交易匹配、风险规避与中间人参与型腐败机理研究
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摘要
中间人介入腐败交易推动了腐败规模的扩张和腐败交易的集中,扭曲了公共资源的公平分配,造成更大社会不公。作为媒介腐败交易的中间人,其凭借在相关信息和知识上的技术优势以及嵌入特定社会网络的地位优势,纾解腐败交易前的交易伙伴的搜寻与匹配问题;促进腐败交易中的交易价格的达成,并为支付安全提供担保;隔离腐败交易后的长期法律和社会风险。在对腐败交易中的中间人功能机理的微观诠释基础上,将其区分为基于技术优势的腐败中间人和基于地位优势的腐败中间人,并针对前者提出三种具体的宏观治理思路。
The intervention of intermediaries into corruption transactions expands the scale of corruption,leads to the centralization of corruption,and distorts the equal distribution of resources,which worsen the social inequalities. As the middlemen of corruption transactions,intermediaries facilitate the finding and the matching of transaction partners before the transactions due to their technical advantages in relative information and knowledge,as well as their social position advantages in certain social networks. They promote the price-setting of transactions,guarantee payment securities during transactions,and isolate the long-term legal and social risks after transactions. Based on the micro-interpretation of the function mechanism of intermediaries in corruption transactions,the intermediaries are theoretically classified into intermediaries with technical advantages and intermediaries with social position advantages. Furthermore,some macroscopic governance thoughts are proposed for the former.
The intervention of intermediaries into corruption transactions expands the scale of corruption,leads to the centralization of corruption,and distorts the equal distribution of resources,which worsen the social inequalities. As the middlemen of corruption transactions,intermediaries facilitate the finding and the matching of transaction partners before the transactions due to their technical advantages in relative information and knowledge,as well as their social position advantages in certain social networks. They promote the price-setting of transactions,guarantee payment securities during transactions,and isolate the long-term legal and social risks after transactions. Based on the micro-interpretation of the function mechanism of intermediaries in corruption transactions,the intermediaries are theoretically classified into intermediaries with technical advantages and intermediaries with social position advantages. Furthermore,some macroscopic governance thoughts are proposed for the former.
引文
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[2]岳磊.“关系”视野下的中介腐败及其治理——基于丁书苗案件的个案考察[J].郑州大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2015,48(5):24-28.
[3]Hasker K,Okten C.Intermediaries and Corruptio[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2008,67(1):103-115.
[4]Bayar G.The Role of Intermediaries in Corruption[J].Public Choice,2005,122(3/4):277-298.
[5]Bose G,Gangopadhyay S.Intermediation in Corruption Markets[J].Indian Growth and Development Review,2009,2(1):39-55.
[6]Lambsdorff J G.Making Corrupt Deals:Contracting in the Shadow of the Law[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2002,48(3):221-241.
[7]Ryvkin D,Serra D.How Corruptible Are You?Bribery under Uncertainty”[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2012,81:466-477.
[8]Khanna J,Johnston M.India's Middlemen:Connecting by Corrupting?[J].Crime Law and Social Change,2007,48:151-168.
[9]Oldenburg P.Middlemen in Third-world Corruption:Implications of an Indian Case[J].World Politics,1987,39(4):508-535.
[10]Graeff P.Why should One Trust in Corruption?The Linkage between Corruption,Norms and Social Capital[M]∥Lambsdorff J G,Taube M,Schramm M.The New Institutional Economics of Corruption.London:Routledge,2005:39-58.
[11]马克斯·韦伯.经济与社会(上卷)[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997:40.
[12]Bertrand M,Djankov S,Hanna R,et al.Obtaining a Driver's License in India:an Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2007,122(4):1639-1676.
[13]Jancsics D.A Friend Gave Me a Phone Number:Brokerage in Low-level Corruption[J].International Journal of Law,Crime and Justice,2015,43(1):68-87.