基于共享节约的网购供应链ITIO动态博弈分析

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• 英文论文题名：Online Shopping Supply Chain based on Dynamic Game Analysis ITIO Shared Savings
• 论文作者：胡安建 ; 李富昌 ; 胡晓辉 ; 卢玮
• 英文论文作者：HU An-jian ; LI Fu-chang ; HU Xiao-hui ; LU Wei ; School of Economics & Management ; Yunnan Normal University
• 年：2016
• 作者机构：云南师范大学经济与管理学院;
• 论文关键词：网络直销商 ; 物流服务商 ; 共享节约 ; 动态博弈
• 英文论文关键词：network distributors ; logistics service provider ; shared savings ; dynamic game
• 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
• 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
• 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
• 语种：中文
• 分类号：F224.32;F274;F724.6
• 学会代码：ZHYJ
• 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
• 会议地点：中国陕西西安
• 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
• 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
• 页数：8
• 文件大小：628k
• 原文格式：O
• 会议级别：全国

摘要

在网购供应链中,网络直销商的利润往往受到物流服务商的制约。而常见的物流外包合同不能有效的协调好二者之间的利益冲突,基于此种情况,本文运用动态博弈模型在分析常见的物流合同的基础之上,设计了节约共享合同,剖析了在网购供应链中博弈主体如何采取最优策略,在寻求供应链协调的时候,也使得库存与运输之间达到联合优化,并结合实例论证了此种合同的有效性,结果表明在共享节约合同优于常见的物流外包合同,双方的努力程度、网络直销商的市场最佳定价、存货决策量和系统的利润都得到帕累托改进。
In the e-commerce supply chain,network distributors profits are often restricted by logistics service providers.But common logistics outsourcing contract cannot effectively coordinate the conflicts between them.Based on the situation,dynamic game model is used based on the analysis of the common logistics contract,save sharing contract is designed,how the online game subjects adopt the optimal strategy in the supply chain is analyzed.In search of the supply chain coordination,it also makes it easier to achieve joint optimization between inventory and transportation.Furthermore,combined with the examples,the effectiveness of this contract is demonstrated.The results show that the shared savings contract is superior to the common logistics outsourcing;the extent of the efforts of both sides,the network distributors market best pricing and inventory decisions and profits of the system all get pareto improvement.

引文

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