金融监管结构是否影响宏观杠杆率
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摘要
金融危机以来,如何提升金融监管有效性,推动经济去杠杆,成为重大的理论和现实课题,然而鲜有研究从更深层次探讨金融监管结构的作用。本文从监管机构和监管模式两个维度出发,考察了金融监管结构对杠杆率的影响。研究发现:金融监管机构对杠杆率有显著影响,由中央银行负责银行业监管可以有效降低杠杆率;监管模式的直接影响并不显著,但与监管机构存在交互作用,在监管机构独立于中央银行的情况下,混业监管比分业监管更有效;监管结构有效性也取决于监管机构独立性,中央银行独立性提高可以显著增强去杠杆作用;不同发展水平经济体存在异质性,发展中经济体由中央银行负责混业监管最有效。本研究为更好推进监管体制改革提供了政策启示。
Since the global financial crisis, how to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision and promote economic deleveraging has become an important theoretical and practical issue. However, there are few in-depth studies concerning the impact of the financial regulatory structure on leverage. From the regulatory authority and supervisory model perspectives, this paper examines the influence of the financial supervision structure on the leverage ratio. Based on theoretical analysis of the underlying mechanism, the paper performs an empirical analysis using panel data of 67 economies. The paper shows that financial regulatory authority has a significant impact on the leverage ratio, and that the central bank is more effective at deleveraging when it assumes banking sector supervision, with its effect positively related to its level of independence. While the direct impact of supervisory model is not significant, it has an interaction effect with the regulatory authority. In the case that the regulatory authority is independent of the central bank, mixed supervision is more effective than separate supervision. Meanwhile, the regulatory effect is heterogeneous. In developing countries, the central bank mixed supervision structure is the most effective.
Since the global financial crisis, how to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision and promote economic deleveraging has become an important theoretical and practical issue. However, there are few in-depth studies concerning the impact of the financial regulatory structure on leverage. From the regulatory authority and supervisory model perspectives, this paper examines the influence of the financial supervision structure on the leverage ratio. Based on theoretical analysis of the underlying mechanism, the paper performs an empirical analysis using panel data of 67 economies. The paper shows that financial regulatory authority has a significant impact on the leverage ratio, and that the central bank is more effective at deleveraging when it assumes banking sector supervision, with its effect positively related to its level of independence. While the direct impact of supervisory model is not significant, it has an interaction effect with the regulatory authority. In the case that the regulatory authority is independent of the central bank, mixed supervision is more effective than separate supervision. Meanwhile, the regulatory effect is heterogeneous. In developing countries, the central bank mixed supervision structure is the most effective.
引文
李妍(2010):《金融监管制度、金融机构行为与金融稳定》,《金融研究》第9期。
刘晓光、刘元春、王健(2018):《杠杆率、经济增长与衰退》,《中国社会科学》第6期。
马勇、陈雨露(2017):《金融杠杆、杠杆波动与经济增长》,《经济研究》第6期。
叶永刚、张培(2009):《中国金融监管指标体系构建研究》,《金融研究》第4期。
张昶(2015):《中国银行业监管评价指标体系构建研究》,《未来与发展》第2期。
Arnone, M. and Gambini, A. “Architecture of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision,” in D. Masciandaro and M. Quintyn,eds., Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance. Printing place: Edward Elgar, 2007.
Arnone, M.; Laurens, B. J.; Segalotto, J. F. and Sommer, M. “Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends.” IMF Staff Papers, 2009, 56(2), pp.263-296.
Boyd, J. and Runkle D. “Size and Performance of Banking Firms: Testing the Predictions of Theory.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 1993, 31, pp.47-67.
Desbordes, R. and Vicard, V.“Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political Perspective.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 2009, 37(3), pp.372-386.
Dincera, N. and Eichengreen, B. “Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures.” International Journal of Central Banking, 2014, 10(1), pp.189-253.
IMF.《金融稳健指标编制指南》: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsi/guide/2006/pdf/chn/guide.pdf, 2006.
Masciandaro, D. “Divide et Impera: Financial Supervision Unification and the Central Bank Fragmentation Effect.” European Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 23(2), pp.285-315.
Masciandaro, D. “Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification Outside the Central Bank: Why Do They Do It?” Journal of Financial Stability, 2009, 5(2), pp.1-146.
Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. “Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervision Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View.” The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2008, 19 (2), pp.153-173.
Masciandaro, D.; Pansini, R. V. and Quintyn, M. “The Economic Crisis: Did Supervision Architecture and Governance Matter?” Journal of Financial Stability, 2013, 9(4), pp.578-596.
Melecky, M. and Podpiera, A. M. “Institutional Structures of Financial Sector Supervision, Their Drivers and Historical Benchmarks.” Journal of Financial Stability, 2013, 9, pp.428-444.
Mishkin, F. “Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 1999, 23, pp.675-691.
Posner, E. and Weyl, E. “Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2013, 103(3), pp.393-397.
Stern, G. and Feldman, R. Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression.” NBER Technical Working Papers, 2002, 14(1), pp.80-108.
Sundararajan, V.; Enoch, C.; Jose, S.; Hilbers, A.; Krueger, P.; Moretti, M. and Slack, G. L. “Financial Soundness Indicators: Analytical Aspects and Country Practices.” IMF Occasional Paper, 2002, No.212.
(1)《深化党和国家机构改革方案》提出:“金融是现代经济的核心,必须高度重视防控金融风险、保障国家金融安全。为深化金融监管体制改革,解决现行体制存在的监管职责不清晰、交叉监管和监管空白等问题,强化综合监管,优化监管资源配置,更好统筹系统重要性金融机构监管,逐步建立符合现代金融特点、统筹协调监管、有力有效的现代金融监管框架,守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线,将中国银行业监督管理委员会和中国保险监督管理委员会的职责整合,组建中国银行保险监督管理委员会,作为国务院直属事业单位。主要职责是,依照法律法规统一监督管理银行业和保险业,保护金融消费者合法权益,维护银行业和保险业合法、稳健运行,防范和化解金融风险,维护金融稳定等。”
(2)2018年3月,中国银行保险监督管理委员会党委书记、主席郭树清同志,兼任中国人民银行党委书记、副行长以及银行保险改革领导小组组长。
(3)按照世界银行的标准,本文涉及的67个经济体包括34个中低收入经济体和33个高收入经济体。中低收入经济体包括:阿根廷、亚美尼亚、玻利维亚、巴西、保加利亚、智利、中国、哥伦比亚、哥斯达黎加、厄瓜多尔、埃及、萨尔瓦多、格鲁吉亚、印度、印度尼西亚、约旦、哈萨克斯坦、立陶宛、马其顿、马来西亚、墨西哥、尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、巴拿马、秘鲁、菲律宾、罗马尼亚、俄罗斯、南非、泰国、土耳其、乌克兰、乌拉圭、委内瑞拉。高收入经济体包括:澳大利亚、奥地利、比利时、加拿大、克罗地亚、捷克、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、芬兰、法国、德国、中国香港、匈牙利、冰岛、以色列、意大利、日本、拉脱维亚、卢森堡、马耳他、荷兰、挪威、波兰、葡萄牙、新加坡、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚、韩国、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、英国、美国。
(4)政府治理能力为以下6个指标的均值:言论自由和政府责任(voice and accountability)、政治稳定和无暴力(political stability and absence of violence)、政府效能(government effectiveness)、监管质量(regulatory quality)、法制(rule of law)及腐败控制(control of corruption)。
(5)由于数据截至2010年,考虑到央行独立性变化较慢,本文假定2011年央行独立性与2010年相同。
(6)从不同收入水平经济体来看,中低收入经济体的监管结构调整幅度和调整速度远低于高收入经济体。本文认为,中低收入经济体的金融业发展相对落后,经济发展和对外开放程度相对较低,政府治理能力等制度性因素与高收入经济体相比存在明显劣势,加上危机爆发后的应对措施相对滞后,这些因素都可能使中低收入经济体的金融监管结构调整速度较慢,导致金融监管低效背景下杠杆率大幅上升。
(7)限于篇幅,表7只报告第一种分类(发展水平分组)的回归结果,第二种分类(OECD分组)的回归结论与其类似。
刘晓光、刘元春、王健(2018):《杠杆率、经济增长与衰退》,《中国社会科学》第6期。
马勇、陈雨露(2017):《金融杠杆、杠杆波动与经济增长》,《经济研究》第6期。
叶永刚、张培(2009):《中国金融监管指标体系构建研究》,《金融研究》第4期。
张昶(2015):《中国银行业监管评价指标体系构建研究》,《未来与发展》第2期。
Arnone, M. and Gambini, A. “Architecture of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision,” in D. Masciandaro and M. Quintyn,eds., Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance. Printing place: Edward Elgar, 2007.
Arnone, M.; Laurens, B. J.; Segalotto, J. F. and Sommer, M. “Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends.” IMF Staff Papers, 2009, 56(2), pp.263-296.
Boyd, J. and Runkle D. “Size and Performance of Banking Firms: Testing the Predictions of Theory.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 1993, 31, pp.47-67.
Desbordes, R. and Vicard, V.“Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political Perspective.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 2009, 37(3), pp.372-386.
Dincera, N. and Eichengreen, B. “Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures.” International Journal of Central Banking, 2014, 10(1), pp.189-253.
IMF.《金融稳健指标编制指南》: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsi/guide/2006/pdf/chn/guide.pdf, 2006.
Masciandaro, D. “Divide et Impera: Financial Supervision Unification and the Central Bank Fragmentation Effect.” European Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 23(2), pp.285-315.
Masciandaro, D. “Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification Outside the Central Bank: Why Do They Do It?” Journal of Financial Stability, 2009, 5(2), pp.1-146.
Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. “Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervision Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View.” The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2008, 19 (2), pp.153-173.
Masciandaro, D.; Pansini, R. V. and Quintyn, M. “The Economic Crisis: Did Supervision Architecture and Governance Matter?” Journal of Financial Stability, 2013, 9(4), pp.578-596.
Melecky, M. and Podpiera, A. M. “Institutional Structures of Financial Sector Supervision, Their Drivers and Historical Benchmarks.” Journal of Financial Stability, 2013, 9, pp.428-444.
Mishkin, F. “Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 1999, 23, pp.675-691.
Posner, E. and Weyl, E. “Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2013, 103(3), pp.393-397.
Stern, G. and Feldman, R. Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression.” NBER Technical Working Papers, 2002, 14(1), pp.80-108.
Sundararajan, V.; Enoch, C.; Jose, S.; Hilbers, A.; Krueger, P.; Moretti, M. and Slack, G. L. “Financial Soundness Indicators: Analytical Aspects and Country Practices.” IMF Occasional Paper, 2002, No.212.
(1)《深化党和国家机构改革方案》提出:“金融是现代经济的核心,必须高度重视防控金融风险、保障国家金融安全。为深化金融监管体制改革,解决现行体制存在的监管职责不清晰、交叉监管和监管空白等问题,强化综合监管,优化监管资源配置,更好统筹系统重要性金融机构监管,逐步建立符合现代金融特点、统筹协调监管、有力有效的现代金融监管框架,守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线,将中国银行业监督管理委员会和中国保险监督管理委员会的职责整合,组建中国银行保险监督管理委员会,作为国务院直属事业单位。主要职责是,依照法律法规统一监督管理银行业和保险业,保护金融消费者合法权益,维护银行业和保险业合法、稳健运行,防范和化解金融风险,维护金融稳定等。”
(2)2018年3月,中国银行保险监督管理委员会党委书记、主席郭树清同志,兼任中国人民银行党委书记、副行长以及银行保险改革领导小组组长。
(3)按照世界银行的标准,本文涉及的67个经济体包括34个中低收入经济体和33个高收入经济体。中低收入经济体包括:阿根廷、亚美尼亚、玻利维亚、巴西、保加利亚、智利、中国、哥伦比亚、哥斯达黎加、厄瓜多尔、埃及、萨尔瓦多、格鲁吉亚、印度、印度尼西亚、约旦、哈萨克斯坦、立陶宛、马其顿、马来西亚、墨西哥、尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、巴拿马、秘鲁、菲律宾、罗马尼亚、俄罗斯、南非、泰国、土耳其、乌克兰、乌拉圭、委内瑞拉。高收入经济体包括:澳大利亚、奥地利、比利时、加拿大、克罗地亚、捷克、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、芬兰、法国、德国、中国香港、匈牙利、冰岛、以色列、意大利、日本、拉脱维亚、卢森堡、马耳他、荷兰、挪威、波兰、葡萄牙、新加坡、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚、韩国、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、英国、美国。
(4)政府治理能力为以下6个指标的均值:言论自由和政府责任(voice and accountability)、政治稳定和无暴力(political stability and absence of violence)、政府效能(government effectiveness)、监管质量(regulatory quality)、法制(rule of law)及腐败控制(control of corruption)。
(5)由于数据截至2010年,考虑到央行独立性变化较慢,本文假定2011年央行独立性与2010年相同。
(6)从不同收入水平经济体来看,中低收入经济体的监管结构调整幅度和调整速度远低于高收入经济体。本文认为,中低收入经济体的金融业发展相对落后,经济发展和对外开放程度相对较低,政府治理能力等制度性因素与高收入经济体相比存在明显劣势,加上危机爆发后的应对措施相对滞后,这些因素都可能使中低收入经济体的金融监管结构调整速度较慢,导致金融监管低效背景下杠杆率大幅上升。
(7)限于篇幅,表7只报告第一种分类(发展水平分组)的回归结果,第二种分类(OECD分组)的回归结论与其类似。
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