The Influence of Third-party E-Commerce Platform Price Limits on the Dual-Channel Strategy of Manufacturers
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摘要
Powerful platform operators always set price limits for sellers on the platform. This paper establishes Stackelberg game models according to two pricing models when the manufacturer enters the third-party e-commerce platform and sells products online. The first is a seller-pricing model in which the manufacturer decides the online price. The second is a platform-pricing model in which the platform decides the online price. We obtain the equilibrium results for these two models and the condition that allows the manufacturer to adopt the dual-channel strategy by comparing the operation decisions and performance of supply-chain members in the two models. Results show that the dual-channel strategy of the manufacturer always decreases the profit of the traditional retailer. In comparison with the sellerpricing model, the platform-pricing model always erodes parts of the manufacturers profit obtained by the dual-channel strategy. The manufacturer will pass on the partial loss to the retailer using relative leadership in the platform-pricing model, which renders the profit of the retailer lower than that in the seller-pricing model. Also, price limits do not always bring the platform more profits; sometimes the platform is forced to set a low price.
Powerful platform operators always set price limits for sellers on the platform. This paper establishes Stackelberg game models according to two pricing models when the manufacturer enters the third-party e-commerce platform and sells products online. The first is a seller-pricing model in which the manufacturer decides the online price. The second is a platform-pricing model in which the platform decides the online price. We obtain the equilibrium results for these two models and the condition that allows the manufacturer to adopt the dual-channel strategy by comparing the operation decisions and performance of supply-chain members in the two models. Results show that the dual-channel strategy of the manufacturer always decreases the profit of the traditional retailer. In comparison with the sellerpricing model, the platform-pricing model always erodes parts of the manufacturers profit obtained by the dual-channel strategy. The manufacturer will pass on the partial loss to the retailer using relative leadership in the platform-pricing model, which renders the profit of the retailer lower than that in the seller-pricing model. Also, price limits do not always bring the platform more profits; sometimes the platform is forced to set a low price.
Powerful platform operators always set price limits for sellers on the platform. This paper establishes Stackelberg game models according to two pricing models when the manufacturer enters the third-party e-commerce platform and sells products online. The first is a seller-pricing model in which the manufacturer decides the online price. The second is a platform-pricing model in which the platform decides the online price. We obtain the equilibrium results for these two models and the condition that allows the manufacturer to adopt the dual-channel strategy by comparing the operation decisions and performance of supply-chain members in the two models. Results show that the dual-channel strategy of the manufacturer always decreases the profit of the traditional retailer. In comparison with the sellerpricing model, the platform-pricing model always erodes parts of the manufacturers profit obtained by the dual-channel strategy. The manufacturer will pass on the partial loss to the retailer using relative leadership in the platform-pricing model, which renders the profit of the retailer lower than that in the seller-pricing model. Also, price limits do not always bring the platform more profits; sometimes the platform is forced to set a low price.
引文
[1] eMarketer. Worldwide Retail and Ecommerce Sales:eM arketer’s Updated Forecast and New Mcommerce Estimates for 2016–2021. 2018.7.29. https://www.emarketer.com/Report/Worldwide-Retail-EcommerceSales-eMarketers-Updated-Forecast-New-Mcommerce-Estimates-20162021/2002182.
[2] Hao W, Cai G, Jian C, et al. Online manufacturer referral to heterogeneous retailers. Production&Operations Management, 2015, 24(11):1769–1782.
[3] E-commerce Research Center of China. Online retail market data monitoring annual report of China in2017. 2018.6.3.
[4] Business.sohu.com. Ivestment rules of Tmall. 2006.11.11. http://business.sohu.com/20161103/n47220 3314.shtml.
[5] Arbatskaya M. Can low-price guarantees deter entry?. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2001, 19(9):1387–1406.
[6] Wismer S. Intermediated vs. direct sales and a no-discrimination rule. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013.
[7] Chiang W Y K, Hess J D. Direct marketing, indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science, 2003, 49(1):1–20.
[8] Lu Q, Liu N. Effects of e-commerce channel entry in a two-echelon supply chain:A comparative analysis of single-and dual-channel distribution systems. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 165:100–111.
[9] Hsiao L, Chen Y. Strategic motive for introducing internet channels in a supply chain. Production&Operations Management, 2014, 23(1):36–47.
[10] Mukhopadhyay S K, Zhu X, Yue X. Optimal contract design for mixed channels under information asymmetry. Production&Operations Management, 2008, 17(6):641–650.
[11] Xiong Y, Wei Y, Xiong Z K, et al.“Bricks vs. Clicks”:The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 217(1):75–83.
[12] He Y, Huang H, Li D. Inventory and pricing decisions for a dual-channel supply chain with deteriorating products. Operational Research, 2018:1–43.
[13] Cattani K, Gilland W, Heese H S, et al. Boiling frogs:Pricing strategies for a manufacturer adding a direct channel that competes with the traditional channel. Production and Operations Management, 2006, 15(1):40–56.
[14] Dan B, Xu G, Liu C. Pricing policies in a dual-channel supply chain with retail services. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 139(1):312–320.
[15] Tsay A A, Agrawal N. Channel conflict and coordination in the E-commerce age. Production&Operations Management, 2010, 13(1):93–110.
[16] Liu M, Cao E, Salifou C K. Pricing strategies of a dual-channel supply chain with risk aversion. Transportation Research Part E, 2016, 90:108–120.
[17] Xu H, Liu Z Z, Zhang S H. A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply chain design with price and delivery lead time considerations. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 139(2):654–663.
[18] Li L, He J, Shi Q. Dual-channel pricing strategies for small and medium-sized enterprises. International Journal of Services Technology&Management, 2014, 20(1/2/3):47–70.
[19] Bu S, Yu F R. A game-theoretical scheme in the smart grid with demand-side management:Towards a smart cyber-physical power infrastructure. IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, 2013,1(1):22–32.
[20]?rsdemir A, Kemahlioglu-Ziya E, Parlaktuerk A K. Competitive quality choice and remanufacturing. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(1):48–64.
[2] Hao W, Cai G, Jian C, et al. Online manufacturer referral to heterogeneous retailers. Production&Operations Management, 2015, 24(11):1769–1782.
[3] E-commerce Research Center of China. Online retail market data monitoring annual report of China in2017. 2018.6.3.
[4] Business.sohu.com. Ivestment rules of Tmall. 2006.11.11. http://business.sohu.com/20161103/n47220 3314.shtml.
[5] Arbatskaya M. Can low-price guarantees deter entry?. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2001, 19(9):1387–1406.
[6] Wismer S. Intermediated vs. direct sales and a no-discrimination rule. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013.
[7] Chiang W Y K, Hess J D. Direct marketing, indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science, 2003, 49(1):1–20.
[8] Lu Q, Liu N. Effects of e-commerce channel entry in a two-echelon supply chain:A comparative analysis of single-and dual-channel distribution systems. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 165:100–111.
[9] Hsiao L, Chen Y. Strategic motive for introducing internet channels in a supply chain. Production&Operations Management, 2014, 23(1):36–47.
[10] Mukhopadhyay S K, Zhu X, Yue X. Optimal contract design for mixed channels under information asymmetry. Production&Operations Management, 2008, 17(6):641–650.
[11] Xiong Y, Wei Y, Xiong Z K, et al.“Bricks vs. Clicks”:The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 217(1):75–83.
[12] He Y, Huang H, Li D. Inventory and pricing decisions for a dual-channel supply chain with deteriorating products. Operational Research, 2018:1–43.
[13] Cattani K, Gilland W, Heese H S, et al. Boiling frogs:Pricing strategies for a manufacturer adding a direct channel that competes with the traditional channel. Production and Operations Management, 2006, 15(1):40–56.
[14] Dan B, Xu G, Liu C. Pricing policies in a dual-channel supply chain with retail services. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 139(1):312–320.
[15] Tsay A A, Agrawal N. Channel conflict and coordination in the E-commerce age. Production&Operations Management, 2010, 13(1):93–110.
[16] Liu M, Cao E, Salifou C K. Pricing strategies of a dual-channel supply chain with risk aversion. Transportation Research Part E, 2016, 90:108–120.
[17] Xu H, Liu Z Z, Zhang S H. A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply chain design with price and delivery lead time considerations. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 139(2):654–663.
[18] Li L, He J, Shi Q. Dual-channel pricing strategies for small and medium-sized enterprises. International Journal of Services Technology&Management, 2014, 20(1/2/3):47–70.
[19] Bu S, Yu F R. A game-theoretical scheme in the smart grid with demand-side management:Towards a smart cyber-physical power infrastructure. IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, 2013,1(1):22–32.
[20]?rsdemir A, Kemahlioglu-Ziya E, Parlaktuerk A K. Competitive quality choice and remanufacturing. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(1):48–64.