突发性产出下的供应链协调应对策略
|
摘要
针对突发事件影响制造商产出的情形,研究了收益共享契约协调应对突发产出事件的有效性问题。首先论证了无突发产出事件时收益共享契约协调供应链的有效性,进而分析了突发产出事件对供应链最优生产计划、定价决策、绩效和协调性的影响。然后,建立了突发产出事件下的收益共享契约协调应对模型,并对原收益共享契约和修正后的收益共享契约进行了对比分析。研究表明:当突发产出事件导致产出扰动范围较小时,供应链的最优生产计划、批发价格和零售价格几乎保持不变,仅当产出扰动范围较大时,三者才需要同时调整,此时原供应链的协调性也将被打破,而修正后的收益共享契约具有良好的抗突发性。最后,通过算例进行了验证。
The sudden occurrence of uncertainty-creating factors such as natural disasters and public social events may have an impact on supply(production).For example,in recent years,the supply(production)of products has often been affected by hurricanes and strikes.The occurrence of these emergencies means the original optimal plan or mode of operation can no longer be carried out smoothly,and the coordinated supply chain is no longer coordinated,thus causing large losses to enterprises.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study how the coordinated supply chain system deals with emergencies.In this paper,a three-level supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer,a distributor and a retailer is considered where the manufacturer's output is random.At the same time,it is assumed that retail price depends on random output.It is studied that how a revenue sharing contract deals with disruptions to output caused by emergencies.The decentralized decision-making model and centralized decision-making model are analyzed in the case of no emergencies and construct a revenue sharing contract model(original revenue sharing contract)to coordinate the supply chain.Second,it is assumed that emergencies will lead to changes in the distribution of random output.The optimal adjustment strategy is put forward for production following emergencies,a revised revenue sharing contract model is established,and the original revenue sharing contract and the revised revenue sharing contract model are compared.Finally,the impact of emergencies on optimal production planning,pricing decisions,profit and the coordination of the supply chain are analyzed.Through the analysis of theoretical and numerical examples,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)After the emergency,the optimal production input quantity for a supply chain is not necessarily related to the output scale but depends on the new expected output and the output volatility.(2)When the range of output disruption due to emergencies is small,the optimal production plan and wholesale price of supply chain remain unchanged,and the retail price changes small.However,the coordination of the supply chain under the original revenue sharing contract will be broken,and the revised revenue sharing contract can better withstand emergencies.(3)When emergencies lead to a large range of output disruption,the optimal production input quantity of the supply chain is negatively related to the expected output and output volatility,and the optimal retail price is also negatively related to the expected output,while the optimal retail price is positively related to output volatility.(4)When emergencies lead to a large range of output disruption,the optimal wholesale price for distributor and retailer is negatively related to expected output and first decreases and then increases with the increase in output volatility.(5)Following an emergency,whether under the original revenue sharing contract or a revised revenue sharing contract,the profit of the supply chain system increases with the increase of expected output but decreases with the increase of output volatility.This study provides a basic method to mitigate the impact of emergencies on product supply(production)and therefore enriches current theoretical knowledge of supply chain emergency management while also providing some theoretical guidance for supply chain managers regarding the handling of emergencies.
The sudden occurrence of uncertainty-creating factors such as natural disasters and public social events may have an impact on supply(production).For example,in recent years,the supply(production)of products has often been affected by hurricanes and strikes.The occurrence of these emergencies means the original optimal plan or mode of operation can no longer be carried out smoothly,and the coordinated supply chain is no longer coordinated,thus causing large losses to enterprises.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study how the coordinated supply chain system deals with emergencies.In this paper,a three-level supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer,a distributor and a retailer is considered where the manufacturer's output is random.At the same time,it is assumed that retail price depends on random output.It is studied that how a revenue sharing contract deals with disruptions to output caused by emergencies.The decentralized decision-making model and centralized decision-making model are analyzed in the case of no emergencies and construct a revenue sharing contract model(original revenue sharing contract)to coordinate the supply chain.Second,it is assumed that emergencies will lead to changes in the distribution of random output.The optimal adjustment strategy is put forward for production following emergencies,a revised revenue sharing contract model is established,and the original revenue sharing contract and the revised revenue sharing contract model are compared.Finally,the impact of emergencies on optimal production planning,pricing decisions,profit and the coordination of the supply chain are analyzed.Through the analysis of theoretical and numerical examples,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)After the emergency,the optimal production input quantity for a supply chain is not necessarily related to the output scale but depends on the new expected output and the output volatility.(2)When the range of output disruption due to emergencies is small,the optimal production plan and wholesale price of supply chain remain unchanged,and the retail price changes small.However,the coordination of the supply chain under the original revenue sharing contract will be broken,and the revised revenue sharing contract can better withstand emergencies.(3)When emergencies lead to a large range of output disruption,the optimal production input quantity of the supply chain is negatively related to the expected output and output volatility,and the optimal retail price is also negatively related to the expected output,while the optimal retail price is positively related to output volatility.(4)When emergencies lead to a large range of output disruption,the optimal wholesale price for distributor and retailer is negatively related to expected output and first decreases and then increases with the increase in output volatility.(5)Following an emergency,whether under the original revenue sharing contract or a revised revenue sharing contract,the profit of the supply chain system increases with the increase of expected output but decreases with the increase of output volatility.This study provides a basic method to mitigate the impact of emergencies on product supply(production)and therefore enriches current theoretical knowledge of supply chain emergency management while also providing some theoretical guidance for supply chain managers regarding the handling of emergencies.
引文
[1]大卫·辛奇-利维,菲利普·卡明斯基,伊迪斯·辛奇-利维.供应链设计与管理[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2013.
[2]吴忠和,陈宏,吴晓志,等.突发事件下不对称信息供应链协调机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(1):48-56.
[3]Qi Xiangtong,Bard J F,Yu Gang.Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004,32(4):301-312.
[4]Huang Chongchao,Yu Gang,Wang Song,et al.Disruption management for supply chain coordination with exponential demand function[J].Acta Mathematica Scientia,2006,26(4):655-669.
[5]Xiao Tiaojun,Qi Xiangtong,Yu Gang.Coordination of supply chain after demand disruptions when retailers compete[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2007,109(1):162-179.
[6]Xiao Tiaojun,Qi Xiangtong.Price competition,cost and demand disruptions and coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers[J].Omega,2008,36(5):741-753.
[7]Zhang Weiguo,Fu Junhui,Li Hongyi,et al.Coordination of supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract under demand disruptions when retailers compete[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(1):68-75.
[8]Chen Kebing,Xiao Tiaojun.Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2009,197(1):225-234.
[9]Ji Xiang,Sun Jiasen,Wang Zebin.Turn bad into good:Using transshipment-before-buyback for disruptions of stochastic demand[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,185:150-161.
[10]Behzadi G,O’Sullivan M J,Olsen T L,et al.Allocation flexibility for agribusiness supply chains under market demand disruption[J].International Journal of Production Research,2017,56:3524-3546.
[11]刘浪,石岩.回购契约应对非常规突发事件的三级供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(2):296-303.
[12]庞庆华.收益共享契约下三级供应链应对突发事件的协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(4):101-106.
[13]胡劲松,王虹.三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(3):103-107.
[14]吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.需求和生产成本同时扰动下供应链期权契约应对突发事件[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(4):98-104.
[15]宋巧娜,曹细玉,宋璐君.双契约下闭环供应链应对突发事件的协调性研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(11):420-425.
[16]肖美丹,陈铭洋.三级供应链应对突发需求的联合契约协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(5):1347-1354.
[17]庞庆华,张月,胡玉露,等.突发事件下需求依赖价格的三级供应链收益共享契约[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(6).887-896.
[18]高波,石书生,韦诗韵.需求和价格时间敏感下供应链应对突发事件[J].控制与决策,2011,26(9):1363-1366.
[19]吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.非对称信息下闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):97-106.
[20]吴忠和,陈宏,梁翠莲.时间约束下不对称信息鲜活农产品供应链应对突发事件协调模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(6):126-134.
[21]刘浪,吴双胜,史文强.信息不对称下价格随机的应急数量折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(3):169-176.
[22]柴文龙.突发事件下需求依赖融资利息的资本供应链协调[J].预测,2018,37(2):76-80.
[23]唐振宇,罗新星,陈晓红.突发事件扰动下基于双向期权和B2B电子市场的供应链决策研究[J].管理学报,2018,15(1):127-134.
[24]蹇明,王永龙.产出不确定性的三级供应链风险分担组合契约设计[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(7):74-81.
[25]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:Strengths and Limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.
[2]吴忠和,陈宏,吴晓志,等.突发事件下不对称信息供应链协调机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(1):48-56.
[3]Qi Xiangtong,Bard J F,Yu Gang.Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004,32(4):301-312.
[4]Huang Chongchao,Yu Gang,Wang Song,et al.Disruption management for supply chain coordination with exponential demand function[J].Acta Mathematica Scientia,2006,26(4):655-669.
[5]Xiao Tiaojun,Qi Xiangtong,Yu Gang.Coordination of supply chain after demand disruptions when retailers compete[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2007,109(1):162-179.
[6]Xiao Tiaojun,Qi Xiangtong.Price competition,cost and demand disruptions and coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers[J].Omega,2008,36(5):741-753.
[7]Zhang Weiguo,Fu Junhui,Li Hongyi,et al.Coordination of supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract under demand disruptions when retailers compete[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(1):68-75.
[8]Chen Kebing,Xiao Tiaojun.Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2009,197(1):225-234.
[9]Ji Xiang,Sun Jiasen,Wang Zebin.Turn bad into good:Using transshipment-before-buyback for disruptions of stochastic demand[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,185:150-161.
[10]Behzadi G,O’Sullivan M J,Olsen T L,et al.Allocation flexibility for agribusiness supply chains under market demand disruption[J].International Journal of Production Research,2017,56:3524-3546.
[11]刘浪,石岩.回购契约应对非常规突发事件的三级供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(2):296-303.
[12]庞庆华.收益共享契约下三级供应链应对突发事件的协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(4):101-106.
[13]胡劲松,王虹.三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(3):103-107.
[14]吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.需求和生产成本同时扰动下供应链期权契约应对突发事件[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(4):98-104.
[15]宋巧娜,曹细玉,宋璐君.双契约下闭环供应链应对突发事件的协调性研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(11):420-425.
[16]肖美丹,陈铭洋.三级供应链应对突发需求的联合契约协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(5):1347-1354.
[17]庞庆华,张月,胡玉露,等.突发事件下需求依赖价格的三级供应链收益共享契约[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(6).887-896.
[18]高波,石书生,韦诗韵.需求和价格时间敏感下供应链应对突发事件[J].控制与决策,2011,26(9):1363-1366.
[19]吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.非对称信息下闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):97-106.
[20]吴忠和,陈宏,梁翠莲.时间约束下不对称信息鲜活农产品供应链应对突发事件协调模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(6):126-134.
[21]刘浪,吴双胜,史文强.信息不对称下价格随机的应急数量折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(3):169-176.
[22]柴文龙.突发事件下需求依赖融资利息的资本供应链协调[J].预测,2018,37(2):76-80.
[23]唐振宇,罗新星,陈晓红.突发事件扰动下基于双向期权和B2B电子市场的供应链决策研究[J].管理学报,2018,15(1):127-134.
[24]蹇明,王永龙.产出不确定性的三级供应链风险分担组合契约设计[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(7):74-81.
[25]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:Strengths and Limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.