企业专利诉讼战略研究
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摘要
在激烈的市场竞争中,专利对外授权许可使用或经由诉讼赔偿所产生的巨额收益已经成为企业的重要收入来源之一,企业也更多地寻求通过专利诉讼战略来获得竞争优势。本文通过探讨企业专利诉讼战略的内涵、形成和运作模式,指出企业专利诉讼战略对我国企业发展的影响,并且为增强我国企业在国内外市场竞争中的纠纷处理、预防潜在专利诉讼风险的能力提出了对策建议。本文的主要研究内容如下：
首先,基于战略管理的视角,本文指出企业专利诉讼战略的形成呈现出一种以企业专利战略规划、选择与实施的三个步骤为中心的逻辑主轴。在此基础上,提炼出企业专利交易诉讼战略、专利掠夺诉讼战略、专利投资诉讼战略和专利诉讼防御战略四种诉讼战略类型。并进一步从这四种专利诉讼战略的内涵、战略的运用、诉讼资源获取等方面进行比较分析,探索了它们与专利战略之间相互作用、相互影响的动态关联性。
其次,本文构建了基于博弈论视角的企业专利诉讼战略模型,并重点运用模型诠释了四种专利诉讼战略的实施条件和战略结果,进而得以讨论了专利诉讼战略的运行机理,以及不同的战略类型与企业技术创新的关系。研究结果指出,不同的专利组合差距和损害赔偿的组合可能对应不同的专利诉讼战略类型,而不同的专利诉讼战略类型对企业技术创新的影响程度和关系也具有明显的差异。
再次,对当前新的创新模式和商业模式下,具有代表性的企业专利诉讼战略运作模式进行深入剖析。本研究以专利联盟、专利钓饵、专利信托联盟(AST公司)、合理交易公司(RPX公司)以及美国高智发明公司(IV公司)作为研究典型,通过案例研究方法,深入分析了这些组织或公司的专利诉讼战略运作模式,指出：专利联盟内部通过许可协议避免了专利侵权风险、完成了交易的过程,而专利联盟外部则体现对非联盟成员或竞争对手实施专利掠夺诉讼战略；专利钓饵实施专利投资诉讼战略,通过风险资本的运作,对外收购专利,将这些专利进行一定的组合发挥规模优势,反过来再运用专利诉讼战略所产生的现金流用以支撑未来的收购行为；专利信托联盟与合理交易公司代表着诉讼防御战略运作模式的出现,这是一种应对专利钓饵投资诉讼战略的反制机制；高智发明公司的运作模式则代表着企业专利诉讼战略的一种组合实施,利用其汇集起来庞大的专利资产库,不但进行专利资产的交易和投资,而且还可以防御专利诉讼,有时甚至通过诉讼战略直接对外掠夺。
最后,针对企业专利诉讼战略提出了对策建议。本研究选取了三个典型案例,分析了企业专利诉讼战略对我国企业的影响及其成因,在此基础上提出了我国企业应对专利诉讼战略的具体对策建议：首先,建议加强我国企业内部知识产权管理体系的建设,从创造、管理、交易、影响和防御五个环节,建立一套完善的应对侵权指控的操作程序；其次,提出建立全行业联合防御机制,增强企业共同抵御外来风险的能力；最后,建议政府应从立法、监管和引导三个方面发挥积极作用,监视外国企业在中国的知识产权交易行为,帮助企业防范侵权诉讼指控。
In the fierce market competition, more and more companies to gain competitive advantage through the patent litigation strategy. Patent litigation is no longer a legal issue, but a product of enterprise patent resources and competitive strategy. The dissertation elaborates the effect of patent litigation strategies on China enterprises development through discussing the connotations and the formation of patent litigation strategies and analysizing its operation models. In order to provide theoretical guidance and methodological support for china's companies effectively resolving patent disputes and preventing the risk of patent litigation.The main content and innovations of the dissertation include:
Firstly, this dissertation points out that from the perspective of strategic management, the formation of corporate patent litigation strategy presents a clear logic spindle which include planning, selection and implementation, the three steps of patented technology business strategies. On this basis of refining four types patent litigation strategies, namely, patent trading litigation strategy, patent predatory litigation strategy, patent investing litigation strategy, and patent defending litigation strategy. And then we compare those modes from five aspects, covering the connotation, patent strategy implementation, access to litigation source, source concentration degree and bargaining power of these four types in order to discuss the a dynamic linkage between patent strategies and patent litigation strategies.
Secondly, this dissertation examines the enterprises' patent litigation strategy from a perspective of the game-tree model. And then in the analysis of litigation parties' equilibrium profit in various condition, this dissertation interpretates the implementation and strategic results of four types of patent litigation strategies. Basis on the aforementioned study, this dissertation continues to discuss the relationship between of patent litigation strategy and the technological innovation. The results show that patent portfolio gaps and intensity of damages may correspond to different combinations of the type of patent litigation strategy. Moreover, different types of patent litigation strategy also results in significant differences in influence degree and the relationship of technological innovation.
Thirdly, this dissertation points out the strategic use of patent litigation results in the displacements of enterprises' operating modes. In order to analysize the specific operating modes of patent litigation strategies, the author select some typical orgnizations and companies as contents of case study, that is, patent pool, patent trolls, Allied Security Trust, Rational Patent Exchange and Intellectual Ventures. It gets the following results:Patent pool avoids the risk of patent infringement through an interal cross licenses, while, sues the non-pool members or competitors by external predatory patent litigation strategy. Patent trolls are investing in patent litigation through the acquisition of patents. Those patents will play a certain combination of scale advantages, in turn, the use of patent investing litigation strategy to generate cashflow to support future acquisitions. AST and RPX implement patent defending litigation strategy in their operating model which is a countermeatures of anti-trolls patent litigation. Intellectual Ventures is the typical model that represents a combination of patent litigation strategies implementation. It brings vast proprietary assets, not only for proprietary trading and investing, but also can be used to defense patent litigation.
Finally, after discussing the causes and impact of patent litigation strtegies on Chinese enterprises by three typical cases, the author provides some countermeasures at three levels. China enterprises should establish a comprehensive response to allegations of infringement procedures from the creation, management, trade, impact and defense five areas, in order to move the security line forward and enhance the ability to resist risks. Trade association should set up an industry-wide defense mechanism to help enterprises ability to resist risk.Government should play an important roles in supervising and guiding against unfair competition and potential threat, which (1) surveilling foreign enterprises and organizations patent activities in China, (2) managing the intellectual property transaction of domestic enterprises (3) guiding social supervision and supporting non-profit public interest organization.
首先,基于战略管理的视角,本文指出企业专利诉讼战略的形成呈现出一种以企业专利战略规划、选择与实施的三个步骤为中心的逻辑主轴。在此基础上,提炼出企业专利交易诉讼战略、专利掠夺诉讼战略、专利投资诉讼战略和专利诉讼防御战略四种诉讼战略类型。并进一步从这四种专利诉讼战略的内涵、战略的运用、诉讼资源获取等方面进行比较分析,探索了它们与专利战略之间相互作用、相互影响的动态关联性。
其次,本文构建了基于博弈论视角的企业专利诉讼战略模型,并重点运用模型诠释了四种专利诉讼战略的实施条件和战略结果,进而得以讨论了专利诉讼战略的运行机理,以及不同的战略类型与企业技术创新的关系。研究结果指出,不同的专利组合差距和损害赔偿的组合可能对应不同的专利诉讼战略类型,而不同的专利诉讼战略类型对企业技术创新的影响程度和关系也具有明显的差异。
再次,对当前新的创新模式和商业模式下,具有代表性的企业专利诉讼战略运作模式进行深入剖析。本研究以专利联盟、专利钓饵、专利信托联盟(AST公司)、合理交易公司(RPX公司)以及美国高智发明公司(IV公司)作为研究典型,通过案例研究方法,深入分析了这些组织或公司的专利诉讼战略运作模式,指出：专利联盟内部通过许可协议避免了专利侵权风险、完成了交易的过程,而专利联盟外部则体现对非联盟成员或竞争对手实施专利掠夺诉讼战略；专利钓饵实施专利投资诉讼战略,通过风险资本的运作,对外收购专利,将这些专利进行一定的组合发挥规模优势,反过来再运用专利诉讼战略所产生的现金流用以支撑未来的收购行为；专利信托联盟与合理交易公司代表着诉讼防御战略运作模式的出现,这是一种应对专利钓饵投资诉讼战略的反制机制；高智发明公司的运作模式则代表着企业专利诉讼战略的一种组合实施,利用其汇集起来庞大的专利资产库,不但进行专利资产的交易和投资,而且还可以防御专利诉讼,有时甚至通过诉讼战略直接对外掠夺。
最后,针对企业专利诉讼战略提出了对策建议。本研究选取了三个典型案例,分析了企业专利诉讼战略对我国企业的影响及其成因,在此基础上提出了我国企业应对专利诉讼战略的具体对策建议：首先,建议加强我国企业内部知识产权管理体系的建设,从创造、管理、交易、影响和防御五个环节,建立一套完善的应对侵权指控的操作程序；其次,提出建立全行业联合防御机制,增强企业共同抵御外来风险的能力；最后,建议政府应从立法、监管和引导三个方面发挥积极作用,监视外国企业在中国的知识产权交易行为,帮助企业防范侵权诉讼指控。
In the fierce market competition, more and more companies to gain competitive advantage through the patent litigation strategy. Patent litigation is no longer a legal issue, but a product of enterprise patent resources and competitive strategy. The dissertation elaborates the effect of patent litigation strategies on China enterprises development through discussing the connotations and the formation of patent litigation strategies and analysizing its operation models. In order to provide theoretical guidance and methodological support for china's companies effectively resolving patent disputes and preventing the risk of patent litigation.The main content and innovations of the dissertation include:
Firstly, this dissertation points out that from the perspective of strategic management, the formation of corporate patent litigation strategy presents a clear logic spindle which include planning, selection and implementation, the three steps of patented technology business strategies. On this basis of refining four types patent litigation strategies, namely, patent trading litigation strategy, patent predatory litigation strategy, patent investing litigation strategy, and patent defending litigation strategy. And then we compare those modes from five aspects, covering the connotation, patent strategy implementation, access to litigation source, source concentration degree and bargaining power of these four types in order to discuss the a dynamic linkage between patent strategies and patent litigation strategies.
Secondly, this dissertation examines the enterprises' patent litigation strategy from a perspective of the game-tree model. And then in the analysis of litigation parties' equilibrium profit in various condition, this dissertation interpretates the implementation and strategic results of four types of patent litigation strategies. Basis on the aforementioned study, this dissertation continues to discuss the relationship between of patent litigation strategy and the technological innovation. The results show that patent portfolio gaps and intensity of damages may correspond to different combinations of the type of patent litigation strategy. Moreover, different types of patent litigation strategy also results in significant differences in influence degree and the relationship of technological innovation.
Thirdly, this dissertation points out the strategic use of patent litigation results in the displacements of enterprises' operating modes. In order to analysize the specific operating modes of patent litigation strategies, the author select some typical orgnizations and companies as contents of case study, that is, patent pool, patent trolls, Allied Security Trust, Rational Patent Exchange and Intellectual Ventures. It gets the following results:Patent pool avoids the risk of patent infringement through an interal cross licenses, while, sues the non-pool members or competitors by external predatory patent litigation strategy. Patent trolls are investing in patent litigation through the acquisition of patents. Those patents will play a certain combination of scale advantages, in turn, the use of patent investing litigation strategy to generate cashflow to support future acquisitions. AST and RPX implement patent defending litigation strategy in their operating model which is a countermeatures of anti-trolls patent litigation. Intellectual Ventures is the typical model that represents a combination of patent litigation strategies implementation. It brings vast proprietary assets, not only for proprietary trading and investing, but also can be used to defense patent litigation.
Finally, after discussing the causes and impact of patent litigation strtegies on Chinese enterprises by three typical cases, the author provides some countermeasures at three levels. China enterprises should establish a comprehensive response to allegations of infringement procedures from the creation, management, trade, impact and defense five areas, in order to move the security line forward and enhance the ability to resist risks. Trade association should set up an industry-wide defense mechanism to help enterprises ability to resist risk.Government should play an important roles in supervising and guiding against unfair competition and potential threat, which (1) surveilling foreign enterprises and organizations patent activities in China, (2) managing the intellectual property transaction of domestic enterprises (3) guiding social supervision and supporting non-profit public interest organization.
引文
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