试论我国股东派生诉讼制度的发展状况与完善路径
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摘要
区别于股东直接诉讼,股东派生诉讼制度产生于现代公司法制不断发展的时代。其对中小股东的权益保障,公司内部治理的监督都具有重大现实意义。当下我国股东派生诉讼制度的发展存在原告主体资格要求高、前置程序缺乏可操作性、律师费用分担不合理、双重派生诉讼问题存在法律空白等不足,应从调整原告主体资格要求、细化前置程序豁免规定、引入集团诉讼制度和增加双重派生诉讼制度立法等方面着手改进,以期完善该制度的构建和运行。
Different from the direct action of shareholders, the shareholder derivative action system generated from the continuous development of the legal system of modern corporations. It has great significance on the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and the supervision of internal governance of the company. At present, China's shareholder derivative action system still have some development disadvantages of high qualification for plaintiff, operability lacking in pre-procedures, unreasonable sharing of lawyers' fees, and legal gaps in double-derivative action, etc.. Therefore, to perfect the construction and operation of the shareholder derivative action system should take measures involving adjust the plaintiff's qualification, refine the exemption provisions of pre-procedure, introduce the group action system and increase the legislation of the double-derivative action system.
Different from the direct action of shareholders, the shareholder derivative action system generated from the continuous development of the legal system of modern corporations. It has great significance on the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and the supervision of internal governance of the company. At present, China's shareholder derivative action system still have some development disadvantages of high qualification for plaintiff, operability lacking in pre-procedures, unreasonable sharing of lawyers' fees, and legal gaps in double-derivative action, etc.. Therefore, to perfect the construction and operation of the shareholder derivative action system should take measures involving adjust the plaintiff's qualification, refine the exemption provisions of pre-procedure, introduce the group action system and increase the legislation of the double-derivative action system.
引文
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[4]许美丽.控制与从属公司(关联企业)之股东代位诉讼[J].政大法学评论,2000(63):442.
[5]翁建新.美国集团诉讼与我国代表人诉讼制度之比较[J].产业与科技论坛,2006(7):18.
[6]崔文玉.日本公司法最新修改之简述[J].河北法学,2013(31):35.
(1)江文宏诉吴金辉等公司的控股股东、实际控制人、董事、监事、高级管理人员损害公司利益赔偿纠纷案,(2008)沪二中民五(商)初字第21号.
[2]朱丹颖.中华人民共和国公司法[M].北京:中国法律出版社,2018:407.
[3]朱慈蕴.股东派生诉讼的前置程序研究——“紧急情况”之外是否存在可豁免情形[J].政法学刊,2010(3):28.
[4]许美丽.控制与从属公司(关联企业)之股东代位诉讼[J].政大法学评论,2000(63):442.
[5]翁建新.美国集团诉讼与我国代表人诉讼制度之比较[J].产业与科技论坛,2006(7):18.
[6]崔文玉.日本公司法最新修改之简述[J].河北法学,2013(31):35.
(1)江文宏诉吴金辉等公司的控股股东、实际控制人、董事、监事、高级管理人员损害公司利益赔偿纠纷案,(2008)沪二中民五(商)初字第21号.