PPP项目中投资者协同行为发生机制及其演化规律研究

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英文篇名：Occurrence Mechanism and Evolution Law of Investors' Collaborative Behavior in PPP Projects 作者：范道安 ; 何清华 ; 杨德磊 英文作者：FAN Daoan;HE Qing-hua;YANG De-lei;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University;Research Institute of Complex Engineer & Management,Tongji University;School of Engineering Management and Real Estate,Henan University of Economics and Law; 关键词：PPP项目 ; 协同行为 ; 稳定策略 ; 演化博弈 英文关键词：PPP projects;;collaborative behavior;;evolutionary stable strategies(ESS);;evolutionary game 中文刊名：YCGL 英文刊名：Operations Research and Management Science 机构：同济大学经济与管理学院;同济大学复杂工程管理研究院;河南财经政法大学工程管理与房地产学院; 出版日期：2019-02-25 出版单位：运筹与管理 年：2019 期：v.28;No.155 基金：国家自然科学基金重大项目:“重大基础设施工程的组织行为与模式创新研究”(71390523);国家自然科学基金资助项目:“重大工程组织公民行为形成动因、效能涌现及培育研究”(71571137) 语种：中文; 页：YCGL201902022 页数：7 CN：02 ISSN：34-1133/G3 分类号：164-170

摘要

在公私合作项目(PPP)项目中,政府和私人投资者可能会采取协同行为来追求自身利益。这就需要对政府和私人投资者的协同行为进行研究,以了解提高项目绩效的基础机制。首先,基于演化博弈模型分析项目投资者策略选择的动态演化过程,据此政府和私人投资者通过交互选择来实现各自的最优策略。其次,通过演化博弈模型分析发现,政府和私人投资者协作管理具有多重复杂路径演化,其稳定策略很大程度上取决于组织的初始状态及相互激励关系。然后,探讨不同情境下投资者的最优策略和有效增强投资者协同行为的利益协调机制。
        In public-private partnership( PPP) projects,the government and private investors may engage in collaborative behavior to pursue interest. This makes necessary the study of government and private investors' collaborative behavior in order to gain the understanding of the underlying mechanisms towards enhancing project performance. At first,the dynamic evolutionary procedure of project investors' choice of strategies is analyzed based on an evolutionary game model,in which the government and private investors could nearly choose interactions as their optimal strategy. Secondly,from the perspective of evolutionary game model( EGT),the results show that the evolution of the government and private investors' collaborative behavior has multiple equilibrium in payoff matrix,and the evolutionary stable strategies( ESS) are largely influenced by the initial organization states and mutual incentive situations of both the regulatory system. Furthermore,the equilibrium solution of the game is discussed to find an effective way to strengthen collaborative behavior which would improve the mechanism of benefit coordination by investors under different situations.

引文

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