供应链视角下食品质量安全风险调控投资研究
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摘要
食品供应链契约联盟中每一个节点企业进行食品质量安全风险调控的投资意愿,不仅受自身风险投资收益因素影响,还取决于链上其他利益关联主体的相互协同激励。以博弈论为基础构建食品供应链中供应商与制造商质量安全风险调控投资模型,研究结果表明:在一定条件下,供应商与制造商中的一方选择食品质量安全风险投资的概率是政府惩罚力度和投资补贴率的增函数,是另一方风险投入产出比和投资成本分担系数的增函数,是"搭便车"收益的减函数;风险投入产出比与投资补贴率之间具有一定的替代性,投资补贴机制对惩罚机制具有良好的补充作用;供应商质量安全风险投资的概率是风险传导治理投资协调系数的减函数,即其风险投资的概率与供应链整体质量安全风险投资的协调性正相关。
The investment willingness of every node enterprise in the food supply chain contract alliance to regulate and control the risk of food quality and safety is not only influenced by its own risk investment income factors, but also depends on the mutual synergistic incentives of other stakeholders in the chain. Based on game theory, this paper constructs an investment model for quality safety risk regulation of suppliers and manufacturers in food supply chain,the results show that: Under certain conditions, the probability of one supplier and manufacturer choosing food quality and safety risk investment is the increase function of government punishment and investment subsidy rate,is the increase function of the other side's risk input-output ratio and investment cost sharing coefficient, and is the "hitchhiker" income reduction function; There is a certain alternative between the ratio of the input-output ratio and the investment subsidy rate, and the investment subsidy mechanism has a good supplementary effect on the punishment mechanism; The probability of supplier quality and safety risk investment is the reduction function of risk conduction governance investment coordination coefficient, that is, the probability of risk investment is positively related to the coordination of quality safety risk investment of supply chain as a whole.
The investment willingness of every node enterprise in the food supply chain contract alliance to regulate and control the risk of food quality and safety is not only influenced by its own risk investment income factors, but also depends on the mutual synergistic incentives of other stakeholders in the chain. Based on game theory, this paper constructs an investment model for quality safety risk regulation of suppliers and manufacturers in food supply chain,the results show that: Under certain conditions, the probability of one supplier and manufacturer choosing food quality and safety risk investment is the increase function of government punishment and investment subsidy rate,is the increase function of the other side's risk input-output ratio and investment cost sharing coefficient, and is the "hitchhiker" income reduction function; There is a certain alternative between the ratio of the input-output ratio and the investment subsidy rate, and the investment subsidy mechanism has a good supplementary effect on the punishment mechanism; The probability of supplier quality and safety risk investment is the reduction function of risk conduction governance investment coordination coefficient, that is, the probability of risk investment is positively related to the coordination of quality safety risk investment of supply chain as a whole.
引文
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[16]李宗泰,何忠伟.基于进化博弈论的食品质量安全监管分析[J].中国农学通报,2012,28(30):312-316.
[17]李昌兵,杨宇,敬艾佳.食品供应链物流资源投入的演化博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2016(9):57-61.
[18]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):131-141.
[2]ORTEGA D L,WANGA H H,WU L P,et al.Modeling heterogeneity in consumer preferences for select food safety attributes in China[J].Food policy,2011,36(2):318-324.
[3]FARES M,ROUVIERE E.The implementation mechanisms of voluntary food safety systems[J].Food Policy,2010,35(5):412-418.
[4]李中东,张在升.食品安全规制效果及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2015(6):74-84.
[5]SONG H,CHEN K.Trade effects and compliance costs of food safety regulations:the case of China[J].Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia,2010,12(5):23-30.
[6]李亘,李向阳,刘昭阁.完善中国食品安全风险交流机制的探讨[J].管理世界,2017(1):184-185
[7]ANTLE J M.No such thing as a free safe lunch:the cost of food safety regulation in the meat industry[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2000,82(2):310-315.
[8]SINGER M,DONOSO P,TRAVERSO P.Quality strategies in supply chain alliances of disposable items[J].Omega,2003,31(6):499-509.
[9]GARTINEZ M,FEARNE A,CASWELL J A,et al.Co-regulation as a possible model for food safety governance:opportunities for publicprivate parterships[J].Food policy,2007,32(3):299-314.
[10]张文胜,王硕,安玉发,等.日本“食品交流工程”的系统结构及运行机制研究:基于对我国食品安全社会共治的思考[J].农业经济问题,2017(1):100-108.
[11]胡颖廉.国家食品安全战略基本框架[J].中国软科学,2016(9):18-27.
[12]陈梅,茅宁.不确定性、质量安全与食用农产品战略性原料投资治理模式选择:基于中国乳制品企业的调查研究[J].管理世界,2015(6):125-140.
[13]张云华,孔祥智.食品供给链中质量安全问题的博弈分析[J].中国软科学,2004(1):23-26.
[14]倪国华,郑风田.“一家两制”“纵向整合”与农产品安全:基于三个自然村的案例研究[J].中国软科学,2014(5):1-10.
[15]徐金海.政府监管与食品质量安全[J].农业经济问题,2007(11):85-90.
[16]李宗泰,何忠伟.基于进化博弈论的食品质量安全监管分析[J].中国农学通报,2012,28(30):312-316.
[17]李昌兵,杨宇,敬艾佳.食品供应链物流资源投入的演化博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2016(9):57-61.
[18]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):131-141.