中国地方政府环保责任履行的动力研究——基于浙江省“河长制”政策的分析
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摘要
落实政府环境保护责任是贯彻绿色发展理念和美丽中国建设的主要任务。根据中央环保督查的结果反馈,一些地方政府仍存在推卸与淡化环保责任的现象。已有研究主要在中央与地方关系范式下,围绕地方行为的激励与约束,认为外部政治力量是推动地方政府履行环保责任的动力因素,但此类解释存在一些不足。文章将多源流分析框架作为理论依据,以浙江省河长制政策为研究对象,探究地方积极履行环保责任的动力条件。研究发现:地方政府履行环保责任是综合问题、政治、政策三个条件及其结合时机的结果;促进地方环保责任履行的动力机制包括激励机制、偏好机制和注意力机制;除外部政治力量外,地方政府间学习、地方发展目标、公众情绪等影响地方环保责任的履行。这些发现有助于探索落实地方环保责任的新路径。
The fulfillment of local governments′environmental protection responsibility is the main task of implementing the concept of green development and the construction of beautiful China.The results of the central environmental supervision show that some local governments still pass the buck of and weaken environmental protection responsibility.The existing studies mainly focus on the inspiration and control of local behaviors under the central and local relation paradigm,and hold that external political forces is the motivation of local governments for fulfillment of environmental protection responsibility,but such explanation has some deficiencies.Based on the multi-stream analysis framework,the River Chief System in Zhejiang Province was investigated and the motivation conditions for local governments to actively fulfill environmental protection responsibility were explored.It was found that fulfillment of environmental protection responsibility by local governments is the result of three conditions(problem,politics and policy)and their combination timing.The motivation mechanisms promoting local governments to fulfill environmental protection responsibility include incentive mechanism,preference mechanism and attention mechanism.Except external political power,local inter-governmental learning,local development objective and public mood influence the fulfillment of environmental protection responsibility by local governments.These findings contribute to exploring the new path for local governments to implement environmental protection responsibility.
The fulfillment of local governments′environmental protection responsibility is the main task of implementing the concept of green development and the construction of beautiful China.The results of the central environmental supervision show that some local governments still pass the buck of and weaken environmental protection responsibility.The existing studies mainly focus on the inspiration and control of local behaviors under the central and local relation paradigm,and hold that external political forces is the motivation of local governments for fulfillment of environmental protection responsibility,but such explanation has some deficiencies.Based on the multi-stream analysis framework,the River Chief System in Zhejiang Province was investigated and the motivation conditions for local governments to actively fulfill environmental protection responsibility were explored.It was found that fulfillment of environmental protection responsibility by local governments is the result of three conditions(problem,politics and policy)and their combination timing.The motivation mechanisms promoting local governments to fulfill environmental protection responsibility include incentive mechanism,preference mechanism and attention mechanism.Except external political power,local inter-governmental learning,local development objective and public mood influence the fulfillment of environmental protection responsibility by local governments.These findings contribute to exploring the new path for local governments to implement environmental protection responsibility.
引文
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[21]李文钊.多源流框架:探究模糊性对政策过程的影响[J].行政论坛,2018(2):88-99.
[2]张凌云,齐晔.地方环境监管困境解释:政治激励与财政约束假说[J].中国行政管理,2010(3):93-97.
[3]杨海生,陈少凌,周永章.地方政府竞争与环境政策:来自中国省份数据的证据[J].南方经济,2008(6):15-30.
[4]周雪光,练宏.政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型:以环境政策实施为例[J].中国社会科学,2011(5):80-96.
[5]冉冉.“压力型体制”下的政治激励与地方环境治理[J].经济社会体制比较,2013(3):111-118.
[6]郑思齐,万广华,孙伟增,等.公众诉求与城市环境治理[J].管理世界,2013(6):72-84.
[7]冉冉.环境治理的监督机制:以地方人大和政协为观察视角[J].新视野,2015(3):73-77.
[8]约翰·W·金登.议程、备选方案与公共政策[M].丁煌,方兴,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2014.
[9]尼古拉斯·扎哈里尔迪斯.模糊性、时间与多源流分析[M]//保罗·A·萨巴蒂尔.政策过程理论.彭宗超,钟开斌,译.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2004:93.
[10]李汉卿.行政发包制下河长制的解构及组织困境:以上海市为例[J].中国行政管理,2018,401(11):116-122.
[11]李金珊,沈楠.浙江省污水治理现状、问题及对策研究[J].中共浙江省委党校学报,2014,30(6):59-65.
[12]奥兰·扬.直面环境挑战:治理的作用[M].赵小凡,邬亮,译.北京:经济科学出版社,2014:84.
[13]况广收,胡宁生.社交媒体时代的政策议程设置:基于多源流理论的分析[J].南京社会科学,2017(10):80-86.
[14]冉冉.环境议题的政治建构与中国环境政治中的集权-分权悖论[J].马克思主义与现实,2014(4):161-167.
[15]夏宝龙.以“五水共治”的实际成效取信于民[N].人民日报,2014-01-22(15).
[16]于文超,高楠,龚强.公众诉求、官员激励与地区环境治理[J].浙江社会科学,2014(5):23-35.
[17]景秋.河长制:根生无锡走向全国[EB/OL].(2009-07-03)[2018-12-03].http://www.h2o-china.com/news/81335.html.
[18]向玉琼,黄健荣.论当代地方政策移植:内涵、必要性与可行性分析[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2010(2):121-127.
[19]王洛忠,庞锐.中国公共政策时空演进机理及扩散路径:以河长制的落地与变迁为例[J].中国行政管理,2018,395(5):63-69.
[20]沈满洪.河长制的制度经济学分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(1):134-139.
[21]李文钊.多源流框架:探究模糊性对政策过程的影响[J].行政论坛,2018(2):88-99.
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