从心理内容到语言表达式意义的联接
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摘要
从弗雷格开始,分析哲学家就把心理内容和语言的意义区分开来,不把心理内容看作语言表达式的意义,这种反心理主义的观点切断了意义和心理内容之间的联系,无法根本解决心智问题。心智哲学集中于对身心问题的研究,抛开了对语言的研究,也没有对意义问题给出更好的回答。分析哲学家所谈的意义预设了心理内容,必然导致心智哲学家重新回归到心理主义的角度去谈论意义。语言意义和心理内容有什么样的关系,它们是如何联接的,是认知科学和人工智能需要解决却还没有很好解决的问题,本文尝试给出如下回答:语言意义和心理内容之间的关系类似于货币价值和商品的使用价值之间的关系,离开了后者前者就失去了来源。人们在拥有心理内容的情况下通过交流活动赋予符号以意义,从而形成语言。在交流过程中人们赋予语言以意义并达到心理的确定性,获得确定性是从心理内容形成语言意义的机制。
From Frege,analytic philosophy don't think that mental content is the meaning of language and the object of study,so their antipsychologism meaning theory cannot solve the question of mind. Philosophy of mind concentrates on the study of body-mind problem,and it seems to give up researching languages. Today,artificial intelligence and cognitive science press for philosophy to make a contribution,and advancing a better meaning theory is the goal pursued by analytic philosophers. The relation between the meaning of language expressions and mental content is similar to the relation between money value and the use value of merchandise,and the later will lost sources without the former. With mental content,human give meaning to symbol through exchange activities,then language is formed. In the course of exchange,man endues language with meaning and gains psychological certainty.Gaining psychological certainty is the formation mechanism from mental content to language meaning.
From Frege,analytic philosophy don't think that mental content is the meaning of language and the object of study,so their antipsychologism meaning theory cannot solve the question of mind. Philosophy of mind concentrates on the study of body-mind problem,and it seems to give up researching languages. Today,artificial intelligence and cognitive science press for philosophy to make a contribution,and advancing a better meaning theory is the goal pursued by analytic philosophers. The relation between the meaning of language expressions and mental content is similar to the relation between money value and the use value of merchandise,and the later will lost sources without the former. With mental content,human give meaning to symbol through exchange activities,then language is formed. In the course of exchange,man endues language with meaning and gains psychological certainty.Gaining psychological certainty is the formation mechanism from mental content to language meaning.
引文
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[18][英]威廉·涅尔,玛莎·涅尔.逻辑学的发展[M].张家龙,洪汉鼎,译.北京:商务印书馆,1985:252.
[2]迈克尔·达米特.弗雷格在哲学史上的地位[M].王路,译.哲学译丛,1988(2):48-57.
[3]迈克尔·达米特.分析哲学的起源[M].王路,译.上海:上海译文出版社,2005:22.
[4]C.谢萨.维特根斯坦与心理主义的终结[M].张伯霖,译.哲学译丛,1998(1):62-68.
[5]Davidson,D.Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages[C]//Davidson,D.(eds.).Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.New York:Clarendon Press,1984:3-16.
[6]柯克·路德维希,主编.唐纳德·戴维森[M].郭世平,译.上海:复旦大学出版社,2011:35.
[7]迈克尔·达米特.什么是意义理论?(II)[J].鲁旭东,译.哲学译丛,1998(2):54-69.
[8]迈克尔·达米特.什么是意义理论?(II续)[J].鲁旭东,译.哲学译丛,1998(3):57-73.
[9]Taddeo,M.and Floridi,L.A praxical solution of the symbol grounding problem[J].Minds and Machines,2007,17(4):369-389.
[10]Baron Reed.Certainty[EB/OL].[2008-02-02](2018-06-09).http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/.
[11]Stevan Harnad,Luc Steels,Tony Belpaeme,et al.Research Commentaries on Cangelosi’s“Solutions and Open Challenges for the Symbol Grounding Problem”[J].International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems(IJSSS),2011,1(1):55-79.
[12]W.F.G.Haselager.Robotics,philosophy and the problems of autonomy[C]//Dror,I.(ed.).Cognitive Technologies and the Pragmatics of Cognition.Lodon:John Benjamins,2007:61-77.
[13]李侠.论感受性在心理内容表征中的作用[J].自然辩证法研究,2015(4):21-26.
[14]夏永红.意义如何涌现于形式系统——评《计算主义及其理论难题研究》[J].科学技术哲学研究,2017(6):125-128.
[15]费多益.意义的来源[J].世界哲学,2016(6):88-94.
[16]D.洛马尔.镜像神经元与主体间性现象学[J].世界哲学,2007(6):82-87.
[17][奥]路德维希·维特根斯坦.论确实性[M].张金言,译.桂林:广西师范大学出版社,2002:35.
[18][英]威廉·涅尔,玛莎·涅尔.逻辑学的发展[M].张家龙,洪汉鼎,译.北京:商务印书馆,1985:252.