作为理智德性的理解
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摘要
在本文中,我阐述了理解可以以哪些方式被视为心灵之卓越状态(品质)或理智德性。在此过程中,我讨论了一个被忽视的问题,即:什么是一个有理解力的人?我说的不是一个理解自然界许多事情的人,而是这样一个人:在对别人进行评价时,她能够避免道德审判主义,进入别人的视角,并以同情的眼光看待他们。在这个意义上,作为一个有理解力的人似乎是一种性格层面的德性,它有趣地结合了道德和认知元素。在我们这个分裂的时代,它似乎也是一种特别需要的德性,因为人们普遍认为,社会之所以分裂,部分是因为相互理解的失败。
In this paper I elucidate various ways in which understanding can be seen as an excellence of the mind or intellectual virtue. Along the way, I take up the neglected issue of what it might mean to be an"understanding person"-by which I mean not a person who understands a number of things about the natural world, but a person who steers clear of things like judgmentalism in her evaluation of other people, and thus is better able to take up different perspectives and view them with a sympathetic eye. Being an understanding person in this sense seems to be a character-level virtue that interestingly combines moral and epistemic elements; it also seems to be a virtue particularly needed in our age of deep political division, where it is commonly said that failures of mutual understanding are partly to blame for this problem.
In this paper I elucidate various ways in which understanding can be seen as an excellence of the mind or intellectual virtue. Along the way, I take up the neglected issue of what it might mean to be an"understanding person"-by which I mean not a person who understands a number of things about the natural world, but a person who steers clear of things like judgmentalism in her evaluation of other people, and thus is better able to take up different perspectives and view them with a sympathetic eye. Being an understanding person in this sense seems to be a character-level virtue that interestingly combines moral and epistemic elements; it also seems to be a virtue particularly needed in our age of deep political division, where it is commonly said that failures of mutual understanding are partly to blame for this problem.
引文
[1]Zagzebski,L.T.'Virtues of the Mind:An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge'[J].Philosophy&Phenomenological Research,1996,60(1):185-189.
[2]Zagzebski,L.T.'Recovering Understanding'[A],Steup,M.(Ed)Knowledge,Truth,and Duty:Essays on Epistemic Justification,Responsibility,and Virtue[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2001,235-252.
[3]Zagzebski,L.T.'Towards a Theory of Understanding'Forthcoming.
[4]Sosa,E.'Human Knowledge,Animal and Reflective'[J].Philosophical Studies,2001,106(3):193-196.
[5]Sosa,E.‘Firsthand Knowledge and Understanding:Toward an Epistemology for Philosophy and the Humanities’.Forthcoming.
[6]Riggs,W.D.'Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding'[A],DePaul,M.,Zagzebski,L.(Eds)Intellectual Virtue:Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology[C],New York:Oxford University Press.2003,203-226.
[7]Roberts,R.C.,Wood,W.J.,Wood,W.J.Intellectual Virtues:An Essay in Regulative Epistemology[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2007.
[8]Pritchard,D.'Knowledge and Understanding'[A],Pritchard,D.,Millar,A.,Haddock,A.(Eds)The Nature and Value of Knowledge:Three Investigations[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2010,3-90.
[9]Greco,J.Achieving Knowledge:A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity[M].Cambridge University Press,2010.
[10]Greco,J.'Episteme:Knowledge and Understanding'[A],Timpe,K.,Boyd,C.(Eds)Virtues and Their Vices[C],New York:Oxford University Press.2014,285-302.
[11]Greco,J.'Satisfying Understanding'[A],Grimm,S.R.,Baumberger,C.,Ammon,S.(Eds)Explaining Understanding:New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science[C],New York:Routledge,2016,230-248.
[12]Baehr,J.'Sophia:Theoretical Wisdom and Contemporary Epistemology'[A],Timpe,K.,Boyd,C.(Eds)Virtues and Their Vices[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2014.
[13]Baehr,J.'Intellectual Virtues and Truth,Understanding,and Wisdom'[A],Snow,N.E.(Ed)The Oxford Handbook of Virtue[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2017,800-819.
[14]Grimm,S.R.'Wisdom'[J].Australasian Journal of Philosophy,2015,93(1):139-154.
[15]Baehr,J.,Baehr,J.S.The Inquiring Mind:On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2011.
[16]Battaly,H.Virtue[M].John Wiley&Sons,2015.
[17]Baehr,J.'Responsibilist Virtues and the‘Charmed Inner Circle’of Traditional Epistemology'[J].Philosophical Studies,2017,174(10):2557-2569.
[18]Grimm,S.R.'Is Understanding A Species of Knowledge?'[J].The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,2006,57(3):515-535.
[19]Grimm,S.R.'Understanding'[A],Pritchard,D.,Berneker,S.(Eds)The Routledge Companion to Epistemology[C],New York:Routledge,2011,84-94.
[20]Grimm,S.R.'Understanding as Knowledge of Causes'[A],Fairweather,A.(Ed)Virtue Epistemology Naturalized:Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science[C],New York:Springer,2014,347-360.
[21]Grimm,S.R.'How Understanding People Differs from Understanding the Natural World'[J].Philosophical Issues,2016,26(1):209-225.
[22]Grimm,S.R.'The Ethics of Understanding'[A],Grimm,S.R.(Ed)Making Sense of the World:New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding[C],Oxford University Press,2017,116-134.
[23]Stueber,K.R.'Understanding Versus Explanation?How to Think about the Distinction Between the Human and the Natural Sciences'[J].Inquiry,2012,55(1):17-32.
[24]Moravcsik,J.'Understanding and Knowledge in Plato’s Philosophy'[J].Neue Hefte für Philosophie,1979,15(16):53-69.
[25]Woodward,J.Making Things Happen[M].New York:Oxford University Press.2003.
[26]Hills,A.'Understanding Why'[J].No?s,2016,50(4):661-688.
[27]Kvanvig,J.L.The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding[M].Cambridge University Press,2003.
[28]Sliwa,P.'Understanding and Knowing'[J].Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,2015,115(1):57-74.
[29]Lawler,I.'Reductionism about Understanding Why'[J].Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,2016,116(2):229-236.
[30]Ultimate Rome:Empire Without Limit:Episode 3[N].British Broadcasting Company,2016-05-11.
[31]Coplan,A.'Understanding Empathy:Its Features and Effects'[A],Coplan,A.,Goldie,P.(Eds)Empathy:Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2011,3-18.
[32]Simon,C.J.'Judgmentalism'[J].Faith and Philosophy,1989,6(3):275-287.
[33]Sosa,E.Judgment and Agency[M].Oxford University Press,USA,2015.
[34]Baehr,J.'Responsibilist Virtues and the“Charmed Inner Circle”of Traditional Epistemology'[J].Philosophical Studies,2017,174(10):2557-2569.
[35]Goldman,A.I.'Interpretation Psychologized'[J].Mind&Language,1989,4(3):161-185.
[36]O'Brien,L.'Phenomenal Understanding'.Forthcoming.
[37]Nagel,T.'What Is It Like to Be A Bat?'[J].The Philosophical Review,1974,83(4):435-450.
[38]Garfinkel,H.Studies in Ethnomethodology[M].Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall.1967.
[39]O'Connor,F.'Letter to XX'[A],Fitzgerald,S.(Ed)The Habit of Being:Letters of Flannery O’Connor[C],New York:Farrar,Straus,and Giroux.1998.
(1)注意,本文中“知识”指的是“命题知识”;此后我将考虑这一术语更广泛的含义。
(2)“心灵的卓越”(excellence of the mind)这个概念和“信念”、“解释”一样,在行为/客体(或过程/结果)的区分上模糊不清。因此一方面,“心灵的卓越”可指认知结果或成就:例如,知识、智慧或理解这类“心智德性”。这似乎符合亚里士多德对理智德性的设想。在《尼各马可伦理学》第六卷列举的理智德性中,亚里士多德列举了诸如sophia(理论智慧),episteme(理解),nous(理性洞见)和phronesis(实践智慧)的成就。另一方面,“心灵的卓越”可指帮助我们达到这些目标的个人属性、职能和特质。这是当代认识论学者理解理智德性这一概念的主流方式,区别在于如何理解这些特质--是思想开明、认知勇气这种“性格层面”的理性特质,还是好的视力、优秀的记忆力这种“能力层面”的特质。
(1)恰如朱利尔斯·莫拉弗斯科(Julius Moravcsik)的观点,他在柏拉图和其他古代思想家那里发现,“我们理解的是不同种类的系统,在各种要素没有构成相关结构的世界里,不可能有理解。”
(2)“认知掌控”的概念显然类似于但我认为不同于艾莉森·希尔斯(Alison Hills)的重要概念“认知控制”(cognitive control)。尽管我不认为希尔斯会认可我在此基于伍德沃的解释。
(1)要明确:我并不否认奴隶制度是不好的,罗马人的行为是不好的,或他们的特质是不好的。理解能帮助我们确定的是,他们的特质如何不好。理解预先阻断了我们可能落入简单结论的任何一种倾向--简单地把他们描述为邪恶的然后停止争论--不做任何更进一步的尝试以把握他们的特质。感谢希瑟·巴特利(Heather Battaly)对这些有益的澄清的帮助。
[2]Zagzebski,L.T.'Recovering Understanding'[A],Steup,M.(Ed)Knowledge,Truth,and Duty:Essays on Epistemic Justification,Responsibility,and Virtue[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2001,235-252.
[3]Zagzebski,L.T.'Towards a Theory of Understanding'Forthcoming.
[4]Sosa,E.'Human Knowledge,Animal and Reflective'[J].Philosophical Studies,2001,106(3):193-196.
[5]Sosa,E.‘Firsthand Knowledge and Understanding:Toward an Epistemology for Philosophy and the Humanities’.Forthcoming.
[6]Riggs,W.D.'Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding'[A],DePaul,M.,Zagzebski,L.(Eds)Intellectual Virtue:Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology[C],New York:Oxford University Press.2003,203-226.
[7]Roberts,R.C.,Wood,W.J.,Wood,W.J.Intellectual Virtues:An Essay in Regulative Epistemology[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2007.
[8]Pritchard,D.'Knowledge and Understanding'[A],Pritchard,D.,Millar,A.,Haddock,A.(Eds)The Nature and Value of Knowledge:Three Investigations[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2010,3-90.
[9]Greco,J.Achieving Knowledge:A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity[M].Cambridge University Press,2010.
[10]Greco,J.'Episteme:Knowledge and Understanding'[A],Timpe,K.,Boyd,C.(Eds)Virtues and Their Vices[C],New York:Oxford University Press.2014,285-302.
[11]Greco,J.'Satisfying Understanding'[A],Grimm,S.R.,Baumberger,C.,Ammon,S.(Eds)Explaining Understanding:New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science[C],New York:Routledge,2016,230-248.
[12]Baehr,J.'Sophia:Theoretical Wisdom and Contemporary Epistemology'[A],Timpe,K.,Boyd,C.(Eds)Virtues and Their Vices[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2014.
[13]Baehr,J.'Intellectual Virtues and Truth,Understanding,and Wisdom'[A],Snow,N.E.(Ed)The Oxford Handbook of Virtue[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2017,800-819.
[14]Grimm,S.R.'Wisdom'[J].Australasian Journal of Philosophy,2015,93(1):139-154.
[15]Baehr,J.,Baehr,J.S.The Inquiring Mind:On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2011.
[16]Battaly,H.Virtue[M].John Wiley&Sons,2015.
[17]Baehr,J.'Responsibilist Virtues and the‘Charmed Inner Circle’of Traditional Epistemology'[J].Philosophical Studies,2017,174(10):2557-2569.
[18]Grimm,S.R.'Is Understanding A Species of Knowledge?'[J].The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,2006,57(3):515-535.
[19]Grimm,S.R.'Understanding'[A],Pritchard,D.,Berneker,S.(Eds)The Routledge Companion to Epistemology[C],New York:Routledge,2011,84-94.
[20]Grimm,S.R.'Understanding as Knowledge of Causes'[A],Fairweather,A.(Ed)Virtue Epistemology Naturalized:Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science[C],New York:Springer,2014,347-360.
[21]Grimm,S.R.'How Understanding People Differs from Understanding the Natural World'[J].Philosophical Issues,2016,26(1):209-225.
[22]Grimm,S.R.'The Ethics of Understanding'[A],Grimm,S.R.(Ed)Making Sense of the World:New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding[C],Oxford University Press,2017,116-134.
[23]Stueber,K.R.'Understanding Versus Explanation?How to Think about the Distinction Between the Human and the Natural Sciences'[J].Inquiry,2012,55(1):17-32.
[24]Moravcsik,J.'Understanding and Knowledge in Plato’s Philosophy'[J].Neue Hefte für Philosophie,1979,15(16):53-69.
[25]Woodward,J.Making Things Happen[M].New York:Oxford University Press.2003.
[26]Hills,A.'Understanding Why'[J].No?s,2016,50(4):661-688.
[27]Kvanvig,J.L.The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding[M].Cambridge University Press,2003.
[28]Sliwa,P.'Understanding and Knowing'[J].Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,2015,115(1):57-74.
[29]Lawler,I.'Reductionism about Understanding Why'[J].Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,2016,116(2):229-236.
[30]Ultimate Rome:Empire Without Limit:Episode 3[N].British Broadcasting Company,2016-05-11.
[31]Coplan,A.'Understanding Empathy:Its Features and Effects'[A],Coplan,A.,Goldie,P.(Eds)Empathy:Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives[C],New York:Oxford University Press,2011,3-18.
[32]Simon,C.J.'Judgmentalism'[J].Faith and Philosophy,1989,6(3):275-287.
[33]Sosa,E.Judgment and Agency[M].Oxford University Press,USA,2015.
[34]Baehr,J.'Responsibilist Virtues and the“Charmed Inner Circle”of Traditional Epistemology'[J].Philosophical Studies,2017,174(10):2557-2569.
[35]Goldman,A.I.'Interpretation Psychologized'[J].Mind&Language,1989,4(3):161-185.
[36]O'Brien,L.'Phenomenal Understanding'.Forthcoming.
[37]Nagel,T.'What Is It Like to Be A Bat?'[J].The Philosophical Review,1974,83(4):435-450.
[38]Garfinkel,H.Studies in Ethnomethodology[M].Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall.1967.
[39]O'Connor,F.'Letter to XX'[A],Fitzgerald,S.(Ed)The Habit of Being:Letters of Flannery O’Connor[C],New York:Farrar,Straus,and Giroux.1998.
(1)注意,本文中“知识”指的是“命题知识”;此后我将考虑这一术语更广泛的含义。
(2)“心灵的卓越”(excellence of the mind)这个概念和“信念”、“解释”一样,在行为/客体(或过程/结果)的区分上模糊不清。因此一方面,“心灵的卓越”可指认知结果或成就:例如,知识、智慧或理解这类“心智德性”。这似乎符合亚里士多德对理智德性的设想。在《尼各马可伦理学》第六卷列举的理智德性中,亚里士多德列举了诸如sophia(理论智慧),episteme(理解),nous(理性洞见)和phronesis(实践智慧)的成就。另一方面,“心灵的卓越”可指帮助我们达到这些目标的个人属性、职能和特质。这是当代认识论学者理解理智德性这一概念的主流方式,区别在于如何理解这些特质--是思想开明、认知勇气这种“性格层面”的理性特质,还是好的视力、优秀的记忆力这种“能力层面”的特质。
(1)恰如朱利尔斯·莫拉弗斯科(Julius Moravcsik)的观点,他在柏拉图和其他古代思想家那里发现,“我们理解的是不同种类的系统,在各种要素没有构成相关结构的世界里,不可能有理解。”
(2)“认知掌控”的概念显然类似于但我认为不同于艾莉森·希尔斯(Alison Hills)的重要概念“认知控制”(cognitive control)。尽管我不认为希尔斯会认可我在此基于伍德沃的解释。
(1)要明确:我并不否认奴隶制度是不好的,罗马人的行为是不好的,或他们的特质是不好的。理解能帮助我们确定的是,他们的特质如何不好。理解预先阻断了我们可能落入简单结论的任何一种倾向--简单地把他们描述为邪恶的然后停止争论--不做任何更进一步的尝试以把握他们的特质。感谢希瑟·巴特利(Heather Battaly)对这些有益的澄清的帮助。