从制度之战到经济竞争:国内政治与美国对华政策的演变(2009～2018)
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摘要
美国的对华政策一直以来都是地缘政治与国内政治两种逻辑共同作用的产物。冷战后,由于国际体系结构与美国国内政治结构分别出现单极化与两极化的发展趋势,地缘政治逻辑在美国对华政策制定中的重要性显著下降,国内政治逻辑的影响则迅速上升。与之相应,经济取代安全成为中美关系的首要议题。自奥巴马政府执政起,随着中美两国步入战略竞争时代,地缘政治在美国对华政策制定中的重要性再次突显,并成为未来中长期中美战略互动的决定性变量。然而在这一宏观背景下,不同时期美国对华政策连同中美战略竞争的主题却是由美国国内政治所界定的:从奥巴马政府到特朗普政府,变化了的国内政治动因促使上述主题经历了从基于自由主义的规则约束与多边制度竞争到基于现实主义的合作型施压与双边经济竞争的演化。因此,美国国内政治的变化是观察今后美国对华政策走向的重要窗口。
America's China policy has always been a product of the twin logics of geopolitics and domestic politics.Following the end of the Cold War,as the structure of the international system became more unipolar in nature,while America's own domestic politics shifted to become bipolar,the importance of the geopolitical logic for the shaping of America's China policy was drastically reduced,while domestic politics became a much more critical driver of policy logic.As such,economics replaced security as the core theme in US-China relations.Starting from the Obama Administration,the US and China entered into an era of strategic competition,and the role of geopolitics in setting the agenda for America's China policy became much more prominent.Over the medium to long term,it is ultimately becoming the key variable in determining the nature of US-China dynamics.While so,America's China policy and the core themes of strategic competition in the US-China relationship are still defined and re-defined periodically by America's domestic politics.For example,with the transition from Obama to Trump,domestic political changes caused the core themes of US-China relations to evolve from a form of competition constrained by liberal norms and manifested through multilateral institutions to one moored a realist logic of cooperative pressure and bilateral economic competition.As such,changes in America's domestic politics might be seen as a prism through which one can observe the future of trends in America's China policy.
America's China policy has always been a product of the twin logics of geopolitics and domestic politics.Following the end of the Cold War,as the structure of the international system became more unipolar in nature,while America's own domestic politics shifted to become bipolar,the importance of the geopolitical logic for the shaping of America's China policy was drastically reduced,while domestic politics became a much more critical driver of policy logic.As such,economics replaced security as the core theme in US-China relations.Starting from the Obama Administration,the US and China entered into an era of strategic competition,and the role of geopolitics in setting the agenda for America's China policy became much more prominent.Over the medium to long term,it is ultimately becoming the key variable in determining the nature of US-China dynamics.While so,America's China policy and the core themes of strategic competition in the US-China relationship are still defined and re-defined periodically by America's domestic politics.For example,with the transition from Obama to Trump,domestic political changes caused the core themes of US-China relations to evolve from a form of competition constrained by liberal norms and manifested through multilateral institutions to one moored a realist logic of cooperative pressure and bilateral economic competition.As such,changes in America's domestic politics might be seen as a prism through which one can observe the future of trends in America's China policy.
引文
(1)这场辩论在奥巴马政府第二任期达到顶峰,代表性观点参见Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis,“Revising US Grand Strategy towards China”,Council on Foreign Relations,April 2015,http://www.cfr.org/china/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china/p36371。对于这场辩论的总结,参见陶文钊:《美国对华政策大辩论》,载《现代国际关系》2016年第1期,第19~28页。
(2)Graham Allison,“Thucydides’s Trap has been Sprung in the Pacific”,Financial Times,August 22,2012;Graham Allison,Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap,Boston:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,2017.
(3)Aaron Friedberg,“Competing with China”,Survival,Vol.60,No.3,May 2018,pp.7-64;Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.2,2018,pp.60-70;Charles Lane,“We Got China Wrong,Now What?”,Washington Post,February 28,2018;Juan Pablo Cardenal et al.,Sharp Power:Rising Authoritarian Influence,Washington,D.C.:National Endowment for Democracy,2018;“Worldwide Threat Briefing:5Takeaways,From Russia to China”,Wired Staff Security,February 13,2018,https://www.wired.com/story/worldwide-threats-briefing-russia-election-china/.
(1)参见王浩:《特朗普政府对华战略调整的双重逻辑及其互动》,载《世界经济与政治》2018年第3期,第47~69页。
(2)参见达巍:《美国对华战略逻辑的演进与“特朗普冲击”》,载《世界经济与政治》2017年第5期,第21~37页。
(3)美国官方对其国家核心利益的界定可见其历年《国家安全战略》报告(National Security Strategy),“National Strategy Archive”,http://nssarchive.us/2018。从国家核心利益的角度出发对于中美关系发展逻辑的专门探讨,参见王浩:《利益、认知、互动:中美关系演进的动因探析》,载《世界经济与政治》2014年第10期,第98~116页。
(1)经济的首要性集中反映在克林顿政府以“Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”为主题的三份《国家安全战略》报告中,参见“National Strategy Archive”。
(2)Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross eds.,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,Boston:Taylor and Francis,2005.
(3)参见傅莹、王缉思主编:《超越分歧、走向双赢---中美智库研究报告(中方)》,2017年5月22日,第3页。该研究报告由北京大学国际战略研究院、南京大学中国南海协同创新中心等智库共同参与完成,全文可参见南京大学中国南海协同创新中心网站https://nanhai.nju.edu.cn/0f/2c/c5322a200492/page.htm。
(1)Peter Trubowitz,Defining the National Interest:Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1998.
(1)Peter Trubowitz,Politics and Strategy:Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2011;王浩:《社会联盟与美国对外战略演化的逻辑(1945~2015)》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第7期,第58~88页。
(2)参见奥巴马于2009年12月1日就阿富汗问题发表的讲话。“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”,West Point,New York,December 1,2009,The White House,https://www.whitehouse.gov./the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan。
(3)Collin Dueck,The Obama Doctrine:American Grand Strategy Today,New York:Oxford University Press,2015.
(1)从大选的结果看,在大湖区“铁锈地带”的五个州中,俄亥俄州、密歇根州、威斯康星州和印第安纳州全部变成了共和党及特朗普的“势力范围”,只有伊利诺伊州支持民主党。参见王浩:《美国政治的演化逻辑与内在悖论》,载《世界经济与政治》2017年第8期,第64~87页。
(2)历史地看,“双重极化”是美国政党重组初期的国内政治正常现象。所谓政党重组,是美国政治中的一种具有长周期特征的现象,它指的是两党选民基础的根本变化以及由此带来的美国两党力量对比的改变和国内公共政策议题的重大转向。对于特朗普政府执政后美国政治“双重极化”的具体分析,参见吴心伯、达巍主编:《解读“特朗普元年”》,复旦大学中美新型大国关系协同创新中心,2018年1月20日,第17~22页,http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/14/ff/c6840a136447/page.htm。
(1)参见Pew Research Center,“Republicans Divided in Views of Trump’s Conduct:Democrats are Broadly Critical”,http://www.people-press.org/2017/08/29/republicans-divided-in-views-oftrumps-conduct-democrats-are-broadly-critical/。
(2)Colin Dueck,Hard Line:The Republican Party and U.S.Foreign Policy since World War II,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2010.
(1)参见王浩:《美国对外战略变迁的动力、机制及进程---基于“社会中心”视角的分析》,载《当代亚太》2016年第6期,第34~58页。
(1)参见Nicholas Spykman,The Geography of Peace,New York:Harcourt Brace&Co.,1944,p.51。对二战后美国地缘战略的专门分析,参见吴征宇:《霸权的逻辑:地理政治与战后美国大战略》,中国人民大学出版社2010年版。
(2)达巍:《全球再平衡:奥巴马政府国家安全战略再思考》,载《外交评论》2014年第2期,第62~63页。
(3)相关数据可参见国际货币基金组织网站,International Monetary Fund,World Economic and Financial Surveys(2012),http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/APD/eng/areo0412.pdf。
(4)“双领导体制”指中美分别在亚太经济和安全领域的领导地位,参见赵全胜:《中美关系和亚太地区的“双领导体制”》,载《美国研究》2012年第1期,第7~26页。
(5)参见Samuel Huntington,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,New York:Simon and Schuster,1996,p.218。
(1)John Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York:W.W.Norton,2001,chapter 10.
(1)The Pentagon,“Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review”,The White House Office of the Press Secretary,January 5,2012,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-review.
(2)参见《美防长在日撰文称美日同盟是“地区和世界安全支柱”》,新浪网,2011年10月25日,http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2011-10-25/130623359327.shtml。
(3)参见李家成:《冷战后美国强化美日同盟的动因解析》,载《世界经济与政治论坛》2013年第2期,第14~26页。
(4)参见《达尔文港成美军重返亚洲起点》,中新网,2011年11月25日,http://www.china news.com/gj/2011/11-25/3486238.shtml。
(5)James Steinberg and Michael E.O’Hanlon,Strategic Reassurance and Resolve:U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2014,chapter 6.
(1)经过几十年发展,东亚经济一体化已建立包括自由贸易区(FTA)、经济合作协定(EPA)在内的双边或多边合作机制。参见王守贞:《东亚经济一体化:回顾与展望》,载《东南亚纵横》2007年第4期,第21~25页;张锡镇:《东亚地区合作进程与有关各方的态度和立场》,载《东南亚研究》2001年第5期,第34~40页;Harry Harding,“International Order and Organization in the Asia-Pacific Region”,in Robert Ross ed.,East Asia in Transition:Toward a New Regional Order,New York:M.E.Sharpe Inc.,2003,p.334。
(2)章念生:《投资合作促进中美双赢》,载《人民日报》第3版,2017年1月4日。
(1)对于“中国制造2025”对美国霸权构成冲击的美方观点,参见Jost Wubbeke et al,“Made in China 2025:The Making of a High-Tech Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries”,Mercator Institute,December 2016,http://www.meris.org/en/meris-analysis/papers-on-china/made-in-china-2025/:US Chamber of Commerce,“Made in China 2025:Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections”,October 2017,https://www.uschamber.com/report/made-china-2025-globalambitions-built-local-protections-0。
(2)Aaron Friedberg,“A New US Economic Strategy toward China?”,Washington Quarterly,Vol.40,No.4,2018,pp.97-114.
(3)Larry Bartels,Unequal Democracy:The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age,New York:Russell Sage Foundation,2008,p.112.
(1)宋国友:《“百日计划”如何书写中美经贸路线图?》,载《新民晚报》第2版,2017年4月24日。
(1)参见《特朗普要求贸易代表办公室对中国商品征收关税》,新浪网,2018年3月13日,http://finance.sina.com.cn/7x24/2018-03-23/doc-ifyspctc2181067.shtml。
(2)参见《国务院关税规则委员会发布公告,对原产于美国部分进口商品加征关税》,中华人民共和国中央人民政府,2018年4月5日,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/05/content_5279934.htm。
(3)Daniel Rosen,“Is a Trade War the Only Option?”,Foreign Affairs,March 20,2018,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-20/trade-war-only-option.
(4)参见《习近平同美国总统特朗普举行会晤》,新华网,2018年12月2日,http://www.xin huanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-12/02/c_1123796067.htm。
(1)“How the West Got China Wrong:Decades of Optimism About China’s Rise have been Discarded”,The Economist,March 1,2018.
(2)Daniel Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?”,Rhodium Group,January 19,2018,https://rhg.com/research/post-engagement-us-china-relationship/.
(2)Graham Allison,“Thucydides’s Trap has been Sprung in the Pacific”,Financial Times,August 22,2012;Graham Allison,Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap,Boston:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,2017.
(3)Aaron Friedberg,“Competing with China”,Survival,Vol.60,No.3,May 2018,pp.7-64;Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.2,2018,pp.60-70;Charles Lane,“We Got China Wrong,Now What?”,Washington Post,February 28,2018;Juan Pablo Cardenal et al.,Sharp Power:Rising Authoritarian Influence,Washington,D.C.:National Endowment for Democracy,2018;“Worldwide Threat Briefing:5Takeaways,From Russia to China”,Wired Staff Security,February 13,2018,https://www.wired.com/story/worldwide-threats-briefing-russia-election-china/.
(1)参见王浩:《特朗普政府对华战略调整的双重逻辑及其互动》,载《世界经济与政治》2018年第3期,第47~69页。
(2)参见达巍:《美国对华战略逻辑的演进与“特朗普冲击”》,载《世界经济与政治》2017年第5期,第21~37页。
(3)美国官方对其国家核心利益的界定可见其历年《国家安全战略》报告(National Security Strategy),“National Strategy Archive”,http://nssarchive.us/2018。从国家核心利益的角度出发对于中美关系发展逻辑的专门探讨,参见王浩:《利益、认知、互动:中美关系演进的动因探析》,载《世界经济与政治》2014年第10期,第98~116页。
(1)经济的首要性集中反映在克林顿政府以“Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”为主题的三份《国家安全战略》报告中,参见“National Strategy Archive”。
(2)Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross eds.,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,Boston:Taylor and Francis,2005.
(3)参见傅莹、王缉思主编:《超越分歧、走向双赢---中美智库研究报告(中方)》,2017年5月22日,第3页。该研究报告由北京大学国际战略研究院、南京大学中国南海协同创新中心等智库共同参与完成,全文可参见南京大学中国南海协同创新中心网站https://nanhai.nju.edu.cn/0f/2c/c5322a200492/page.htm。
(1)Peter Trubowitz,Defining the National Interest:Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1998.
(1)Peter Trubowitz,Politics and Strategy:Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2011;王浩:《社会联盟与美国对外战略演化的逻辑(1945~2015)》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第7期,第58~88页。
(2)参见奥巴马于2009年12月1日就阿富汗问题发表的讲话。“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”,West Point,New York,December 1,2009,The White House,https://www.whitehouse.gov./the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan。
(3)Collin Dueck,The Obama Doctrine:American Grand Strategy Today,New York:Oxford University Press,2015.
(1)从大选的结果看,在大湖区“铁锈地带”的五个州中,俄亥俄州、密歇根州、威斯康星州和印第安纳州全部变成了共和党及特朗普的“势力范围”,只有伊利诺伊州支持民主党。参见王浩:《美国政治的演化逻辑与内在悖论》,载《世界经济与政治》2017年第8期,第64~87页。
(2)历史地看,“双重极化”是美国政党重组初期的国内政治正常现象。所谓政党重组,是美国政治中的一种具有长周期特征的现象,它指的是两党选民基础的根本变化以及由此带来的美国两党力量对比的改变和国内公共政策议题的重大转向。对于特朗普政府执政后美国政治“双重极化”的具体分析,参见吴心伯、达巍主编:《解读“特朗普元年”》,复旦大学中美新型大国关系协同创新中心,2018年1月20日,第17~22页,http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/14/ff/c6840a136447/page.htm。
(1)参见Pew Research Center,“Republicans Divided in Views of Trump’s Conduct:Democrats are Broadly Critical”,http://www.people-press.org/2017/08/29/republicans-divided-in-views-oftrumps-conduct-democrats-are-broadly-critical/。
(2)Colin Dueck,Hard Line:The Republican Party and U.S.Foreign Policy since World War II,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2010.
(1)参见王浩:《美国对外战略变迁的动力、机制及进程---基于“社会中心”视角的分析》,载《当代亚太》2016年第6期,第34~58页。
(1)参见Nicholas Spykman,The Geography of Peace,New York:Harcourt Brace&Co.,1944,p.51。对二战后美国地缘战略的专门分析,参见吴征宇:《霸权的逻辑:地理政治与战后美国大战略》,中国人民大学出版社2010年版。
(2)达巍:《全球再平衡:奥巴马政府国家安全战略再思考》,载《外交评论》2014年第2期,第62~63页。
(3)相关数据可参见国际货币基金组织网站,International Monetary Fund,World Economic and Financial Surveys(2012),http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/APD/eng/areo0412.pdf。
(4)“双领导体制”指中美分别在亚太经济和安全领域的领导地位,参见赵全胜:《中美关系和亚太地区的“双领导体制”》,载《美国研究》2012年第1期,第7~26页。
(5)参见Samuel Huntington,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,New York:Simon and Schuster,1996,p.218。
(1)John Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York:W.W.Norton,2001,chapter 10.
(1)The Pentagon,“Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review”,The White House Office of the Press Secretary,January 5,2012,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-review.
(2)参见《美防长在日撰文称美日同盟是“地区和世界安全支柱”》,新浪网,2011年10月25日,http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2011-10-25/130623359327.shtml。
(3)参见李家成:《冷战后美国强化美日同盟的动因解析》,载《世界经济与政治论坛》2013年第2期,第14~26页。
(4)参见《达尔文港成美军重返亚洲起点》,中新网,2011年11月25日,http://www.china news.com/gj/2011/11-25/3486238.shtml。
(5)James Steinberg and Michael E.O’Hanlon,Strategic Reassurance and Resolve:U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2014,chapter 6.
(1)经过几十年发展,东亚经济一体化已建立包括自由贸易区(FTA)、经济合作协定(EPA)在内的双边或多边合作机制。参见王守贞:《东亚经济一体化:回顾与展望》,载《东南亚纵横》2007年第4期,第21~25页;张锡镇:《东亚地区合作进程与有关各方的态度和立场》,载《东南亚研究》2001年第5期,第34~40页;Harry Harding,“International Order and Organization in the Asia-Pacific Region”,in Robert Ross ed.,East Asia in Transition:Toward a New Regional Order,New York:M.E.Sharpe Inc.,2003,p.334。
(2)章念生:《投资合作促进中美双赢》,载《人民日报》第3版,2017年1月4日。
(1)对于“中国制造2025”对美国霸权构成冲击的美方观点,参见Jost Wubbeke et al,“Made in China 2025:The Making of a High-Tech Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries”,Mercator Institute,December 2016,http://www.meris.org/en/meris-analysis/papers-on-china/made-in-china-2025/:US Chamber of Commerce,“Made in China 2025:Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections”,October 2017,https://www.uschamber.com/report/made-china-2025-globalambitions-built-local-protections-0。
(2)Aaron Friedberg,“A New US Economic Strategy toward China?”,Washington Quarterly,Vol.40,No.4,2018,pp.97-114.
(3)Larry Bartels,Unequal Democracy:The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age,New York:Russell Sage Foundation,2008,p.112.
(1)宋国友:《“百日计划”如何书写中美经贸路线图?》,载《新民晚报》第2版,2017年4月24日。
(1)参见《特朗普要求贸易代表办公室对中国商品征收关税》,新浪网,2018年3月13日,http://finance.sina.com.cn/7x24/2018-03-23/doc-ifyspctc2181067.shtml。
(2)参见《国务院关税规则委员会发布公告,对原产于美国部分进口商品加征关税》,中华人民共和国中央人民政府,2018年4月5日,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/05/content_5279934.htm。
(3)Daniel Rosen,“Is a Trade War the Only Option?”,Foreign Affairs,March 20,2018,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-20/trade-war-only-option.
(4)参见《习近平同美国总统特朗普举行会晤》,新华网,2018年12月2日,http://www.xin huanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-12/02/c_1123796067.htm。
(1)“How the West Got China Wrong:Decades of Optimism About China’s Rise have been Discarded”,The Economist,March 1,2018.
(2)Daniel Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?”,Rhodium Group,January 19,2018,https://rhg.com/research/post-engagement-us-china-relationship/.