EB/OL].2002,http:/ /www.innovationlaw.org/Assets/old/gilbert_1022019.doc.
[65]Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas, Jean Tirole. The Structure and Performance of Patent Pools: Empirical Evidence [EB/OL].2003,http://idei.fr/doc/conf/sic/papers_2003/tirole2.pdf.
[66]Steffen Brenner. Stable patent pools [EB/OL].2004,http://www.epip.eu/papers/20050310/E pip%205%20Papers_Presenations/Session%208%20Brenner_Paper.pdf.
[67]Atsushi Kato. Patent pool enhances market competition [J].International Review of Law and Economics,2004, (24):255-268.
[68]Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas, Jean Tirole. The design of patent pools:the determinants of licensing rules [J]. RAND Journal of Economics,2007,38(3):610-625.
[69]Steffen Brenner. Optimal formation rules for patent pools [J]. Economic Theory,2009,3(40): 373-388.
[70]James Kulbaski. Comments on Patent Pools and Standards for Federal Trade Commission Hearings Regarding Competition & Intellectual Property [EB/OL].2002, http://www.cptech.org/cm/patentpool.html.
[71]Ryan lampe, Petra Moser.Do patent pools encourage innovation? Evidence from 19th-century sewing machine industry [EB/OL].2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1308997.
[72]David S. Taylor. The sinking of the United States electronics industry within Japanese patent pools [M].Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.1992, (26):181-212.
[73]Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole, Marcin Strojwas.Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors:Evidence from Patent Pools [EB/OL].2003, http://time.dufe.edu.cn/jingjiwe ncong/waiwenziliao/tirole009.pdf.
[74]Aoki Reiko and Sadao Nagaoka.The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools[J].The Economic Review,2005,55(4), pp.346-356.
[75]李玉剑,宣国良.专利联盟与专利使用效率的提高[J].科学学研究,2005,23(4)：513-516.
[76]刘林青,谭力文,赵浩兴.专利丛林、专利组合和专利联盟——从专利战略到专利群战略[J].研究与发展管理,2006,18(4)：83-89.
[77]任声策,宣国良.专利联盟中的组织学习与技术能力提升—以NOKIA为例[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006,(9)：96-102.
[78]张文莉.专利联盟许可行为的博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2007,16(4)：153-156.
[79]陈欣.国外企业利用专利联盟运作技术标准的实践及其启示[J].科研管理,2007,28(4)：23-29.
[80]杜晓君.专利池：高新技术产业发展和竞争的主导范式[J],经济理论与经济管理,2007,(10)：32-36.
[81]朱振中,吴宗杰.专利联盟的竞争分析[J].科学学研究,2008,25(1)：110-116.
[82]任声策.专利联盟中企业的专利战略：基于联盟要件的考察[J].研究与发展管理,2008,20(3)：95-99.
[83]任声策,尤建新.专利联盟成员的专利许可投入决策研究[J].科研管理2009,30(2)：77-83.
[84]徐明华,陈锦其.专利联盟理论及其对我国企业专利战略的启示[J].科研管理,2009,30(4)：162-167.
[85]Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole.Public Policy toward Patent Pools [J]. Innovation Policy and the Economy,2007, (8):157-186.
[86]Richard J. Gilbert. Antitrust for Patent pools:A Century of Policy Evolution [EB/OL].2002, http://www. law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.
[87]工业和信息产业部TD-SCDMA专利联盟简介[EB/OL].1999, http://www.miit.gov.cn/nll 293472/n11293877/n12163738/n12163787/12180772.html
[88]工业和信息产业部.什么是3G[EB/OL].2004,http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n 12163738/n12163802/12164933.html20090311.
[89]工业和信息产业部TD-SCDMA标准的提出[EB/OL].2000, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1129 3472/n11293877/n12163738/n12163802/12164917.html20090311
[90]工业和信息产业部.什么是TD-SCDMA [EB/OL].2009, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472 /n11293877/n12163738/n12163802/12164925.html.
[91]中国电子报社TD-SCDMA(?)产业十年发展历程[M].北京：电子工业出版社,2008.
[92]国家知识产权局规划发展司.2009年国内发明专利逆势上扬创新能力建设取得新进展[J].专利统计简报,2009,(1)：1-6.
[93]国家知识产权局规划发展司.我国PCT的技术领域分布特点[J].专利统计简报,2010,(7)：1-5.
[94]杜晓君,梅开.基三于纵向结构的专利联盟效应分析[J].预测,2009,28(2)：37-41.
[95]To promote innovation:the proper balance of competition and patent law and policy [EB/OL].2003,http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
[96]梅开,杜晓君,杨昆明.单一市场结构下专利联盟的市场绩效分析[J].科学学于科学技术管理,2009,(8)：41-44.
[97]斯蒂芬.马丁.高级产业经济学[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[98]F. M. Scherer, David Ross. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance [M].Chicago press,1970.
[99]George J. Stigler.The Organization of Industry[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1968.
[100]Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Roller.Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2005 (23):829-848.
[101]Fornell Claes, Robinson William.Industrial Organization and Consumer Satisfaction Dissatisfaction [J].The Journal of consumer research,1983,9(3):403-412.
[102]Harold Demsetz.Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1973,16(1):1-9.
[103]任剑新.单一市场结构下横向联盟的市场绩效与规制[J].中国工业经济,2004,(2)：42-47.
[104]Oliver E.Williamson.Economies as an Antitrust Defense:The Welfare Tradeoffs [J]. The American Economic Review,1968,58(1):18-36.
[105]Carl Shapiro, Willig Robert. On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures [J] Journal of Economic Perspectives,1990,4(3):113-130.
[106]Carl Shapiro. Antitrust limits to patent settlements [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003,34(2):391-411.
[107]查尔斯.I.琼斯.经济增长导论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.
[108]熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1991.
[109]Kenneth J. Arrow. Economic Welfare and the Allocationon Resources for Invention [EB/OL]. 1962,http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P1856.pdf.
[110]Harold Demsetz. Information and Efficiency:Another Viewpoint [J]Journal of Law and Economics,1969,(12),1-22.
[111]Morton 1. Kamien. Market structure and innovation [EB/OL].http://ideas.repec.org/cgi-b in/get_doc.pl?urn=RePEc%3Anwu%3Acmsems%3A256&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kellog g.northwestern.edu%2Fresearch%2Fmath%2Fpapers%2F256.pdf.
[112]Morton I. Kamien.and Schwartz, Nancy L. Market Structure, Elasticity of Demand and Incentive to Invent [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1970,(13):241-252.
[113]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Timing of Innovations under Rivalry[J].Econometrica, 1972,40(1)43-60.
[114]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Market Structure and Innovation:A Survey [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1975,13(1),1-37.
[115]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. On the Degree of Rivalry for Maximum Innovative Activity [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,(90):245-260.
[116]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Self financing of an R&D Project0[J].American Economic Review,1978,(68):252-261.
[117]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy. Potential Rivalry, Monopoly Profits and the Pace of Inventive Activity[J].Review of Economic Studies,1978,(45),547-557.
[118]Morton I. Kamien, Schwartz L. Nancy.Market Structure and Innovation [M].Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982.
[119]Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information[EB/OL].
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/holdup.pdf.
[120]James Bessen, Eric Maskin. Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation[EB/OL].1999, http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/econpaper25.pdf.
[121]杜晓君,梅开纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励作用分析[J].科研管理,2010(1)：64-68.
[122]张伟,张华祝,倪晓宁,张倩伟,王宝来.经济数学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[123]中华人民共和国科学技术部.科学研究与试验发展经费[EB/OL].2008,http://www.sts.org.c n/sjkl/kjtjdt/data2008/2008-1.htm.
[124]薛定宇,陈阳泉.高等应用数学问题的MATLAB求解[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2008.
[125]Reiko Aoki, Aaron Schiff. Promoting access to intellectual property:patent pools, copyright collectives, and clearinghouses [J]. R&D Management,2008,38(2):189-204.
[126]Jay Pil Choi. Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation [EB/OL].2003,http://ssrn.com/abstract=466062.
[127]Corinne Langinier. Patent Pool Formation and Scope of Patents [EB/OL]. 2007,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155762.
[128]Michael Bednarek, Markus Ineichen.Patent Pools as an Alternative to Patent Wars in Emergent Sectors[J]Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal,2004,16(7):1-5.
[129]Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation. [EB/OL].2003,http://ssrn.com/abstract=380880.
[130]Jeanne Clark, Joe Piccolo, Brian Stanton, Karin Tyson.Patent pools:a solution to the problem of access in biotechnology patents? [EB/OL].2004,http://www.uspto.gov/web/off ices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf
[131]Esther van Zimmeren.from one-stop to one-stop-shop:patent pools and clearinghouse mechanisms as pragmatic solutions for patent thickets and non-cooperative patent holde rs in genetic diagnostics? [EB/OL].2006,http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/p apers2/van%20Zimmeren.pdf.
[132]梅开,杜晓君,杨昆明,冯国滨.网络效应与专利联盟[J].科学学研究,2010,28(2)：211-214.
[133]刘振刚.技术创新、技术标准与经济发展[M].北京：中国标准出版社,2005.
[134]Jefrey L. Funk, David T. Methe. Market and Committee based Mechanisms in the Creation and Difusion of Global Industry Standards:the Case of Mobile Communication[J]. Research Policy,2001,30(4):589-610.
[135]Farrell J.,Saloner G.Coordination Through Committees and Markets[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1988,19(2):235-252.
[136]Nicholas Economides, Charles Himmelberg.Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications [EB/OL].1994, http://www.google.com/books.
[137]Nicholas Economides, Brian Viard. Pricing of Complements and Network Effects [EB/OL].2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=407280.
[138]夏大慰,熊红星.网络效应、消费偏好与标准竞争[J].中国工业经济2005,(5):43-49.
[139]段文奇,陈忠.网络效应新产品成功的关键：产品质量还是安装基础?[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,(7)：144-148.
[140]朱.弗登博格,让.梯若尔.博弈论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[141]Li Hui Lin, Na Lin Kulatilaka,network effects and licencing with fixed fee,royalty,hybrid contract [J].Journal of Management Information Systems,2006,23(2):91-118.
[142]Alberto Cavaliere. Price Competition and Consumer Externalities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Information Disparities[J].Journal of Economics,2005,86 (1):29-64.
[143]何青,王利芬Maple教程[M].北京：科学出版社,2006.
[144]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[145]迈克尔.波特.竞争优势[M].北京：华夏出版社,2006.
[146]International Telecommunication Union. IMT-Advanced (4G) Mobile wireless broadband on the anvil New ITU radio interface standards to revolutionize mobile communication [EB/OL].2009-10-21,http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2009/48.html.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |