可再生能源配额制、发电厂商的策略行为与演化
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摘要
可再生能源配额制(简称配额制),是我国实现能源低碳转型的强制性制度变迁;其成功与否,决定于科学的制度设计。制度具有建构性与演进性,配额制在建构发电厂商策略行为博弈规则的同时,长期中会与发电厂商的策略行为共生演化。本文在构建配额制与发电厂商策略行为演化博弈模型基础上,分析了配额制的相关制度准参数对发电厂商策略行为的影响。结果表明:配额制与发电厂商策略行为的演化博弈均衡,决定于相关的制度准参数(如配额和单位罚金)以及绿色证书市场的交易成本和发电厂商的边际成本差额。其中,科学的配额、较高的单位罚金以及较低的交易成本和边际成本差额,绿色证书市场更为有效,配额制这一强制性制度变迁更易成功;反之反是。因此,科学设计配额制的相关制度准参数并加强其制度环境建设,有助于我国有效施行配额制。
The renewable portfolio standards(RPS)is a mandatory institution change for China to realize the energy low-carbon transition,and its success depends on the scientific institution design.The institution is constructive and evolutionary.RPS will coexist and evolve with power producers' strategic behavior in the long run while constructing the game rules of power producers' strategic behavior.The effects of institution quasi parameter and institutional environment related to the RPS on the strategic behavior of power producers are analyzed,based on the construction of the evolutionary game model between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers.The results indicate that the evolution game equilibrium between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers mainly depend on the relevant institution quasi parameters(such as quota,unit fine,the transaction cost of tradable green certificate market and the marginal cost margin of power producers).The scientific quota,higher unit fine,lower transaction cost and marginal cost margin can not only make the green certificate market more effective,but also make the mandatory institution change of RPS more successful.Therefore,to design the institution quasi parameters related to the RPS scientifically and strengthen the construction of institutional environment helps China to effectively implement the RPS.
The renewable portfolio standards(RPS)is a mandatory institution change for China to realize the energy low-carbon transition,and its success depends on the scientific institution design.The institution is constructive and evolutionary.RPS will coexist and evolve with power producers' strategic behavior in the long run while constructing the game rules of power producers' strategic behavior.The effects of institution quasi parameter and institutional environment related to the RPS on the strategic behavior of power producers are analyzed,based on the construction of the evolutionary game model between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers.The results indicate that the evolution game equilibrium between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers mainly depend on the relevant institution quasi parameters(such as quota,unit fine,the transaction cost of tradable green certificate market and the marginal cost margin of power producers).The scientific quota,higher unit fine,lower transaction cost and marginal cost margin can not only make the green certificate market more effective,but also make the mandatory institution change of RPS more successful.Therefore,to design the institution quasi parameters related to the RPS scientifically and strengthen the construction of institutional environment helps China to effectively implement the RPS.
引文
[1]Jaccard M.Renewable portfolio standard[J].Encyclopedia of Energy,2004,29(4):413-421.
[2]李家才,陈工.国际经验与中国可再生能源配额制(RPS)设计[J].太平洋学报,2008,(10):44-51.
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[8]Río P D,Gual M.The promotion of green electricity in Europe:present and future[J].Environmental Policy&Governance,2010,14(4):219-234.
[9]Berry T,Jaccard M.The renewable portfolio standard:design considerations and an implementation survey[J].Energy Policy,2001,29(4):263-277.
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[12]赵新刚,冯天天,杨益晟.可再生能源配额制对我国电源结构的影响机理及效果研究[J].电网技术,2014,38(4):974-979.
[13]Tamás M M,Shrestha S O B,Zhou H.Feed-in tariff and tradable green certificate in oligopoly[J].Energy Policy,2010,38(8):4040-4047.
[14]Espey S.Renewables portfolio standard:A means for trade with electricity from renewable energy sources?[J].Energy Policy,2001,29(7):557-566.
[15]任东明.中国可再生能源配额制和实施对策探讨[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(22):25-28.
[16]Barbose G,Wiser R,Heeter J,et al.A retrospective analysis of benefits and impacts of U.S.renewable portfolio standards[J].Energy Policy,2016,96:645-660.
[17]Fischer C.Renewable portfolio standards:When do they lower energy prices?[J].Energy Journal,2012,31(1):101-120.
[18]Tanaka M,Chen Y.Market power in renewable portfolio standards[J].Energy Economics,2013,39(3):187-196.
[19]Sun Yanming.The optimal percentage requirement and welfare comparisons in a two-country electricity market with a common tradable green certificate system[J].Economic Modelling,2016,55:322-327.
[20]焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):140-150.
[21]胡黎明,赵瑞霞.产业集群式转移与区域生产网络协同演化及政府行为研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):76-84
[22]Agnolucci P.The effect of financial constraints,technological progress and long-term contracts on tradable green certificates[J].Energy Policy,2007,35(6):3347-3359.
[23]Friedman D.On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1998,8(1):15-43.
[24]Schaeffer G J,Boots M G,Martens J W,et al.Tradable green certificates:A new market-based incentive scheme for renewable energy:Introduction and analysis[R].Working paper,ECN publication,1999.
[25]Bergek A,Jacobsson S.Are tradable green certificates a cost-efficient policy driving technical change or a rent-generating machine?Lessons from Sweden 2003-2008[J].Energy Policy,2010,38(3):1255-1271.
[26]吴克晴,冯兴来.时滞系统在博弈中的应用研究[J].数学理论与应用,2014,34(2):55-61.
[2]李家才,陈工.国际经验与中国可再生能源配额制(RPS)设计[J].太平洋学报,2008,(10):44-51.
[3]任东明.关于引入可再生能源配额制若干问题的讨论[J].可再生能源,2007,29(11):10-13.
[4]国家发展和改革委员会赴美国、澳大利亚可再生能源立法考察团.美国、澳大利亚可再生能源立法考察报告[R].北京:国家发展和改革委员会能源研究所,2004.
[5]国家发展和改革委员会赴欧洲可再生能源立法考察团.欧洲可再生能源立法考察报告[R].北京:国家发展和改革委员会能源研究所,2004.
[6]Unger T,Ahlgren E O.Impacts of a common green certificate market on electricity and CO-emission markets in the Nordic countries[J].Energy Policy,2005,33(16):2152-2163.
[7]Jensen S G,Skytte K.Interactions between the power and green certificate markets[J].Energy Policy,2002,30(5):425-435.
[8]Río P D,Gual M.The promotion of green electricity in Europe:present and future[J].Environmental Policy&Governance,2010,14(4):219-234.
[9]Berry T,Jaccard M.The renewable portfolio standard:design considerations and an implementation survey[J].Energy Policy,2001,29(4):263-277.
[10]Wiser R,Porter K,Grace R.Evaluating experience with renewables portfolio standards in the united states[J].Mitigation&Adaptation Strategies for Global Change,2005,10(2):237-263.
[11]Marchenko O V.Modeling of a green certificate market[J].Renewable Energy,2008,33(8):1953-1958.
[12]赵新刚,冯天天,杨益晟.可再生能源配额制对我国电源结构的影响机理及效果研究[J].电网技术,2014,38(4):974-979.
[13]Tamás M M,Shrestha S O B,Zhou H.Feed-in tariff and tradable green certificate in oligopoly[J].Energy Policy,2010,38(8):4040-4047.
[14]Espey S.Renewables portfolio standard:A means for trade with electricity from renewable energy sources?[J].Energy Policy,2001,29(7):557-566.
[15]任东明.中国可再生能源配额制和实施对策探讨[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(22):25-28.
[16]Barbose G,Wiser R,Heeter J,et al.A retrospective analysis of benefits and impacts of U.S.renewable portfolio standards[J].Energy Policy,2016,96:645-660.
[17]Fischer C.Renewable portfolio standards:When do they lower energy prices?[J].Energy Journal,2012,31(1):101-120.
[18]Tanaka M,Chen Y.Market power in renewable portfolio standards[J].Energy Economics,2013,39(3):187-196.
[19]Sun Yanming.The optimal percentage requirement and welfare comparisons in a two-country electricity market with a common tradable green certificate system[J].Economic Modelling,2016,55:322-327.
[20]焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):140-150.
[21]胡黎明,赵瑞霞.产业集群式转移与区域生产网络协同演化及政府行为研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):76-84
[22]Agnolucci P.The effect of financial constraints,technological progress and long-term contracts on tradable green certificates[J].Energy Policy,2007,35(6):3347-3359.
[23]Friedman D.On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1998,8(1):15-43.
[24]Schaeffer G J,Boots M G,Martens J W,et al.Tradable green certificates:A new market-based incentive scheme for renewable energy:Introduction and analysis[R].Working paper,ECN publication,1999.
[25]Bergek A,Jacobsson S.Are tradable green certificates a cost-efficient policy driving technical change or a rent-generating machine?Lessons from Sweden 2003-2008[J].Energy Policy,2010,38(3):1255-1271.
[26]吴克晴,冯兴来.时滞系统在博弈中的应用研究[J].数学理论与应用,2014,34(2):55-61.